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THE HIGHER DIRECFION OF COM3INED OPERATION'S IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM FRal DUNKIRK TO PEARL HARBOR 
Howard JoseT)h Thomas Steers 
This thesis examines the -relationship between the rational, 
organisational, and personal influences on the direction, at the 
higher levels, of combined (amphibious) operations in the United 
Kingdom during 1940 and 1941. It details the combined operations 
policy in effect during this neriod and the development of material 
requirements, the establishment and modification of the combined 
operations organisation, and the conduc. t of all combined operations 
for which troops were allocated. 
Prior to Dwikirk' the British bad no operational requirement 
for an amphibious assault capability, thou-gh the foundation had 
been laid, on a low priority, for assaults of up to divisional 
size. 
The changed strategic situation after Dunkirk meant that any 
offensive operations by army forces, other than in North Africa, 
would have io be amphibious in nature. The policy then outlined, 
as a supplement to the blockade, bombing, and subversion, envisaged 
the conduct of divisional-sized amphibious assaults, from the United 
Kingdom or the Middle East, against outlying areas where the enemy 
was weak. This policy, never fully developed, was expanded in 
early 1941 to encompass a corps-sized assault. Although some in- 
vestigations into the return to the Continent in force were made, 
the limited combined operations policy remained basically unchanged 
until the American entry into the war. 
A Directorate of Combined Operations was established in June 
1940 to direct raiding operations on the enemy occuT)ied coast and 
to provide advice to the Chiefs of Staff on combined operations. 
The Directorate was the cause of much controversy throughout this 
period, and was never fully integrated into the machinery for the ýirection of the war. Vague nolicies and inadequate directives, 
combined with organisational differences and r)ersonal conflicts, 
resulted in an exT)enditure of time and material resources that 
produced relatively meagre results. 
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War is an intermittent experience in the profession of arms, 
and this poses some problems unique to the calling. Peace-time 
exercises are designed to simulate the conditions of uncertainty 
and stress to the maximum extent possible, but these measures must 
necessarily fall short of the mark. The character of war changes 
markedly over time and place, and -particularly with the advance. of 
technology, thus confounding most predictions. The nature of war 
remains remarkably stable, however, based as it is on that one 
constant - man. How man acts under stress, and how he takes de- 
cisions, are things that to a great extent can-be imparted by a 
conscientious study of how these have been done in the past. It 
is on account of this that military history plays such an essential 
part in the development of the professional soldier. The first 
object of a work of military history must be, therefore, to explain 
what has transpired in the past, and why. 
There are different as, )ects to the study of military history. 
Tactical histories, the basics of the profession, are relatively 
simple, the main emphasis being on an understanding bf how men 
function under stress. Strategic histories are, in accord with the 
subject, much more complex. The higher direction of military opera- 
tions fundamentally consists of the rational allocation and efficient 
use, in an organisational context, of scarce resources - men, material, 
and time. The main emnhasis of strategic histories is the decision- 
taking process. As the number of alternatives increases, and the 
number of people involved in the process increases, so does the 
8 
complexity increase. An added complication, 
in both the taking 
and in the implementation. of the decisions, is the often disparate 
interest of the organisations involved. 
_j 
This dissertation, as the title indicates, falls into the stra- 
ýC 
tegic category. It is a study of the British organisation for com- 
bined -operations, in the narrow sense of amphibious assaults, staged 
from the United Kingdom during the period from Dunkirk to Pearl Har- 
bor. It will illustrate three main influences in the decision-taking 
process, serving thereby as a guide and as a warning to those who 
in the future partake in the formulation of strategy and force develop- 
ment. 
The first influence' , the rational, 
'is normally 'oresumed to be 
the basis for all decisions. A disDassionate study of the advantages 
and disadvantages of all relatively feasible courses of action, the 
process taught at all staff colleges, should result in a fairly clear 
choice, but this dissertation will 'ooint out many instances where this 
procedure was only a minor factor in the development of a combined 
operations policy and organisation, or in the conduct of combined 
operations. The second influence, the organisational, stems from 
the fact that decision-taRers are members of existing organisations, 
each of which has its own interests to be taken into account. The 
organisational environment thus has a major effect on the T)rocess by 
which decisions are taken and carried out. 'Me third influence, 
the individual, is Derhaps the most variable. This dissertation will 
establish that organisational and personal influences, rather than 
rational, were often the deciding factors in decisions on combined 
9 
oT)e-rations. In other situations the relative importance of these 
three influences will. vary, and. may be widely different from that 
presented bere, but the student of military bistory will profit 
berein by gaining an understanding of their inter-relationsbi-n. 
There are a number of reasons for the selection of the period. 
DunRirk saw a major change in the strategic situation of the United 
Kingdom, and posed a new Droblem of bow, with limited resources, to 
wage offensive war against the enemy. There were three main pillars 
of grand strategy - the blockade, the strategic bombing cwnnaign, 
and subversion but the military also advocated the conduct of 
combined operations in outlying areas wbere the enemy was weak. 
This concept of a long-range, limited-scale combined operation was 
to be the basis of planning through the fall of 1941. Although some 
tentative studies were made on the material requirements for a re- 
turn to the Continent, the conceDt, as evidenced by the preparation 
of papers for the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in August 1941, was 
more along the lines of a 'MODPing-upl oDeration to finish off an 
exhausted enemy. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war did 
little to change strategic planning because there was little expecta- 
tion that she would hold out for any length of time. The entry of 
the United States into the war after Pearl Harbor thus marked the 
first major change in strategic planning since Dunkirk. The full 
exoansion of American production now make larger combined oDerations, 
including a return to the Continent in force, feasible. All planning, 
however, was henceforth a combined British-American process. The 
period under study is thus distinctive, the 'British Warl in its own 
right. 
1. Graham T. Allison, in his Essence of Decision-Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Boston,, 1971), has ýYrovided three sophisticated- 
models of policy-making which are very similar to the influences 
detailed above. 
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During this period a Directorate of Combined Operations was 
established, with both a Taiding. -role and an advisory -role on com- 
bined operations. This was a time of relative confusion and dispute, 
in which organisational and individual influences were most Pronounced. 
The Problems encountered with -raiding policy caused the Directorate 
to become more and more involved witb combined operations, with the 
directive establishing the organisation being modified constantly in 
an attempt to provide a workable system. This period virtually 
coincided with the tenure of one Director of Combined Operations, 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes. It was with his replacement by 
Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten, and wi fh thechange in the directive 
for the last time, that the Directorate of Combined Operations achieved 
the form that would carry it through to the Normandy invasion. 
This dissertation, rather than giving a summary of all of the 
activities of the Directorate of Combined Operations, concentrates 
on three areas: ýhe overall combined operations policy and material 
requirements, the organisational development of the Directorate, and 
all the combined operations during the period for which forces were 
actually assigned. These three areas fully detail the higher direc- 
tion of combined operations, the decision-taRing process by which 
resourceswereallocated and used. There are several related aspects 
of combined operations, listed below, that are not included, both 
because of space limitations and because they are not central to the 
thesis, Combined operations, for example, were also considered by 
theatre commands, but this was a separate process. Projected opera- 
tions which did not entail the assignment of forces, of which there 
11 
were a number, tool-, up a considerable amount of planning time, but 
were speculative matters of a different nature. Raiding operations, 
which comprised virtually all the operations actually conducted, 
were a major interest of the combined operations organisation, but 
2 
were of a fundamentally lower order. Training and material develop- 
ment are also topics of a similar category. 
As organisations and forces do not simply sT)ring out of the air, 
the dissertation will first examine the elements existing at the 
start of the -period which went into the making of a combined opera- 
tions policy. Combined operations policy and material reouirements, 
which are closely inter-related, will then be-detailed. The develoD- 
ment of the )combined ODerations organisation will next be covered, 
including the changes in personnel and directives. The manner in 
which all combined operations for which troops were detailed were 
planned will be the last area examined. 
The study has been made primarily through the records written 
at the time. Although these may be an imperfect -reflection of the 
thoughts and discussions of those involved, in a bureaucratic sense 
the memoranda and minutes are the histo-ry, for it was these -pieces 
of paper which produced action within the service machinery. The 
number of secondary sources that comment on the organisational 
aspect of combined operations is extremely small, and these sources 
often T)rove unreliable. The latter is also true of the memories of 
those individuals involved in the organisation who are still living. 
2. For an account of raiding forces and operations during this period, 
see CPT H. J. Steers, Raiding the Continent: The Origins of British 
Special Service Forces, I-MAS, U. S. Army Command & General Staff 
College, Fort Leavenworth, 1980. 
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GIAJIFER I 
COM31NED OPERAXIONIS PRIOR TO DUNKIRK 
Amphibious operations, traditionally considered a British 
specialty, had in reality been a neglected subject before the out- 
break of the Second World War. The strategic planners, prior to 
the war, could conceive of no contingency in which a major opposed 
landing would be required, and the Air Ministry, in particular, 
doubted that, with the advent of airpower, such operations would 
even be feasible. That perennial bugbear of British defence policy, 
the shortage of funds, also lent weight to the arguments that any 
forces dedicated to combined operations. would be uneconomic. 
A modicum of work had nevertheless been carried out in regard 
to combined operations, and it was to prove just enough to give the 
British the basis for an amphibious capability at the time when it 
would really be needed. A Manual on Combined Operations had been 
published in 192S, and had been twice updated. The outlines of 
a doctrine had been sketched out by an Inter-Services Training and 
Development Centre (ISTDC) founded at Eastney on IS September 1938. 
This Centre was commanded by Captain L. E. H. Maund, RN, and had on 
its staff Major M. W. M. MacLeod, Royal Artillery, two men who 
would be closely associatedivith the development of the amphibious 
3 
capability throughout the early war period. The ISTDC had devel- 
oped designs for an Assault Landing Craft (ALC), a small armoured 
2 
1. L. E. H. Maund, Assault from the Sea (London 1949). pp. 3-4 and 
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, Combined Onerations Organisa- 
tion 1940-194S (London 1956), p. 9. 
2. DCOS(IT) 2 Mtg 7 Jul 38, CAB 13/12 and I5COS(IT) 9 'Memorandum- 
Instructions for Training and Development Centre' 20 Jul 38, 
CkB S4/13. 
3. Maund, P. 7. The early ýays of the ISTDC are well covered in 
this book. - 
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craft capable qf carrying 36 soldiers, a Support Landing Craft 
(SLC), basically an ALC modified with machine guns and mortars for 
smoke bombs, and a 114otor Landing Craft Q-1Q.. ' capable of carrying 
a 14-ton tank. Merchant shipping of the Glen class bad been identi- 
fied as suitable for conversion to carriers for the ALC and SLC, and 
some L. N. E. R. railway ferries were considered for conversion to MC 
carriers. 
The ISTDC reported to the DeDUty Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee 
(DCOS), through the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on Inter- 
Service Training (DCOS(IT)), composed of'the Assistant Chief of 
Naval Staff (ACNS), the Director of Military 02erations and Intelli- 
gence (910&1), and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff (DCAS). The DCOS 
(IT) bad requested, on 28 I-larch 1939, that the ISTDC report on the 
4 
material and time required to mount a combined operation. Maund 
replied on 11 Iby 1939 that a brigade assault would require 26 ALC, 
4 SLC, and 18 MLC., which could be constructed in four months if given 
priority status. The conversion of the shipping would take six months, 
though this could be cut in half if the davits required were nro- 
cured beforehand. 
The DCOS(IT) thought that this neriod was too long, taking the 
5 
matter up with the DCOS. Although there were still no combined 
operations in the war T)Ians, the DCOS noted that the Turks, with 
whom the British might be allied in the event of war, were consider- 
ing an operation against the Dodecanese. The DCOS therefore thought 
that it would only be prudent to take some reasonable precautions, 
4. DCOS(IT) 6 Mtg 28 Mar 39, CAB S4/12. 
S. DCOS(IT) 7 ýJtg 11 May 39, CAB 54/12. 
14 
and approved, on 10 July 1939, the construction of IS ALC, 2 SLC, 
and 12 MLC. Thd remainder of the ALC and SLC could be constructed 
when an operation was decided upon, and 6 old MLC, ordered at the 
time of the Abyssinian crisis and delivered in 1938, would complete 
6. 
the brigade packet. -This would not reduce the time required to 
mount an operation, a fact recognised by the DCOS on 10 August 
7 
1939 Mien they agreed to procure the davits. The policy was thus 
set that the British should be caDable of mounting a brigade-sized 
oDeration on three months' notice. 
The material actually on band at the outbreak of the war was 
rather meagre. A total of 9 old MLý and 23 horse barges were in the 
United Kingdom, with a further 2 horse barges at Malta. Two Droto- 
type ALC were undergoing trials and the prototype of the ISTDC's 
MLC was under construction. No troops had yet been trained, or even 
earmarked, for amphibious oDerations. A Royal Marine Brigade of 
four battalions had been pronosed by the Committee set up under 
Admiral Sir Charles Madden in 1923 to determine the function of the 
Royal Marine Corps, created that year by the amalgamation of the 
Royal 111arine Light Infantry and Royal ý. tarine Artillery, but financial 
stringencies had prevented any implementation of the Committee's 
8 
recommendation. Aside from the Dodecanese, combined onerations 
seem imProbable, and no contingency -plans had been prepared. There 
was nothing that could be described as a combined onerations 
6. DCOS(1T) 3S 'The-Situation as Regards Material and Pe-sonnel 
for Landing Attacks' 30 Jun 39, CAB S4/13 and DCOS 49 'Mtg 10 
Jul 39, CAB 54/2.1 
7. DCOS 48 Mtg 10 Aug 39, CAB 54/2. 
8. The Background of the Algamation is covered in K. J. Clifford's 
unDublished manuscript On Parallel Courses - An Analysis of 
British and American Amphibious (Combinea)- Onerations 1920-194S 
im. 13-38 
is 
organisation. All this, considering the military situation on 
the Continent, was perfectly acceptable at that time. 
The outbreak of the war lent little urgency to the preparations 
for combined operations. Despite a ruling in June 1939 that the 
exT)erience of the staff of the ISTDC should be used in the planning 
sections of their service departments, the improbability of any 
combined operation resulted in all excent MacLeod being sent off on 
other duties. The War Office could find no suitable nost for Mac- 
Leod, so he continued to carry out the ISTDC programme. At a DCOS C, 
meeting on 19 September 1939, the DCNS agreed to -return Maund to the 
9 
ISTDC as soon as his other duties were completed. This was soon 
forgotten, and it was not until 15 December 1939 that the status 
of the ISTDC was formally reviewed. The DCOS(IT) then agreed that, 
rather than having the staff of the Centre disnersed to the -Dlanning 
sections of their respective service departments, the ISTDC should 
continue in being. The Admiralty was again requested to return 
Maund. The RAF, never much concerned with amphibious warfare, ob- 
tained agreement that a nermanent RNF officer was not required at 
the ISTDC. It promised to mak-e arrangements, however, for an 
officer from a nearby headquarters to be 'affiliated' to the 
10 
Centre. 
The ISTDC had issued a situation Tenort on 10 Sentember 1939. 
Plans for the operations against the Dodecanese, on vAhich the ISTDC 
had been tasked to assist, had been sent to the vlanning staffs, 
but no new tasks had been assigned. The ISTDC proDosed setting un 
one-week courses for officers from the three senices. Trials 
with the new equiment were continuing, but a nroblem first broached 
Maund, pp.. -2-0--23 and DCOS(39) 6 Mtg 19 Sen 39, CIAB 82/1. 
10. DCOS(JT)(39) I Mtg 15 Dec 39, CIAB 82/22. 
16 
by Maund in March 1939 had not been resolved. Mien the ISTDC 
had first been e5tablished, as an experimental Centre, no thought 
had been given to an organisation for landing craft. The assunp- 
tion aparently was that they would be organic to their carrier 
shins. There was nm a considerable amount of equipment on hand at 
the ISTDC, and'with the arrival of the landing craft ordered for 
the first 'packet', the question of accommodation and maintenance 
would become urgent. The craft would either have to be dispersed 
among the naval dockyards or would have to be stored in civilian 
facilities. The ISTDC thought that it would be more economic and 
efficient to keen them at one centre. It also wanted to retain con- 
trol of the landing craft, a feasible action considering the numbers 
involved. With the a-pT)Yoval of the ACNS on 24 October 1939, the 
Admiralty started negotiating with civilian dockyards near the ISTDC, 
though it did not consider the establishflent of a nermanent base 
11 
either necessary or desirable at the time. 
The general utility of the ALC was soon recognised by the 
ISTDC, which noted on 20 November 1939 that, in spite of the orders 
12 
placed, there would never really be enough of them. By early 
December the inability of the builders to deliver the landing craft 
on schedule, a major and constantly recurring problem, was becoming 
nainfully evident. The initial nroblem centered around the T)rovision 
of armour nlate, and the builders sugeested that an even greater delay 
might be avoided if the remaining craft of the brigade 'pacRet' were 
ordered immediately, before the sub-contractors si.. itched to other work. 
11. DCOS(IT)(39) 8 'Note bv Secretarv on ISTDC Situation Report 
of 10 SeT) 391 28 Oct 39, CIAB 82/22: 
DCOS(IT)(39) 4 'Report byISTDC' 16 Oct 39; and DCOS(IT)(39) 
7 ".. emorandum by ACNSI 24 Oci 39, CAB 82/22. 
12. DCOS(IT)(39) 12 'Memorandum bv Commandant ISTDC: Assaulting 
Landing Craft' 20 Nov 39, C_kB 82/22. 
17 
The delivery of the 18 ALC already on order would tale place frgm 
MLC f rom March February until the end of, M? ýy 1940, and that of the Ix. 
13 
until July 1940, 
About the beginning of December 1939 the DNC renorted to the 
Admiralty that the conversion of the L, N, E, R, ferries appeared to be 
feasible. This and most of the matters noted above were considered 
by the DCOS(IT) at their first wartime meetinla, on 15 December 1939. 
'Mey did little more than to review the ISTDCs progress in various 
areas, 'Me main results of the meeting were the formalisation of 
the ISTDC's status, a renUest to the Admiraltv to T)reT)are plans for the 
conversion of the L. N. E. P. ferries, and the recommendation to the 
DCOS that orders be placed for the remainder of the brigade 'packet', 
8 ALC and 2 SLC. The committee also noted the investigation into 
14 
the i)yoblem of landing craft storage and maintenance. 
The first steps had also been taRen to nrovide a body of troops N 
for the combined operations. In late SeT)tember 1939 the Adjutant 
General Royal Marines (AGRM) , Lieutenant General A. G. B. Bourne, 
nroduced a T)aper recommending the formation of a Royal Ilarine Brigade 
of three battalions, along the lines of Admiral Madden's original 
proposal. This was apT)roved on 19 October, but the actual formation 
of the brigade would take some considerable time. The Royal Marines 
had started the war at a strength of 12,390, with only 1,082 more 
men in the Royal Fleet 'Reserve, and the entire Corps was almost whollN 
committed to sea-going reouirements. The Royal ýIarines were also 
forming a Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (IINIBDO) , which had 
13. UC-OS(-IT-ý-(39) 15 'Report bý ISTDC: Dates of Completion of 
Landing Craft' 14 Dec 39, CAB ')2/22. 
14. DCOS(IT)(39) 1 'Mto 15 Dec 39, CkB S2/22. C, 
priority over the requirements of the nev., bri, (,,,, ade. The brigade, 
including the off, icers, would consequently have to be formed from 
., and scratch. 
Bourne interviewed each officer candidate i)ersonallv 
the officer training started on I December 1939. The full brigade 
was not scheduled to be combat-ready until the end of June 1940. 
After the formation of the brigade had been decided unon, the new 
commander, Brigadier A. C. St. Clair'Morford, and his key commanders 
and staff officers met at Eastney for a conference. The function of 
the brigade was seen as raiding, in operations involving the entire 
brigade. The recommendation was therefore made that a fourth 
battalion was reo. uired to secure the beach while the other three 
operated inland. The First Lord, Churchill, apDroved this and by 
December 1940 a fourth battalion was added. The battalions them- 
selves were also slia ,,, 
btly enlarged, the total strength of the I 
brigade being finally set at 113 officers and 2,545 other ranks, 
is 
with a ten Dercent resenre. 
The first formal principles for the employment of the brigade 
were framed by Rear Admiral T. S. V. Phillips, the DCNS, in a memoran- 
dum on 22 December 1940. He made the distinction between a large 
scale combined operation on the lines of Tanga or Galli-noli, with 
the extensive preparation time required, and limited raiding operations 
carried out at night on selected -points along the enemy coast. While 
the former might or might not take place, the latter was something 
for which pre-narations should be undertaken immediately. The Royal 
Marine Brigade would be the ideal standing force for such raids, and 
the equipment needed for this -role would not conflict with the re- 
quirements of the other sen, ices. Phillips made the significant 
is. Intervie-wwith General Sir A-. G. 9--. 1ý-0--urne K-C-B--D-)S-O- WO' 4 Au, 9 
42, DEFE 2/699; 'Provisional War Establishment of R'M Brigade' 
15 Dec 39, M! 1/10334; Interviei.., with Maj. Gen. J. L. Moulton 
by Author 10 Nov 78. 
18 
19 
point that the brigade should not be strictly an AcbTiiralty resnonsi- I- 
bility. It should be closely associated with the ISTDC and, although 
the administration would remain with the Admiralty, the general 
16 
development of the brigade should be fostered by the DCOS. The War 
Office supported. this concept, although it foresaw an additional role 
for the brigade as a nucleus to assist in the training of army units 
iýhlch might be made available for combined operations. With this 
eventual participation of army units in mind, it also thought that 
special material might be provided on a larger scale than previously 
envisaged. Sufficient material for a two-brigade landing was a 
reasonable figure, as this would constitute the assault force of a 
17 
division. Many of the underlying concepts of the later resnonsi- 
bilities of the combined o-Derations organisation are readily awarent 
in these pro-nosals. 
Strengthened by this Joint baching, the pronosals were considered 
by the DCOS on 3 January 1940. The DCO-S thought that an organisation 
such as the Royal Marine Brigade, which could be used at comparatively 
short notice 'for any suitable operation which might be projected', 
would be 'of great value I. They agreed that the close association 
of the brigade with the ISTDC would be a great assistance in its 
training and in the development of its equinment, and that such 
matters 5bould come under the supervision of the DCOS(IT). The DCOS 
were aware that the landing craft on order were Dot being produced 
as quicRly as bad been hoped, and that the DCOS(IT) were nren. aring a 
recommendation, then awaiting detailed costing, that the remainder of 
the craft for the brigade '-nacRet' be ordered. The DCOS(IT) were 
instructed to determine if there was any nossibility of accelerating 
the production of the craft ordered, and were also to consider the 
II-L 
16. DCOS-(39) 67 1 ensive Onerations' 22 Dec 39, CAB 82/4. 
17. WO Brief on DCOS(39) 67 2 Jan 40, WO 193/378. 
20 
desirability of ordering Iforthwith' enough landing craft to enable 
18 
an oT)eration to be undertaken by two brigades simultaneously. 
By 26 January 1940 the ISTDC had reported that it was not Possible 
to hasten the construction of the craft. If the remaining craft of 
the first brigade 'packet' were oydeyed then, or in the near Wtuye, 
they could be ready by August 1940. If a second 'Paclet' was ordered 
at the same time its ALC and SLC would be ready by October 1940. and 
19 
its MLC by December 1940. On 30 January 1940 the secretary of the 
DCOS(IT) was s-nuyyed to action. Each day's delay would cause a 
corresponding delay in delivery. If the'DCOS waited for the DCOS(IT) 
fonTr. 1-YepoYt further delays would ensue, and., as the DCOS(IT) had 
agreed at their meeting over six weeks before that the remainder of 
the first packet should be ordered, the secretary brought the matter 
up directly with the DCOS at their meeting of 1 February 1940. The 
DCOS accepted this irregular Drocedure, and decided to order the 
8 ALC and 2 SLC, so that the nre-way Drinciple of three months lead 
time could be adhered to. As it was, the services would not be pre- 
20 
pared for an oneration before August 1940. 
The DCOS(IT) held their first, and only, meeting of 1940 on 
I February, immediately after the DCOS meeting. The DCOS(IT), in 
regard to the question of a second brigade T)aclet, felt unable to 
maRe any recommendation on strategic grounds, as this was an area 
outside their competence. It was noted that the original InacRet' 
f 
18. DCOS(40) 1 Mtg 3 Jan 40, CAB 82/2 and DCOS(IT)(40) 1 'Prepara- 
tions for a Sea-Borne Exnedition' S Jan 40, CAB 82/23. 
19. DCOS(IT)(40) 8 'Prenarations for a Sea-Borne Ex-nedition' 26 
Jan 40, CAB 82/23. 
20. DCOS(IT)(40) 10 'Prenarations for a Sea-Borne ExT)edition' 30 
Jan 40, CAB K. 13; DCOS(40) 17 Note by Secretary 30 Jan 40, 2/ý 
GAB 82/5; and DCOS(40) 4 ýItg I Feb 40 CAB 82/2. Cý I 
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was only sufficient for a lift of two battalions, with no T)rov isi on 
for a reserve force or replacements for casualties among the craft. 
In addition St. Clair-Morford had since expressed his opinion that 
there might be times when all four of his battalions would have to be 
in the craft simultaneously. The DCOS(IT) therefore thought it 
advisable, as a minumum, to order the ALC and SLC for an additional 
two battalions, so that the full employment of the Royal Marine 
Brigade would be possible. No extra MLC would be needed for the 
Royal Marines, though this would not be the case if a lift of four 
battalions of two army brigades, as -Dart of a division assault, was 
contemplated. They thought that it might be useful to order the 
additional 18 MC, as-they took a long time to build and future 
events could not be foretold, but there weye considerations affect- 
ing such a decision that were, again, outside the sphere of the 
DCOS(IT). These recommendations were sent to the DCOS ON 10 Feb- 
ruary 1940 in the form of a renort on the pre-parations for a sea- 
borne expedition. After August the possibility of a combined opera- 
tion by one brigade would exist. The limiting factor would then be 
the conversion of the shipping, which could be done in three months. 
21 
The pre-war principle could thus be adhered to. The YeT)ort was 
considered on 14 February 1940 by the DCOS. Since the necessity for 
a two-brigade landing might apparently arise at any time from the 
spring on, the DCOS aD roved the order of a comnlete 'packet' for a p 
second brigade, i. e. 26 ALC, 4 SLC, and 18 ýUC. Iliere was. little 
discussion on the subject, and no indication where the IDCOS thought 22 
a combined operation likely. Nevertheless, a major sten had been 
2 DCW-TT(- I IS 1 40 1 Mtg I Feb 40, C_kB 82/23 and DCOS(40) 24 'Prepara- 
tions for a Sea-Borne Expedition' 10 Feb 40, CAB 82/5. 
22 DCOS (40) 8 Mtg 14 Feb 40, GAB 82/2 and DCOS (1T) (40) 23 'Memoran- 
dum by ACNSI 27 Apr 40, CIAB 82/23. 
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tal, en. 
The I STDC, -after the second - 'brigade paclet' was approved, was 
faced with a marked exnansion of its landing craft fleet. On 15 
February 1940 it therefore raised again the questions of the accomoda- 
tion and maintenance of the craft. It maintained that a complete 
landing craft base was urgently needed, with suitable beaches and 
good tactical training areas, accomodation for equiment, crews, and 
troops in training, anchorage for craft, and accessibility to mili- 
tary commands. Hayling Island, with its holiday camT) at Northney, 
filled all of the requirements. It was T)ronosed that a base be 
established there under a Commander RNT, with 8 officers and 289 
-ratings. These would include nermanent crews for 30 ALC and SLC 
and 8 MLC, with coxwains and maintenance nersonnel for the others. 
The remaining crew members, it was rather ontimistically assumed, 
could be trained once an oneration was decided upon. The MLC, for 
example, could be commissioned 6 weeks Drior to the actual date of 
the operation. The inconsistency of this idea with a principle 
espoused in the same paper, that the landing craft crews must be a 
corps d'elite similar to the assault troops, was not -remarked upon. 
'Phe base commander would -receive direction from the ISTDC. The 
ISTDC asked for a target date of I May 1940 for the 'requisition of 
23 
the areas and the completion of the work necessary. No mention of 
an organisation for the operational emplo)nent of the craft was made 
in this Daner, though Haund nut fon-ýard the idea of 9 -ýooll in a 
memorandum of 23 March 1940. This memorandum also brought to light, 
the problems of the bureaucracy of the neriod. Although the DCOS had 
23. WO-S(IT)(40) 14 'Provision for Accommodation and Permanent Crews 
for Landing Craft and Other Materiall 15 Mar 40, CAB 82/23. 
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urgently decided to order a second 'paclet' on 14 February, by 23 
March 1940 the. Tyeasury bad not signed a contract udtb the builders. 
The intention of maintaining the landing craft and troops as 
a standing force was soon to conflict with that constant plague of 
planners, the diversion of the craft to other uses. A new allocation 
of landing craft to the Royal Marine battalions now had to be made, 
owing to the somewhat belated realisation of the ISTDC that the Royal 
Marine battalions contained a higher proportion of combat troops 
that similar army units. This was academic if all the landing craft 
were held in a pool, but the first of man), other demands for the craft 
had already been received. Some MC wer& requested for the Mediter- 
ranean, and a further group was to go to the Royal Marine Mobile Naval 
Base Defence Organisation. Should such a dis-persal of the pool take 
T place the capability for combined operations would be seriously im- 
24 
-paired. 
This question of landing craft allocation was considered by the 
DCOS on 27 March 1940. The concept of the pool was formally accented, 
and it was agreed that other requests should be regarded as separate 
commitments. If any diversion of craft from the nool was urgently 
required re-olacements for them should be nrocured. Strangely, no 
other landing craft were ordered for these other commitments until 
much later. This well-intentioned decision itself served to cause 
-Droblems later, as it had the rather unfortunate effect of -oroducing 
a piecemeal aDDroach to the planning of overall future requirements for 
craft. When coupled with the constant delays in production, this 1%-ýs 
25 
to have a detrimental effect on both training and onerations to 1941. 
24. DCOS(40) 46 'Note by Secretary: Allocation of Landing Craft' 23 
Mar 40, CM 82/S. 
2S. DCOS(40) 14 Mtg 27 'far 40, CAB 82/2. -1 
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The ISTDC was still working on the conversion of merchantmen. 
The four Glen class shiT)s, eamArled before the war as the most 
suitable, bad been talen un and converted for use as suT)T)ly ships 
for Operation UMERINT, the nassage of a naval force into the Baltic. 
On 9 March 1940 the ISTDC noted that four shins of the Dunnottar 
26 
Castle class had been chosen for conversion. After CATHERINIE was 
cancelled, further discussions were held with the DNC and the Board 
of Trade, and on 22 Ay, )ril 1940 the ISTDC reDorted that the Glen class 
ships had once again been eaymarked. These shins could not use their 
original davits, and so the 30 on order could be used to fit only 
two ships with 12 each, leaving 6 for pekbaps a third shin of the class. 
Besides the 12 ALC, each ship could carry I MLC, which would be hoisted 
out by a derrick. The remaining half of the ALC and SLC would have 
to iuýe carried by large liners, of which 17 were considered suitable. 
Of these 7 could also boist a MC. The remaining MLC could nrobably 
be carried by 3 L. N. E. R. ferries, each of which if converted could 
carry 14 MC. Experiments on the feasibility of this conversion had 
been T)ostponed, as the only MLC available had been sent off to Nonqay. 
As the Royal Marine Brigade vould -reach the advanced training stage 
by September 1940, the conversion of at least one Glen shin and one 
L. N. E. R. ferry was urged so that training could be conducted with 
assault shipging. Once an operation was decided upon the other con- 
27 
versions could be accomplished and the appronriate, liners taRen un. 
The ISTDC memorandum also noted that 4 ALC, 1 new MLC and S of 
1. 
26. DCOS(IT)(40) 18 'Note by SecTetary: Davits for'Assault Landing 
Craft' 9 Mar 40, CAB 82ý23. 
27. DCOS(IT)(40) 22 'Memorandum by ISTDC: Proposals for Carrying 
and Launching Landing Craft' 22 Apr 40, CýB 82/23. 
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the old ',, 'LC had been talen from the pool for use in Nonýay, and, 
in accordance with the DCOS decision on the pool, it renuested that 
replacement craft be ordered. By 13 May 1940 no action had been taRen 
on these recommendations. The actions in Non.., ay had shoi%n the great 
utility of the landing craft, but there were further nroduction diffi- 
culties. The davits were being completed faster than exnected, but 
it was found that the sub-contractors for the landing craft did not 
have -Driority for Admiralty work. The T)rimary contractors had only 
been given -Driority on the first IT)acket', and the second 'pacl, -, et' 
had no priority at all. Thorneycroft had determined that if they could 
modifv the original MLC design, eliminating the armoured deck and using 
American engines, the MLC could be nroduced at a faster rate. The 
ISTDC consequently recommended that nriority be given to all the land- 
ing craft on order. It urged again that the landing craft sent to 
Nonýay be replaced, and in view of the proven utility of the MLC it 
suggested that an addition 24 of the modified N1LC be ordered. In 
addition to this, the conversion of 2 Glen ships should begin at 
28 
once, and a liner be made available for trials in carrying an ALC. 
This memorandum took some time to be digested at the Admiralty, 
and it was not until I June 1940 that the ACNIS stated their position. 
This, of course, reflected the crisis in France; Britain was in 
imminent danger, and it was vital to 'guard against dissipating the 
limited productive cai)acityl on requirements that were not essential 
to the ijTnediate war effort. The interference of allocated priorities 
28 DCOS(IT)(40) 25 I'lllemorandum by ISTDC, 13 May 40, CAB 82/23. 
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would furtbermore lead to a dislocation of all prolgrmunes, and could 
not be justified 'unless some very definite oneration involving the 
use of a large number of landing craft, was envisaged in the near 
future. The Admiralty could not therefore agree to either a change in 
29 
priorities or to additional orders. 
MacLeod replied to this the following day. Realising the validi- 
ty of the Admiralty's position, he asked that the construction of 
landing craft nevertheless be continued as actively as -nossible. The 
Germans had made the most of surprise and unorthodox methods, and 
the -possession of landing craft by the United Kingdom would enable it 
to do likewise with its seapower, by stril<ing at a critical moment 
at unexnected and vulnerable points in the enemy's defences. MacLeod 
emphasised the suitability of landing craft for cross-Channel raids. 
With these ideas in mind he revised the nrevious programme suggested 
by the ISTDC. He proposed that the ALC and SLC programme should pro- 
ceed a. s at Dresent, though 5 ALC should be added to replace Dunkirk 
losses. The 4 MLC then in Nonýay sbould be returned to enable the 
Royal Marine Brigade to train. It was still considered that the 
additional 24 MC would not greatly interfere with other production. 
Although the conversions of the Glen shins and the L. N. E. R. ferry 
would have to be reviewed the trials with the liner should procced. 
30 
This Proposal went unanswered, and further action would be held in 
abeyance pending the establishment of the new combined operations 
organisation. 
Throughout the beginning of 1940 the War Office, faced with itý 
29. DCOS(IT)(40) 28 'Memorandum by ACNS(T): Production and UTriýoritv 
of Construction of Landing Craft' I Jun 40, C-kB 82/23. 
30. DCOS(IT)(40) 29 'Memorandum by ISTDC: Landing Craft' 2 Jun 40, 
C, kB S21/23. 
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involvement iJI the formation of the Royal Marine Brigade and with 
the possibility c; f employing un -to two army 
brigades in combined 
ODerati ons, attempted to establish nolicies concerning resnonsibili- 
ties and missions. The formation of the Royal Marine Brigade was 
causing some problems. There had apparently been a lack of comfluni- 
cation between the Admiralty and the 11, ar Office on it. As late as 
February 1940 the War Office uas still iLnsure of its organisation, 
the composition of its personnel, and its availability for roles 
other than combined operations, all of which had a bearing on the 
equir)ment the War Office would have to nrovide for the brigade. 
The War Office view was that, if the brigade was comnosed of new 
recruits, the limited enuipment available would be better used if 
given to the nearly fully trained territorial divisions; if the 
brigade was composed of mainly regulars or reservists it would, 
of course, be another matter. The questions was also nosed as to why 
the full scale of war equipment was desired by 1 July, if the landing 
31 
craft were not to be ready until the end of August. 
St. Clair-Morford met some representatives of the War Office on 
1 March 1940 to resolve some of these Droblems. During this meeting 
he listed the functions of the brigade. The nrimary function was 
to raid the enemy coast - 'tip and run' affairs of a few hours, 
rather than days, followed by combined oT)erations and co-o. neration 
with field army, in that order. As the brigade was to be organised 
and trained for its T)rimary function it would carry nothing that 
1940 on Royal 
Marine Brigade' 29 Feb 40, WO 193/378. - 
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could not fit into an ALC, Further equiprient and training would be 
required before it would be able to undertaRe any other type of oPera- 
tion. The Brigade would be ready, as scheduled, by 1 August, though 
an additional month for training would be desirable. July was thus 
a realistic date for the provision of equipment, as the brigade could 
be 'crashed ashore' without the use of landing craft in an emergency. 
This meeting is well illustrative of the problems of communication 
encountered during this period where inter-senrice co-oneration for 
32 
combined operations was concerned. 
Such an emergency operation was to take place earlier than 
exT)ected, for the German occupation Of Norway on 9 April caused the 
War Cabinet to look to the safety of Iceland and the Faeroes. The 
Faeroes were occupied on 13 April 1940, aT)r)arently by ships! detach- 
ments of Royal I'larines. They were relieved by army troops on 23 May 
1940. The War Cabinet did not decide to occupy Iceland until 6 I-lay 
1940. A reinforced battalion, 2nd Battalion, Royal Marines, from 
the Royal Marine Brigade was hurriedly loaded onto two cruisers at 
Greenock, and sailed for Iceland on 8 May 1940. The force landed 
unopposed 'at Reykjavik on 10 May 1940, so swiftly that the German 
Consulate was seized before any papers could be destroyed. Ten days 
33 
later the Royal 'Marines were relieved by a Canadian army brigade. 
Although these first operations were successful, from a -Dl, --inning T)Oint 
of view they could 'only be described as disastrous'. Mien the ques- 
tion of occupying Iceland was raised the Foreign Office sought the 
Opinion of the three service departments sei)arately, rather than going 
r 40, ! '. '0 193/378. 
33. Cantain S. W. Roskill RNI, The War at Sea, Vol I (London 19S4), 
p. 34S; J. R. R. Butler, GranT5trategy, Vol 11 (London 1957), 
n. 128; and Colonel K. J. Clifford, The U. S. ý'arines in Iceland 
1941-1942 (Washington 1970), -n. 1 
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to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) or the Joint Planning Sub- 
Committee (JPSC). The Admiralty unilaterally vorl,. -ed out a plan and 
started embarking the Royal Marines. The formal nroposal was given 
to the War Cabinet by the Admiralty on 6 May 1940, who then approved 
it and referred it to the JPSC. The Air Staff Director of Plans, 
Air Commodore J. C. Slessor, supported by others, thought the plan 
i)resented was 'a thoroughly bad one' and the force allotted 'quite 
inadequate for its taks'. As the troops were already embarking and 
the plan had been disseminated there was very little that could be 
done about it. Slessor could only remonstrate to the WAS about the 
'totally unsound and dangerous' Drocedure that had been used. The 
matter was raised with the other service departments by the VUS, and 
T)romises were made that there would be more consultation in the fu- 
34 
ture. 
The opening of the Non, 7egian threatre of war had a number of 
effects on the ISTDC. Maund was immediately whisRed away to be the 
chief of staff to the naval commander for the assault on Narvik, 
while MacLeod became deeply involved in the Dreparations for HMMER, 
an assault on Trondheim. All the available landing craft -4 ALC and 
35 
6 MLC - were sent off with the expedition to Narvik. An opposed 
landing, from shiT) to shore, was made at Bjerkvik on 12-13 May 1940. 
A total of 4 ALC and 3 MLC were actually used in this assault, which 
also included the landing of tanks. This was to be used as a strong 
arg-ument for the feasibility of opposed landings, and was to provide 
some small 'lessons learned'. The arrangements bad been a local 
responsibility, however, and the service machinery in the United 4- 
Kingdom had not really been involved. It was -rather ironic, too, 
that in spite of the War Office's i)ast interestin combined onerations, 
34. Slessor to WAS 7 'May 40, Slessor PaT)ers I J. As the Committee 
of Imperial Defence was defLmct the COS was no longer a sub- 
committee. The JPSC is the old JPC. 
35. Maund, n. 24 and 37. 
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this first actual assault landing of the war was carried out not by 
British troons,. but by elements of the 13eme Demi-Brigade of the 
French Foreign Legion, at the instigation of the French general 
directing land onerations in the Narvik area. A further opnosed 
landing, using 3 ALC and 2 IILC for a shore-to-sbore movement, was 
carried out by the same legionaires on 28 May to canture Narvik 
36 
itself. During the later withdrawal from Non, ýay all the surviving 
landing craft, 3 ALC and 1 MC) were lost during an attempt to tow 
them back to the United Kingdom. 
Planning co-ordination in the United Kingdom for the combined 
operations as-nect of the Norwegian campaign had been no more efficient 
than that for the later Tceland occupation. The rank structure be- 
tween the army and navy was unbalanced, the naval commander i%, as only 
given verbal instructions, and the army commander was given written 
instructions that did not conform to the naval commander's. The 
two commanders neither nlanned nor made the journey to Nonýay together 
in the same shii). This aspect of the campaign is well covered by the I Cl 
major histories. Maund was later to note that 'most of the principles 
governing command which had stood in the Combined Onerations ýIanual 
for so many years had been broken', and that 'it would have been a 
miracle, -personalities aside, if such a scheme of command had worRed 
37 
harmoniously'. 
After his experience with Operation MMMER, MacLeod submitted on 
10 May 1940 a recommendation for the establishment of a strategic 
36. See Maund-for the best account of these landings, Buckley gives 
them in outline, and Roskill omits even the date of the first 
assault. 
37. Maund, pp. 29-30. 
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reserve of one division for combined oncrations. 'Me time required 
to T)rcpare an qxPedition would thus be reduced, and future Gen-, qan 
initiatives such as those in Norway more readily countered. The size 
of this reserve was based on the number of landing craft on order, i. e., 
sufficient for a two brigade assault. MacLeod suggested that the 
division might be formed from the Royal Marine Brigade, the 184th 
Infantry Brigade, which had already been associated with the ISTDC 
on certain matters, and a third infantry brigade, with the addition of 
a regiment of 3.7" howitzers, the only type of artillery that would 
38 
fit into a landing craft. The War Office did pot fully agree with 
this scheme. MO I thouaht it excellent. in theory, but there were so 
many prior commitments for the limited resources available that it 
would be impossible to put it into effect for some time to come. In 
particular it would interfere with the movement of the third contingent 
to France. 'flie o-pinion of 11,10 2 was similar, though it thought that 
it might be preferable to build up a new division staff rather than, 
as proposed, earmark a committed one. 110 2 was also concerned that the 
Admiralty re-oresentatives in the force must be peri-, ianent ones, not 
liable to be snatched away on another project, such as had twice 
happened to Maund. The staff Duties (SD) section stressed that the 
troops must be thoroughly trained soldiers before they could start 
training in combined onerations. The difficulty was that as soon 
as this stage was reached under the -present 'DrograiTnies the formations 
were scheduled to proceed overseas and the whole system, including the 
. )Ian 
for issuing equipment, was regulated to that end. It was therefore 
a nuestion either of retaining T)ermanently in the United Kingdom a 
38 DCOS(40) 67 'Note by Secretary: Combined Onerations' 10 May 49, 
ýCAB 82/5. 
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division once it was trained in combined operations, or of attemoting 
to train a succession of divisions. In any case the 184th Infantry 
Brigade was a low priority unit and should not be included. Ile 
general War Office agreement that a division could not be spared at C> 
that time from the mobilisation scheme, and that reliance must 
therefore be ! )laced on the Royal Marine Brigade, was summed up in the 
39 
War Office brief on the proposal for the DCOS meeting of IS May 1940. 
The DCOS concurred that the suggestion bad much to recommend it, but 
was not practicable at that time. They directed that the DCOS(IT) 
study the proposal with a view to its reconsideration in the autumn. 
.,, Pestions 
MacLeod had made, concerning such Some of the detailed suo 
things as the -provision of maps and air photos-, were referred to the 
service departments for consideration if a combined oneration had to 
40 
be conducted in the interim. 
The ISTDC then sent off all the landing craft completed since 
the start of the Non-; egian cam-naign under a Commander Cassidi to 
assist in the evacuation from Dunkirk. The carrier shin, the Clan 
Mac-Alister, was sunk on the first run, before all the landing craft 
were even hoisted out, but the surviving craft did yeoman work- off the 
beaches at La Panne and Dunkirk., ferrying troops directly back to the 
Kent coast. During the evacuations 6 ALC and 1 ýEC were lost. 
39. Memoranda MO I to SD 1 11 May 40,1,10 2 to MO 1 14 May 40, SD l(a) 
to MO 1 14 May 40, and WO Brief on DCOS(40) 67 15 May 40, WO 193/378. 
40. DCOS(40) 22 Mtg 15 May 40, CIO 82/2. 
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MAITFFP IT 
COMBINED OPERATIONS POIACY MID MATERIAL RF-QUIIU3-ffNFS 
With the loss, in Non-my and at IXinRi-rI,, of the 10 ALC and 7 MLC, 
only 6 ALC and I MLC were left in service, and tbese, badly battered, 
were scattered throughout the Channel ports. There were 36 ALC, 8 SLC, 
1 
and 27 MC still under construction. The handful of landing craft 
had proven their worth on operations, though the cost had been high. 
It soon became clear that the main bottlenecl, to the combined opera- 
tions programme then in the Drocess of develoment would be a short- 
age of landing craft. Wien the secretariat informed the COS that the 
War Office was thinking in terms of 260 landing craft, rather than 
2 
96, 'a change in outlook was apnarent. At a COS meeting on 17 June 
1940, it was agreed that the construction of landing craft on order 
would be accelerated 'to the maximum degree -possible'. It was then 
suggested that 'in anticipation of the detailed War Office statement 
of future requirements an order should be placed now for, say, ISO 
landing craft'. After some discussion, it was agreed that the 
Admiralty would -place the order las soon as possiblel for a further 
150 landing craft 'in the same nroportion of types as craft now on 
3 
order', these apparently also to be given priority. After the 
i)ainstaking discussions of the f irst nine months of the war over a 
These _f _alýe_n__f7rom -figures vary slightly from Maund, T). 62, but are t 
COS(40) 470 'Memorandum by General Bourne: Offensive Operations' 
18 Jun 40, CAB 80/13, which is most probably the correct one as 
far as losses are concerned. Even this docinent has some discre- 
Pancies in regard to the number of ýUC on order. Documents through- 
out this period give conflicting numbers in regard to landing craft, 
and it has generally been assumed that the numbers in the COS min- 
utes are correct. For a description of the DunRirk onerations see 
B. Fergusson, The Watery ', laze (New YorR 1961), P. 44. 
2. COS(40) 464 'Note by Secretary: Landing Craft' 1S Jun 40, CIAB 80/13. 
3. COS(40) 184 Mtg 17 Jun 40, CIAB 79/5. 
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handflil of craft, this was a sweeping order. The fact that this was 
the day that France capitulated. may have had -something to do with the 
haste of this decision. 
Lieutenant General A. G. B. Bourne, the newly appointed Director 
of Combined Operations, provided a breakdown of the requirements, on 
18 June 1940, which was accepted by the COS. The Royal Marine Brigade 
would need 48 ALCj, 8 SLC, and 12 MC, while the proposed army brigade 
grouD would require S2 ALC, 8 SLC, and 36 MCL. A reserve, of 8 ALC 
and 2 SLCY was included, for the first time, and a further 50 MLC 
were allocated to the Mediterranean. Requirements also existed for 
100. raiding craft. The design for tbes& had not been determined, 
although a suitable craft, the Higgins 'Eureka', termed an IRI Craft, 
ivaý eventually bought from the United States. 
Bourne also requested that all four Glen class shiT)s be con- 
verted, this being agreed to by the COS pending Admiralty priorities. 
The Glenroy, Glenearn, and Glenggyle were soon taRen up for conversion 
to Landing Shij3s Infantry, Large (LSI(L)). The fourth Glen shiT) was 
retained by the Admiralty to run suDnlies to Malta, and was lost in 
that service. As a substitute, two smaller Dutch 'nassenger ships, 
the Queen Emma and Princess Beatrix, weTe converted to Landing Ships 
Infantry, Medium (LSI(M)). Bourne also secured agreement for the 
conversion of two L. N. E. R. ferries, to be named Iris and Daffodil, 
4 
to carry IS N11C each. Sometime later agreement was also given for 
the conversion of six small Belgian cross-channel pacýets to Landing 
Ships Infantry, Small (LSI(S)), for raiding operations. 
4. CO-S; -(-40) 470 Temorandum by Lt. Gen. Bourne' 18 Jun 40, CAB 80/13 
and COS(40) 187 Nitg 20 Jun 40, CAB 79/S. 
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Churchill's interest in landing tanks onto beaches, noted in a 
memorandum of 5-June 1940, resulted in the develonment of a Wrtber 
type of landing craft. In late June or early July 1940 he directly 
approached the Minister of Supply concerning this problem, outlining 
his demands for a vessel to transport six or seven heavy tanks on a 
S 
sea voyage, and land them across a beach. This was referred to the 
Admiralty, who in some way construed this requirement to mean a land- 
ing craft capable to carrying three heavy tanks. The DNC, in colla- 
boration with the ISTDC, quickly produced a design for a Tank Landing 
Craft (TLC), which had a disi)lacement of 310 tons and a range of 
1,100 miles. It was not a decked vessel; however, and had -Door sea 
keening qualities, as well as no accommodation for the crew. It was 
also designed for the average beach slope in the United Kingdom, I 
in 30, as no study had apparently been made of the beaches in France, 
which had a slope of 1 in 200. It is difficult to determine what 
operational requirements were considered when it was designed, for 
it was suitable neither for short-range cross-Channel onerations nor 
for long-range expeditions overseas. A total of 30 were ordered in 
June 1940, the first T)roduction craft undergoing trials in November 
6 
1940. 
Bourne had not been involved in the decisions concerning the 
TLC, -and was unsure of its relation to the amDhibious lift for two 
brigades agreed to by the COS on 20 June 1940. He was further con- 
fused by a note from Churchill, who, upon being advised of the 
5. Morrison to Alexander 22 Jun 40; Churchill to Morrison 7 Jul 40-, 
ýIorrison to Churchill 9 Jul 40- and Alexander to Morrison 9 Jul 
40) PRDI 3/330/9. 
Ferysson, pp. 70-71 and llqaund, pp. 67-68. 
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design of the TLC, coiamented 'Good - Enough sea carriers will be 
required to trqnsport the vehicles of two armoured divisions at one 
voyage'. It was clear that Churchill was thinking in far different 
terms than Bourne and the COS, and Bourne on 16 July 1940 accordingly 
asRed the COS for more specific guidance as to the scale of combined 
operations contemplated and their maximum range from the United King- 
7 
dom, as well as the outline of any ultimate cross-Channel oj)eration. 
The answers to these questions were necessary for the develoment of 
a coherent combined operations policy, but they were not to be forth- 
coming for a considerable time. 
The Director of Plans at the Air Thistry, Air Comodore J. C. 
Slessor, had complained on 19 Jime 1940 of this lack of an overall 
plan for the prosecution of the war. 'Die COS, in a Paper of 25 May 
1940, had sketched out a strategy in the event of the collapse of 
France. This was the first a-o earance of the triad of the economic 
.P 
blockade, strategic bombing, and subversion, hut it did not, under- 
standably at the time, mention any offensive operations of the land 
forces, Slessor now complained that he had been told officially 
that the War Office was 'not nrepared to believe that Cemany can 
be conquered unless and until her land forces are met and defeated 
on the battlefield', but he was not T)re, )ared to acceDt that a return 
8 
to the Continent in force was either necessary or nracticable. lie 
later noted that this was the start of a JPS study on future strategy 
9 
i%iiich was approved by the COS on 4 SeT)tember 1940. Due to the Dress 
7. CO 552 'Overseas Transport for Tanks' 16 Jul 40 CIAB 80/1S. 
8. Slessor to VCA 19 June 40, Slessor Papers IE. More on this report 
is contained in Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (London 190), 
pp. 304-313. The COS paper of 2S May 1940 was taken un by the War 
Cabinet on 27 May as 10(40) 168, and is well detailed in AR. M. 
Butler, Grand Strategy, Volume 11 (London 1971), pn. 209-217. 
9. I-VP(40) 362/COS(40) 683 'Future Strategy' 4 Se-n 40, CIAB 66/11 and 
Butler, pp. 343-3S3. 
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of events in September, the paper was never formally submitted 
to the War Cabinet. It was talen tip at a meeting of the Defence 
Committee (Operations) on 15 October 1940, by which time it was 
10 
partly out of date. The committee nevertheless described it 
as 'a valuable study', and for the lack of any other document it 
must be taken as the strategic policy of the period. 
The COS agreed that the need to provide security in overseas 
areas would necessarily delay the date when major offensive onera- 
tions could be mounted from the United Kingdom. 'The wearing doi,,, n 
of Germany by ever-increasing force of economic pressure should be 
the foundation of our strategy. In conjunction with this, air 
attacks upon Germany were to be increased. Within the limits of 
resources available it was considered imnortant to conduct am- 
phibious operations against the enemy's coastline to harass him 
and to weaken his morale. The main thrust, however, as British 
forces expanded, was seen as making full use of sea power 'to 
strike with land forces at outlying positions' , from which further 
pressure could be placed upon Germany. 'flie overall nolicy could 
not be to raise, and land upon the Continent, an army comparable 
to that of Cermany, but it was assumed that the blockade and air 
offensive would eventually produce conditions i%here numerically 
inferior forces could be employed there with a good chance of 
success. The general aim was to have an expansion programme such 
that the British could go over to the offensive in all spheres 
and in all theatres in the snying of 19472. 
In the innediate future, the best opnortunities for offensive 
10. DO(40) 34 Mtg 15 Oct 40, CIAB 69/1. 
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combined operations anpeared to be in the Middle East. The JPSC 
on S August hadjecomended that this theatre receive some considera- 
tion in the allocation of landing craft, and the C-in-C Middle East 
11 
was asRed to state his requi-rements. On 24 August London was told 
that the minimum requirements were for the landing of the assatilt 
elements of a division, i. e., two brigades with divisional troops. 
The suggestion was made that India might be able to build some of the 
12 
necessary craft. 
The Directorate of Combined Operations, now tinder Admiral of the 
Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, studied these requirements, the results being 
13 
presented at a COS meeting chaired by Churchill on 6 September 1940. 
It was agreed that 48 MLC would be sent around the Cape starting in 
October 1940. The despatch of the Glen ships did not seem pressing, 
and it was suggested that proposals for their use, particularly their 
required dates of arrival, should be sent to the C-in-C Middle East 
for comment. Precise info-riiiation on the state of planning in general 
in the Middle East was not then readily available in London, and 
14 
information on this was soon requested. In order that the United 
Kingdom, after the despatch of this force to the Middle East, would 
still retain the ability to conduct a divisional-size combined opera- 
tion, even if only from converted liners, a further 26 ALCI 10 SLC 
and 11 MC i,: ere ordered. 
The COS, on 16 September, confirmed that the Middle East require- 
is 
ments should be Provided for, even if at the exy)ense of home needs. 
11. JP(40TY7-7-10nerations in the I-liddle East' 5 -Aug 
40, -MB 84/17. 
12. Enclosed in COS(40) 695 'Landing Craft for the Middle East' 1 Sep 
40, Cla 80/17. 
13. COS(40) 520 'Landing Craft' 3 Jul 40, C-AB 80/14 and COS(40) 298 
Mtg 6 Sep 40, C-AB 79/6. 
14. JP(40) 92 Mtg 10 Sen 40, CIAB 84/2. 
15. COS(40) 313 I-Itg 16 Sei) 40, C-, kB 79/6. See also COS(40) 736 'Land- 
ing Craft and Carriers' 11 Sep 40, C-A. B 80/18. 
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Keyes then submitted a sailing programme for the despatch of laýdinp 
craft and assault ShiDDing, this being aporoved by the COS on 23 
-16 
September 1940. The three 
_GIen 
and the two r)utcb ships werc ex- 
nected to be ready by the end of 1940, and would arrive in the Middle 
East, by the Cai)e route, in mid-February 1941. If the shiwAng were 
needed earlier, it would have to -nass through the Mediterranean. India 
was to build 44 TLC for the Middle East, and a further 20 were to be 
shipped out in sections from the United Kingdom. The COS thought that, 
with the limited forces then available in the Middle East, combined 
operations would be unlikely before the early Spring of 1941. This 
general , )Yiority 
for a divisional-sized. combined operation: in the 
Middle East was to continue through the beginning of 1941, desT)ite 
the attention given to other onerations such as BRISK and WORKSHOP, 
and was in accord with the JPS grand strategy Paper of 4 SeT. )tember 
1940. 
The COS by now considered it unnecessarily extravagant to -provide 
separate fleets of landing craft and assault shigning for raiding and 
for combined operations. On 16 September 1940 they accordingly in- 
structed Keyes to i)re. pare an estimate, in broad terms, of the require- 
ments for possible raiding operations in 1941, at the same time the 
newly-oTganised Joint Planning Staff (JPS) were to prepare a similar 
17 
estimate for large scale combined operations. The total require- 
ments would have to be worked out once the seT)arate estimates were 
received. This tasking indicated a major change in the responsibilities 
of the Directorate of Combined Operations, which, u-o to then, had been 
16. C-O-S(40) 767 'Landing Cy-aft and Carriers' 22 Sep 40, CkB 80/19 and 
COS(40) 321 Nftg 21 SeT) 40, CIAB 79/6. 
17. COS(40) 313 Mtg 16 SeT) 40, CAB 79/6 
deeply involved in the determination of material renuirements. It 
was now to be rel6gated to the framing of raiding needs only, being 
excluded from the planning process of a newly established section of 
the JPS, the Future Operational Planning Staff (FOPS). The FOPS was 
henceforth to be the coordinator of material requirements, and, al- 
though the Directorate was to continue to have a say, or attempt to 
have a say, in the allocation of landing craft and assault shil)ping, 
even its oi%m material requirements for raiding were to be largely 
disregarded. The situation w0uld change only towards the end of 
1941, when the task of framing renuirements for a return to the Con- 
tinent became too great for the JPS alone. 
In addition to its directive of 8 Sentember 1940, the FOPS had 
been given a tentative list of onerations, in order of priority, and 
was requested to submit outline plans for them as soon as nossible, 
18 
so that special needs might be identified. First on the list was 
the Middle East, followed by an offensive against metronolitan Italy. 
It was recognized that operations against Italy might have to be done 
in -ohases, with Sicily or Sardinia being seized initially. Third was 
an offensive to secure a bridgehead in Non, ýay, to increase economic 
pressure upon Germany. Fourth was the establishment of a bridgehead 
in France,, in the Gironde or Brittany, or on the Cherbourg Peninsula, 
from which subsequent operations could be launched. Fifth was a move 
into the Low Countries, so that a force could advance to the Ruhr 
as quickly as possible. Last was the establishment, in the event of 
Spanish hostility, of a bridgehead in Spain. 
After studying this list, the FOPS suggested to the COS on 14 
18. COS(40) 1 (0) (jP) 'Future ODerational Planning' 8 Sep 40 GAB 
84/18 and COS (40) 302 Mtg 9 SeT) 40, CAB 79/6. 
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September 1940 that there miglit be certain basic requirements for each 
of the operations-listed, and that it would be more desirable to 
consider these requirements first before i)rocceding with the outline 
19 
nlans. 'fliese basic requirements seemed at first sight to include 
the training and equipping of an assault force of two or three divi- 
sions, as well as the Drovision. of the necessary landing craft and 
assault shipping. 
The FOPS report on these requirements was received by the COS 
20 
on 22 October 1940. In a covering letter, the JPS noted that they 
had been instructed to prepare future merational -olans 'almost en- 
tirely for the type of operations in which we maRe full use of our sea 
power to enable us to obtain a bridgehead in outlying enemy positions'. 
The Directors of Plans concurred with the FOPS recommendations and 
suggested, if the COS were in similar agreement, that the service 
departments examine them in detail. It was stressed that an early 
decision was required as to whether these basic requirements, which, 
in certain cases, might conflict with existing programmes, could or 
could not be met. 
The FOPS, in studying the establishment of a bridgehead, con- 
sidered that a corps of about two divisions, along with armoured 
forces, would be required. Although foreseeable naval and shipning 
-resources would be unlilely to Dermit two such operations being 
carried out simultaneously, the nlans were based on the assumntion 
that two such forces, one in the United Kingdom and one in the ! -. Iiddle 
East, would be available, so as to be able to mount any oDeration 
19. JP(40) 443 (S) IJPSI 14 SeD 40, CAB 84/18 
20. COS(40) 18 (0)(JP) 'Future Plans: Basic Renuirements' 18 Oct 40, 
CAB 80/106 and COS(40) 356 Mtg 22 Oct 40, CAB 79/7. 
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without undue delay. 
Naval, shinning, and shipbuilding considerations were the limit- 
ing factor in the number of landing craft and assault shipping likely 
to be available, and thus in the size and composition of the assault 
forces. Armour would certainly be required, but this presented the 
most difficult ý. )roblem of all. If ocean-going TLC were available, the 
maximum armoured force capable of being landed after a long sea voy- 
age was one brigade. The estimate for the landing craft for one 
major operation, including reserves and craft for training, was ISO 
ALC, 30 SLC, 104 MLC, and 90 TLC. For the DCO's raiding requirements, 
the estimate was 60 ALC, 10 SLC, and 15 MLC - giving a total figure of 
210 ALC, 40 SLC, 119 MLC, and 180 TLC. This was 79 ALC, 16 SLC and 
150 TLC more than the current -Drogramm-es, including those for 1941, 
called for. These figures were based on the assumntion that the 
smaller craft could be transported between theatres for major opera- 
tions, while the number of TLC was duplicated owing to the diffi- 
culties of trans-porting them. The JPS admitted that this duPlication 
of the TLC might seem rather 'extravagant', but made the prophetic 
statement that 'every available TLC, if not more, will be required 
for cross-Channel operations'. On the whole, however, the JPS 
thought. that the most critical factor for a long-range opeyation 
might be the nrovision of shirming. 
The service departments were requested to review this study, with 
the results being circulated by 6 November 1940. It is im-Dortant to 
note that the study was drafted without any reference to the DCO, 
other than the inclusion of his raiding requirements, and that it 
was not to be reviewed by the DCO. E ven greater disrelgard of the 
43 
DCO was to be seen in the final document, which was not read), until 
17 January 1941. ý 
The War Office returned its comments to the JPS on 11 November 
- 21 1940. The provision of the army forces was seen to cause no great 
problem, and the War Office's only concern was the proposed strength 
of the armoured force. The minimum aim, it was suggested, should be 
the landing of two armoured brigades rather than one, at least one 
brigade of which should be able to land from tanh assault shins. 
The Admiralty set out its programme for 1941 and 1942 on 19 
22 
November 1940. An additionl 6S TLC ivqre being ordered, and arrange- 
ments were being made to fit three oilers as MLC carriers, termed 
Landing Ship Gantry (LSG). A number of tTooj)shiT)s were also being 
earmarked to carry landing craft. By July 1941 the number of assault 
shipping and landing craft in the 111editerranean. would be 2 or 3 
LSI(L), 2 LSI(M)) 3 LSG, at least 7 trans-ports, 9S ALC, IS SLC, 74 
MLC, and 104 TLC. This was a lower number than originally called for, 
but it was expected to suffice. Remaining in the United Kingdom, 
for reserves and training, would be 36 ALC, 6 SLC, 4S MLC, and 3S 
TLC. The DCO would have to make do with SO 'R' Craft, nlus another 
112 for which purchase apT)roval was being sought. Three 'Maracaibol 
oilers were being considered for conversion to tank assault shins, to 
be ready by Tlay 1941, and the two L. N. E. R. ferries would remain in 
home waters. The remainder of the assault shipping would have to be 
bTou, (, 3, ht back from the Middle East if an oneration vere to be mounted 
from the United Kingdom. The Admiralty noted that it was extremely 
21 0 928 'Future Plans Basic Requirements' 11 Nov 40, 
CAB 80/22. 
22. COS(40) 958 'Future PlanS Basic requirements' 19 Nov 4g, 
CAB 80/23. 
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difficult to organise the 1941 nrogramme, and even as it was the 
landing craft could not be completed without detriment to other 
naval construction. Mention was also made that, if any cross-CIannel 
merations on a large scale were contemnlated, the longest nossible 
notice would be required. 
The Air Ministry only answered the JPS on 24 December 1940, and 
raised the main obstacle to the implementation of the plan for the 
23 
'invasion corps'. It considered specialised training for the air 
elements of such a force 'undesirable, unnecessary, and impracticable'. 
Because of the continuing effort to achieve air superiority, the size 
and comnosition of the air element of a ýombined oPeration could only 
be decided a short time before the exnedition was launched, and the 
Air Ministry tool, the rather cavalier view that 'if at this stage the 
forces considered necessary are not available, the expedition must 
be altered in character, 1)ostponed, or abandoned'. It deigned to 
admit that this vas ladinittedly highly inconvenient from the planning 
Point of viewl, but considered it 'no Fiore than the recognition of the 
realities of the situation'. 
The JPS produced their final version of the study on 17 Januarv ý4 
1941, noting that three new factors bad entered their calculations. 
The shinning situation had deteriorated. The renuirements for an 
oneration involving a open sea Passage had changed due to the pronosals 
for tank assault ships and further experience with landing craft. 
Consideration had also been given, for the first time, to the reauire- 
ments for a cross-Channel operation. E%ren excluding the cross-Channel 
23. COS(40) 1057 'Future Plans Basic Renuirements' 24 Dec 40, 
CAB 80/24. 
24. JP(41) 2S (REVISE) 'Future Plans Basic Requirements' 17 Jan 40, 
CIALB 80/25 
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craft operation, the requirements for assault shinning and I. mdinv 
were considerable, and raised the question as to wbat extent inter- 
ference with other production could be acceT)ted. The JPS thought. 
that the requirements they had laid down were reasonable, but there 
was the possibility of conflict with other programmes. 
2S 
The COS examined the JPS paper on 17 January 1941. The forma- 
tion of an invasion corps in the United Kingdom was agreed to, and 
it was honed that it could be ready by I August 1941. Another in- 
vasion corps would be formed in the Middle East with the resources 
there. The size of the armoured force for an assault was a compro- 
mise. After a sea voyage, the goal was io be one armoured and two 
infantry brigades in the first flight. In the case of a short voyage, 
a second a-imoured brigade could be landed from TLC. Nothing much 
was to come of these linvasion coyps', as the War Office was to 
realise that laroe operations would have to be conducted by the units 
at hand, rather than by special purpose formations. The COS also 
acce-Dted the Air Staff's nosition, so nothing was to be done in this 
area. 
The naval side, concerned as it was with details of nrocurement, 
was the most comDlex, and the one with the most concrete results. 
The estimate of the landing craft needed for one corps' assault was 
now 60 ALC, IS SLC, 44 MLC, 44 TLC, and 32 'R' Craft, a reduction 
from the Drevious estimate. The total number of landing craft re- 
quired had not been -reduced equivalently, however, as the previous 
idea of transporting all but the TLC from one theatre to another now 
25. COS(Tlj-ff Mtg 17 Jan 41-, -CW 791 
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looRed less inviting, and it was considered desirable to have a 
comnlete set available in each. Doubling the assault figures, and 
allowing a 100% loss rate in training and a 30% loss rate in opera- 
tions overayear's time., the total requirement was now forecast as 
210 ALCy 38 SLC, 113 MLC, 103 TLC, and 104 IRI Craft. Not counting 
the 44 TLC being built in Tndia, which had been found unsuitable for 
operations, the current programme was 79 ALC, 14 SLC, and 8 TLC short. 
The COS apDroved the JPS recommendation that these additional craft 
should be ordered, and stiplilated that work should also continue on 
the 16 MLC and 58 IRI Craft that were in excess of the new requirements. 
The assault shipping was also to be increased. The three 'Mara- 
caibo' tank assault shii)s, Misoa, Tasajera, and Bachequero, were to 
be ready by mid-1941, and orders had been placed in the United Kingdom 
for three new tank assault ships of the IlVinnettel design. A further 
six 'Winnettes' were required, but as construction of these in the 
United Kingdom would seriously interfere with other proJects, causing 
the cancellation of at least twelve corvettes, it was agreed to try to 
have them built in North America. The three LSG, Denýentdale, Dewdale, 
and Ennerdale, and the ferries Iris and Daffodil were sufficient to 
fill the other -requirements. 
The assault shipning and landing craft above would be sufficient 
for an overseas assault, but the requirements for a cross-Channel 
operation would be far larger. The FOPS estimated that the initial 
assault would have to be conducted by one infantry and one armoured 
division, with two more armouTed and one more infantry divisions 
foll6wing. The size of the force was limited by the number of assault 
ships and landing craft that the FOPS-considered could be built without 
47 
seriously interfering with the T)ToJuctive capacity of the country, 
and by the estimated capability to maintain a force across an open 
beach until a port could be captured. Besides the material already 
listed, a further 400 TLC would be -required, clearly a serious hin- 
drance to production. until after 1942. The Admiralty was then work- 
ing on an alternative to the TLC, a tank ferry called the 'Brunette', - 
and the COS asRed it for a further report on the question of ferries 
for operations in 1942. 
The Directorate of Combined Oocrations' reauirements had been 
steadily disregarded as time went on. Miile in the paner of 22 Octo- 
bey 1940 a part of the landing craft had been allocated to Keyes, the 
Admiralty response of 19 November 1940 expected him to mak-e do with 
the 'RI Craft. In the final paper of January 1941, the requirement 
for 'R1 Craft was determined by the needs of the corps assault, and 
no mention at all was made of craft for Keyes. It was not clear 
whether he would -receive the S8 excess IRI Craft., nor was any mention 
made of assault shipping for him. It could be presumed that he had 
the LSI(S), and perhaps the two Belgina LSI(M), but, if so, they 
would be without any landing craft, as the entire ý)Yoduction had been 
allocated to the 'invasion corps'. Keyes was apparently not consulted 
on the final Daper, another commentary on the situation, and no answer 
can be found to these difficulties. 
The Admiralty produced a paper clarifying the naval portion of 
26 
the basic requirements DaT)er on 21 February 1941. The transi)orts 
Kenya and Karanja, then being held for operations in the Atlantic, 
would be converted to LSI as soon as they could be released. This 
26. COS(41) 118 'Future Plans - Basic Requirements' 21 Feb 41, 
CAB 80/26. 
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would provide a Middle East force of the three Glen LSI(L), and a 
United Kingdom. force of the two. Dutch LSI(M) and the two converted 
transports. Landing craft for tanRs were a major problem. Under the 
current priorities, with structural engineers alone responsible for 
their manufacture, only about half the stated requirement could be 
met by 1942. There were problems with the 'Brunette' design and the 
Admiralty now proposed to insert another section into a TLC, increas- 
ing its capacity. This proved feasible, and a total of 200 'stretched' 
TLC were then included in the 1941 programme. 
The damage to merchant shipping was by this time becoming so 
acute that the War Cabinet Import Executive, on 28 February 1941, 
asked the Admiralty to examine again the completion dates for assault 
shi-pping and craft, in light of -Drojected operations, to see if any 
work could be postponed. After study. by the JPS, the COS and Denuty 
Director of Combined Operations (DDCO) took up the matter on 24 March 
27 
1941. The conversion of two Belgian LSI(S) was -posti)oned, and the 
conversion of one of the three 'Maracaibos' was, if possible, to be done 
in North America. Most of the landing craft were being built outside 
the shipyards, and so posed no difficulties, but the 200 'stretched' 
TLC now in the 1941 programme would be a major T)roblem. If they were 
to be built by structural engineers outside shipyards, they could 
not be ready until 11ýfarch 1943. 
The COS was not willing to accept such a delay, and requested 
the Admiralty to make another study. The Admiralty responded that the 
200 'stretched' TLC could not be completed by April 1942, the original 
target date, without a major disruption of the regular naval building 
JP(41FMI-Tonstruction of Issault Shipping' 22 M; -jr 41, 
84128 Fx-. d COS(41) 107 ?, Itg 24 Mar 41, CAB 79/10. 
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'Die Adiiiii-alt), tlierefore -quggested a colný)rc), lise 
they 'should build as many as we can by April 1942 without seriously 
28* 
interfering with other workl. 'Mis extremely vague position was 
29 
surprisingly accepted by the COS on 18 Mril 1941. As in the case 
of production planning from the beginning, the DCO was not a party 
to these decisions. The Admiralty retained a firm grip on this asnect 
of combined ODerations. 
'flie Admiralty proposals for assault shipning and craft of 21 
February 1940 had been sent to Keyes for comment, along with a JPS 
30 
note on the distribution of landing craft. This was just at the 
time the dispute was in progress leading uD to-the second directive 
for the Director of Combined OT. )erations and, involved as he was with 
this matter, Keyes apparently made no formal resT)onse. On 5 April 
1941 the JPS proposed a revised policy on the distribution of landing 
craft, giving increased priority to the Middle East, with the request 
that they be nuthorised to carry out further aTunendments without 
31 
reference to the COS. What part Keyes would play in the nrocess was 
not addressed, but, as he only had access to the T)Janning machine 
through the COS, it was apparent that the new scheme would clearly 
eliminate what little influence he did have. The COS called Hornby, 
the DDCO, in to discuss these recoTiuiiendations on 7 AT)ril 1941, 
and the general -nolicy was awroved, subject to a review in a few 
32 
month's time. 
241 'Construct i on --Steel for Tank 28. COS 0 
Ferries' IS Apr 41, CAB 80/27. 
29. COS(41) 139 Mtg IS Apr 41, C-AB 79/10. 
30. COS(41) 72 lltg 26 Feb 41, CkB 79/9. 
31. JP(41) 261 'Distribution of Landing Craft' S Apr 41, CAB 79/10. 
32. COS(41) 126 Mtg 7 Aý)r 41, C-U 79/10. 
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The first review of the situation, on 5 July 1941, indicated 
that the T)-rogramme was about three month's behind the original fore- 
33 
cast. The 'stretched' TLC were expected to be produced at the rate 
of about 10 per month, but only 12S. would be ready by April 1942. 
34 
The COS 'noted' this on 7 July 1941. 
Although the 17 January 1941 version of the JPS basic require- 
ments paper contained a vague outline of the number of landing craft 
renuired for a return to the Continent., the basic combined operations 
policy was still that reflected in the paper of 4 September 1940. In 
June of 1941 the JPS again conducted a review of strategic nolicy. 
This was digested for presentation to the United States military 
reT)resentatives at the RIVIEM Conference between Chrucbill and 
Roosevelt in August 1941, and can be tahen as the authoritative nolicy 
3S 
on combined oDerations at that time. There is now no mention of the 
long-range, limited-scale combined operation, though the necessity 
to be able to mount an exi)edition to seize the Canaries is confirmed. 
The fundamental strategy, relying on the three elements of blockade, 
bombing, and subversion, as originally outlined in May 1940 and in- 
cluded in the paper of. September 1940, remained unchanged. A return 
to the Continent was seen as a possibility, but only in the 'final 
phase' to 'destroy any elements of the German forces which still 
resist' after a 'radical decline in fighting value and mobility' 
brought about by the three main components of the overall strategy. 
It would be difficult to view the RIVIERA paDer as the basis for 
a change in combined operations policy for the immediate future, but 
33. COS(41) 412 'Construction of the TLC's' 5 Jul 41, CIAB 8- 0/29. 
34. COS(41) 23S Mtg 7 Jul 41, CAB 79/12. 
3S. COS(41) 155 (0) 'General Strategy' 31 Jul 41, C-kB 80/S9. This 
situation and strategy is well detailed in J. M. A. Gwyer, Grand 
Strategy, Volume III, Part 1 (London 1964), -pn. 1-48 and 12S-130. 
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the planning staffs had begun to appreciate the necessity for large 
numbers of landing craft. It was also recognised that the main 
source of pyoduction, particularly, TLC, would have to come from the 
United States. In early September 1941 the JPS consequently gaire 
the Foreign Office a set of unofficial figures, based on a preliminary 
investigation, for discussions with American sunDly experts. Count- 
ing anticipated wastage up to March 1943, the JPS was now thinking 
36 
of a total of 1,300 TLC. The rationale for this was sent out in a 
paper by the ITIO&P, Major General Sir John Kennedy, on 7 September 
1941, in which he explained that the general strategy contained in 
the R11TIMN T)aper, which had been generally accemed by the Americans, 
had envisaged an eventual assault on the Continent, primarily by 
37 
armoured formations. Although this would admittedly be after the 
Germans had been seriously weak-ened, it did entail an assault across 
the French beaches, the size and date of which would be governed by 
the TLC -nroduction programme. 
Kennedy pointed out that the approved pyogramme then in pTogress 
had been based on the entirely different concept of long-range combined 
operations of corps size. This progy, -urne, which would result in only 
6 tank assault ships and 220 TLC by December 1942, was totally inade- 
quate. A new and vastly increased T3rogramme was needed if a landing I. I 
in France on a wide front was ever to take nlace. Even the design of 
the current equinment was incompatible vath a cross-Channel assault, 
for all of it, 11-laracaibos' and 'Winnettes' included, had been built 
for a beach gradient of 1 in 30. Kennedy recomended that the JPS, 
36. COS(41) 186 (0)(RhATISE) 'Overall Production Requirements' 4 Sep 41, 
CAB 80/59. 
37. COS(41) S57 'Landing Craft Prod-oction Progranune' 7 SeD 41 CAB 
80/30. 
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'as a matter of urgency', examine closely the plans for onerations 
on the Continent in the final phase of the war, with particular atten- 
tion to the requirements for assault shi, )ping and craft. In any event, 
: hnmediate steps should be taken to increase the nLuilber of the present 
type of TLC, using -American production, and a TLC 
for use in northern 
France should be develoned as soon as possible. 
38 
The COS reviewed this situation on 8 September 1941. A new 
programme was certainly needed, but before any decisions could be 
taken the FOPS would have to complete their study of plans for future 
operations, and the Admiralty would have to consider the effect of any 
new proposal on other construction. Actions to develop the American 
production would be held in abeyance until these two studies had been 
made. In the interim the Admiralty was to design a TLC suitable 
for any beach. The Directorate of Combined Q)erations was not mentioned 
at all, even though the development of new landing craft was one of 
its responsibilities that had hitherto never been challenged. 
- The JPS produced their estimate of the requirements on 11 September 
1940, for a brief for the representatives to a conference in London 
39 
on British-American production. The estimates were held to be onl) 
nrovisional, reflecting strategic requirements rather than nroduction 
capabilities. They were also not tied to British mannower, and much 
of the equipment would not only have to be produced in the United 
States but would also have to be manned by Americans. The totals 
called for 33 assault ships, 1,300 TLC, SOO ALC, 70 SLC, SOO MLC, 
and 200 'R' Craft, these being considered the bare minimum. These 
figures were aT)! )Yoved on 12 Sept e; Tiber 1941 as a basis for discussion 
38. COS-(41) 31S Htg 8 Sep 41, CA, B 79/14. 
39. JP(41) 797 'Overall Production Pequirements' 11 Sep 41, CM 
79/14. 
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wi th the Ameri cans, as nart of the 'Iri ctory Programme The 
Americans accepted the British figures on 20 September 1941. ), taling 
them to the United States for comnilation with their ourn requirements 
41 
and submission to production authorities. 
These discussions were the start of the return across the Channel, 
but they bad no effect on the current situation. On I October 1941 
there were only S2 ALC and 44 ýUC in the United Kingdom, and Keyes 
nrotested that the study of minor operations was 'futile' unless more 
landing craft were made available. He therefore requested an immediate 
decision on a number and type of craft required for oT)erations within 
42 
the next 12 months. 
The VCOS and the DDCO met on 3 October 1941 to discuss Keyes' 
request, the JPS report on a cross-Channel assault, and a request 
frorn the United States for a further definition of landing craft 
43 
requirements. It was apparent that more ALC and MLC were -required 
than -planned for, and the Admiralty was ask-ed to place orders for a 
further 400 ALC and 400 ýILC in North America, the production to start 
as soon as possible at the rate of 30 a month. The Admiralty was 
also requested to double the production rate of TLC to 20 a month, 
again as soon as T)ossible. This increased involvement of the DCO 
in the determination of overall requirements is somewhat strange, 
particularly considering the disnute then in Progress over the new 
directive. for the Director of Combined Operations. 1t would annear 
that the change resulted from the magnitude of the problen involved. 
40. CO--S(41) 321 Mtg 12 Sep 41, CAB 79/14. This was for a Dreliminary 
meeting between the two countries before a delegation was sent to 
Russia. See Ismay, pp. 227-229 and Taylor, Pp. 477-50S. 
41. COS(41) 215 (0) Wictory Requirements' 22 Sep 41, C-, kB 80/. 59 
42. COS(41) SgS 'Provision of Landing Craft' I Oct 41, CAB 80/30. 1 
43. COS(41) 342 Mtg 3 Oct 41, CIAB 79/14. 
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The JPS had been able to work out renuirements for the limited ex- 
peditionary force concent, but the question of a return to the Con- 
tinent in force was so complex that the JPS was not cavable of handling 
it in addition to their other tasks. ' 
The Admiralty was in the process of setting up its oi., n committee 
to examine landing craft production requirements, and on 8 October 
1941 the VCNS told the COS that the decisions of their 3 October 
meeting had been made without full access to the facts, and that he 
had therefore suspended action on the conclusions. The COS accented 
this, and agreed to the Admiralty's establisliment of an ad hoc inter- 
service committee to examine the whole -oroblem of sT)ecial craft for 
44 
combined operations, both in the short and the long term. 
That some urgent action was necessary v., as evident from the next 
quarterly progress report, prepared by the Admiralty on 10 October 
45 
1941. The programme, three months behind at the last reT. )ort, 
had been further delayed lowing to the fact that TLC have no T)riority'. 
This lack of priority for TLC was something of a surprise to the 
War Office, but the Admiraltv explained that, until the whole matter 
of landing craft construction had been reconsidered, such would in 
46 
fact be the case. This was certainly a strange way of exnediting 
production, the intent of all meetingson the subject from the start. 
The Admiralty also maintained that the TLC could be T)roduced only at 
the rat, e of 8 to 10 per month. The gaD between what the n1anners 
wanted and what was available, always a T)Yoblem, was seemingly growing 
wider. 
44. COS(41) 346 Mtg 8-0-c-f- 4-1, Ck-B- 79/14. - 
4S. COS(41) 620 'Construction of TLCls' 10 Oct 41, CAB 80/31. 
46. COS(41) 3S8 Mtg 17 Oct 41, CAB 79/14. 
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The COS were informed on 10 November 1941 that the Admiralty was 
taking measures' to implement tho decisions of the ad hoc committee, 
47 
which had first met on 20 October 1941. Production of TLC could, 
after all, be increased to 20 per month, and -production of ALC was to 
be increased so that SOO would be com-olete by May 1943. Orders for 
the 'Winnettes' in the United States had been cancelled, being 
superseded by an order for four TLC carriers of a new design, termed 
Landing Ship Dock (LSD). 
Phe VCOS, now with Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten as Advisor 
48 
on Combined Operations, reviewed the sitpation on 14 November 1941. 
The current programme fell very short of the estimated requirements, 
but the Admiralty maintained that it would not be possible to -nro- 
duce more than 300 TLC by May 1943 without seriously disyuT)ting the 
whole building programme. The VCOS was not fully convinced by this 
argument, and requested the Admiralty prepare another report showing 
the effect on shipbuilding of a programme of 1,000 TLC by May 1943. 
49 
The requested reDort was ready by S December 1941. It main- 
tained that a 1,000 TLC programme would require a complete reorganisa- 
tion of the shipbuilding industry, and even if this was approved 
it was 'extremely unlikely' that the programme would be comnleted on 
time. India and Canada, for one reason or another, were not considered 
feasible sources for more craft, and this left only the United States, 
where a similar pro-Dosal was already being considered in the form of 
47. WS(41) 668 'Construction of Special Craft for Combined Operations' 
10 Nov 41, CAB 80/31. 
48. COS(41) 679 'Provision of Landing Craft' 13 Nov 41, C. AB 80/31 and 
COS(41) 388 Htg 14 Nov 41, CAB 79/15. 
49. COS(41) 726 'Special Craft for-Combined Roerations' S De c 41, 
CAB 80/32. 
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the 'Victory Progrannel. 
The COS considered this rebort on the afternoon of 8 December 
so 
1941. A telegram bad been received that day from the Foreign 
Office mission in the United States, indicating that it might be 
possible to arrange for the construction of 700 TLC there. A further 
YeDort was expected from the United States, and the COS decided that 
they would wait for this before examining the relationsbin, of the 
availability of landing craft to future planning for combined opera- 
tions. This news marRed the final end of the production nrogra-nune 
oriented towards the long-range assault by the 'invasion coi-os'. 
The cross-Channel operation, with the aid of American production and 
American troops, and involving American -participation in the planning 
process, was henceforth to be the major focus of combined overations. 
SO. COS(41) 413 Mtg 8 Dec 41,79 16. 
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CHAPTER III 
COMBINED OPERATION'S ORGANIISATIONI (1) 
'ME APPOINDU: -VF OF UhUfEMWr GENTRAL A. G. B. BOURNIF 
AS 
DIRECTOR OF COMBINED OPERATION'S AND THE FIRST DIRECTINT 
The evacuation of the BEF from the Continent and the loss of 
the French as an ally drastically changed the British strategic T)osi- 
tion. A return to the Continent by the British army to defeat the 
full power of the German army, and the massive combined operation. 
needed to effect it, were recognized as being totally beyond any 
future British capability. Cutting their coats according to their 
cloth, the COS were to develop a strate& which relied upon the 
strategic bombing campaign, the economic blockade, and the eventual 
revolt of the occupied territories to defeat Germany. A return to 
the Continent was foreseen only when the German forces had become so 
seriously weakened that the British would be able to conduct mainly 
a 'mopping up' operation. Some of the planners thought that this would 
take a considerable period - 10 or 12 years - as in the Napoleonic 
wars. 
Combined operations thus did not occupy a key nosition in British 
grand strategy. Nevertheless, it was no longer a strictly auxiliary 
form of warfare. With the exception of operations in the Western 
Desert-, virtually any offensive operation around the perii)hery of 
German T)ower would now have to be a combined operation, conducted 
either to take advantage of an opportunity that might anpear, or 
to forestall an enemy iniative. 
The immediate requirement-,. after the evacuation of Ihinkirk, 
was the defence of the United Kingdom. Churchill was determined ZD $ 
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however, that 'the completely defensive habit of mind, which has 
niined the French, must not be allowed to ruin all our initiAtive!, 
As early as 3 June 1940, with th e allies still fighting in the south 
of France, he told the COS that it was 'of the highest consequence, 
to keep the maximum number of German troops occunied along the French 
coast, and demanded that raiding forces for this purpose be organised 
immediately. 'An effort must be made to shake off the mental and 
moral prostration to the will andý initiativeof the enemy from which 
we suffer', he continued. Churchill was already showing indications 
gh this was of his desire for a number of large-scale raids. Althou 
totally beyond the British caDability, he was to remain wedded to this 
idea for some time, refusing to admit that it was not feasible. This 
attitude, whicb can be partly attributed to his recognition of the 
need to overcome obstacles in a confused and threatening time, was 
to have a major effect on the develowent of the combined operations 
organisation. 
Churchill followed his ideas of 3 June in another, and more 
detailed, memorandum to the COS on S June 1940. He wanted pl-OT)Osals 
_ companies: -', with 
I snecially trained framed immediately for Istriking 
troops of the hunter class who can developa-reign of terror dol%n these 
coasts'. lie understood that the first raids conducted would have to 
be the 'butcher and bolt' tvqe, but as soon as the raiding forces 
were T)Yopeyly organised he envisaged an operation such as the temporary 
occupation of Calais or Boulogne. Churchill also wanted methods 
develoDed for landing tanks onto beaches. A parachute force of 5,000 
men was also to be established, and a system of intelligence and Z> 
espionage created. Ilie COS were to effect measures for 'a vigorous, 
1. Churchill to Ismay, 3 Jun 40, PRPA 3/330/5. In his book 'I'heir. 
Finest Hour (New York, 1962) 17hurchill gives the date as 4 Jun 40. Z11 
r ý, q 
enterprising, and ceaseless offensive against the whole Geman 
12 occupied coastline'. 
On 6 June 1940 the COS inst-nicted the Joint Planning Sub- 
Committee (JPSC), comprised of the Directors of Plans of the three 
services, to consider, in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence 
Sub-Committee (JISC), the scope and nature of ouerations which might 
be carried out both in the short and long terms, as well as the 
'machinery' which should be set up to enable plans and preparations for 
3 
these operations to be made in the greatest secrecy. 'flie implicit 
emphasis was on conventional onerations, for the War Office had that 
same day established a section, designated as MO 9, to conduct minor 
4 
unconventional onerations with 'commando' forces. 
, an aide-memoire that 
The JPSC set to worl, immediately, T)roducinq 
same day outlining their views. The JPSC preferred unconventional 
operations, being of the opinion that they were best suited to the 
situation. They noted that stePs were already being taRen in this 
regard, though they thought the organisation being established for 
this purpose needed strengthening. Further details on this were to 0 
be given to the COS verbally. The JPSC could not see much potential 
in conventional raids by 'striRina comnanies' due to the German 
consolidation of the coast, but admitted that, with information 
gained by the unconventional onerations and the esT)ionaQe system. 
opportunities for the use of conventional forces might nossibly 
arise at a later date. In order to grasT) such fleeting opportunities, 
2. Churchill to Ismay, S Jun 40, PRD1 3/330/S. In Their Finest Hour 
Churchill gives the date as 6 Jun 40. In both this and tNe---aBox-'e 
case the difference is not material. 
3. COS(40) 170 Mtg 6 Jun 40, CAB 79/4; 
4. For more details concerning the establishment of W) 9, see Dudley 
Clarke, Seven Assignments (London 1948), pn. 20S-239. 
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the raiding forces, suitably organised I equipped, and trained, must 
already be in existence. The JPSC therefore recommended that a 
division of regular troops should be earmarRed for this role. The 
division commander, assisted by the ISTDC, would be responsible for 
determining the organisation, equipMent, and doctrine required. 
This was very similar to the ISTDC proposal of 10 May 19.40. The 
JPSC thought that time could be saved if a regular division of the 
BEF were given this tasR, though a delay would nevertheless be 
unavoidable because of the difficulty of providing special equipment, 
particularly an adequate number of landing craft. As far as the 
operational employment of this division-was concerned, the JPSC 
5 
deemed the normal service planning channels sufficient. 
Armed with these recommendations, the COS formed some tentative 
conclusions by 7 June 1940, but Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, 
the CAS, did not get to see Churchill about them until the evening 
of 9 June 1940. At this time the classification and distribution 
system for sensitive naners had not reached the sonhistication later 
achieved, and many matters were noted as being too secret to commit 
to paper. Newall's report is one of these, though the aide-m6moire 
he used does survive. The COS had accepted the JPSC argument on the 
division of operations, and Newall explained that the War Office was 
establishing an organisation for unconventional operations. In 
respect to conventional operations, the onlv really suitable formation 
readilv available was the Royal Marine Brigade, then in training for 
a contingency operation in Eire. The Independent Com-nanies, formed 
by the War Office during the Nonýegian Camnai gn, were seen as the 




issue of comnand and control of offensive operations, either conven- 
tional or unconventional, alongAhe occupied coasts, the COS disaq]-ced 
with the JPSC, feeling that: 
If the planning and conducý of offensive operations is to 
be carried out with efficiency and desDatcb it will be 
necessary to set up a central organisation charged with 
the direction of Aese o-perations. 
This organisation would be sewed by a tri-service staff, and in 
order to give it the widest possible latitude it would be indenendent 
of any one service department, coming directly under the COS. A 
'live Arel commander was needed for it, and a Brigadier J. F. Betts 
was recommended. 
In response to Churchill's other demands the C-kS stated that the 
tecliniques for landing tanks onto a beach from landing craft were 
well advanced, the only limiting factor being the nroduction of the 
craft in adequate numbers. Churchill had far higher exDectations in 
this area also, but the scone of his thinking was not then realised. 
The basis of an intelligence network had been created some time 
earlier under Colonel Sir Stewart TIenzies, though the s) T stem would have 
to be built up considerably in the recently occupied countries. The 
Air Ministry was to report seParately on the formation of parachute 
6 
forces. 
The results of Newall's discussion with Churchill were reviewed 
by the COS on 11 June 1940. It was ag-reed that a Commander, Offensive 
Operations, (COD) was to be annointed bv the COS, and provided with 
a small inter-service staff. lie was to receive instructions from the 
COSy with matters of policy being referred to, the 114inister of Defence. 
Subject to this, he was to be given a free hand to prepare, 'as a 
140-11 is-to S6-a-l 7 -, Jim40, 
-P 
FB-F373-3-0-/-5--a-nU -. AjmE-e-xF' COS (-4-0-)-l 7-4 -1-! t-g 
9 Jun 40, DEFE 2/699. 
matter of urgency', offensive plans which he would subsequently 
execute. The CCUcould plan on using the Royal Marine Brigade and, 
7 
initially, an Army brigade grouT) of specially selected personnel. 
There are indications of a difference of opinion among the COS as 
to who the COO was to be, for on 12 June 1940 the Admiralty candidate, 
Lieutenant General A. G. B. Bourne., the Adjutant General Royal Marines, 
(AGRM), was appointed rather than the Army candidate, Brigadier J. F. 
Evetts. Exretts was still to be included in the organisation, and it 
seems that Bourne was to be concerned with -policy and general direction 
of operations while Evetts was to be the actual raiding commander. 
There was a measure of logic in the seler-tion of Bourne, since any 
offensive operation would of necessity be a combined oDeration, 
probably involving the Royal Marine Brigade. Bourne was considered 
to have the bacl., ground and experience to conduct such affairs effec- 
tively, and from the Admiralty point of view it would also maintain 
the naval predominance in combined operations established since the 
early days of the ISTDC. 
The COS on 13 June 1940 directed the JPSC to draft, in consulta- 
tion with Bourne, a directive for the COO. A number of specific 
guidelines were given, among which were that Bourne was to have 
control oXrer all operations, conventional or unconventional, against 
the occupied coast, and that he should be Rept informed of all other 
unconventional oDerations conducted elsewbere. He was to have control 
of the ISTDC, and would keep in constant touch with the operational 
and intelligence staffs of the three service departments. He was to 
determine his reouirements for landing craft immediately, ý)Ianning 
for the use in the near future of one infantry brigade grouD. He 
7. COS 40 176 Mtg 11 Jun 40, CAB 79/5. 
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was also to receive the parachute troops as nart of his forces. 
I 
These guidelines indicated'one very important change from the 
discussions of 11 June 1940, for they omitted any reference to the 
Royal Marine Brigade. This was confirmed as deliberate on 14 
June 1940, the rationale being that the brigade's contingency role 
in Eire was outside of the COO's geographical area of responsibility. 
This arrangement may have been seen as a merely temnorary one, for 
9 
it is doubtful that the nlanners could have foreseen the Royal Marines 
being held in readiness for contingency operations in the Atlantic 
through 1941. It did create the anomaly of the only regular formation 
raised for raiding being left out of the raiding organisation, and 
caused the transformation of the Army 'commandos' into regular units 
cast in the original role of the Royal Marines. The Post-war organ- 
isation of the Royal Marines as the British commando force only high- 
lights this fact. 
The War Office, who already had the orp , anisation 
for unconventional 
oDerations, remained op-nosed to the concent. of the COS of an overall 
commander, contending that the COO should be restricted, as the JPSC 
had recommended, to conventional raiding operations. Anthony Eden, 
the Secretary of State for War, wrote to Churchill on 13 June 1940 
in regard. to the organisation for unconventional onerations. On the 
basis of papers originating in MI(R), the original section of the 1%'ar 
Office concerned uith guerrilla warfare and now closely linl, -, ed with 
113 9, Eden -Dronosed the creation of a s-necial denartment in the 11. ar 
Office which would include aDplicable operations of the Secret 
8. COS(40) 179 Mtg 13 Jun 40, CAB 79/5. 
9. COS(40) 181 Mtg 14 Jun 40, CAB 79/5- 
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Intelligence Service and C, %mpbell-Stuartls organisation. )Iaior 
General H. L. I. smay, of the Secretariat, wrote a covering letter to 
this, explaining to Churchill that the COO would have a similar 
function and suggesting that it would be sufficient to have the 
Inter-Service Planning Board, the coordinating body for the intelli- 
gence sphere, to link the COO with the Secret Intelligence Service 
and Cwnnbell -Stuart. Eden's T)roposal was therefore not considered 
10 
further. 
The Director of Military O-Derations and Plans (DMO&P) in the 
War Office, Brigadier Otto Lund, was one of the main defenders of 
the senaration of conventional and unconventional operations. Lund 
had been instrumental in the founding of the 'commando' troops, and 
controlled M0 9. He i%Tote to the Vice Chief of the Imnerial Ceneral 
Staff the same day, 13 June 1940, reiterating his nosition that the 
COO should be limited to the conduct of conventional raids on the 
coast of up to divisional size and to the training of other formations 
of the three services for combined operations. Although the COO 
might call upon the unconventional forces for assistance in his own 
operations, Lund maintained that the lorganisation, training, and 
operation of the irregular forces is much better left in the hands of 
11 
the MO and MI sections which are now specialising in this subject. 
This viewv ýas sunnorted by Lt. Colonel Dudley Clarke, the head of 
12 
ýY) 9. 
After discussions with the COO, the JPSC submitted a draft 
directive to the COS on 15 June 1940. BacRed by the War Office, the 
10. Ismay to Churchill 14 Jun 40, PRU-37S30/9. 
11. DAMIP to VCIGS 13 -Jun 40, WO 193/3S4. 
12. ClarRe, T). 216 
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JPSC had disregarded the guidelines laid down by the COS and had 
institUtionalised the division between conventional and unconventional 
operations. Further arguments A ýere put forward for this distinction, 
to the effect that, as unconventional onerations would extend far 
beyond the occupied coast, the organisations responsible, though 
liaisinp closely with the COO, should remain inde-nendent. The JPSC 
thought that there would be no duplication or interference, and that 
co-operation might occasionally be possible. 'Fhere was a good deal 
to be said for this new line of argument, and the COS finally gave 
their a-)T)roval. 
The JPSC bad further categorised conventional operations into 
raids and combined operations intended to seize and hold strategic 
objectivesl such as the contingency oT)erations then planned in Eire 
or against the Portuguese Atlantic islands. 11;, hile Bourine would be 
resT)onsible for -raids against the German occupied coast, the second 
category of combined operations would be the resnonsibility of the 
appointed commanders worhing through normal service channels. 
Because of the similarities in the material and techniques involved 
in both tynes of oneration, it was accented that 
Although it is essential that, when a commander is a, T)pointed 
for any combined operation, he should be solely responsible 
for its planning and execution, the assistance of a -nermanent 
expert organisation, to act in an advisory capacity, would 
prove of considerable value. 
Bourne's control of the ISTDC would enable him to serve as the authority 
on, landing operations, and he was thus given the dual function of 
'Commander of Raiding Operations on Coastsin Enemy Occupation and Ad- 
viser to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Onerations', controlling the 
13 
Directorate of Combined Operations. 
13. JP(40 244 or COS(40) 467 (JP) 'Directive to General Bourne' 
JS Jun 40, CAB 84/1S. 
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This directive was clearly a victory for the JPSC, who saw 
most of the points made in their aide memoire of 6 June 1940 retained. 
The new organisation would not be resT)onsible for unconventional 
operations nor for combined operations other than raids. The title 
given to Bourne also would seem to imply that be would only be responsi- 
ble for raids on the occupied coast of northern Europe, and not in 
other areas. Bourne's operational resnonsibility was thus effectively 
limited to the one type of operation whicli the JPSC had considered 
to be the least promising. He was given an advisory role in other 
operations, but this was an aA-ward arrangement that would lead to 
many other problems. This restricted role may have suited the T)Ianners, 
jealous of their authority, but it was far different that what 
Churchill had intended, and the seeds of trouble were soi%Ti. Bourne 
readily accepted the limitations in the directive, i.. Titing on 23 
June 1940 that 
It is neither desirable nor necessary that the activities of 
this Directorate should in any way supersede those of the ISPS. 
The DCO staff should be represented during the prenaration 
stages of any plan which may involve a landing in the face 
of opposition. They can not only give advice but can T)reT)are 
the technical operational nlan for the landing itself. When 
the commanders are apnointed the most suitable meeting place for 
them is in the operations room of the DCO Directorate, where 
all assistance can be given them. Close touch will be main- 
tained throughout with the ISPS who should continue to insure 
that executive action is taken by the service department con- 
cerned. 
-In general, the activities of this Directorate may use- 
fully be simuned up as Ito assist and not to supersede the 14 
existing organisations for raiding and for combined onerations. 
The full directive is reproduced at Appendix A. 
The DCO's responsibilities were reasonablý well defined, but 
there was some difficulty about the command arrangements. The most 
complex problem arose in regard to the military forces. W9 was to 
14. I!, lemorandum by 10' 23 Jun 40, DEFE 2/698. 
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be the DCO's contact in the War Office for all military forces, 
although it had been organised to direct the Cominandos in imcon- 
ventional operations. The Independent Comnanies from the Nonýegian 
camDaign, originally formed as unconventional units tmder MI(R), 
and now tinder 1109, were deemed conventional units tinder Bourne's 
control for raiding. The parachute units, although they were to come 
from the Couuflandos, were also to be tinder Bourne's control. The 
Commandos themselves, although intended for an unconventional role 
and thus outside of Bourne's scoT)e, were being used initially for 
small conventional raids. These operations were Bourne's responsi- 
bility and so the CoiTnandos were also included in his directive. MO 
9 and the Commandos were thus responsible to two different aoencies 
for two t)mes of operations. The delineation between the two was 
vague, and in the early days M(R) even sent representatives to 
Bourne's staff meetings. As one section of the Way Office commented 
on 20 June 1940, 'Ris is getting, as we Am, into a perfectly 
is 
glorious mddle'. 
Other difficulties v., ere also being encountered in regard to 
the Army brigade group promised the DCO. War Office feeling had 0-I 
been, as in the JPSC recommendations of 6 June 1940, that a force 
of up to a division might be required for combined operations. 
Contingency operations against the Azores and Cape Verdes had since 
been planned, and the immediate need for trained troops had caused 
the 11, 'ar Office to earmark two brigades of Major General B. L. Mont- 
gomery's 3rd Division for them. It was then thought that the 
third brigade of this division would be one Bourne would use for 
raiding. As brigades of this division were sent on operations 
they would be replaced by other brigades, 
15. GSD to CSS 20 Jun 40, WO-193/378. 
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so that there would always be a division trained for combined 
operations in hand. This scheme being adopted, there was no need 
for Evetts to serve as the raiding commander, as Montgomery could 
16 
perform this function. By 4 July 1940, however, the entire 3rd 
Division was reassigned to other tasks, being re-Aaced by the Royal 
Marine Brigade for operations against the Azores and Cape Verdes. 
Bourne was thus left without any -regular formations for raiding, and 
also i.., ithout a raiding commander. The War Office would later attemDt 
to combine the Independent Companies and Commandos into formalised 
Special Service Battalions in a Special Service Brigade, which it 
may have viewed as the renlacement for the regular brigade group. 
The Commandos and Independent Companies, in performing this task of 
raiding, soon lost all connection with the unconventional operations 
for which they had originally been raised, organised, and equipped. 
The Special Service Brigade organisation x.., ould revert from Special 
Service battalions to Commandos in early 1941, but its role would 
remain unchanged. The function of raiding commander, with the de- 
parture of Montgomery, was assumed by Bourne, and this arrangement 
was also to lead to difficulties in the future. 
When Bourne began to look at possible raids, the need for a 
central agency, able to coordinate the political and military aspects 
of all offensive operations, became even more anParent. On 3 July 
1940 he therefore suggested th'at it was both practicable and desir- 
able to appoint a cabinet minister, idth a small staff, to -perform 
this function. The minister would tie together the activities of Z> 
MI (R) , MI 9 and MO 9 at the War Of fi ce; MI 6 and Section D at the 
16. Memorandum by CIGS 18 Jun 40, /384. 
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Foreign Office; Campbell-Stuart's org, -uiisation at the Foreign 
Office and the Nlinistrýy of Information; MI s at the liom Office-, and 
17 
the DCO. Similar T)roposals, unk-nown to Bourne, had been made by 
some of the other agencies involved, and on 1 Tuly 1940 the Foreign 
Secretary had T)resided over a meeting concerned with the coordination 
of subversive activities. 'Mis was the beginning of the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE), which was formally established on 19 
July 1940. 
Bourne discussed his proposal with the COS and the service 
Directors of Intelligence on 8 July 1940. His scheme was not totally 
satisfactorv, but all concerned agreed that the current system for 
controlling offensive and unconventional operations needed revision. 
Further military study of this issue was overtaken by the establish- 
ment of the SOE. In an interview in 1942, Bourne mentioned that the 
DCO was intended to come under the SOE, as he himself had suggested, 
but that his successor did not like the idea and -nersuaded Churchill 
to leave the DCO as an independent agency. As all the records -Der- 
tinent to the SOE are still closed this can not be confirmed, but 
it does seem reasonable. 
18 
The months of June and Jul), 1940 had been a -period of change in 
the United Kingdom, with new strategies being develoT)ed and new 
organisations being formed. The delineation between some of these 
organisations was very vague. The JPSC had from the start made a Z' 
distinction between conventional and unconventional onerations, and 
bad intended to keep the control of the unconventional onerations 
17. COS(40) 52'S`0-ffensive and Irregular Oneration! ýý5-Jul 40, C-, %B 
80/14. 
18. COS(40) 212 Mtg, CAB 79/S and WO Brief on COS(40) S23 8 Jul 40, WO 
193/378. For origins of SOE see 1M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France (London 
1966), pp. 6-9. 
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in the hands of the War Office. Although Bourne bad seemed to agree 
witb this, he was at the end still proposing a merger of these func- 
tions. The establishment of the SOE, a product of other political 
maneuvering, did at least clarify the position of the DCO. The 
anomalous position of HO 9 and the Commandos was resolved, and they 
became nart of the DCO organisation for conventional operations. 
MI(R) went over to the unconventional side, and apparently ceased 
its regular attendance at DCO Meetings. The major loser in this 
struggle would seem to be the War Office, which lost part of its 
conventional raiding responsibility to tile DCO and all of its 
unconventional responsibilities to the SPE. This had its effect on 
the new organisation's relationship with the senrice ministries. As 
Clarke would later iv-, rite 
... from the date of General Bourne's aoDointment a subtle 
change crept into our -relations with the War Office and 
the Admiralty. 1, Je did not detect it straight away, but 
gradually found fair weather giving place to squalls, and 
before long the troubles were starting. With the a, ppear- 
ance of a Lieutenant-General at the head of an embryo 
'Combined Ooerations Headquarters', the whole character of 
raiding began to change before it had even started. The 
Service Ministries saw their grip being loosened, for it 
was ceasing to be an affair of enthusiastic amateurs to 
whom. they had been ready to give every encouragement and 
help so long as they remained tinder their own control. 
Now control was -nassing to a brand new agency which was 
answerable onlv to the three Chiefs of Staff and the Prime 
Minister, an agency which had never been tested and of which 
conservative Whitehall was frankly sceptical. The War 
Office viewed the prospect of some five thousand soldiers 
in the new Commandos being removed bodily from tinder its 
hand at a moment iýhen every man might be needed for the de- 
fence of Enqland; while the Admiralty felt much the same 
in regard to the small craft and their crews. It was 
perhaps only human nature if their staffs began to lose 
a good deal of the enthusiasm for the new venture as a 
consenuence. 19 
The service departments were naturally loath to give un any more 
authority than they had to, and jurisdictional disputes were to be 
part of the scene until the end of 1941. 
- Clarke, po. 217-218 
7T 
Bourne, upon taldng up his appointment, had quickly produced more 
detailed proposals for the new organisation, presenting them to the 
COS on 20 June 1940. lie thought it desirable that the title of his 
appointment should inake it clear that be was responsible for the 
coordination of all offensive operations 'of the type under considera- 
tion' involving more than one service, and after some discussion 
agreement was reached that be should be termed Director of Combined 
20 
ODerations (DCO). This term iMDlied some fairly broad executive 
powers, and was Perhaps unfortmate. Bourne's successor, in later 
jurisdictional disputes, leaned on it a good deal, tending to over- 
look the qualifying clause just quoted.. 
The Combined Onerations Headouarters (COHQ) of the Directorate 
of Combined ODerations was very small. Besides Bourne there were 
three service denuties. The DeDuty Director of Combined Onerations, 
Military (DDCO(M)), was Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Hornby, wbose con- 
tact in the War Office was Clarke as the head of MO 9. The Deputy It 
Director of Combined Operations, Naval (DDCO(N)), was Illaund, whose 
contact in the Admiralty was Captain R. A. Garnons-Williams, PN, 
as the Assistant Director of the Onerations Division, Combined 
Operations, (ADOD(CO)). The Deputy Director of Combined Oýnerations, 
Air (DDCO(A)) was Group Cantain G. H. Bowman, but according to Bourne 
he 'did not put in an anpearance for some time'. During this i)eriod 
the Air Ministry would refuse to admit that the air role in combined 
operations called for an), particular specialisation, and conseQuently 
it did not think that there was enough work for a full-time DDCO(A). 
Boi%Tnan was accordingly also saddled with the development and training 
of airborne forces and the establishment of a 'special duty flight' 11 
20. COS-(40) 187 Mtg 20 Jun 40, CAB 79/S. 
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analogous to the naval raiding craft organisation, The latter concent 
was soon discarded, but his responsibility for airborne forces meant 
that lie sDent most of his time in the Air Ministry. A Royal Marine 
caT)tain served as the adjutant for týe COHQ, and Bourne initially 
asRed for a GSO 2 from each senrice to act as intelligence staff 
21 
officers. This staff was ahnost immediately seen to be inadequate, 
and was increased by three further GS02s to act as an operations 
staff and three GSO 3s to act primarily as liaison officers. The 
intelligence section was soon talen over by Captain John Knox, a Royal C, 
Navy officer recalled from retirement. Bourne was initially provided 
22 
with four rooms in the Admiralty to house the COHQ. 
Bourne reauested that a total of 2,000 men to formed into 
Jndependent Companies and S, 000 into CojTnandos, the latter figure 
including the parachute troops. He tried to regain operational 
control of the Royal Marine Brigade, but this unit was again ex- 
cluded. Bourne was, however, given control of the Brigade for 
training, and it was directed to make use of his advice on any 
operations it was assigned. Iýhile the programme look nromising, 
Bourne's immediate assets were meagre. 'Fhe only trained body of 
men he had available were the 3SO men of the first composite Commando. 
He was told that he could have any small craft in the United Kingdom 
that he wanted for raiding, butIthese boiled down to 22 that might 
21. A General Staff Officer (GSO) sewed in th ee grades. , GSO I 
was a Lt. Col. or equivalent, a GSO 2 was a AQ. or equivalent, 
and a GSO 3 was a Capt. or equivalent. 
22. References to the initial organisation are found in DP to VCAS 
13 Jun 40, Slessor papers VIII D; COS(40) 470 'Memorandum by 
Lt. Gen. Bourne' 18 Jun 40, C-U 80/13; COS(40) 187 Mtg 20 Jun 40, 
CAJ3 79/S; JP(40) 7 (ISPS) 'Instructions to General Bourne' 21 
Jun 40, CAB 84/93; and 'Memorandum by 
ýDCOI 
23 Jun 40, DEFE 2/698. 
The quote on Bov. -man is from llnten, iew with Lt. Cen. A. G. B. 
Bourne' 4 Aug 42, DEFE 2/699. 
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conceivably be usefull. Further investigation showed that only one 
of these might. be likely to make a cross-Channel trip, and this one 
broke down on the way to Dover. Bourne therefore had to rely on 
23 
seven RAF crash boats borrowed without the Air Ministry's knowledge. 
He quickly realised that, whatever the wishes or intentions of Church- 
ill and the COS, the raiding prograpne would be very limited for some 
time to come. 
Bourne was aware of Churchill's dislike of small operations, but, 
with the assets available, they seemed the only feasible course for 
the near future. He had inherited the T)lans for one such raid, termed 
COLIAR, which was directed against the Vrench-coast at Le Touquet, 
near Boulogne. This raid was conducted on the night of 24/2S June 
24 
1940, but had little success. On 10 July 1940 Bourne then drafted 
a reasoned memorandum outlining a policy for such operations. He 
emphasised that all offensive operations should be related to the 
plan by which the war would ultimately be won. In the absence of 
any clear instructions, he had set the goals of his Directorate as 
the destruction of the enemy's resources, the forcing of the enemy 
to expend his resources, and the making of the enemy's life as hard 
and as uncertain as possible. The sooner these were achieved the 
sooner would victory be -oossible, and he therefore T. )lanned to conduct 
small raids as soon as weather conditions and his limited -resources 
would permit. Bourne was aware that this policy might come under 
criticism for being merely a series of 'pinpricks', but he was con- 
fident that 
those pinpricks very materially assist us in the general 
23. 'Inteniew with Lt. Gen. A. G. B. Bourne. ' 4 Aug 42, NIT-e-2-7-6-99. 
24. H. St. George-Saunders, The Green Beret, (London 1971) gives a 
good account of this raid, i_. _1_8_-_22__, _though the date is incorrect. 
Another account is in Buckley, T)P. 167-168. The date is con- 
firmed from the entry in the CnHQ War Diary 24 Jun 40, DEFE 2/1. 
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ý? ol icy. . .. and wi 11 not in any way prevent us carrying, out 
larger and more imT)ressive raids when the means are forth- 
coining... These more s7)ectqcular raids will be coming in 
due course", but they will only differ from the smaller raids 
in that they will týnd to maRe the enemy exnend still more 
guns instead of butter, and cause more enemy to be harried 
and made miserable. 'Mey will not produce any new effect 
and therefore my contention is that the sooner we start the 
T)rocess the sooner the war will end... 
I submit therefore that my present policy of staging 
small raids is in conformity with correct war policy, and 
that these small raids should be permitted to ýontinue until 
such time as larger raids could be started, and later in 
conjunction with such larger raids. 
This view was sunported by the War Office, which felt that his 
actions were 'being hamnered very seriously by a lack of drive, 
due to uncertainty as to whether his raiding policy has the whole- 
2S 
hearted suT)T)ort of the Chiefs of Staff The War Office felt that 
26 
Bourne's policyshould receive 'unqualified annrovall. 
Bourne Tnet Churchill for lunch just after he had written the 
memorandum above, but did not manage to dissuade Churchill from his 
desire to conduct much larger raids. Churchill had earlier been 
given an outline of the full raiding organisation that was to be 
established, and was apparently unwilling to accept that the forces 
27 
proposed would not be available for some time. Bourne then met 
the COS on 12 July 1940 to discuss his policy. It was again apnar- 
ent that the Prime Minister, rather than the COS, was the main 
opponent of -the small -raid policy. 'Ihe second raid for the COHQ 
had just been apy)roved, and, -rather than suý)port Bourne's T)YoT)osals 
and provoke a confrontation with Churchill, the COS deferred con- 
sideration of his policy until after the results of this raid were 
2S. COS(40) 544 'Raiding Operations Policy' 10 Jul 40, CIU 80/14. 
26. IVO Brief on COS(40) 542 (sic) 11 Jul 40, WO 193/384. 
27. 'Inteiwiew with Lt. Gen. A. G. B. Bourne' 4 Aug 42, DEFE 2/699. 
28 
hnomi. The raid, termed AMMSSM)OR, was conducted against Qiei-nsey 
29 
the night of 14. -IS July, and was a comnlete failure. 
Despite the failure of the first two raids, the War Office 
still supported Bourne's Policy. On 22 July 1940 Eden wrote to 
Churchill exnlainingg his views on the four nbases of future offensive 
operations. He thought the first would be the reconnaissance and 
experimental phase of very small raids; the second a series of 
'constant smash-and-grabl operations conducted along the coast; 
the third large combined operations against important objectives; 
and the fourth the conduct of major offensive onerations inland. 
The forces for the second phase were then in the nrocess of formation, 
and Eden thought it necessary that they be 'blooded' by modest 
'mosquito raids'. These would also serve the purposes of recon- 
naissance, the development of material and technique, and the creation 
of a good 'moral effect'. One or two raids a week, of not more than 
200 men. were forecast. As soon as regular formations could be 
released from home defence duties and could be trained they would 
initiate the third phase by tackling objectives too well defended 
for the raiding forces. As long as the onerations were raids the 
DCO would be responsible, but if they were intended to seize and bold 
bridgeheads the normal service channels would be used. Eden also made 
8. COS(40) 219 Mtg 12- Jul 40, CALB -TYTS-. 
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29. See St. George-Saunders, pp. 23-25 and Bucl\le-, T, T)D. 169-171. 
These two accounts differ in minor details. Peter Young, 
Commando (New York 1969) oives a brief description of both earl-, 
raids on -nT). 13-15. John Durnford -Slater, Commando (London 19S3) 
gives a good first-hand account of the raid. fie mentions that 
it was originally scheduled for 12-13 July, and the postT)onement 
may have been due to the need to secure Churchill's a-Dnroval. The 
more detailed account in max, wavs, T)articularly of the recon- 
naissance measures, is Charýes ýruic_kshanl,, The Cerman Occunation 
of the Channel Islands (London 197S), nn. 8S-90. 
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the point that, in the first two phases, the Army was JR-ely to have 
30 
more trooDs available than the RAF or Navy could transnort. 
IlAs anproach had a good rationale behind it, but it was a very 
long-term programme. The British would be restricted to the first 
two Pbases for a considerable Period. This ran counter to all of 
Churchill's concepts. He intensely disliked small raids, considering 
it 'unworthy of such a large entity as the British Opire to send over 
31 
a few cutthroats'. His reply to Men set a policy that effectively 
stopped further raiding against the Continent until the fall of 1941. 
It would be most unwise to disturb the coasts of any of 
these (the occu-Died) coutries by tbp 'kind of silly fiascos 
which were -nerpetrated at Boulogne and Guernsey. The idea 
of working all these coasts up against us by Din-prick raids 
and fulsome conununinues is one to be strictly avoided. 
32 
Churchill was then thinking in terms of two to three raids of 
between S, 000 to 10,000 men being conducted against the French coast 
during the i6nteT of 1940-41, and it would be only after these that 
he would consider small raids. The differences between his inten- 
tions and British capabilities is evident here, for it was not until 
1942 that the British were in a position to mount such a large raid. 
This bar on small raiding -placed both Bourne and the Directorate 
in a difficult nosition. Bourne's directive limited him to raids on 
the coast of northern Ebrone, and his canability limited him to small 
raids at that. Since these were not to be allowed, the onerational 
reouiTement for the Directorate was questionable. The advisory role 
remained, but t1here were nroblems with this that would surface at a 
later date. Bourne himself was in an awRward nosition, for he was 
an avowed proponent of a policy that had now been exnressly repudiated 
30. Eden to urchill 22 Jul 40, PRBI 3/330/9. 
31.1 Intenieiv with Brigadier O. M. Lund' 8 ',! ay 42, DEFE 2/699 
32. Churchill to Eden 23 Jul 40, PM-J 3/330/9. 
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by the Prime Minister, 'flie ll. ar Office continued its sunnort, but 
this bore little -weight as its own credibility was rather low in 
Clurchill's eyes. 
One area in which Bourne did lay a solid foundation was that of 
combined operations training. It soon became clear that the area 
around the ISTDC was not safe enough to base the shipping, and Loch Fyne 
in Scotland was selected as a suitable site. A meeting was held in 
the War Office on 18 July 1940, and agreement secured that a Combined 
Training Centre (CTC) should be established under Vice Admiral Theo- 
33 
dore, Hallet, who would be termed the VACTC. Hallet, who was to re- 
port to the DCO, took command of the CTC at Loch Fyne on I Sentember 
1940. It was commissioned on 1S October 1940 as fPIS Quebec. 
During July 1940, the princinle was accepted by all parties in- 
volved that formations should be rotated through the CTC, rather- 
34 
than concentrating on one or two specialist brigade groups. Few 
troops could, under the circumstances, be made available for this 
training, and the first battalion of Ist Corps only started its 
35 
cycle on 4 November 1940. Because of the continuous eannarking I Z' 
of forces for contingency operations, however, and the shortage of 
landing craft, training of other formations for combined operations 
remained a low priority, and less than two divisions were to be 
36 
trained by April 1942. 
33. Bourne to DMT 11 Jul 40; DSD to DCO 16 Jul 40; and 'Plinutes of 
Meeting held by DSD on 18 July to discuss 'Arrangements for a 
Training Centre for Combined Operations' 18 Jul 40, WO 193/378. 
34. COS(49) 241 Mtg 30 Jul 40, OB 79/15 and MS(40)SS7 'Training in 
Combined Aerations' 30 Jul 40, CAB 80/1S. 
3S. Note to C-in-C Home Forces 14 Oct 40 and 26 Oct 40, WO 193/378 
36. COS(41) 406 Mtg 3 Dec 41, CIALB 79/16. 
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CMT'FF, R IV 
COMBINET OPERATIONS ORCANISATION (2) 
THE APPOINTMENT OF "URAL OF THE FJ, Eh-r SIR ROGER 
KEYES AS DIRECFOR OF COMBINED OPERATIONS 
Although Churchill had in effect started the nrocess that led to 
the establishment of the Directorate of Combined (ý)erations, the T)ro- 
blems associated with the fall of France and the entrance of Italy 
into the war had nrevented the COS from discussing its formation in 
detail with him. Knowing what imnortance Churchill attached to 
offensive operations, they had gone ahead alone with the apnointment 
of Bourne and the nreparation of his directive. Churchill i,,, as first 
annraised of their actions in a note by Ismay on 20 June 1940. 
Immersed in other, more serious matters, Churchill merely noted t1lis 
on 22 June 1940, asking for a weekly nrogress report. It was not 
until 30 June 1940, when Churchill received Bourne's first nrogress 
report, that the realisation dai%med uT)on him that Bourne was the foymer 
2 
AGRIL The two met for the first time since Bourne's anpointment on 
2 Jul), 1940. Churchill did not seem too haT)T)y about Bourne's appoint- 
ment., and was narticularly irritated that he had not been consulted. 
lie therefore asked his secretary to determine exactly how this anpoint- 
ment had come about. Bourne was an ex-Perienced officer, though he has 
been characte rised as rather 'Pedestrian' . He worked well within the 
Admiralty channels, but might not be canable of breaking loose from 
them to form the independent organisation that Churchill deemed nec- 
3 
essary to produce some vi. gorous action. Bourne's advocacy of a 
1. Ismay to Churchill 20 Jun 40 and Jacob to Seal 6 Jul-T)-, -PRIM 3/330/S. 
2. Ismay to Churchill 24 Jun 40 and annotation 30 Jun 40, PRBI 3/32/1 
and hourne to Churchill 30 Jun 40, PRDI 3/330/S. 
3. Interview of Autbor with Maj. Gen. J. L. ýIoulton, 10 Nov 1978. 
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small-scale raiding policy, anatbema to Churchill, also told heavily 
against him. On 7 July aurchill notified the COS tbat: 
I was surorised not to have been consulted 
beforehaný in the a-Dnointment of AGRM which 
arose from various minutes I bad sent to the COS 
Committee. Tt is always better to mention a 
matter of this inportance, involving the three 
services, to me beforehand, especiahy wlien I 
myself am taking a great interest in it. However, 
I gladly anprove, as a temnorary and emergency 
measure, th-e interim stens which the COS Committee 
took. I have the highest o, pinion of General 
Bourne's services as AGRNI, and of his powers of 
emergency imProvisation. The scoý)e which I 
desire may be given to these oDerations is, 
however, far more extensive than is at -nresent 
foreseen, and I have come to the conclusion that 
their planning must be entrusted to an officer 
of seniority and proved way aqhievement. 
It is an oft-commented weakness of Churchill that he relied too much 
on old friends from World War IY and this can be seen in this note. 
For the post of DCO he suggested either Lord Trenchard, Lord Cork, 
or Sir Roger Keyes. Churchill added that his oun judgement turned 
4 
on Keyes, and asked for the COS opinions. This was aDnarently a 
not unexpected choice. Hornby iý., as later to urrite that Keyes 'had 
been hanging about in the background for some time, and we in COHQ 
always realised there was an odds-on chance of him being apPointed 
5 
as soon as excuse could be found to do so'. It is certain that 
the COS, and in uarticular Pound, opposed this appointment. There is 
very littlerecord of the conversations leading un to Keyes' eventual 
aT)-nointment, though Pound was later to write that 'Keyes intrigued 
6 
himself, against the advice of the COS, into the position'. 
On 17 July 1940 Churchill sent a note giving his decision to the 
4. Jacob to Seal and Churchill to 1smay, 6 Jul 4Q PPD-1 3/330/5. 
S. Intenriew with Brig. Hornby 28 Mar 42, DEFE 2/699. 






nointed Sir Roger Keyes as DCO. lie should tale 
over the duties and resources now assigned to General Bourne... 
General Bourne should be informed that owing to the larger 
scope now to be given to these onerations, it is essential 
to have an officer of higher raA in charge, and that the change 
in no way reflects unon him or upon. those associated with him... 
I formed a high oninion of this officer's work as AGRM, and in 
any case the Royal MariDeS must -r)lay a leading part in this 
organisation. 
Pending further arrangements, Sir Roger Keyes will form 
gh 
General Ismay contact with the service departments throug 
as representing theMinisterof Defence. 
7 
Sir Roger Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet and MP for Portsmouth 
North, was then 67 year old. The commander of the famous Zeebrugge 
raid in 1918, he bad left active service in 1931 and was formally 
retired in 1934. From 1934 until his elevation to the peerage in 
1943 he served as an MP. He was a close nersonal friend of Churchill's, 
having lmoi%n him since 1903-4, and had been a strong supporter of 
Churchill from the Gallipoli campaign through the defence debates 
8 
of the Thirties. He i)ossessed a tremendous personal nugnacity, 
a great faith in his oi%m ability to lead men in combat, and not a 
little desire for nersonal glory. As a retired officer, he had not 
been kept abreast of Admiralty planning, but the war had barely 
started before he began to criticise the Admiralty for its T)assive 
conduct of onerations and the 'lack of any attempt at immediate 
offensive action'. 
Keyes had approached Churchill as early as 4 September 1939 with 
some ideas for action, and Churchill had volunteered then that, after 
he had time to look around, he would find a 'mission' for Keyes. 
Keyes' mounting criticism of the Admiralty, sharpened by his frustra. - 
A Murchill to Ismay 17 Jul-40, DEFE 2/698. 
Details of Keyes can be found in C. Asninall-Oglander, Roger 
Keyes (London 19S1) 
9. Keyes to his Wife Eva S SeD 39, K 13/21. 
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tion at being excluded from current n1anning, steadily increased the 
difficulty of finding emolo, . ýment 
for him. The Admiralty, and in 
particular the aS, Admiral Pound, became even more reluctant to deal 
with him, and the gaT) widened further. nn 1 November 1939 Keyes again 
complained to Churchill that his 'unique experience, was 'not being 
10 
made use of in any way'. 
Keyes' dissatisfaction with the Acki-ralty reached its height 
during the Nonýegian campaign. He had some pronosals for offensive 
action against Trondheim which had been disrep, arded, leaving a great 
deal of bad blood between himself and Pound. Keyes was astonished by 
the withdrawal from Norway, and took part while in full uniform in the 
debate in the House on 7 and 8 May 1940 over the government's con- 
duct of the war. He was one of the chief critics of the government, 
and his sneech was regarded by some observers as having had a major 
influence on the change in the government. I 
Keyes' estrangement from the Chief of the Naval Staff must have 
been obvious to Churchill, but, in his oi%m imDatience for offensive 
action, something the service departments "had not seemingly produced 
thus far, Churchill stood by his old friend, believing that he alone 
would be able to instill the bold offensive spirit that the occasion 
demanded. It is even nossible that Churchill may have considered 
maRing Keyes the head of the COS, but if so this idea was quickly 
12 
dronped at the realisation of the onT)osition it would encounter. 
10. Keyes to Churchill I Nov 39, K 13/12. 
Aspinall-Oglander, p. 349 and Keyes to Churchill 4 Jul 40, 
K 13/13. 
12. Sir John 111heeler-Bennett, Action This Day - Working With 
Churchill (London 1968) pp. 62-63 and R. Leivin, Churchill 
as Warlord (London 1973) T). 8. 
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(liuTcbill, as headstrong as he was, was not one to go against the 
unanimous oninion of his T)rofessional service advisors. As it stood, 
Pound's objections to Keyes' annointment as the DCO bode ill for the 
13 
future. 
The COS were informed that Keyes bad taRen over as DCO on 19 July 
1940. A discussion ensued on his title, and it was finally agreed to 
retain that devised for Bourne. No nublicity was to be given to the 
14 
new aDpointment. The mariner in wTAch this appointment had been 
handled was to have a very detrimental effect on the development of the 
combined operations organisation. As evidenced by Churchill's comments 
in the note of 7 July 1940, in regard to operations 'far more extensive 
than is at present foreseen', and in the note of 17 July 1940, on 
the 'larger scope to be given to these operations', his expectations 
of future large-scale combined onerations, mirrored by Keyes himself, 
seems to have been the decisive factor in the appointment of Keyes, 
though the exact phraseology may in nart have been an atteMDt to 
justify the a,. -), Dointment of an Admiral of the Fleet. Bourne was, 
after all, a Lieutenant General and the AGRM, and even the whole group 
of forces then promised could well have been handled by an officer of 
his rank. But, as has been noted, Bourne favoured small raids, whereas 
is 
Keyes was more 'Zeebrugge minded'. There was also little doubt that 
Keyes could wrench the rather revolutionary organisation then being 
formed out of the stifling grip of the service departments, as Churchill 
thought necessary, although the resulting antagonisms would make the 
proner integration of the combined werations organisation into the 
machinen, for the conduct of the war a well-neigh unattainable goal. I 
C. 
13. Asninall-Oglander, n. 333 
14. COS(40) 228 litg 19 Jul 40, CAB 79/S 
15. 'Intenriew with Brigadier O. M. Lund' 8 May 42, DEFE 2/699. 
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nere is, most unfortunately, no record of Keyes' discussions 
with Churchill zibbut the scc)n. e Of his appointment. Keyes was cer- 
tainly to consider himself the Prime Minister's deputy for combined 
operations, a point of view which was sup orted by his original re- lp 
norting arrangement through Ismay and by Churchill's direct annroaches 
16 
to Keyes for some early oDerations. 
Besides the personal factor, there were other pitfalls inherent 
in Keyes' appointment. Although it was soon clear that Churchill 
was thinking of Keyes conducting operations on a scale of S, 000 to 
10,000 men, no full explanation of the 'larger scope' of the DCO was 
17 
ever developed. Bourne's original directive, 
-with 
all its limita- 
tions, was consequently carried over without revision. Bearing in 
mind the COS' previous experience with Keyes, the), certainly would 
have had no inclination to increase his authority gratuitously. 
Keyes surprisingly acceDted the old directive without requesting 
alterations, most probably because he was confident, in the event of 
any dispute, of the support of Churchill. Both the COS and Keyes 
subsequently read into the directive whatever was convenient to 
themselves, and the resultant divergence of outlook was to cause 
friction throughout Keyes' tenure. All attempts to modifv the direc- 
tive by Keyes were looked upon by the COS as a threat to their 
rightful position as the sole responsible military advisors to the 
Government, while all attempts at revision on their part were re- 
garded by Keyes as an attempt to limit the authority personally in- 
vested in him by the Prime Minister. The COS' predominant mood of 
cautiousness, contrasted with Keyes' desire to go over to the 
16. Fergusson, 
17. Based on Churchill's coTments to Keyes in Churchill to Keyes w 2S Jul 40, K 140/3/1 and Churchill to Eden 23 Jul 49, PREM 
3/330/9. No detailed descriptions of the intended scone are 
available. 
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offensive, served to exacerbate this conflict, In many cases the 
advocacy of certain operations was on strictly partisan lines, with 
Churchill, or in minor cases Ismay, forced to act as arbiter. It 
was C1urchill himself who in August 1940 had to lay doi%m the guideline 
for the division of responsibility concerning raids, and who had to 
uTite the first new directive for Keyes in 1941. Though this inter- 
vention temporarily settled these disputesthis could hardly be 
termed a functioning system, the decisions being made thus freqtlentýy 
being compromises based on the exigencies of the moment rather than on 
a rational and comT)rehensive review of renuirements. 
Keyes inherited Bourne's small staff. Bourne was one of the 
few neo-ple who had a good working relationship with Keyes, and agreed 
to stay on for a time as the Deputy Director of Combined Nerations 
. 
(DDCO). The DDCO(M), DDCO(N), and DDCO(A) were then termed Assistant 
Directors, and became the ADCO(M), ADCO(N), and AXO(A) Yes-Dectively. 
They- were to be the points of contact with their own senrice de-oart- 
ments, and act as the authority on their oi%m service matters, such as 
training. The intelligence section was initially seen as the key 
component in the targeting T)rocess for raids, as well as a collection 
agency for both raiding and combined operations commanders until the 
operations were launched. Its actual use in combined operations was 
to vary with the views of the force commanders concerned. Keyes 
attempted to formalise its functions during the mounting of ýENkCE, 
the Operation against DA-ar in 1940, but was not successful. This 
intelligence service was equally offered to the service 791anning 
18 
staffs, though it was not used extensively. 
Keyes decided that as long as the COIIQ was housed in the Admiralty 
18. TCO Internal Organisation' undated, DEFE 2/698. 
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it would be looked upon as a mere appendage to tbat 6epartment. A 
search for a suitable office was conducted, and towards the end of 
August 1940 the Directorate moved into the War Cabinet Annexe at 
Ric'Mond Terrace. This move was opposed by Maund, who thought that 
the main task of the DCO should be the expansion of the landing craft 
19 
programme, which would require a close connection with the Admiralty. 
This was not the last time that Maund would take an Admiralty view-wint, 
and he would soon clash with Keyes. On the whole the move of the COHQ 
did seem to establish the identity of the organisation, and did assist 
it in becoming the first truly integrated tri-service organisation in 
20 
the United Kingdom. MO 9 and the ADOD(CO) remained in the War Office 
and Admiralty, respectively, and they did help -to keep the COHQ in 
touch with events. The change in raiding policy, however, confirmed 
by Keyes' appointment, meant that these sections did not always receive 
the fullest cooperation from their oim department. Dudley Clarke 
would later comment- 
With this change unfortunately there went too a further 
measure of the sympathy and supnort of the three service 
ministries, uDon which we on the lower levels so much de- 
nended. Being realists all, they looked for q* uick and 
visible dividends, and were not immediately imnressed with 
the promises of long-term anni-eciation as represented by 
the altered policy. To Garnons-Williams, Alan Hornby, and 
myself, negotiations with them grew in difficulty from 
then onwatds. 21 
There was little contact with the Air Ministry. Keyes was not 
content to have the services of Boi%man as ADCO(A) on a part-time 
basis only, and negotiations were conducted with the Air Ministn, in 
early August. Requests were also being made for RU officers for the 
19. Maimd, 1). 100. 
20. Fergusson, p. 54 
21. Clarke, T). 248. 
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urc and the ISTDC, but the Air Staff did not believe that combined 
operations was a 'full-time job for three officers, considering its 
own desperate need for qualified pilots. Hornby and Slessor finally 
agreed that the ADCO(A) -nost would be a full time one, but Boiýman 
was not 'anxious' to take it up, and was replaced by Wing Conriander 
G. M. Knocker, who bad originally served at the ISTDC. No officers Z; I 
were nrovided for the other two positions, but a squadron leader 
under the Deputy Director of Plans (MCI of the Air Staff was to serve 
22 
as Rocker's contact in the Air Ministry Staff. 
Bourne did not remain long with the COHQ. The First Lord of g 
the Admiralty wrote to Keyes on 14 October 1940 that Bourne had only 
temporarily been replaced as AGRIM by an officer called out of retire- 
ment, so that the position would -remain open should he -return. Some- 
thing definite now had to be decided, as the continuation of this 
arrangement would cause nroblems in the officer personnel structure 
23 
of the Royal Marines. Keyes agreed that, while Bourne's help and 
experience had been valuable in. the transition period, it iý., as no longer 
24 
fiýecessary to have an officer of Bourne's seniority as his denuty. 
Keyes therefore asked the VCICS if Homby could be promoted to brigadier I 
and apPointed DDCO, with an additional GSO 1 added as ADCO(M). The 
CIGS and Military Secretary balked at this, as Hornby was relatively 
junior in rank and they thought there were other officers with better 
claims. Keyes insisted that Hornby should be selected, as he wa-S 
already well experienced in the or)erations of the COHQ. The promotion 
seemed equitable to him as Hornby was both older and had longer senrice 
than the brigadier recently apnointed to command the raiding troops. 
22. DP to VC. kS 11 Aug 40, Slessor Paners 11111 D. 
23. Alexander to Keyes 14 Oct 40, K 13/2S. There is no indication of 
how long Bourne was originally expected to hold the nost of DCO. 
24. Keyes to Alexander 19 Oct 40 K 13/2S. 
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The VCIGS deferred to Keyes 'Personal wishes' on 31 October 1940, 
25 
and Homby became the DDCO. 
The COHQ, despite the provisions of its directive, was only 
incidentally involved in the planning for PENACE, the oneration 
against Dakar. This had grated on Keyes, and on 16 August 1940 
be submitted a memorandum to the COS on the system of planning for 
combined operations. 'My experience to date of the system outlined 
(in Paragraph 10 of his directive) leads me to propose the following 
modifications in procedure in order that fuller use may be made of 
the combined operations knowledge of this Directorate'. Keyes con- 
sidered that after the joint planning st: age the detailed planning 
should be done by the COHQ rather than the ISPS, with the ISPS being 
consulted in regard to details such as shipping. This had been the 
procedure for some earlier projects such as a raid on Kirkenes 
harbour. 1%lien the commanders of the operation had been anpointed, 
the COHQ should be resnonsible for arranging the provision of all 
necessary intelligence forthem, for assisting them with advice as 
required, and for liaison between them and the ISPS. The COHQ would 
also be responsible for assisting the commanders in any arrangements 
necessary for combined operations training, and for ensuring that 
the arrangements made by the ISPS were adequate for the execution 
of the commanders' detailed plans. Keyes also saw it within his 
Province to represent his views to the COS on the general outline 
of the commanders I plans, if for an), reason bethought it necessary 
26 
These proposals were not favourably received by the War Office, 
the coordinating agency of the JPSC. The rejoinder was that the 
2S. Keyes to Raining 24 Oct 40, Haining to Keyes 28 Oct 40, Keyes 
to Haining 28 Oct 40, and Haining to Keyes 31 Oct 40, DEFE 2/698. 
26. COS(40) 635 'Planning for Combined Operations' 16 Aug 40, CAB 
80/16. 
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first part of Keyes, pronosal was unnecessary, for as soon as commanders 
of operations were annointed they were the ones resnonsible for the 
detailed ? Ianni ng, assisted by both the ISPS and the DCO's staff, iiho 
theoretically had the advantage of having -previously studied the 
T)roblem. This was not, however, always the case as far as DCO's 
staff was concerned, as it was this very issue in the MINACE planning 
T)rocess that had promnted Keyes' paper. As far as the -provision of 
intelligence was concerned, the War Office held the somewhat extra- 
ordinary view that there had been, for ýEýIACE, no duT)Iication in the 
provision of intelligance from various sources, and that the establish- 
ment of a central coordinating agency would result in the T)roduction 
of less intelligence, rather than more. 'flie general feeling was that 
the ISPS was already nerforming most of the functions Keyes had listed, 
and so a reorganisation was not really necessary. The DCO was already 
considered to have some access to the COS on the cor. nanders' plans in 
his capacity as the Adviser on Combined Operations, and it anneared 
to the War Office that the function outlined by Keyes exceeded this, 
and might not prove acceptable. It was also held to be rather redundant, 
as Keyes already was, theoretically at least, 'consulted by the ISPS 
throughout the examination of any combined operations i3ro. ject and is 
at all stages in a position to state his views on the form which the 
plan is taking'. This was, as evidenced in the -planning for MENACE, 0 
an argument based on Keyes' position on paner, with comnlete disregard 
for the facts. It was due partly to a firm opinion by the War Office 
that Keyes' nosition as an advisor on combined oPerations iý., as nrimarily 
intended for those onerations for which he had a geographical interest, 
i. e., those on the Continent, and not for others such as MEXACE. The 
War Office brief on Keyes' proposals concluded by suggesting that: 
89 
more time might with advantage have been allowed for the 
examinatio. n. of the DCO's Proposals before consideration 
by the COS-than lias now bee .n possible, since there would 
appear to be no urgent reason for a change in the exist- 
ing system for the control of combined oDerations. The 
ISPS themselves, having first hand Imowledge of the T)Iann- 
ing machinery, should nerhans have been asked their views 27 
so that the COS could have a balanced view of the problem. 
The COS considered Keyes' T)aver on 17 August 1940, and after 
some discussion it was agreed to defer further consideration of it 
funtil the views of the comanders detailed for certain operations 
28 
and of the ISPS had been ascertained'. This was in effect an 
administrative pigeonholing of the question, as the formal comments 
of the MENACE commanders and - the target of Keyes' criticism - the 
ISPS were never -requested. The after action report for ý-, MNACE 
u, ritten by Major Ceneral N. M. S. T-Mn, however, did suix)ort some of 
Keyes' complaints, and 'proposed a role for the COH(I similar to the 
one given in Keyes' paper. The matter was nevertheless quietly 
forgotten by the COS, but not by Keyes. 
27. IVO Brie on C05(40)- 635 17 A-u-g4-0-, -IVV6 - fg-3-/ -3ýý4- 
28. COS(40) 269 mtg 17 Aug 40, CAB 79/6. 
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CHMFER V 
VE JOINT PlAN`NIING SYSTal 
This period also saw considerable changes in the ser-krice 
machinery for the conduct of the war. On 22 April 1940 the Admiralty 
and the Air Ministry had established the post of Vice Chief of Staff, 
and the DCNIS and DCAS became the VCNS and WAS resnectively. The 
War Office had followed suit on 27 May 1940, when the DCIGS became 
1 
the VCIGS. On 24 June 1940 the COS agreed that in order to cut 
down on paperwork and to allow time for them to concentrate on major 
issues of strategy, the NICOS would be authorised to deal with minor 
matters. The VCOS continued having separate meetings, under the 
old DCOS series, until 8 August 1940. After that the VCOS meetings 
2 
were held as i)art of the COS series. 
On 8 June 1940 the Directors of Plans decided that the JPSC 
and ISPS should be formally linled. The JPSC would control the work 
of the ISPS, a body of junior officers whose i)rimary function was 
to examine projects in detail and prepare co-ordinated operational 
3 
and administrative -olans on an inter-service basis. There was a 
common secretariat for both of these staffs. In his early days as 
Prime IMinister, Churchill was not content with the established ser- 
vice machiner'y, and this accounts for many of his original attempts 
to bypass it. The planning system received its share of his censure, 
and he soon decided to modify 'this important though uT) to now not 
very effective body, so that it would be more responsive to his 
1. f-MSO, The Second 1% 1 orld War- A luide to Doctunents in the Public 
Records Office (London 1972) gives the outlines of all the senrice 
ministry, organisations. 
2. COS(40) 191 Mtg 24 Jun 40, CAB 79/5. 
3. JP(40) S4 IMtg 8 Jun 40, CAB 84/2 and JP(40)1 (ISPS) 'Inter-Senrice 
Planning' 8 Jun 40, C-kB 84/93. 
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pprsonal requirements. On 24 August 194.9 he therefore told the CPS 
that the JPSC would henceforth work directly under the orders of the 
Minister of Defence. It would form part of his office and would work 
in the War Cabinet accomodations. The Directors of Plans were, 
however, to retain their present positions and contacts with the three 
service departments, though they would work out plans for projects 
as directed by Cliurchill himself. They would remain at the disposal 
of the COS for the elaboration of plans sent to them by the COS, and 
were also empowered, under certain conditions, to initiate plans of 
their own. All -plans, regardless of origin, were to be submitted 
to the COS for covnent, and if any diffQrences of opinion arose, 
the matter would be resolved by the Defence Committee (Operations). 
Churchill himself assumed the responsibility for informing the War 
Cabinet of projects in progress, although the COS' relationship to 
4 
the War Cabinet would supposedly remain unaltered. 
This new system received the formal approval of the War Cabinet 
on 26 August 1940. Churchill was later to write that the new 
organisation was 'readily accorded' him by all his advisers. This 
is stretching the -point, as the concurrence of the COS could at best 
be called grudging. Slessor objected, terming Churchill's decision 
a 'uRasel, but Portal feared that if the COS resisted the transfer 
of the JPSC Churchill would simply set up an independent planning 
staff of his oum. The COS were having trouble enough over Churchill's 
direct dealing with outside individuals and agencies. 'Major General 
R. H. Dewing, the new DO&P,. also insisted on a protest. The CIGIS, 
with the backing of Eden, anparently did so, but as lie v., as not 
4. Annex to JP(49) 421 'Joint Planning Arrangements' 6 Sen 40, CAB 
84/18. 
S. INN(40) 234 Mtg 26 Aug 40, CM 6S/8. 
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supported by the. CNIS or CAS it had no effect. In the end a workable, 
though unortbo(IoX. system was developed. Although Dewing was still 
to complain that the COS were I seriously undermined' , as time went 
on it became apparent that they bad retained a large measure of 
control. The ready availability of the planning system also served 
to curb Churchill's tendency to resort to outside sources. This had 
a great impact on the COHQ, as Keyes' influence was consequently 
6 
much reduced. 
It took a few weeks to iron out the administration of the system. 
An eXDansion of the planning staffs was required, and Churchill de- 
manded carefully selected officers who, all things being eaUal, should 
7 
have been wounded or at least seen active service in the current war. 
All planning papers would be sent directly to Churchill, with a simul- 
taneous submission to the COS under a covering note by the Directors 
of Plans. If the Directors of Plans wished to initiate any papers of 
their own, they could submit them directly to Churchill as long as 0 8 
anproval bad been secured from at least one of the COS. The detailed 
establishment of the new system was codified on 6 September 1940. The 
Directors of Plans controlled the Joint Planning Staff (JPS), which 
was divided into three sections. The former staff of the JPSC became 
the Strategic. Planning Section (SPS), located in the Cabinet War Room, 
which would examine and -report on strategic matters -relevant to the 
three services and on current or probable future strategic problems. 
It was also responsible for the Cabinet Ma-o Room. The former ISPS, 
6. Diary of Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing 26 Aug 40 to I SeD 40, held by 
Dewing's son and A. J. Marder, Operation Menace (London 1976), 
p. 26. For details on how Churchill used the system, see Lord 
Ismay, The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London 1960), pp. 158-176. 
The har Office view can be seen in Sir John N. Kennedy, The 
Business of War (London 1957). 
7. COS(40) 694 'Joint Planning Organisation' 1 Sep 40, CAB 80/17. 
8. JP(40) 88 Mtp, 30 Aug 40, CAB 84/2. 
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became the Executive Planning Section (EPS), located in the nlanning 
sections of the ýervice departments, which would plan all the execu- 
tive action necessary to put into effect both operations ordered at 
short notice and operations that had been planned by the third com- 
nonent, the Future Onerations Planning Staff (FOPS). The EPS would 
also assist the commanders appointed for any operation with the pre- 
paration of their operations orders. The FOPS was an entirely new 
section, located in Richmond Terrace, which would work out future 
onerational plans in as much detail as nossible, and subseauent1v 
keeD these plans up to date. 
All three sections were instructed'to consult as necessary with 
the DCO in his capacity as an adviser on the technical aspect of 
combined onerations. Reference was also made at this time to Church- 
ill's decision to divide the responsibility for raiding onerations 
between the DCO and the JPS, with Keyes being responsible only for 
raids of 5,000 or under. It is not definitely known what prompted 
this further limitation of the DCO, but it does follow the consistent 
9 
line of the service departments. This limitation was aT)-narently 
accepted without protest by Keves, much as he had accepted the limi- 
tation in the directive inherited from Bourne. The lack of resources 
for raids of a larger size may have mitigated against any dispute 
at this time. ' 
The formation of the FOPS had been delayed by the difficulty in 
finding suitable officers. The first member of the section reDorted 
v9 SeT)tember 1940, and the section was not comT)1ete til the for dut, un 
end of that month. A draft directive for the section was prepared 
on 8 SeDtember 1940 by the JPS and sent to Churchill, with a copy 
9. JP(40) 421 'Joint Planning Arrangements' 6 SeT) 40, LAB 84/18. 
10 
going to the COS. The Section was intended to nrepare onerational. 
plans for offensive action. This would be done in two stages, the 
first of which was the investigation and preparation of an outline 
nlan. This would ensure that the detailed nlan was based on sound 
assumntions and that any nreliminary decisions reached were brought 
to the attention of the COS at an early date. In addition, if it 
became clear that special material or preparations which renuired 
some time to develop and iinplement were needed for these plans, the 
arrangements for their provision could be initiated without delay. 
'T'he outline plan therefore had to include a statement of assumptions 
on which the n1an was based, the iiTmediate and ultimate objectives of 
the operation, its general nature, and the al-Mroximate strength of 
the forces and shipoing required. In particular the plan was to 
indicate the most suitable time of year for the operation, the T)ar- 
ticular conditions governing its practicability, any equipment which 
must be specially provided, any particular type of training which 
must be conducted by the forces involved, and any other preparations 
which required early action. The second stage comnrised the completion 
of the outline plan, after it had been approved by the Directors of 
Plans, in as much detail as was nossible. The FOPS was also given a 
tentative list of operations, in order of nriority, and was directed 
to submit outline. T)Ians for them as soon as -Dossible. 
/--"\ 
The FOPS studied these documents and came back to the COS on 14 
Sentember 1940. A number of T)oints concerning their planning respon- 
sibility were raised. They noted that they were apnarently 'only 
concerned with the nreparations in detail for combined oi)erations', 
although they were to rut fonvard outline recoinendations for other 
94 
10. COS(40) I (0)(JP) 'Future Nerational Planning' 8 Sen 40, CAB 
84/18 and COS(40) 302 ', Itg 9 Sep 40, CAB 79/6. 
95 
operations in furtherance of the general strategy. I'hey assumed that 
the>, would not -bb responsible 
for the production of the actual plans 
for these complementary oDerations, excent for co-ordination. Ilicy 
considered also that the outline plans for offensive operations 
should include action not only by the service department but also 
by such a2encies as T' and CaMDbell-Stuart's. The plans of these C, -- 
organisations should also be in accord with the broad strategic nlans, 
and the FOPS therefore recommended that they should advise, regardin'., 
the operations that they were planning, those organisations as to the 
areas and times when subversive action and pronap, anda should be 
undertaken, and that they themselves should be kent 'in a verv general 
picture' about plans for such action. Similarly, they thought that 
minor actions in SUDPOrt of the economic offensive, such as those 
pronosed to the DCO bNr the Ministry of Economic Vý'arfare, should not 
conflict with their planning. 'Mey therefore sought authority to 
include such minor operations in their plans, and also the right to 
be kept informed in general terms of other minor operations envisaged. 
Finally, in regard to the wbole subject of these minor operations, they 
noted that whereas the COS future strategy paper bad spoRen of the 
initial oi)erations as probably minor ones in sunpoyt of the economic 
offensive, no mention of these were made in their directive. They 
tequested clarification, as they assumed that they were not reponsible 
for minor operations other than those in furtherance of the major 
offensive plans. 
The Directors of Plans considered these points on 16 September 
1940. They reaffiýrmed their decision that all the outline plans 
should be nrepared before any worl, started on the detailed T)Ians, 
11. JP(40) 443 (S) IJPS' 14 Sep 40, CAB 84/18. 
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and noted that this would taRe at least two months, but they also 
agreed that before T)renaring any of the outline plans the FOPS 
should draw up as soon as possible their recommendations as to any 
basic material requirements, including landing craft and assault 
shipping. This tasRing marked the demise of the COHQ as a collabor- 
ator in the determination of material requirements, and it was not 
until late 1941 that it was again to share this function. The DCO 
would from time to time be asRed about the allocation of shipDing, 
but he was now an outsider in yet another part of the combined opera- 
tions system. Although this responsibility of the FOPS was logical, 
much of the assistance that could have been rendered by the COHQ 
was lost because of the organisational split between the COHQ and 
the JPS. 
The JPS also agreed that close liaison should be established I 
between the FOPS and the denartments resT)onsible for propaganda, 
and that the FOPS should include in their plans proposals for raids 
by the DCO in furtherance of major operations. The responsibility 
for proposing oDerations in furtbeyance of the economic offensive 
was given to the Strategic Planning Section, though, it would be 
12 
for the FOPS to formulate the actual T)Ians. 
f This internal discussion within the JPS reveals clearly just 
how limited was their view of the T)roner role of the DCO. All 
major combined operations were to be the resnonsibilitv of the FOPS. 
As far as minor raids were concerned, those foi-ming part of the plan 
in support of major operations were the responsibility of the FOPS, 
and those in suPT)oyt of the economic offensive were to be co-ordina- 
ted between the SPS and FOPS. 'Fhere was no mention of the DCO, even 
12. JP(40) 95 Mtg 16 Sep 40, CAB 84/2 and COS(40) 45 (0) 'Future 
Nerational. Planning: Supplementary Tnstructions to FOPS' 
18 ScD 40, CAB 84/18. 
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for technical advicc. It seemed that Keyes was to have no nart in 
general planning -at all. The overall emphasis suggests that the 
COHQ was viewed solely as an operational agency, involved in the 
detailed planning and execution of raids on the Continent, but con- 
cerned neither with the formulation of raiding policy nor with the 
integration of the raids into the general strategic plan. The ques- 
tion of whether this was the correct conceDt, or the most efficient 
use of the COHQ, was never gone into in any depth. The concept re- 
flected Keyes' interest in current operations, rather than in the 
long-range planning, and this system consequently came into being 
without any strong objections by the COHý. The continuing conflicts 
over current operations between the COHQ and the EPS served to mute 
any criticism that might have been made of the FOPS, and so the system 
was never accorded thorough analysis. 
While this planning organisation functioned reasonably smoothly 
in the internal triangle of the Prime Minister, COS and JPS, it did 
have a number of inherent friction -points with the DCO. The COHQ 
could never be consideredto be fully integrated into the system until 
a member of the DCO's staff was included in the composition of the 
JPS. lVithout. this link the ex-Dected close co-operation of the two 
bodies was entirely dependent on the existence of a harmonious working 
relationship that, with Keyes as DCO, was highly improbable. While 
it was'exT)ected that the JPS would coordinate with the DCO, there was 
no -provision for SUDervision to ensure that this was in fact done, 
or for arbitration if differences arose between them. As the COHQ 
was not on the JPS. worl, -ing paper distribution list, the DCO often 
did not see the JPS nyonosals until they reached their*final form. 
13 
13. JP (REVISE) 'Circulation- of JP PaT)ersl 18 Sep 40, CAB 
84/18. 
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The result v as frequently a collision at the COS level . Even here 
the DCO was pres6nt only at the invitation of the COS, and if an 
argument was in prospect the easiest course was simnly to exclude 
14 
him. 
The system was also designed to use the DCO only in an advisory 
caT)acity, which was not, Keyes believed, the intention of his appoint- 
ment. In his oT)inion the DCO was the 'Director' resnonsible for all 
asnects of combined onerations. The early practices had reinfored 
this view, and on the whole Keyes' feeling that his authority was 
being encroached uT)on is Lmderstandable, if not always justifiable. 
The definition of the raiding responsibi lity was another sore T)oint. 
Drawn up by Churchill without a detailed apr)reciation, it bore the 
imprint of a compromise solution made without an adequate survey of 
the missions and -roles involved. Even Churchill admitted that this 
definition solely by numbers was an iDexact one, and that there would 
be borderline cases which would have to be considered on an individual 
is 
basis. 
As noted above the creation of an internal planning system for 
Churchill's T)rojects, linked closely to the COS by virtue of the 
Directors of Plans' dual T)osition, effectively cut Keyes off from 
the easy access to Cliurchill and direct involvement in nlanning that 
he had, initially enjoyed. Keyes' lack of a position within the 
system, leaving him as a mere external adviser, greatly reduced his 
influence on the decision making process. This in nany respects 
14. That this was in fact done was admitted by Ceneral C. P. Price, 
who served on the secretariat, in an interview with the Author 
on 30 Nov 78. 
15. As in Ismay Draft to (lurchill 5 Nov 40 PRE-21 3/330/7. 
99 
was welcome to the service departments, who were never happy with 
the creation of ýn outside organisation to undertaRe wbat were con- 
sidered to be their rightful functions. Keyes' aggressiveness and 
personal desire for action as the commander of an expedition of-ten 
led to his advocacy of operations considered unsound by the more 
cautious COS, and this lessened his influence even more. The fact 
that none of the proposed operations ever came to fruition only in- 
creased Keyes' frustration, and left his relations with the service 
departments under. a. more or less T)ermanent cloud. Far from Churchill's 
later o-oinion that Keyes' 'close personal contact with me and with 
the Defence Office served to overcome any departmental difficulties 
arising from this unusual appointment', the failure to T)ronerly 
integrate the Directorate of Combined Operations into the planning 
and decision-takingo process was to dog the conduct of combined opera- 
16 
tions throughout Keyes' tenure. 
16. Sir Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (New York 1962), p. 213 
100 
OUPFER VI 
COMBINED OPERATIONS ORGANISATION (3 
THE DRAFr DIRECFIVE 
The appointment of Keyes may have shifted the eurrPhasis of the 
COHQ to larger raids, but little could be done to provide an immediate 
increase in material canability. Churchill initially went directly to 
Keyes for proposals for raids of S, 000 to 10,000 men, two or three of 
which might be conducted along the French coast during the winter, 
after-the danger of invasion had passed. Even larger a-nTtoured thrusts 
were contemT)Iated for the spring and summer of 1941. On 2S July 1940 
Churchill., again bypassing the COS, asRed Keyes for a detailed list 
of the men, material, and establishments under his command, along 
with i)ronosals for three or four medium sized raids in September or 
October of 1940. I'here was no -oractical result of this, but it did 
1 
serve to reinforce Keyes' opinion of his status. 
On 27 Jul), 1940 Keyes answered this request, giving a much more 
realistic picture of what was then possible. As of yet no assault 
shinning was available, and, besides the IS AJC earmar'ýed for an 
operation against DaRaT, only I SLC and 4 MLC were available. Only 
SOD men from. the Commandos and 7SO men from the Independent Cowanies 
were ready for operations, and the parachute troops had not yet been 
formed. The JPS had been independently examining the raiding possi- 
bilities, concurrent with this exchange, and, i%hen it was clear that 
large raids of the tyne that Churchill had in mind were some way into 
the future, they once again recommenaed a nolicy of small raids. This 
was sunported by a number of factors. Keyes' forces were not seen as 
Based on Churchill to Eden 23 Jul 40, PRENI 3/330/9 and Churchill 
to Keyes, 2S Jul 40, K 140/3/1. 
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being able to mount large-scale operations inde! )cndently, there 
were not sufficient landing craft, and there was a lack of regular 
forces to exploit any successful landing. Another important con- 
sideration was the morale problem likely to be encountered in Keyes' 
units if they were not soon used in the role for which thev volun- 
2 
teered. 
By 8 August Keyes himself pyoposed to carry out small raids of 
200 to 300 men whenever suitable objectives could be found. He 
noted that the larger raids envisaged by Churchill would be underta'k-en 
as soon as the brigade group mentioned in Bourne's directive had been 
3 
assigned and properly trained. This proposal, as could be expected, 
received the support of the War office, but the COS on 9 August simply 
Itoo'k note' of it. Thei-r failure to give this nolicy a T)ositive en- 
dorsement avoided a certain clash with Churchill, but the resulting 
lack of definition did not nale the planning for any subsenuent raids 
any easier. 
There was still some resistance in the senrice departments to 
Keyes' role in the planning and conduct of large-scale raids. This, 
combined with the realisation that the means were not available., caused 
Churchill to reduce implicitly his exPectations in an effort to define 
raiding responsibilities. By September 1940, as has been noted, Keyes 
had been assigned responsibility only for raids of S, 000 men or less, 
leaving the larger raids in the hands of the normal planning organisa- 
tions. This was not -really a functional breakdoim, but the main pro- 
I 
blem was that, with Churchill's ban on small raids and with the failure 
2. JP(40) 76 Mtg 29 Jul 40 2 and COS(40) SSS (JP) 'Raiding I Onerations' 31 Jul 40, CIAJ3 80/1S. 
3. - COS(40) 612 'Combined Operations' 8 Aug 40, C-A3 80/16. 
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of the War Office to provide the reipilar brigade group for larger 
raids, the COHQ was effectively condurmed to a long period of in- 
activity. This was intolerable to Keyes, and contrary to the whole 
rationale for his Directorate. 
This bar on small raids did not T)Yevent the COHQ, the JPS, or 
the MinistrY of Economic Warfare from proposing a number of such onera- 
tions during the fall and winter of 1940, but, despite a great deal 
of time and effort being expended on the operations, none were 
approved. Keyes was thus forced to look for action further afield, 
his iustification for this being that his directive gave him coinnand 
of operations conducted by his own unitý. It was by no means clear 
that the restrictions as to size, type, and location of operation 
were annlicable in these cases. Keyes maintained that they were not, 
and this view was given im-Plicit support by (1urchill in some tenta- 
tive decisions on MENACE-the assault against DaRar and MMAT07 an 
operation against the Channel Islands, as vell as by the oripinal 
-plans for BRISK- an operation against the Azores. This view was 
given explicit support in the command and control arrangements for 
WORKSHOP, the assault against Pantelleria. in the Mediterranean i-)lanned 
for the end of 1940. It was during the preparations for ": 'ORKSHOP 
that Keyes develoned the concept of an amphibious striking force 
under his control. The COS, narticularly Pound, and the JPS naturall-v 
enoughdid not share Keyes' views, and the definition of onerational 
responsibility in such cases was to be one of the main areas of dis- 
pute throughoui Keyes' tenure. 
The COHQ encountered a forced lull in its operations owing to the 
invasion alert of 7 September 1940. Upon this, Keyes agreed to hand 
over the operational control of all his units to the C-in-C Home 
4 
Forces. These units were then integrated into the regular home 
defence scheme.. -Four Commandos i,., ere released to Keyes by 15 October 
for BRISK, an operation agai. nst the Azores, while the rcmainder of 
Keyes' forces, now reorganised into a Special Service Brigade of 
three Special Service Battalions Linder Brigadier J. C. Haydon, were 
returned to him on 10 November 1940. 
The changes in concept of the functions of the DCO, the addi- 
tional instructions issued since the original directive, and ex- 
perience gained in operations, all pointed to the need for a re- 
vision of the directive Keyes had inherited from Bourne. The re- 
vision was initiated by the VCIGS, Haining, who submitted the draft 
of a new directive to the CIGS on 12 October 1940. The -nrinciple 
differences, in the draft, were the removal of the airborne forces 
from the DCO's iurisdiction and an increase of the DCO's Yesi)onsibili- 
ties for the organisation and training of the Special Service trooi)s. 
Haining commented that, 
The onerational needs of the DCO are so sl 
' 
)ecialised that 
I feel he should assume a greater resnonsibility than in 
the Dast. It is not*easy for the War Office, without his 
direction, to organise and train troo-Ds to carry out onera- 
tions which vary in many essential as-Dects from those ývhich 
the army normally expects to undertake. 
The draft outlined Keyes' resDonsibilities for raiding the enemy 
coast, particularly from Norway to France inclusive. He was given 
comnlete discretion in the choice of objectives - subject to the 
COS direction, and in the scale of onerations - up to 5,000 men. 
The Special Service Brigade was placed under his onerational control 
for this purpose, and in the future he would be resnonsible for its 
training. The DCO was also recognised as the determining agency 
103 
4. Edd-ento Churchill 11 Sep 40, PRFýl 3/103/1 and Eden to Keyes 12 
. Sep 40, DEFE 2/698. 
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in questions of organisation of the Snecial Service troops. The 
other aspect of keyes' position, that of Adviser to the Chiefs of 
Staff on Combined Operations, was more clearly defined. Keyes' 
position in regard to combined operations training was described, 
as well as his advisory responsibility for combined operations 
beyond the limited scope of raiding. The EPS were, in this respect, 
to consult him whenever they received a combined operations project 
5 
for study. 
Haining sent the draft to Keyes for comment, and Keyes thought 
'at first glace it will suit the case very well indeed'. After 
further consideration, Keyes returned the draft to Haining on 21 
October 1940 with some minor amendments. He deleted the Droviso 
that operations orders issued by the COHQ to the commander of the 
Special Service Brigade should be approved first by the War Office, 
as well as a reference to the ST)ecial Service units involved in com- 
bined operations, other than a raid, having their plans worl-'ed out 
by the force commanders through the EPS. Both of these amendm ents 
would strengthen his control of the ST)ecial Service troops. Keyes 
also made one addition concerning his continuing responsibility for 
6 
the airborne forces. 
This amended draft was then circulated in the War Office. The 
D%, rF commented that it meant I that we hand over the Snecial Brigade 
and I have no further Yes-, onsibility for training. In the light of 
., 
ht answer He what has happened... I think this is possibly the rig 
thought that the school of irregular warfare, dealing as it did with 
topics other than combined operations, should remain under the 11ar 
S. VCIGS to CIGS 12 Oct 49, WO 216/54. 
6. Keyes to Haining 14 Oct 40 and Keyes to Haining 21 Oct 40, 
DEFE 2/698. 
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Office, and noted that the DCO was, pre. pared to agree to this, 
7 
Before tb6 amended draft was considered by the COS, however, 
Keyes had sent them a letter on the control of BRISK, composed as 
it was of troops under his command. At the COS meeting of 24 Octo- 
ber 1940, Pound insisted that Keyes' original directive limited his 
responsibility to raids. The operations against the Portuguese 
Atlantic Islands were combined operations, and thus, regardless of 
the composition of the trooT)s, there was no question of Keyes being 
8 
responsible for them. This i)rinciple was upheld by the meeting. 
Keyes was stung by this decision, and on 31 October 1940 sent 
Churchill a letter bitterly attacking the COS-attitude. 
... I have not troubled you with my difficulties and I have been very patient, but golden opportunities are 
being missed and I am convinced will continue to be 
missed unless you give me the power to -Dlan and organ- 
ise combined ooerations and be resnonsible to you - 
direct - for their execution. 
-I have established very good relations both in the ýýa*r' Office and Air Ministry ... but I am thwarted at 
every turn by the CNIS who seems to dominate the COS 
Committee as far as combined operations are concerned. 
You told me early last 'May that the COS Committee 
had all the power and miýht well lose the war - it will 
certainly postpone the winning of the war as long as it 
is constituted as it is... 
... I have come to the conclusion that I can be of little 
use to you in the prosecution of the war so long as I 
am in any way under the COS Committee. 
Keyes proposed a reorganisation that would place the DCO directly 
under the Minister of Defence, and outside of the COS. 
... but better still would be to make me your deputy, uith the COS under my direction, as far as combined oPerýtions 
are concerned. 
It would be quite impossible to exaggerate the fierce 
7. DW to XICIGS 24 Oct 40, WO 216/S4. 
8. COS(40)358 Mtg 24 Oct 40, CAB 79/7. 
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resentment which is felt by young officers .., over the 
repeated miscarriages which have been condoned, the lack' 
of offensivd direction, and the fact that we aye always 
too late. 
Keyes attached to the letter a number of doctnents dealing with the 
problems that be bad encountered, including a reference to the 
proposals of 16 August 1940 for the planning system for combined 
operations, which, despite his repeated requests, had never been 
answered by the COS; a reWest. that the Hyal marines be placed 
under the comand of COHQ; and coments regarding the exclusion of 
9 
the DCO from IMENACE and BRISK. 
Keyes' letter was first received by, 1smay. In passing it to 
Churchill, Ismay apologised for his having to be troubled by it, 
and suggested that it was not necessary to read all the enclosures. 
According to Ismay the issue could best be dealt with on 'broad 
lines'. fie had already had several long talks with both Keyes and 
Bourne about the Igrievances' cited, 'but it has been imnossible to 
maRe headway, owing to the fact that there is a fundamental diver- 
gence of opinion between Sir Roger Keyes on one side, and the Chiefs 
of Staff on the other, as to the scope and character of Sir Roger 
Keyes' responsibilities'. Ismay noted that Keyes' proDosal that 
he be made Churchill's deputy in regard to combined operations 
would be 'tantamount to sugggesting that he should be deputy Minister 
of Defence', since every projected operation would be, by nature, a 
combined operation. The COS bad a very different view of the scope 
and character of Keyes' responsibilities, which he listed as the 
planning and execution of raids of under S, 000 men, the limit set 
by Churchill himself; the command and training of the commandos; 
Keyes to Mhu--r7cNill 31 Oct 40, -VW---f-37S3-077-. 
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the technical training of troops earmarked for landing operations; 
the provision of'advice'to the COS and JPS on the technical aspects 
of combined operations; and the develoDment of sT)ecial enuipment 
for combined operations. All these had been enumerated before, 
though there bad been a gradual shift to the role of the DCO as a 
strictly technical, rather than general, adviser. Ismay clearly 
perceived the major problem, the vague definition of responsibility, 
but could offer no comnrehensive solution. 
The division of responsibility as between the JPS on one side, 
and the Directorate of Combined Operations on the other, 
is not susceptible to exact definition. 'fliere must always 
be borderline cases. Elasticity and a s-nirit of give aný take 
are essential. Given these, the -present system should work 
satisfactorily; without these, no system will work. 
Ismay suggested that he draft a minute for Churchill along these 
lines, if Churchill agreed to the outline of Keyes' responsibilities. 
Churchill had Ismay prepare the draft, which told Keyes that his 
proposals of 31 October 'appear to be based on a misconceDtion of the 
character and scope of your responsibility as DC01, and which 'would 
not be at all workable'. The description of Keyes' responsibilities 
then given was virtually identical to that in Ismay's original note 
to Churchill., and included a verbatim repetition of the paragraph 
quoted above. 
As these had been the COS views, this was a clear rebuff for 
Keyes. The key, however, as Ismay had pointed out, was 'elasticity 
and a spirit of give and take'. It must have been evident that these 
had not existed in the past and, considering the personalities in- 
volved, it seems exceedingly over-optimistic if Ismay and Churchill 
really believed they could be achieved in the future. Churchill 
10. ' Iýmay t6 Churchill 2 Nov 40, . PREM 3/330/7. 
11. Ismay to Churchill 5 Nov 40, . 11PD1 3/330/7. 
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then complicated the situation further. fie had recognised the main 
source of Keyes' -discontent, telling Ismay 'but what lie wants is 
12 
something to attempt'. lie therefore asled to see Keyes' T)rODDSa1S 
for an operation against the island of Pantelleria in the Mediter- 
ranean. He would soon agree tothis project, termed WORTsHnP, and 
give Keyes personal command of the expedition. Although this satis- 
fied Keyes, it was completely contrary to the definition of resnonsi- 
bilities that Cliurchill had just laid down. 
The draft directive for Keyes was discussed by the COS on 6 
November 1940, soon after the above exchange of letters had talen 
place. The committee, under the circumstances, agreed to 'defer' 
13 
consideration of the draft. It is not clear whether this was 
done because they felt that Churchill's recent definition of 
responsibility was adequate, or because they did not want to reopen 
a touchy subject immediately. In any event the draft was soon for- 
gotten, and Keyes would continue to wor'k, under Bourne's outdated 
directive until further argument caused Churchill to draw up a new 
one. 
Keyes bad simultaneously tried again to obtain a more precise 
definition by the COS of the COHQ role in the planning of a combined 
operation. The procedures used in previous operations, either 
planned or executed, had varied greatly. Keyes therefore suggested 
that since the Ist Corps had been given the task of training for 
combined operations, the COHQ and the JPS should use the corps in 
a dress rehearsal of the detailed planning for an oneration. The 
rehearsal would start with the COS' acceptance of an outline plan, 
12. Annotaiion by Churchill 3 Nov 40 on Ismay to Keyes 2 Nov 40, 
PREM 3/330/7. 
13. COS(40) 376 Mtg 6 Nov 40, CAB 79/7. 
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and end with the military coumiander's T)roduction, in conjunction 
with the naval. and air commanders, of the detailed n1ans and orders. 
This exercise would have the additional advantage of producing the 
nucleus of a combined staff which could conduct any i)rojected opera- 
14 
tion launched from the United Kingdom in 1941. The JPS studied 
this Dronosal in a leisurely manner, and then referred it to the 
C-in-C Home Forces for comment. As he reportedly 'welcomed' the 
idea of trying out the planning system, the JPS suggested that the COS 
confer with him to determine what assistance lie would like in Pro- 
ducing an appreciation and outline plan. The War Office supported 
the exercise, but thought that it might. be aI oood thing' to actually C> 0 
carry out the plan, or at least part of it. This would require that 
16 
the objective be somewbere in the United Kingdom. 
The exercise was discussed with the C-in-C Home Forces and 
the D-T)CO at a COS meeting on 2 December 1940. The C-in-C Home 
Forces was by now less enthusiastic about the idea, comenting 'that 
if the comander and his staff were to be enployed in worRing out 
plans for combined operations they could not devote much time to the 
defence of the country'. The troops diverted from home defence duties 
for the exercise would ultimately have to be replaced by other forma- 
tions. Portal then suggested that it might be preferable to base I- 
the exercise on an operation that night actually taRe place, thus 
reducing the worldoad on the JPS. Dill still favoured the War Office 
proposal of having the Ist Corns carry it out as a field exercise, 
but the committee eventually decided in principle that the rehearsal 
14. JP(40)-6-0-2(S), (E), AND (0) 'Dress Rehearsal of Planning a 
Combined Operation' 31 Oct 40, CAB 84/21. 
IS. COS(40) 969 (JP) 'Dress Rehearsal of Planning a Combined Opera- 
tion' 22 Nov 40, CkB 80/23. 
16. War Office Brief on COS(40) 969 (JP) 28 Nov 40, ll. 'O 193/378. 
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should consist of the detailed planning of an actual oneration that 
might have to be-mounted at a future date. The JPS were to select 
a possible Meration for approval by the COS, and to frame nroposals 
for the conduct of the rehearsal. The COS would consider the scheme 
17 
further when this preliminary work had been accomplished. 
The JPS recommended the rehearsal of the planning for an expedi- 
tion mounted from the United Kingdom to capture Sardinia. This would 
involve all types of forces, including armour, airborne forces, and 
commandos; almost all forms of assault craft and shipping; and both 
fighter and bomber squadrons. An outline plan was already being 
prepared. The JPS noted that this opera tion was, rather inexplicably, 
selected because it was 'unlikely that this operation udll actually 
take place in the near future as it would depend on the use of special 
ships and troops which are not yet available'. The JPS thought that 
the rehearsal should go through the stages of the FOPS prenaration 
of the outline T)Ian, the JPS review of the strategic situation and 
the determination that the plan should be implemented, and the EPS 
review of the outline plan in the light of the latest intelligence, 
together with its determination as to the adequacy of the forces 
and their likely availability. The JPS would then submit the plan 
to the COS both for an-Droval and for the apT)ointment of commanders. 
The SPS would next prepare a directive for the commanders, and the 
EPS would assist them in the develorment of the detailed Dlans. The 
COHQ, which had suggested the rehearsal, was not directly involved 
in the planning, and was only referred to in a note that it would 
be available at all-stages for technical advice on the landing onera- 
17. COS(40) 411 Mtg 2 Dec 40, CIAB 70-/1-8-. 
ons. 
18 
'Fhe utility of the rehearsal was further diminished when the 
COS on 13 December 1940 niled that, since it was unlikely that the 
proposed oneration would ever take place, it would be a waste of 
valuable time to go through the comnlete planning process. The 
rehearsal was therefore to start at the point where the JPS pre- 
19 
pared the conflander's directive for approval. The outline plan 
was submitted by the FOPS to the Directors of Plans on 23 December 
1940, and the SPS then started on the directive. The directive was 
approved by the COS on 8 January 1941, but by then a number of actual 
plans were in progress for operations in the western Mediterranean, 
and the C-in-C Home Forces was complaining about the diversion of 
additional forces from bome defence that the rehearsal would entail. 
The JPS and DDCO accordingly reviewed the situation with the 
COS on 15 January 1941. 'flie objections of the C-in-C Home Forces 
20 
ill 
Droved to be the deciding factor, and Dill suggested that the re- 
21 
bearsal should be postponed until 'March 1941, at the earliest. 
On 1 March 1941, when the subject was again raised in the COS, it 
22 
was agreed that no further consideration should be given to it. 
The reasons for this decision are unclear, but the end result v. Tas 
the failure of Keyes' second attemT3t. to worl, out a system for viount- 
ing combined operations. The responsibilities of the parties con- 
ceyned remained vague in many areas, and this would cause further 
problems during the mounting of operations against the Canaries. 
18. COS(40) 1034 (JP) 'Dress Rehearsal of Planning a Combined Onera- 
tion' 11 Dec 40, C-4B 80/24. 
19. COS(40) 426 "Itg 13 Dec 40, GAB 79/8 
20. COS(41) 13 Mtg 8 Jan 41, C-AB 79/8. 
21. COS(41) 18 Mtg IS Jan 41, CIAB 79/8. 
22. COS(41) 78 Mtg 1 I-lar 41, C-kB 79/9. 
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1 
'Me DCO's organisational responsibilities were steadily grow- 
ing, and in Noyember 1940 Keyes explained to the VCNS that the nat, al 
side of combined operations would soon include 4,900 officers and men, 
440 landing craft, 162 raiding craft, all the assault shipping, and 
7 training and operations bases. lie therefore needed an increase in 
the personnel assigned to his staff, and requested an office, iqitb 
staff, for the ISTDC in the Admiralty. To coordinate the naval activi- 
ties, he nroposed that the position of the DDOD(CO) should be up- 
graded to that of Director of Landing Equii)ment and Personnel (Com- 
bined Operations). This would enable the ADCO(N) to give his i-., hole 
attention to the operational side of combined o9erations. 
'Fhe VCNS, Rear Admiral T. S. V. Phillips, aT)preciated that this 
amounted to the return to the Admiralty of the control of landing 
craft, with their being administered by an internal 'cell'. He 
thought that it would be better to have the personnel and material Zý 
matters handled by the respective Admiralty denartments, while the 
remaining coordination could be done b%, an officer acting as the 
23 
Assistant Director of Training and Staff Duties. After consulting 
with the Admiralty dCDartfnents concerned, Philli-ps foný! arded his 
T)ro. T)osal to Keyes on 4 December 1940, indicating that Keyes' staff 
could be augmented. Keyes agreed to these arrangements on 6 December 
24 
1940. The Admiralty upon reflection then decided that, as the 
responsibilities of the post, with the expanding landing craft pro- 
gramme, would soon increase considerably, it should be ui) raded to 1 -9 
that of Deputy Director of Training and Staff Duties (Combined ODera- 
tions) DDTSD(CO, )). Some -resistance was encountered from the Treasury, 
but the position was eventually established on 8 March 1941. It 
23. Keyes to Phillips 7 Nov 40 and Phillips to 2nd Sea Lord 12 Nov 
40, Aal 1/11113. 
24. Phillips to Keyes 4 Dec 40 and Keyes to Phillips 6 Dec 40, AM 
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was to enCOmnass all the former duties of the ADOD(CO) , as well 
as all staff duties in connection witb the design and developMent 
of landing craft. Liaison was to be maintained with the COHQ, but 
the arrangement clearly showed the DCO's preference for operational, 
rather than research and development, aspects of combined operations. 
The DDTSD(CO) was to be Cantain R. V. Symonds-Taylor, RNI. There 
25 
had been some personnel changes on the naval side of the COIIQ because 
of conflicts between Keyes and Maund. Keyes felt that Maund resented 
his appointment, as Maund had considered himself the naval authority 
26 
on combined oneyations. Because of these differences, Maund renuested 
that he be relieved as the ADCO(N) and t hat he should return to the 
Admiralty as ADOD(CO). Keyes approved this, though he later comnlained 
that, as soon as Maund returned to the Admiralty, he 'at once set to 
work to undermine my position'. 'Mat there indeed had been a strain 
in relations was attested to by Hornby, who noted that 1111aund never 
27 
felt 'at home' in the COHQ, and that 'his heart was in the Admiralty'. 
Maund has made it quite clear in his book that he believed 
that the work of building un the large am-ohibious orpanisation that 
would eventually be needed for the -return to the Continent i%, as basically 
an Admiralty concern, and that the COHQ's concentration on current on- 
erations was an unnecessary distraction. His arguments are greatly 
weakened by the fact that the strategy of 1940 could envisage no 
such major combined operations. He certainly tooh the Admiralty 
side during Keyes' various confrontations. Matters came to a head 
in December 1940, v'hen Keyes was in Scotland training the force for 
25. CE 56984/40 8 'Mar 41, MM 1/11113. 
26. Keyes to AN. Alexander S Dec 41, DEFE 2/698. 
27. Hornby to Keyes 22 Dec 40, K 13/2S. 
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WORKSHOP. Maund circulated a paper in the Admiralty reviewing 
critically the DCO organisation, 0iich he thought 'cannot be described 
as sound'. He suggested that the organisation be brolken up, and the 
responsibilities returned to the service departments. In this respect 
he saw the Admiralty playing the major part, as it would be responsi- 
ble for personnel and base administration, material develolpment and 
procurement, and training. He thought that these could be directed by 
a. - Cantain, RNT, resDonsible to the WINS through the Director of 
Plans and Imoun as the Deputy Director of Plans for Landing Operations. 
This officer would coordinate sections in the personnel and material 
departments of the Admiralty, and the ISTDC. Mauiid also thought that 
the raiding system was ineffective. The geographical area in v: hich 
the DCO was responsible for raiding was not clearly defined, but 
Maund thought it unlikely that the C-in-Cs of any foreign stations 
would be nrepared to devolve reSPODSibility for raiding to the DCO in 
London. As far as raiding overseas was concerned, lie thought that all 
that should occur in London would be that the M-ans Division would 
recommend what craft should be sent abroad, and the new nost would 
coordinate the desnatch of personnel, craft, and assault shi-nDing 
as determined by the COS. In home waters, the Admiralty and War 
Office could administer the nersonnell craftý and bases directly. The 
separate C-in-Cs would be advised of the equipment and personnel 
available and would propose their oun raids. Sý)ecialist advice 
could then be provided by officers attached to the EPS from each 
service ministry, acting as additional staff officers for the C-in-Cs 
for onerations. The commander of the Special Service troops and the 
naval craft or ship commanders would also be available to the C-in-Cs. 
If the organisation were developed along these lines, Maund suggested, 
'the difficulties that have arisen in the past months with the depart- 
ments would be avoided and a clear and natural svstem of control 
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would sene the higher comand. in the conduct of landing attacks 
on the coasts of, the enemy'. 
Some of the criticisms and suggestions in Maund's T)ancr seew. 
valid. His point about the C-in-Cs-1. responsibilities in respect 
to overseas raiding was apt, but the lack of an overall raiding 
nolicy was the fundamental problem, and no structure, even a more 
decentralised one, could compensate for this. The failure to include 
specialist personnel in the nlanning staffs proper was another prime 
source of trouble, and Maund's suggestions would have helped. It 
was not until Keyes had been renlaced that the service denartments 
would accede to this. The total decentr 'alisation of responsibilities 
to the service departments, however, illustrates a confidence in 
inter-service cooperation that was belied by almost all previous 
experience, and the value of an integrated organisation such as the 
COHQ was entirely overlook-ed. The nroblem. was not in the centralisa- 
tion, of functions i-n the COHQ, which was lopical1v sound, but Yather 
in the failure to integrate the COHQ with the service departments. 
Maund's attitude, shared by many in the service departments, was 
in fact one of the reasons why the system was not worldng. 
Considering Maund's position within the combined oneyations 
organisation, and the fact that this paper was circulated without 
Keyes' knowledge, the resultant row is easily understandable. 
Matters were made worse by the clear implication that Maund himself 
should be appointed as the Admiralty authority on combined operations. 
Upon Keyes' return from Scotland he'told him exactly what I thouOht 
about his disloyalty and intrigues', and complained to the VCNS. 
Maund thereupon asked to be sent to sea, and Keyes angrily noted 
that Mmind was 'actually rewarded' by being given comnand of the 
Ark Royal. This-affair certainly did not help Keyes' relations with 
the Alpiralty, and reinforced his suspicions about the prejudices and 
28 
intrigues he was facing. 
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28. Keyes to AN. Alexander- S D-ec-41, DEFE 2/698. Maund's paner is 
an enclosure. 
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(-IIAIYI'I-D III T 
CONMINED OPHATIONS ORCMISATION (4) 
IliE SFCOND DIREGFIXT, 
Keyes' dissatisfaction with his nosition as DCO had been evident 
in his long complaint to Churchill on 31 October 1940. This had Dro- 
duced a further definition of his responsibilities as DCO, but fresh 
arguments had broken out over WORKSHOP and the striking force created 
for it. On 9 November 1940, wben discussing the Special Service 
troops with Eden, he stated that the War Office had 'Played up 
splendidly'. 'There is only one thing lacking. The will, in one 
quarter, to let me use them offensively*and fearlessly at the earliest 
I 
possible moment'. Delays in WORKSHOP until 19 November 1940, when 
Churchill gave him command of the exnedition, had irritated Keyes, 
and thereafter, despite the support given by the Prime Minister, the 
2 
opnosition of the naval members of the JPS, in his view, 'hardened'. 
Keyes had seized the opportunity to command WORKSHOP primarily 
because of his frustration with his aDpointment as DCO in the United 
Kingdom. Early in December Keyes explained to the C-in-C Mediteran- 
nean that he had held the post for four months but that, oi-Ang to 
the lack of landing craft, assault shi-oT)ing, and aircraft, and to 
objections of 'certain brass bound soldiers' in the I%ar Office who 
hated the very thought of irregular troops, it had been exceedinpl) 
difficult to make any progress. He termed his title of DCO as 
'misnomer', and im-Dlied that t'ýere vas no geogranhic limitation on 
3 
his command of operations undertaken by the Snecial Service units. 
1. Keyes to Eden 9 Nov 40, DEFE 27698. 
2. 'History of Workshop' 19 Nov AM, PREM 3/507. 
3. Keyes to Cunningham 3 Dec 40, K 13/21. 
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Criticism of Keyes' plan for WORKSHOP continued throughout 
November and IX-,. cember 1940. After a posti)onement caused by the 
Snanish seizure of Tangier, Keyes had offered to ste-D down from 
the post of DCO, telling Churchill 'if my withdrawal would relieve 
you, T)ray tell me so and I will find some other way of helning you 
udn the war more speedily than your COS and those dreadful staff 
4 
committees will allow you to do'. Keyes' hUMOUr iMDroved when he 
returned to Scotland to train with the 11, 'ORKSHOP force, but even then 
the dis-nute over the temporary transfer of one of his Glens to 
the forces for TRUCK, an oDeration against the Azores, i%, as to irk him. 
'A DCO with nroper-powers would have had. the planning and -orepara- 
tions for both these expeditions in his hands and, instead of a series 




force available to ensure the success of both operations'. 
Further disillusionment set in with the decision, at the end 
of December 1940, to T)osty)one 111'ORKSHOP a second time, narticularly 
as the main arguments for this had come, once again, from the Naval 
Staff. Keyes, dismayed at the prosnect of inactivity for his force, 
immediately returned to London to find some means of getting it 
unde-n, jay. His temper was not improved when he found out that the 
LAJ\MFALL convoy, with which the force was originally to sail, was 
leaving in earl), Januar,. %T 1941. this disnute, Keyes sur- 
nrisingly did not confront Churchill's reluctance to let the force 
leave the United Kingdom, but vented instead his i%, -rath on his old 
enemy, the I-Naval Staff. lie would accent neither their Justification 
4. Keyes to Churchill 17 Dec 40, PRLM 3/330/7. 
S. Note by Keyes 21 Jan 41, DEFE 2/698. 
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of the postponement nor wbat be considered their attempt to 'put 
6 
the onus' on Oi. urcbill. 
Argments over the feasibility of WORKSHOP, now affected by the 
arrival of the Luftwaffe in Sicily, continued througliout early 
January 1941. Keyes noted, on 17 January 1941, that the Inusillani- 
mous procrastination' of the Naval Staff, Olo had 'done everything 
in their -power to discredit the enterprise', bad resulted in the 
very situation that he had always feared and warned against, fore- 
7 
stall-ment. by the Germans. His bitterness, based on the feeling 
that, if WORKSHOP had been sup. ported when first approved, the result 
would have been far different, was evident, and, to a great extent, 
justified. 
'Fhe next major diS. DUte arose over the breakup of the striking 
force assembled for WORKSHOP. The three Glens and three Commandos 
were to go to the Middle East, in furtherance of the policy outlined 
by the COS in Sept6mber 1940. While Keyes could not claim final 
responsibility for the determination of strategy, the o-oerations of 
the striking force were, in his mind, clearly within his province. 
Having failed to secure an apnointment with Churchill, Keyes x%Tote 
to him on 22 January 1941, 
As 'Minister of Defence you annointed me DCr) and made 
a noint of my having direct access to ou. 
On some iMDOrtant occasions i,.! hen I wished to see you 
about the prosecution of some combined oneration - gener- 
ally to warn )You that the _ýNaval 
Staff were jeonardising 
success and rish Ang, forestallment by causing unavoidable 
delays -I have been told that you were too busy to see me 
As I am not allowed by the COS to have an-ything to do 
with combined operations, I devoted my energies to training 
an amnhibian force. Since, by your ruling, there are no 
objectives in home waters, eleven weeks ago I suggested to 
6. Keyes to Churchill 3 Jan 41, PREM 3/07. 
7. Ismay to Keyes s Jan 41, and Keyes to Churchill 17 Jan 41, 
PREM 3/SO7. 
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the COS sending some commandos to the Mediterranean 
to raid enemy territories and to capture islands ... I Imow. that you meant me well and intended that my 
unique experience in combined operations should be 
made use of, and I honed that as DCO I might be able 
to give valuable service. However, the COS Committee 
decided otheiivise and left me nothing to do other 
than organising the training of the amphibian forces 
over which the directive I inherited gives me command. 
I am very grateful to you in your effort to emnloy 
me. I really have been very patient and have done my 
best to work with the Naval Staff. Viey and their 
committees made it quite impossible and my position is 
intolerable. There is no such office as birector of 
Combined Qperations, and your ruling as to raids gives 
me nothing to do in home waters even if I coul. d raise 
the force to do it. I Imow I could help you win this 
war but you must give me authority if. 1 am to be able 
to do so. I am your very devoted fyiend and supporter 
but I can not bear to see you and the country being 
let doi%n by craven hearted advisors ... Please give me an interview today or tomorrow in order 
that I may kmow iýlhere 81 stand and 
how I can best help 
you, and the country. 
I smay sT)oke to Churchill about t'ýis matter, and the result 
was a short informal note from Churchill on 24 January 1941. 
lie told Keyes 'I do not think that you ought to write me letters 
of this kind on matters which affect those under whom you are 
9 
serving and went- on to say that Keyes would have to obey orders. 
Keyes was by now somewhat mollified, and x%Tote a muted letter to 
the Prime Minister telling him that he appreciated that Churchill 
was doing his best for the Directorate. Keyes declared that he 
would always -DUt his duty to the country before anv other consid- 
eration, and this was why he had been compelled to speak- out. The 
implications of Churchill's remark about serving under the COS was 
not lost upon Kev , es, 
but his attitude remained unchanged. 
When you offered me the appointment of DCO you made it 
clear that I was under the Minister of Defence and had 
8. Keyes to Churchill 22 Jan 41, P-RD-1-STS-07. 
9. Churchill to Keyes 24 Jan 41, PREENI 3/507. 
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direct access to you. I do not feel that I owe any 
allegiance to the Naval Staff ubich denies me the right 
to critic , 
ise their actions when, I consider they are con- 
trary to the interests of'the country. 10 
'Phe heat of the argument having been dissipated, Churchill 
finally consented to see Keyes on 27 January 1941. The meeting 
ended the debate on WORKSHOP, but Keyes still disagreed about the 
status of the Naval Staff and plans to break up the strihing force. 
ThbarRation arrangements for the Glens added to Keyes' frustration. 
He comT)Iained of these to the COS on 30 January 1941, aT)ologising 
for troubling them with such apparently trifling details, but 
acidly noting that, under the definitely limited authority he 
possessed, he had no other means of expressing his views. In this 
respect he reminded the COS that he had never received any reply 
to his proposals of 16 August 1940 for a further definition of the 
responsibilities for the conduct of combined operations. He felt 
that much could have been done to facilitate the -preparations for 
past operations if the system he had then recommended had been put 
into effect. Despite some reminders, he had since heard nothing of 
11 
it. The COS ap-parently ignored this, for there is no entry on 
the subject in their records. 
The inability to obtain a decision on his authority, and Ihe 
actual sailing of the Glens, brought Keyes' fnistration to a head. I 
On 4 February 1941 he wrote another letter to Churchill, in the 
same vein as his letter of 22 January 1941. As it well sumarizes 
Keyes' -position and attitude, it is reproduced here at length. 
10. Keyes to Churchill 2S Jan 41, PRal 3/507. 
31. Keyes to COS 30 Jan 41, DEFE 2/698 
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I have not bothered you with my difficulties more 
than I could help, since you appointed me DCO and gave 
me an outline of what you %ýisbeý me to do, and the men 
and vessels I would have under my control. I was very 
grateful to you, for it seemed to me a wonderful oi)por- 
tunity for being of real service, and I had visions of 
waging the kind of amphibious warfare which has always 
appealed to me, and of which I have had far more exT)cr- 
ience than any living soldier or sailor. 
You put a ban on pin prick raids generally and on 
small operations which could not really affect the 
enemy's war effort. I was fully in agreement with this 
policy, and I hoped before long to mount amphibious 
strokes, akin to those launched by the elder Pitt 200 
years ago, but I have been sadly disillusioned. 
I won't weary you with. a long tale of my efforts 
to come to some working arrangement with the Naval 
Staff - the record is on the shelf -ready for the 
historian... I cannot possibly be of use to you in 
the prosecution of our war effort ivider the existing 
regime. 
You have directed me to make my corroiandos. up to 
S, 000, and I have given my views as to the nossibility 
of recreating a spearhead, as good as that which has 
just been dissipated, by dividing it into two parts 
- neither of which is large enough to play a decisive 
role in an operation of the magnitude you told me to 
concentrate on... 
But it is really not fair to me (or the country) 
to limit my energies, readiness to accept responsibility, 
initiative, and power of leadership, to raising and 
training the personnel for a problematical combined 
operation, for which the Naval Staff have neglected 
to pro%, ide adequate transport and landing craft, and 
which will never be launched as long as the present 
CNS and staff officers who represent his views on 
the various joint service committees remain in office. 
When it was api)arent to me that the COS Committee 
had no intention of making use of me for the planning 
and preparation of combined operations, I turned to 
the one active responsibility within my directive, 
which would enable my experience to be made use of, 
i. e. executive command of raiding ogerations carried 
out by my commandos up to S, 000. 
After infinite amount of onDosition, both in the 
War Office and in the Admiralty, and thanks only to 
the knowledge that you were backing me, I have 
been 
able to organise ana train a splendid striking force ... 
No one can say that I have not made every possible 
effort to use it offensively... 
It is tormenting to reflect on the golden oppor- 
tunities we have lost by failing to make use of the only 
seaborne striking force we possess, or can recreate 
for some time to come. 
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The haste with iOiich the three Glens were despatched, 
and the way in which the three commandos were embarked, 
so that they, were no longer the highly trained am- 
phibious unit I bad prepared for Dinediate action any- 
where - drives one to the conclusion that the one 
object of the Naval Staff was to get this striking force 
well away before it could do anything for which they 
might be held responsible... 
It is hard to believe that it was only sheer in- 
competence to understand the first principles of war... 
If the DCO is to be of any use to the Minister 
of Defence, he must be his renresentative on the COS 
Committee for all matters concerned with combined 
operations ... 
It seems almost iMDOSSible to get soldiers 
or sailors or their respective m1nistries to accept 
responsibility - each tries to place the burden. on 
the others shoulders. 
A COS Committee, aided by little people on the 
various joint committees, can be resolved Won to do 
nothing. .. 67i_xTe me a free hand to take charge of the planning 
and preparations (for YORKER) at once, or is this 
enter-orise too heavy a burden for you to bear against 
the strenuous opposition which it is sure to arouse 
in the COS Committee? The joint committees will 
work overtime to damn it. 
Why not throw them overboard - no one will blame 
you if you will allow Keyes of Zeebrugge to carry 
out a raid far less hazardous than Zeebrugge and in- 
finitely less dangerous than the prompt stroke which 
followed three weeks later at Ostend. 
If you can not do this, why not let me share your 
burden as Under Secretary for Defence? In such a 
capacity I could ensure that when a decision for 
undertaking an oDeration is made, the 1)renarations 
for carrying it out are not held up by any connittees, 
but prosecuted vigorously. It is hateful to see you 
being let doi-. m, as you so often have been by your 
technical advisors. 
Or failing this, make me CNS (for w., hich my varied 
exnerience and the resnonsibilities I have borne in 
peace and war fit me). I would give the ardent spirits 
who are spoiling to fight a chance, and I would re- 
present the '. Navy on the COS Corwittee with the know- 
ledge and the desire to make full use of its ability 
to wage amphibious warfare. 
If Alexander won't take me for a second time as 
First Sea Lord why not make me First Lord. hliat is 
the use of having a First Lord in wartime like 
Alexander? - who understands nothing about war and 
has not the knowledge to select t1ii-eright kind of 
people to form the Naval Staff we so sorely need at 
the moment ... 
Nothing you could do would be more 
jýopular with the people who matter and the man in the 
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street than to enq)loy me properly. Anyhow, I 
would only add to your burdens if I stayed where I 
'un, tinder ' 
the existing conditions at the Admiralty, 
and I must-ask you to release me from the aT)nointment 
of DCO if it is to -remain as it is at preseni ... I place myself and my sword at your service, but 
I am not prepared to stop in the dead alley into 
which I have been forced withoyý any power to do any- 
thing of value to the country. 
Enclosed with this letter was a summation of the handling, 
and ultimate disregard, of bis proposals of 16 August 1940. 1 
The problem of the relations between the DCO and the COS 
was clearly reaching major proportions, although the writing 
of the above letter no doubt helped to relieve some of Keyes' 
anger. Churchill replied tersely on S February 1941. 
It is Quite im-oossible for me to receive a letter of 
this character. I am sure it would do you a great 
deal of hanj if it fell into unsympathetic hands. I 
therefore return it to you with its enclosures. If 
you wish to write of matterslýffecting the commandos, 
pray do so to General Ismay. 
YORKER, an oDeration against Sardinia and one of Keyes' 
main concerns, had, in the interval, been discarded. He there- 
fore moderated his tone considerably, but would not back down. 
On 6 February 1941 he sent Churchill a copy of his minute to 
the COS on the loading of the striking force, noting that it 
related to 
... only one of the many miscarriages, which would have been avoided if the-v had allowed me to be a 
real DCO... It is imnoss1ble for me to continue 
in that office and, if you cannot make a satisfactory 
change, I must ask ou to release me. To acquiesce 
in the existing conditions would be to condone in- 
efficiency which is seriously impeding the nrosecution 
of the war and thus delaying'victory. 14 
12.11 4 Feb 41, DEFE 2/698 -2 nd Keyes to Churc i, for the rema' er 
6f the text, K 140/3/2. This may seem like a long quote, but 
, 
the original letter was over 6 pages. It gives the best idea 
, Possible of the fundamental problem in the DCO-COS relations. 
13. Churchill to Keyes 5 Feb 41, PRLM 3/330/7. 
14. Keyes to Churchill 6 Feb 41, P-RBI 3/330/7. 
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77here was apparently no immediate reply to this letter, 
but Keyes had made an impression. On 12 February 1941 Churchill 
instructed the COS to investigate Keyes' suggestion for restowing 
the Glens. lie added Ireport to me also whether the proper course 
is 
is followed in regard to Admiral Keyes and his responsibility'. 
Keyes had, in the meanwhile, tried to get through to Churchill by 
other channels. On the same day he had exolained his position to 
Brendan Bracken, and asked him to 'pass on some comments to Churchill 
about the recent JPS Paper on combined operations policy, Produced 
without reference to the DCO, 'which is largely in disagreement with 
the experience and views of the Directorate of Combined Onerations 
and if accepted, will do much to nullify Winston's and this Director- 
ate's efforts to prosecute the war'. Keyes again claimed that 
.: -until there is a real DCO with proper aUthOritý', serious 
miscarriages by the sen, ice departments are inevitable. 
Shipping miscarriages have been repeated in ever), combined 
operation actually carried out to date and in every one 16 for which preparation 'has been made - without exception. 
Bracken apparently did speak to Churchill on the matter, and then 
told Keyes that he should hold on to the Position of DCO despite 
17 
disappointments. 'It may yet give you the scope you desire. ' 
Faced with these disagreements, Churchill started worl-, ing, 
seemingly on his own, on a new directive for Keyes. On I March 
1941 he wrote to Ismay that, in view of the changes that had taken 
place since the original directive had been promulgated, the res- 
ponsibilities of the DCO should be redefined. At the same time, 
however, he felt that it must be realised that the division of 
15. Churcbill to Ismay 12 Feb 41, PREM 3/124/2. 
16. Keyes to BracRen 12 Feb 41, K 140/3/2. 
17. Bracken to Keyes 18 Feb 41, K 140/3/2. 
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responsibility between the DCO and the JPS was 'not capable of 
precise definition', and borderline cases would have to be settled 
as they arose 'by mutual consent'. It is most suri)rising that, 
after the past argument, Churchill could hold out any bones for a 
mutual aoreement but this principle was retained in the list of 
responsibilities he then laid down. This list was to constitute, 
almost verbatim., the text of the new directive. 
Ismay gave this note to the COS at their meeting on 3 March 
1941. They decided to ask Keyes to consider the list and to put 
forward any points he wished to in regard to the detailed arrange- 
18 
ments necessary to give effect to Churchill's instructions. Keyes 
disliked some of the points in the draft, particularly one which 
seemed to make him an 'adviser to the JPS on the technical aspect of 
landing operations'. He told Ismay on 6 March 1941 that, if the 
revised directive stood, the title of DCO would be an 'absurd 
anomaly!. He was not prepared to be called IDCOI tinder the new 
directive, as the term implied that he had some responsibilities 
for the planning and preparation of combined operations, whereas 
he would have, in reality, none. He therefore did not wish to be 
associated with operations which Iwould be bound to be unsatis- 
factory and ill-Drepared under the existing regime'. He would pre- 
fer, if he were to be limited to the Special Service troops and 
19 
raiding, to have a new name. 
Ismay suggested an amendment which stipulated that the DCO 
should be present at COS meetings when opposed landings were under 
18. CO-S(41) 79 Mtg 3 Mar 41, C-A. B 79 79. 
19. Notes by Keyes 4 and 6 Mar 41, K 13/1. 
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consideration, and that his staff should lRewise be represented 
20 
in the JPS meetings. Keyes accepted this, but requested that 
it be altered slightly to ensure that the sequence of planning was 
mentioned. Tn many cases, such as the JPS paper on combined opera- 
tions policy, the DCO had been involved only after the pauer was 
completed. This was extremely wasteful in both time and effort; 
if lie was brought in at the beginning, be could prevent errors 
resulting from faulty assumDtions by those who did not have the 
specialised 'Knowledge of his Directorate. lie also wanted to add 
a sub-paragranh on the responsibility of the DCO in regard to the 
'production and allotment' of special landing craft, a subject 
21 
which had been omitted in the draft. 
The COS considered both the draft and Keyes' suggestions on 
11 March 1941. They accepted Keyes' amendments, but made minor 
changes in the text, with the intent of Reeping Keyes' responsi- 
bilities limited both to the tactical allocation of assault shipping 
and craft- i0iich would prevent future arguments such as that re- 
garding the disposition of the striling force, and to the advice 
and consent to the outline plans of the JPS - which would avoid 
22 
difficulties in the preparation of the detailed plans by the EPS. 
Keyes was then shown these changes, and, most suil-)risingly, agreed 
23 
that they were an limnyovement'. 
The directive was then sent to Churchill for final aDproval. 
I ie added a sub-T)aragranh to ensure that the FOPS was retained tinder 
20. Ismay to Keyes 7 ll. lar 41, K 13/1 
21. Keyes to Ismay 10 Mar 41, K 13/1. 
22. COS(41) 93 kitg 11 \far 41, CAB 79/9. 
23. Keyes to Ismay 12 Mar 41, K 13/1. 
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his personal control and then approved the draft. The new directive, 
24 
contained in Appendix C, was promulgated on 14 March 1941. After 
eight months Keyes had finally secured a new directive, more in 
tune with the responsibilities of the Directorate as they had evolved 
duying the build-up of the amphibious forces. It was to be no i)ana- 
cea, bowever. The emphasis was clearly on the technical and tactical 
nature of Keyes' position as an adviser, wbich would not result in his 
interference with strategic planning. The directive admitted, however, 
that there was no exact boundary between Keyes' -responsibilities 
and those of the JPS. 'Fhe reliance on mutual consultation, consider- 
ing the evidence of a fundamental divergence of outlook between the 
parties involved, certainly seemed a trifle optimistic, and the 
lack of any system for the resolution of disiputes would continue to 
produce confrontations at the highest levels, as had been so marked 
in the previous months. The intent of the directive would also not 
be followed in many cases, either by Keyes, Churchill, the COS, or 
the JPS. In all, the outlook for the future was not promising. 
'Me despatch of the three Glens and the three Commandos, 
termed 'Layforcel after their commander Brigadier R. E. Laycock, to 
the Middle East at the end of January 1941 was the occasion for a 
number of changes in the Combined Operations organisation. Churchill 
directed that the strength of the Special Senrice troops left in the 
United Kingdom be brought back up to a figure of S, 000 men, and this 
opportunity was taken to make the last major change in their oroanisa- 
tion. On 12 February 1941 the COS agreed to COHQ proposals that the 
univieldy Special Sen7ice Battalions be done away with, the SDecial 
24. C (41) 166 -ý-D-irective to Director of Combined Operations' 
14 Mar 41, C-AB 80/26. 
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Senrice Brigade being reorganised to contain eight Commandos of six 
troops each, rather than the ten troops each of the earlier Conunandos. 
The Royal Marines would later convert their battalions to Commandos, 
and a number of Special Service Brigade headquarters would be formed, 
but the form was now set for these forces for the remainder of the 
25 
war. 
The War Office was also in the -process of reorganisation. Ning 
to the increasing control of the Special Service troops exercised 
by the COIJQ, 1,10 9 was disbanded in March 1941. The DMO&P, Major 
General Sir John Kennedy, assured Keyes that, although Keyes might 
I feel that his 'direct link had been sacrificed', be was confident 
that the new arrangement of the COHQ dealing direct with the War 
Office sections concerned would result in a more direct and rapid 
handling of Keyes' requirements. As No. 11 Special Air Service 
Battalion and the Central Landing Establishment, its parachute train- 
ing organisation, now went direct to SD 4 for airborne matters, all 
links between the COHQ and the airborne forces were henceforth 
26 
effectively severed. 
There was also a personnel change in the COHQ, as Keyes' rela- 
tions with Homby, the DDCO, had never been entirely satisfactory. 
On 8 Anril 1941 be therefore approached the VCIGS for assistance in 
27 
finding a replacement. Haining selected Major General James Drew, 
who bad just given up the S2nd Division because of age. Keyes 
readily accepted Drew, asking that, as he felt that a brigadier was 
25. 'Minutes of WO Meeting on Reorganisation of SS Troops' 9 Feb 41, 
DEFE 2/54 and COS (41) 50 Mtg 12 Feb 41, CAB 79/9 
26. UMP to DCO 22 Mar 41; Mo 9 to 11 SAS Bn 22 \far 41; and DDMO(H) 
to Commander SS Bde 23 Mar 41, WO 193/379. 
27. Keyes to Haining 8 Apr 41, DEFE 2/698. 
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perhaps too junior as DDCO, Drew be permitted to retain his rank. 
There were furtýier problems with the Treasury, who, under pressure 
from the War Office, agreed 'in the special circumstances that a 
Major General can be borne for the time being in the Brigadier's 
post at the DCOI. Keyes testily requested that the attention of 
the Treasury be drai%m to the fact that the original incumbent of 
the post was a lieutenant general, and it was at Keyes' oiNm sugges- 
tion that his replacement be a brigadier. It v., as niggling obstruc- 
tionism of this sort that plagued Keyes throughout his tenure as 
DCO, and added to his frustration. Drew assumed the post of DDCO 
on 21 April 1941, and was to continue in. that position throughout 
29 
the year. 
28. Haining to Keyes 11 Apr 41 and Keyes to Haining 12 Apr 41, 
DEFE 2/698. 
I 
29. Haining to Keyes 19 Or 41 and Keyes to Haining 22 Or 41, 
DEFE 2/698. 
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OiAprER Irl II 
MMINED OPERATIONS ORCANISATInIN (5) 
THE MIPHIBIOUS STRIKING FORCE 
A change in Keyes' thinRing on combined oT)erations bad become 
apparent during the mounting of WORKSHOP. The force assembled for 
WORKSHOP had originally been intended solely for that oneration. As 
Keyes took over command of the force and trained it, he gradually 
develoned the idea that it was a general purpose amDhibious assault 
force. There were a number of contingency oi)erations being mooted 
in the winter of 1940, and Key, , es thought that the 
'striking force' 
he now had under his command could be used for any of them. This 
was never fully accepted by the service departments, as it in effect 
would have made Keyes the major figure in any combined operations, 
a position the planning staffs had tried to avoid from the start. 
Keyes' feeling of proprietorship of the striRing force was evident 
in the disnutes leading up to the second Directive. With the de- 
parture of the Glens for the Middle East, Keyes immediately started 
working on the reconstitution of an assault force in the United 
Kingdom. 
He noted that he would have to 'start again', but, by making use 
of all the landing craft available in home waters, and imrovising 
the means of carrying them, he could overcome the transport problem. 
With the commandos Keyes had in hand, and the Royal Marines, a force 
i 
of 6,000 could be created. Keyes told Churchill that, being a sailor, 
he 'could legitimately command' this force. Combined operations, he 
had concluded, must be conducted by one supreme commander, who, in the 
132 
case of a -raid by such a force, should be a naval officer. 
I 
The Royal Marine Brigade of four battalions bad been reformed 
into two brigades for the contingency operations against the Azores A 
and Cape Verdes. At the instigation of the Admiralty, the COS on 
9 August 1940 bad approved the creation of a Royal Marine Division 
of three brigades of two battalions each, to be used as an assault 
force for ami)hibious operations. There is no record of the COHQ 
being consulted or involved in this. The third brigade had 
started forming on 1 October 1940 but, as in the case of the first 
four battalions, the force had to be created from scratch. Progress 
2 
in establishing the brigade was slow during the-winter of 1940-41. 
The JPS, during the reorganisation of the commandos, worRed on 
a study concerning the requirements for the Royal Marine Division. 
The previous use of the commandos in an amphibious assault force and 
Keyes' apparent intentions of recreating another such assault force 
with the commandos remaining in the United Kingdom caused the JPS 
to widen the scope of its investigation. They decided that the first 
. 
step should be the determination of the most profitable employment 
of the units available for amphibious oDerations - the ST)ecial Ser- 
vice troops, the Royal Marines, and the field army - and on 6 Febru- 
ary they -presented a report on this. In examining the role of the 
Special Service troops, the Joint Planning Staff found. themselves 
opposed to Keyes' and Churchill's conception of their use as 
1. Keyes to Churchi-11 4 Feb 41,2/698. 
2. Date taken from Navy List issue of 1940, published by the Admir- 
aI ty. Inten, iew oTýNajjor General J. L. Moulton by author, 10 Nov 
78. For further details on the Royal Marine Units, see J. D. Ladd, 
The Roval Marines 1919-1980 (London 1980), pp. 364-381. 
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specialist assault troops for amphibious operations, a task they had 
assumed because of the ban on siTiall raids and the Royal Marines' 
commitment to other continpency oDerations. The JPS now correctly 
pointed out that the commandos lacked adequate coi,. ibat supDort and 
administrative services, thus limiting seriously the extent to which 
a successful landing could be exploited. Although for a short time, 
and at a limited distance, the Special SeTirice troops could provide 
a greater measure of surprise, mobilit) 7 on foot, and short-range fire- 
power, they were not as effective as a normal field unit for landing 
ODerations in the face of an enemy. It was Itactically and econo- 
mically unsound', therefore, 'that these troops should form the 
spearhead of any big landing operation'. 'Nevertheless, in combined 
operations, they are liRely to be useful in diversions to the main 
operation. ' The JPS consequently recommended that the Snecial Service 
troops concentrate on raiding and, surprisingly, unconventional war- 
fare. The assault role in minor operations could be carried out by 
the Royal Marine Division, while any large operations could be carried 
3 
out by field army units. 
'Me COS considered this report on 12 February 1941. Curiously, 
they did not endorse the views of the JPS on the role of the Special 
Service troops, declaring instead that they were 'irrelevant to the 
subject and had not been called for'. It is hard to discern the 
reasons for this abrupt reiection, other than a deference to the vest- 
ed interests of the parties concerned. The heated controversy over 
Keyes' authority as the DCO was then still in Drogress, and the comnan- 
dos were, after all, one of Churchill's proteges. In any event, the 
GO 9.. 3. JP(Tl -1Off-'Future Combined Operations' 6 Feý 41, CIAB 9 q. 
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failure to seize this opportunity to define the relationshiT) and 
function of th6 Special Sei-vice"t-roops in regard to the other forces 
available would lead to further difficulties. The commandos would 
become a Dart of the new amphibious striking force being created, 
4 
and would further complicate the question of command authority. 
After the review of the report above, a further study was 
initiated on the projected amphibious capability to October 1941. 
This was -ready by 18 February 1941, but resulted in no immediate 
5 
action being taRen to constitute another amphibious force. The 
JPS were at the time involved in examining proposed operations in 
the western and central Mediterranean, while Keyes was engaged in 
CLA)M)RE, a raiding operation against the Lofoten Islands. 
As discussions on operations in the Middle East and at home 
continued through March, Keyes once again brought up the subject of 
recreating a striking force. In a formal report on the COHQ's 
activities, issued on 21 March 1941, he repeated the request for the 
inclusion of the Royal Marine brigades in the DCO's command. The 
cancellation of BRISK and SHPAPNEL would free these trOODS for other 
operations, keeping in mind the fact that the), were to form the basis 
6 
for the Royal Marine Division. Keyes was at this time considering 
another operation against Sardinia, GARROTTER, which Churchill had 
asked him to plan. In order to conduct this operation, Keyes esti- 
4. COS(41) 50 Mtg 12 Feb 41, C., kB 79/9. 
S. COS(41) 108 'SDecial Ships and Landing Craft for Combined Opera- 
tions' 18 Feb 41, and COS(41) 11S 'Raiding Craft Carriers' 2S Feb 
41) C_NB 80/26. 
6. Report by DCO 21 Mar 41, DEEFE 2/78S. 
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mated that the Kenya, Karanja, and SobjesRi, the two Dutch LSI(ýO, 
and four Belgian LSI(S) would be required to carry landing craft. 
The Ulster Monarch, Royal Scotsman, and a fast liner could also be 
used to transport troops. The total force would consist of the two 
Royal Marine Brigades, including the 3th A&SH, and seven Commandos, 
7 
a total of over 7,000 men. 
Shortly after this Keyes suggested that, whether or not CIGROTTER 
was carried out, the British would be 1well advised' to assemble and 
organise the amphibious striking force, and to prepare the necessarv 
shipping. He thought it important that-the commanders, staffs, 
and troops should be able to work together beforehand. The commanders 
and staffs could study the whole range of possible operations - YORKER, 
GARROTTER, BRISK, SHPAMNEL., TRUCK, the capture of Las Palmas or Tene- 
riffe, or any other project - and work out detailed nlans. They could 
thus be ready to carry out these operations at the shortest possible 
notice. There would be, Keyes felt, 'a great deal to be gained and 
8 
nothing that will be lost in the assembly of such a force'. The COS 
approved this in princiDle on 27 'March 1941, although the), asked to 
see Keyes before they would issue any definite instructions. It was 
also agreed that, of the possible projects listed, the force, wben 
9 
formed,, should give priority to those against the Atlantic islands. 
Keyes met the COS on 28 March 1941 to discuss this. The temporary 
harmony that existed after the promulgation of the new Directive is 
illustrated by the fact that the pertinent section of the minutes was. 
7. COS(41) 65 (0) 'Operation GLARROTTERI 22 Mar 41, CAB 80/S7. In COS 
(41) 68 (0) 'Assembly of a StriRing Force' 26 Mar 41, CAB 80/S7, 
Keyes says four Belgian LSI(S) will be used. 
8. COS(41) 68 (0) 'Assembly of a Striling Force' 26 liar 41, CM SO/S7. 
9. COS(41) III, Mtg 27 Mar 41, CAB 79/10 
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sent to Keyes for vetting, and was not included in the published 
10 
edition of that'day's meeting. .- 
Keyes explained the details of the force., which would consist of 
the ships and troops mentioned above. The force would assemble at 
Loch Fyne tinder a military commander and a naval officer, to be 
designated as 'SNO Transports'. The XTACTC would be the area commander, 
and it was obviously Keyes' intention that the force would come tinder 
the COHQ. The COS approved the composition of the force in principle, 
although it felt that the actual composition should be left for further 
study by the JPS and the DCO's staff. .. 
Major General R. G. Sturges, 
RM, was appointed to command the force. The meeting also covered the 
procedures for planning the operations of the force. Pound had pro- 
posed 'that the two staffs, the JPS and the staff of the DCO, should, 
for the -purpose of preparing the Dlans be regarded as one staff and 
should work in close consultation. Plans would be submitted to the 
COS who would discuss them with the DCO. I Keyes agreed to this, con- 
sidering it 'most satisfactory'. This might have worRed if measures 
had beentaRen to fuse the two staffs tinder central direction, but they 
were in fact to continue, as before, as somewhat competitive entities. 
As so often happened, the failure to designate specific resDonsibili- 
ties would lead to future dissention. 
Pound also considered that the plans should be prepared and the 
forces organised with definite operations in mind. Priority would go 
first to an opposed landing against the Germans in the Azores, if 
possible with a simultaneous assault on the Caw Verdes. If this was 
10. Hollis to Keyes 28 Mar 41, K 13/9. 
11. Ultimately all six Belgian LSI(S) were to be included, as the 
Sobieski was needed for trooping. 
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not possible, the Azores would be occupied first. Second priority 
would be a landing in the Canaries against Spanish opposition. 
Landings with little or no opDosition in either case would be cover- 
ed by the plans for the more difficult opposed landings. 
This planning procedure would supersede guidance given for the 
operations against the Atlantic islands only a few days previously. 
Furthermore, the arrangements were not quite in line with the DCO 
Directive that had recently been approved. 
At the COS meeting on the next day, 29 March 1941, without 
Keyes, but with the JPS, it was suggested that 
... it would be a great pity to ask the Prime Minister to 
make any amendment to a document which both the COS and DCO 
bad agreed upon less than a fortnight ago. Moreover it was 
thought that there was nothing in the arrangements which 
were made yesterday that was in any way contrary to the spirit 
of the Prime Minister's directive. 
This was accepted by the committee, and the effectiveness of the 
organisation for combined operations consequently was to rest on the 
'spirit' of the directive. It is questionable whether this discussion 
of the directive without Keyes present, could itself be thought to be 
in the 'sT)iritlof the directive. That this reliance on the Ispirit' 
was unsound would be soon apParent, for the stej)s taRen to im-Plement 
the formation of the force revealed differences between the DCO and 
the JPS regarding the command and control arrangements. All the con- 
12 
troversies of the past were to be repeated. 
The JPS and the COHQ started joint work on the plans for the 
capture of the Portuguese Atlantic islands, but nothing concrete was 
12. CUS(41T 113 jlltg, with Annex 29 Mar 41, 
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done to assemble the force. On 10 April 1941 the COS noted that the 
force had not Yet gathered at Loch Fyne, but, rather than issue any 
definite instnictions, they merely asl,, ed the JPS to report on the 
progress made in determining the composition of the force, and in 
13 
assembling it. ne fault apparently lay in the coordination made 
by the JPS, for by IS April 1941 Keyes was bitterly complaining about 
the lack of progress. He noted that the COS bad 'almost enthusiastic- 
ally' approved the formation of the force three weeRs before, but, 
though he had done everything in his power to accelerate its forma- 
tion, 'it will be ages before it is ready to strike under the exist- 
ing system, by which every move must be vetted and approved by inter- 
service committees'. Keyes was particularly upset because he had 
just learned that the operations in the Middle East, for which he 
had been forced to give up the Glens and the comandos, had been 
postponed for two months. His frustration at missed opportunities 
was again growing, and with it his desire for greather authority oxer 
14 
offensive operations. 
There is no record of the JPS reply on the formation of the 
striking force, but Keyes met the COS on 23 Anril 1941 to discuss 
the matter. Although the plans for the operations against the Atlan- 0 
tic islands were now ready for their consideration, the COS were 
'gravely concerned' to learn that little Drogress had been made with 
the assembly of both the forces and the shiming necessary to pUt them 
into effect. The Position in the Iberian -peninsula had seemingly I 
deteriorated to the extent that it was desirable for the force to be 
13- C05-(-4! T! 30 Mtg 10 AT)r 411, CAB 79/10. 
14. Keyes to Bracken 15 Apr 41, K 140/3/2. 
139 
at 48 hours notice to sail as soon as i)ossible. The JPS were there- 
fore instructed to expedite the'-comoletion of the plans, and the DCO 
was invited, in consultation with the JPS, to go ahead at once with 
the assembly and organisation of the required forces and shipping. 
This did not solve the problem of the lacR of unified effort between 
the two staffs, but it did give Keyes a slightly increased authority 
15 
in forming the force. 
I'he command arrangements were to change, albeit imperceptibly 
at first, starting the very next day. 'Me JPS had revised their 
opinions on the strategic importance of-the Atlantic islands, and 
now recommended that an expedition be Prepared-to seize the Canaries 
rather than the Azores. This was approved by a COS meeting, chaired 
by Churchill, on 24 April 1941 as Operation PLJ, \I, %. Sturges and Rear 
Admiral J. C. Hamilton, Rear Admiral (D) Home Fleet, were nominated 
as the joint commanders for planning. They were immediately to draw 
16 
up detailed plans, on the basis of the JPS outline. 
Although the DCO's staff had apparently collaborated on the JPS 
report, which reflected the DCO's views, the net effect was the 
strengthening of the tie between the commanders and the JPS. Rather 
than the DCO's staff and the JPS being considered as one, as Pound 
had foreseen, the DCO's staff was progressively squeezed out of the 
planning. The subordination of the joint commanders also slowly 
changed, from the DCO - through the VACTC. -to a position directly 0 
under the COS, with the JPS as a link-. The apDointment of Hamilton 
served to increase this split. Instead of the CrC and the striking 
15. COS(41) 144 \Mtg 23 Apr 41, CAB 79/11. 
16. COS(41) 146 and 147 Mtgs 24 Apr 41, CAB 79/11. 
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force worRing together to develop expertise and doctrine, they became 
I 
separate, and tompeting, organisations. This may have been tolerable 
for a short period, with a definite date for executing PLMA, but it 
would be a festering sore if PUNR was continually postooned, leaving 
the amnbibious force on notice for extended neriods. This, as had 
been the case with so many previous operations, was exactly what would 
happen. 
Added to these problems was Keyes' desire for couunand. When he 
was given authority to organise the striking force, he knew that PUMA 
was being developed, and told the COS op 24 April 1941 that he approved 
of it. Mien PUAA was- formally approved, he stated that I inter-service 
committees can, of course, give invaluable help, but joint authority 
and responsibility is bound to reproduce the miscarriages and confusion 
which has characterised almost all combined operations in the past'. 
He therefore suggested to Ismay that he should be given the complete 
responsibility for operations of the amphibious force in the Atlantic. 
Keyes, in his judgement of the detrimental effects of the division 
of responsibility, was entirely correct, and his solution was valid, 
but he did not expect that the agency ultimately to be excluded would 
be his owm. This process of exclusion started early on, for it was 
during the joint commanders' first meeting with the COS and Keyes, on 
26 April 1941, called to disucss the outline plans and the commanders' 
17 
draft directives, that Sturges suggested that the coordination pro- 
I 
cedure described should be amended. He tbought, rightfully, that it 
would be 'easier' for the commanders if they could deal with the 
departments concerned through the JPS. This would prevent their hav- 
17. Keyes to Ismay 24 Apr 41, PRL%l 3 361/1. 
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ing to deal with two staffs, the DCO's staff and the JPS, simultan- 
1 18 
cously. 'Mis W'as agreed to by *all concerned. It was not fully 
realised at the time, but this gave the JPS a major advantage in 
disT)utes with the DCO. The s-olit would become major when Sturges 
was replaced as the 'military commander by Lieutenant General H. R. G. 
Alexander. The stage was sent for yet another confrontation. 
18. COSPI 12 Mtg 41, CAB 7-9T5!; -. 
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CHAPTER IX 
COM31NED OPFRATIO. NS'. ORC-tANIISATION (6) 
THE APPOIN91ENlT OF COMMODORE LORD LOUIS MUNITBAITEN 
AS ADVISER ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND TliE '111IRD DIRECTIVE 
Keyes and the COHQ were cut off almost entirely from further 
planning for PUMA after the aDDointment of Alexander. The full 
dress rehearsal, termed LEAPFROG, for the Canaries operations, re- 
named PILGRIM, was held in the second week of August 1941, and 
Keyes went as an observer. 
The rehearsal, directed by the joirft commanders, and with the 
King as a witness, was in most respects a failure. The beach re- 
connaissance was poor, the craft were landed in the wrong place, 
and the beach organisation was lacking. Both tank assault ships 
grounded, and the unloading of the force was dilatory. The signals 
organisation was poor, and the handling of craft was open to criti- 
cism. Air co-operation was minimal. 
Keyes had not spoken to the joint commanders immediately after 
the exercise, but on 18 August he sent Hamilton a letter containing 
a number of criticisms 'mainly directed against the senior officers 
who were responsible for the delays and miscarriages which ought 
not to have occurred'. Keyes noted that the joint commanders had 
every facility for training the force for two months prior to the 
exercise, which, until shortly beforehand, was to have been the 
final rehearsal before sailing. lie considered it'distressing,, 
therefore, to watch the proceedings on 10 August, for they disclosed 
a-deplorable lack or organisation to overcome the hazards and diffi- 
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culties of such a formidable enterprise,. In his opinion virtually 
nothing had been learned from pýst experience; otheTwise the majority 
of the difficulties of LEAPFROG could have been avoided. Keyes 
pointed out several examples, good and bad, from the Gallipoli land- 
ings that were aT)T)licable. Keyes thought the commanders had suffi- 
cient ODPOrtunity to preT)are for the oneration, but 'combined opera- 
tions are immensely difficult to execute, and they certainly cannot 
be undertaken with the light-hearted optimism which I have heard in 
connection i%dth PILGRIM nor in the manner in which LEAPFROG was 
conducted'. He stressed the effectiveness and quick tempo of Gel-man 
oPerations, with which he had firsthand experience, and so he had 
watched the 'leisurely proceedings' of LEAPFROG Iwith dismay'. 
Keyes also sent a letter to Alexander, but, as his criticisms had 
been primarily naval, this was much more restrained. Keyes also had 
his eye on Alexander's supPort for some alternative uses of the 
2 
PI LGRIM force. 
After Alexander declined to support Keyes' alternative projects 
Keyes too], a harder line. On 22 August 1941 lie told Alexander that, 
while he agreed with the -orincipal lessons that bad been enunciated 
in the joint commanders' report on LEAPFROG, it 'should not 'have been 
necessary to stage an altogether abortive exercise' in order to de- 
monstrate them. He nevertheless attempted to enlist Alexander's 
support for the general--purDose training of the amnhibious striking 
3 
force, rather-than the concentration on one -particular operation. 
The joint commanders naturalINr reacted to this stinging criti- 
1. Keyes to Hamilton 18 Aug 41, DEFE 2/698. 
2. Keyes to Alexander 19 Aug 41, DEFE 2/698. 
3. Keyes to Alexander 22 Aug 41, DEFE 2/698*. 
144 
cism. On 23 August 1941 they produced a joint paper - -ilthough 
the main contributer appears to'have been Hamilton - in which they 
justified the conduct of LENPFROG. It was the first large scale 
exercise of its Rind., and 'it is only through practical experience 
on a large scale that faults and difficulties xd11 come to light'. 
As far as they were concerned, it was 'obvious that the study of 
opposed landings was still in its early stages and that there is 
still a great deal to be learned'. What Keyes thought of this 
argument has already been made clear. 
The paper went. much further, however, countering Keyes' criti- 
cisms by declaring that 
-. the machinery for the execution of combined 
operations, including training, is basically at 
fault and, in the light of our nresent experience, 
we would recommend that force commanders be directed 
to deal solely with the service ministries and not 
be partially responsible to an outside Directorate, 
thus avoiding divided control at the outset which 
is bound to lead to confusion and chaos. 
The battle lines were being set. The cormanders went on to say that 
the COHQ should be reT)laced with bodies in each service ministry 
which should be collectively charged with long term training and 
technical development. This collective group would exercise its 
functions through the CTC at Inverary for basic training and through 
an operational training centre at Largs for the training of large 
formations prior to mounting operations, as well as through the ISTDC. 
For'the execution of special operations, the EPS was considered suffi- 
cient. These proposals were nut forward on the justification that 
the size and requirements of large expeditions were such that only 
the service ministries could provide the technical and staff facili- 
ties needed to njan, train, and launch them. The commanders also 
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considered that no outside deDartment could exercise the executive 
14 
authority alreýdy enjoyed by the service departments. 
The imnact of this report was bolstered by a general feeling 
then existing in the War Office that a reorganisation of the system 
for the control and execution of combined operations was necessary. 
Doubts on the current system were evidenced by Lieutenant (, eneral 
Sir Henry Pownall, the VCIGS, who thought that it was time that a 
study, from operations in the current war, be made of the broad 
lessons of strategic T)lanning of combined oT)eyations. This would 
serve as a guide to commanders and staffs involved in future opera- 
tions. Pownall therefore wanted an inter-service committee, with 
representatives of the service ministries and the COHQ, to be set 
S 
ut) and directed to T)Yepare a short YeDort. 
The CIGS was also concerned about extending the -responsibilities 
of the C-in-C Home Forces to include the planning and execution of 
any large scale operations forecast on the Continent, on the basis 
that the C-in-C would nrovide the troons involved. The commanders 
and staffs concerned should therefore be brought into the planning 
at the earliest possible stage. This task would still be secondary 
to the planning for the defence of the United Kingdom. If this 
were agreed upon Dill thought that the C-in-C should be provided 
with an inter-service staff to assist in the formulation of plans. 
This--nroposal was -not intended to sunersede or duplicate the existing 
planning machinery, nor was it intended to be linked with the sug- C, - _, 
es- 
4. COS(41) 178 (0) 'Remarks on Opposed Landings by Force Commanders 
. 
Operation PILGRIM' 23 Aug 41, bAB SO/S9. 
S. COS(41) S12 'Study of Combined Operations' 22 Aug 41, CAB 80/30. 
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tions for reorganising the combined operations training machinery. 
'16 Nevertheless, it did make a contribution to the growing controversy. 
The COS took note of Pownall's paper on 2S August 1941, but 
agreed to defer consideration of the -proDosal until the paper from 
the joint commanders was examined. The War Office brief on the 
commanders' paper - most probably nrepared by Pownall - supported 
their contentions, and suggested that the Admiralty and the War 
Office, though not the DCO, should be asked for proposals for the 
7 
reorganisation of the system. Poi%mall was no supporter of Keyes, 
wbom he termed 'a great nuisance'. Pownall was firmly on the side I 
of the joint commanders in the dispute, and considered Keyes' linter- 
ferencel unwarranted. 'But Winston put him in and it's the devil of 
a job to get him out', Poi%nall wrote in his diary on 20 September 
8 
1941. The joint cojiunanders then met the COS, on 26 August 1941, 
to expand on their suggestions. Although the COS listened attentive- z 9 
ly, no action was decided upon at this time. 
Keyes had heard something of the joint camanders, proposals, 
but he bad difficulty in obtaining a copy of their paner. In the 
interim he also considered some changes in the organisation for 
combined operations. As the forecast for 1942 called for larger 
numbers of troons at Tnverary than had been planned upon at its 
6. Notes on COS(41) 520 27 Aug 41, WO 106/4117. 
7. IIVO Brief-on COS(41) 178 (0) 2S Aug 41, WO 193/794 i 
8. Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Pownall, Chief of Staff, edited by B. Bond 
(London 1974), pp. 43-44. Keyes had an equally low oDinion of 
Pownall. He noted to Ismay in a letter on 19 Nov 41, based on 
what he had seen of Pownall during the campaign in the Low Coun- 
tries, 'it alarms me to think of his having my nosition of res- 
ponsibility', K 13/17. 
9. COS(41) 297 Mtg 26 Aug 41, CAB 79/13. 
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establishment, the CfC would need some reinforcement. Keyes also 
thought it illboical that there*- should be two separate training 
organisations, one for his troops for raids and one for larger op- 
erations. In order to promote a 'stronger and closer' working 
connection between the DCO and the service ministries he proposed 
setting u-P a main inter-service committee on combined operations, 
with himself as chairman and the ACINIS, UTF, a representative from 
the Air Ministry, and the DDCO as members. A subordinate committee, 
with the DDCO as chairman and staff officers of the Ist ýirade from 
the service ministries, would also be established. The main committee 
would meet occasionally to decide training policy, while the detailed 
supervision of the CTC would be the resý)onsibility of the subordinate 
committee. The staff officers from the service departments would act 
as general liaison officers for all combined operations questions, 
10 
other than -planning, for their de-oartments. 
Keyes' proT)osal was referred to the VCOS for a preliminary in- 
vestigation of its implications. They were in general agreement 
with the DCO's thoughts on training, incorporating them in a new out- 
line organisation for combined oDerations. This new organisation 
followed Keyes' nroposals On training and enuipment exactly, but 
added a section on planning that showed a chain from the COS to the 
JPS for outline nlanning, and from the COS to the force commanders 
for detailed -Dlanning. The DCO was to liaise with the force commanders, 
but was cut out of the outline planning process comnletely- 'Me 
11 
intent was clear. 
10. 
- 
COS(41) 185 0 Aug 41, 
CAB 80/S9. 
11. COS(41) 540 'Organisation for Combined Operations' 3 SeT) 40, CAB 
80/30. C, 
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Keyes finally managed to obtain a copy of the joint conunanders' 
paper on 30 August 1941, and was' predictably outraged. fie had by 
then already drafted a long memorandum outlining the development of 
the second striking force since his proposal on 25 March 1941, point- 
ing out that he had been steadily excluded from the planning and C, 
preparations for its employment. The joint commanders had turned 
doi%n his offer of rooms to work in, as had been done earlier and in 
the case of THRUSTER, and bad remained witbin the Admiralty. All 
the plans for PILGRIM and LEAPFROG had been worked out without any 
reference to the DCO, the ADCO(N), or the CTC. He would, therefore, 
accept no responsibi-lity for the miscarriages encountered in LEAP- 
FROG and considered that the commanders, in particular Hamilton, 
were attempting in an unwarranted manner to shift the blame onto his 
12 
Directorate. 
Keyes was partially mollified when Alexander came to see him on 
30 August 1941, claiming that the intention had been 'to st-rengthen 
13 
my Directorate'. Keyes had also spoRen to Ismay about the joint 
commanders' proposal, and v., as assured that I the COS did not take it 
14 
seriously', and that 'in fact it was nonsense,. As it had been 
'placed in the records of the COS Committee', however, Keyes insisted 
on sending the COS his observations on the -naper. 
These comments were fairly acid ones, for altbough. Keyes main- 
tained that be bad 21ways bad friendly relations with the military 
members of the EPS, he did not think 'that the naxral members of the 
12. COS(41) S42 'Landing Operations' 2 Se-D 41, CAB 80/30. 
13. Note, COS(41) 31 il-Itg (0) 30 Aug 41, K 13/9. 
14, Note by Keyes 2 Sen 41, K 13/1. 
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EPS can be disassociated from the attempt to ignore mv Directorate 
and to eliminate the DCO from afty nart of the "machinery for the 
execution of combined onerations"'. lie emphasised that after about 
8 July 1941 the joint commanders had operated totally independently 
of the DCO and CTC - in effect under the new system they proT)Osed - 
and the result was the mediocre performance of LEAPFROG. lie included 
his oi%n suggestions for the smoother worRing of the Directorate. lie 
complained that, particularly for PUM and PILQlM, na-pers bad been 
circulated which 'vitally affected the functions of the DCO1, but to 
which he had been denied access, in contravention of his directive of 
14 March 1941. 'It is impossible for the DCO to function under condi- 
tions of divided authority'. He considered that all operations either 
came into his scope or not. If they did, they were classified as a 
TCO oDeration'. 
It should then follow that in regard to all that concerns or 
arises out of such operations, DCO is the directing or consult- 
ing authority. All papers affecting the operation should be 
referred to him and no action of any soft which affects the 
operation should be taken without -prior consultations with DCO 
and, especially, without the opportunity being afforded him to 
record his views on proposals with whicb lie disagrees. 
It is also considered that the officer or officers a-D-oointed 
to command a IDCO operation' should, during the planning stage, 
establish offices in the premises allotted to the DCO and work 
in the closest cooperation under him. lS 
The complaints about the disregard of his directive were valid, 
but in view of the fact that almost all the offensive operations con- 
temolated would, by their nature, be IDCO onerations', this was a 
rather sweeping demand. It was obviously in complete onT)osition to the 
intent of the VCOS proposal for reorganisation. I 
Keyes asked Churchill for an interview on 2 September 1941. Between 
the differences of oDinion over the dispersion of the PILGRIM force for 
the winter and over the organisation for planning and mounting combined 
operations, Keyes despaired of exercising any influence. 
COS(4_1)_ 190 (0) Keyes to COS 3 Sep 41, CIALB /59. 
iso 
... You are now in a position to prevent the COS losing the war, but, tbey will certainly postpone victory so long 
as they are guided by the advice of the inter-service 
committees of comparatively junior officers, without 
practical war exnerience to justify their dictation as 
to what can or cannot be done. 
Their chief object seems to be to array all the 
difficulties and dangers of any offensive operation 
generally 
by ivbicb is within our nowers to carry out, P 
proposing as nreferable something far more hazardous 
and formidable, which they know to be impracticable... 
I am so consistently discredited by your advisers 
that I have to blow my own trumpet to -remind you that 
I have not yet acouired natience and am tired of 
having to waste t: LMe and energy in trying to overcome 
the supine objections of our oi%n people, inl8rder to 
be allowed to make real war unon the enemy. 
The COS met on 4 September 1941 to i; onsider the VCOS recounenda- 
tions and Keyes' T)roposals. Keyes i.., as not invited, and the COS merely 
took note of his papers. They then made a few minor amendments to the 
VCOS organisation and sent it to Keyes for comment. They made it clear 
that the EPS would coordinate with the force commanders for detailed 
17 
planning, the DCO's staff being contacted for technical advice only. 
Hollis, who drew up the covering note to Keyes, made haste to point 
out that the oTganisation for training was identical to Keyes' own 0 
proposal. He also assured Keyes that the scheme for operations would 
only apply to those whicb did not come into the category of IDCO opera- 
tions'. This was not, however, really addressing the problem at band, 
for Hollis was using the term IDCO operations' in -respect to raiding 
operations under S, 000, which had always been acknowledged as Keyes' 
responsibility, and was ignoring Keyes' definition of the term as 
is 
all those operations involving onposed landings. 
16. Keyes to Churchill 2 Sep 41, DEFE 2/698. 
17. COS(41) 311 Mtg 4 Sen 41, CAB 79/14. 
18. Hollis to Keyes 4 Sep 41, K 13/1. 
Keyes replied ijiunediately, reaffi ming his definition of a 
I 
'DCO operation' and stating thaý he was not prepared to accept the 
proposed reorganisation. At the same time he lodged a further com- 
plaint about the consultative arrangements in his directive being 
19 
ignored by the COS. Keyes also went to see Churchill, and their 
five minute meeting ended with some fairly strong words being ex- 
changed. Keyes then wrote a long letter to Churchill - his usual 
practice. fie covered the history of the Admiralty opposition to 
the DCO and his nroblems with the service denaTtments over PILGRIM. 
lie re-iterated that the procedure now being suggested was actually 
that which had been followed in the later stages of PILGRIM, and 
that he could not accept it. He was willing to accept the entire 
responsibility for the training of the amphibious force, T)rovided 
that he was given executive authority by the COS and Churchill. 
'Failing this, I am not prepared to allow uiy name to be associated 
with combined operations, since I am certain to be considered res- 
ponsible wben things go i%rong'. In this respect he cited LFAPFROG, T 
for which the COHQ had had no reswnsibility, but which was being 
used as an excuse for the recommendation of the elimination of COHQ 
altogetber. This was certainly a valid point, one that was never 
20 
fully countered. 
As complex as the situation already was, the COS on 8 September 
1941 decided to take up Dill's earlier suggestion regarding the ex- 
tension of the responsibility of the C-in-C Home Forces to the plan- 
ning, organising, and training for 'operations against the Continent', 
9.. Keyes to Hollis 4 Sep 41, K 16 
Isi 
20. Keyes to Giurcbill 5 SeT) 41, PROI 3/330/7. 
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as well as his other request for the transfer of much of the raid- 
21 
ing responsibility to Home Forcbs. The COS, taRing all the pro- 
posals that bad been circulating into consideration, produced a 
draft report on the organisation for combined operations. They 
basically expanded upon the VCOS recommendations, accepting the prin- 
ciples involved. For operations outside of home waters, the JPS 
would prepare an outline plan. If this was approved in principle 
by the Defence Committee (Nerations), the commanders would then be 
appointed, and they would prepare the detailed plans in consultation 
with the EPS. Technical advice would be sought from the DCO. After 
the detailed plan was nrepared it would be submitted to the COS, who 
would then consult with the DCO. If the -Dlan were then approved - 
and there is still no mention of what the -procedure would be if the 
DCO did not approve at any stage - the plan would be submitted to the 
Defence Committee (Operations) with the commanders T)resent. The 
responsibility for training the forces for the ope rations would then 
lie with the commanders, though they were to Iseel, help and advice' 
from the DCO's staff. The study and design of s, )ecial equipment 
would be the DCO's only primary responsibility. For operations on 
the Continent the C-in-C Home Forces was to be in the same position 
as the commanders appointed for overseas expeditions. The raiding 
organisation was to be in accordance with the C-in-C Home Forces' 
22 
proposals. 
Consideration of this matter was delayed in the next few days 
because of the dispute over the dispersal of PILGRDI force. Besides 
the detailed arguments over the disposition of the force, it was 
21. COS(41) 314 Mtg 8 SeD 41, CIAB 79/14. 
22. COS(41) 195 (0) 'Organisation fo Combined Operations' 8 Sen 41, 
CIAB 80/S9. 
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clear that one of the primary issues in contention was the role of 
the DCO. Keyes was by now being assailed on all sides. As usual he 
appealed to Churchill, both to establish his authority over the train- 
ing of the striking force, to prevent its dispersal, and to sul)Port 
his consultative posit ion on all combined operations. This was 
the only way, in Keyes' opinion, that the management of amphibious 
warfare could be kei)t out of the control of the demonstrably incom- 
petent junior officers on the committees of the service deiiartments, 
so that bold offensive strokes could be made when oT)r)ortunities 
23 
arose. To an extent, Keyes' i)osition had been accepted by Churchill 
when he had earlier sunported Keyes' criticisms of the PILGRIM plans. 
After the furore over the dispersion of the PILGRIM force had 
died down, the COS redrafted, on 16 September 1941, their recowenda- 
tions regarding the organisation for combined onerations, with the 
result that Keyes' influence would be further decreased. This new 
24 
proposal was sent to Keyes for his comments. In Hollis' covering 
note, he assured Keyes of the committee's 'earnest desire to preserve 
all that has proved valuable of the existing arrangements and to 
modify only those parts of the machine which make for friction or 
misunderstanding. ' 
This new scheme, which had the full authority of the COS, came 
as a shock to Keyes, -oarticularly in view of the assuYances that 
had'earlier been given to him by the secretariat. His susPicions i 
ayoused, Keyes im. ediately u-rote to aurchill that, in view of the 
23. See Keyes to Chu --chilf-111H -SeDi- 4-1 a-n-d-N16-tebF Keyes thereon 12 
- Sep 41, DEFE 2/698. 
24. COS(41) 324 'i\Itg 16 Sei) 41, Cle 79/14. 
25. Hollis to Keyes 18 Sen 41, PRDI 3/330/2. 
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appointment which had been offered him on 17 July 1940 and of his 
I 
directive of 14 March 1941, he did not intend to reply to the COS 
26 
until he had an interview with the Prime Minister. Churchill was 
angry that Keyes should have been sent the proposal before he him- 
self had approved it, and decided to taRe the matter up with the COS. 
Hollis then exDlained to Churchill that the COS bad sent it to Keyes 
to be fair and polite, to avoid friction, and to disprove the DCO's 
27 
allegation that the COS were not giving him 'a square deal'. Chur- 
chill advocated a strange procedure indeed to frame 7aroT)osals, and 
this is an example of one of the veo things that Keyes was comnlain- 
ing about. The Prime Minister's position, nevertheless, must be re- 
membered, for it was Churchill, who, on his own initiative and without 
proper staff coordination, drafted the last directive to Keyes. Chur- 
chill refused to see Keyes personallv about this cominlaint, bowever. 
Keyes thereupon started working out his comments on the COS pronosal, 
and Churchill agreed to defer any decision until be had examined these. 
The COS, in the meanwhile, continued discussions with the Directors 
of Plans and the C-in-C Home Forces on the -Droi)osed reorganisation. 
Keyes sent his comments on the scheme to Hollis on 25 SeDtember 1941, 
noting that the proposals made no reference to the command of the 
-raiding flotillas and Special Service troops. Keyes wished to take 
28 
these up in a meeting with the COS. 
Keyes' comments on the proposed reorganisation covered many 
29 
points. The COS had declared that there were two major principles 
which had to be recognised as affecting all large operations. The 
26. Keyes to Churchill 19 Sep 4, PRh\I 3/330/2. 
27. Hollis to Churchill 21 Sep 41, PRENI 3/330/2. 
28. Keyes to Hollis 2S Sen 41, K 13/1. 
29. See COS(41) S70 (RhAIISE) 'Interservice Organisation for Combined 
Operations' 22 Sep 41, CAB 80/30. 
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first was that the responsibility for tendering advice to the Prime 
Minister, Defen . ce Committee (Operations), or War Cabinet on the 
strategic aspects and general feasibility of any operat-ional plan 
must lie with the COS. Keyes maintained that at no time had he 
ever questioned this principl6, and that he bad only been anxious 
to T)Iace his ex-nerience in combined oT)erations at their disposal. 
The second principle was that the commander or commanders of an 
operation, once appointed, must be responsible for the detailed 
n1anning, for the training of the forces allotted, and for the 
execution of the operation. Keyes agreed that the commanders should 
'generally' be responsible for planning 'and training, and entirely 
responsible for the execution. As far as planning and training was 
concerned, he suggested that it be incumbent for the commanders to 
consult the DCO, so that if any difficulties of opinion did arise 
they could be placed before the COS for resolution. The COS next 
laid down three functions for a combined operations organisation. 
These were the organisation of training for troop units at the 
amphibious warfare schools, the research and development of special- 
ised equiment, and the study and development of tactics and tech- 
niques. Keyes agreed to all of this, with the nroviso on training 
mentioned above. Problems arose over the COS conception of how 
. planning for large scale operations should work-, however. It was 
clearly stated in their T)aDer that it would not be done by the new 
combined operations organisation. The outline plans were to be 
prepared under the direction of the COS for approval by the govern- 
ment; the detailed planning would be done by the commanders. The 
COS noted that 'it will be advantageous for those responsible for 
the planning to have the benefit, on the ap pro-priate level, of the 
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sRilledadvice of an inter-service organisation'. Keyes certainly 
disagreed witb*. tbis, both because he thought it essential that the 
DCO should become involved in the initial stages of the outline 
planning, and because he thought that the commanders should be 
required to consult with the DCO rather than being given the option. 
The COS, in outlining the new organisation, wisbed to change the title 
of 'Director of Combined Operations' to 'Adviser on Combined Opera- 
tions' (ACO) to 'distinguish the new arrangement from the old'. This 
certainly annoyed Keyes, who could see no advantage in the change, and 
who thought it would lead to a 'misapprehension of his duties and 
responsibilities'. In reality, under the new terms, it was an accur- 
ate description, and herein lies the difference in outlook between 
the COS and Keyes. The COS bad also further defined the position 
of the C-in-C Home Forces, and had directed that the ACO would also 
be responsible for advising him. Before a definite decision on this 
new organisation was made, however, the COS wanted the machinery 
tested in practice, and proposed to invite the C-in-C Home Forces, 
in consultation with the aT)pronTiate naval and air C-in-Cs, to plan 
a definite operation. The organisation would then be reviewed in the 
light of the experience gained. The fact that the DCO ivas not in- 
cluded in these proposals for an exercise was not lost on Keyes, and 
he therefore wanted it made clear that the C-in-C should also be re- 
quired to consult him. 
In general, Keyes agreed with much of the paper ý)Yoduced by the 
COS. He pointed out, however, that excent for a coment. by Hollis 
in his covering letter that the new organisation would prevent Ifric- Z' - 
tion and misunderstanding', the COS had adx, anced no reasons for the 
cancellation of his directive of 14%-Iarch 1941. The net result of 
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the new oyganisation would be to re)ieve the DCO of 'an), executive 
authority or independent responsibility'. Large scale raids would 
be transferred to the C-in-C Home Forces, the COS would lassulle any 
powers the DCO may have nossessed as to the general conception of 
plans', and the commanders of oDerations were relieved of the res- 
ponsibility of consulting the DCO. All the 'very wide powers and 
responsibilities of the DC01 in his March directive would thus be 
Iswept away'. Considering the achievements of the COHQ, and 'fail- 
ing reasons to the contrary being established', Keyes declared that 
be could not be expected to agree to the new organisation. fie 
thought that the proposals contained in the COS -oaper should instead 
be married, as far as possible, to what was in his existing directive, 
30 
and proposed. a meeting with the COS to this end. 
The COS considered Keyes' comments at their meetings on the 
mornings of 26 and 27 September 1941, and made some amendments to 
the organisation. They altered the operational procedure slightly, 
so that the outline plans would be examined by the JPS with the advice 
of the ACO and then would be sent to the COS for consideration, with 
the ACO again 'present. Had a representative of the ACO been included 
permanently on the JPS, as was done later in the way, this would have 
been a step forward. I'his alteration, however, was mainly cosmetic, 
for the JPS had been obliged to consult with the DCO under the terms 
of the old directive, and this had not prevented i)roblems from arising. 
The COS now included the CTSs in the organisation, placing them under 
the inter-service sub-committee on training, and the cor. nandos, who 
would come under the CTCs when not detailed for operations. The 
-p7p 30. Hollis to MuEr-chill 2S Sep 41, fOl 37T30/2. 
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responsibility for small cross-Channel raids was also clearly dele- 
gated to the C in-C Home Forces. These amendments resulted in the 
NO losing his hold on the Special Service troops. His responsi- 
bility for Continental raiding was virtually elAinated, and his 
31 
position in respect to raids overseas was still vague. 
Hollis told Keyes, on 28 September 1941, that he bad passed 
Keyes' previous comments on to Churchill, and enclosed the amended 
COS proposals. He explained that some of the suggestions Keyes had 
made were incorporated in the -r)aper, but 'the COS did not find them- 
32 
selves able to change their view on the. major issues'. Keyes met 
the COS on 29 September 1941 to Dresent his case. This was contained 
in part in a summary he gave them. 
I am quite -Drepared to direct combined onerations under 
you, on this revised directive, and, as I have said in 
previous memoranda, to be Yesponsible to you for the train- 
ing and efficiency of an amphibious expeditionary force. 
I am not, however, prepared to accept a directive which 
sweeps away the one which you gave me as recently as 14 
March, with the a-proval of the Prime Minister, and which, 
thought it gives me wide advisory -powers, deprives me of V. - 
all the res-oonsibility confided in me and relegates me to 
the position of an adviser whose advice is persistently 
ignored. In effect I become the chairman of yet another 
inter-service committee. 
Of course, if the Prime Minister wishes to terminate 
my appointment, that is another matter. 
Keyes ivent on to review his own proposals for a new directive. 
Pound replied, detailing the reasons for the reorganisation and I 
emphasising the 'advantages' of the new procedure, but to no avail. 
The conclusions reached at this meeting are rather vague and contra- 
dictory, for the COS seemingly agreed to consider Keyes' proposals 
31. COS(41) 334 ýItg 26 Sep 41 and COS(41) 335 Mtg 27 Sep 41, CIAB 
79/14; COS(41) 589 'Inter-sen, ice Organisation for Combined 
Operations' 27 Sep 41, CIAB 80/30. 
32. Hollis to Keyes 28 Sep 41, K 13/1. 
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for a new directive while at the Same time endorsing their oi,,, n and 
33 
instructing the secretary to send it to Churchill. 
Hollis submitted everything to Churchill the evening of 
29 September 1941. It is apDarent that Hollis was taRing the side 
of the COS in the matter, as his notes to Churchill became increas- 
ingly slanted. It is perhaps unfortunate that Ismay was at this time 
on a mission to Russia, as he understood the need for the secretariat 
to taRe a neutral attitude. Hollis em. phasised how the COS had tried 
to accommodate Keyes, and how they had continually revised their pro- 
posals to meet his requirements. They had, for example, considered 
the situation further, after Keyes bad left the meeting, and now 
suggested Keyes be called 'Adviser on Combined Operations and Comman- 
dant of CTCs', which would 'in fact give him the supervision of 
all training for combined onerations but not the Yes-oonsibility. 
which commanders would exercise for training forces specifically 
allotted to them'. In many resT)ects this was a soi), for it did 
not address the main point in regard to training, and would not in 
itself overcome the conflict between the maintenance of a general- 
purpose amphibious force and the indefinite holding of all available 
resources for a specific operation. Hollis continued that he bad 
gone to see Keyes after the meeting, but was 'unable to convince him 
that the COS were prepared to give him a large measure of resT)onsi- 
bility for the general organisation of combined operations', though 
they were not willing to give in on the Doint of his being an 'Ad- 
viser' rather than a 'Director'. Hollis admitted that the -oroblem 
was getting very involved, but emphasised to Churchill that 'the 
33. COS(41) 336 Mtg 29 SeT) 41, CAB 79/14. 
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COS have devoted a great deal of We in a genuine attempt to arrive 
at a worRing a greement', thoughý regrettably, 'we have so far failed 
34 
to do so'. 
Churchill wrote to Keyes on 30 September expressing his hope that 
Keyes would be able to come to an agreement with the COS regarding the 
modification of his directive. He told Keyes that the title of 'Direc- 
tor7 did not correspond to the facts, as the responsibility for advis- 
ing the Defence Committee (Operations) and the War Cabinet could only 
rest with the COS, and that the responsibility for operations that 
were approved must belong to the commanders appointed. Churchill 
added that he believed 'very large spheres of-important and interest- 
ing work' would be open to Keyes under the new directive. He warned 
Keyes that 11 should find it very hard to resist the advice of all 
my responsible experts. I trust that you will fall in therefore with 
35 
the plans which have now taRen shape'. 
Keyes was still attempting to have the organisation changed, 
and told Hollis that he would like another meeting with the COS 
after he bad drafted his new proposals. The COS agreed to wait for 
these new -oroposals, as had apparently been decided in Keyes' last 
meeting with them. At the same time, however, Keyes re-Diied petu- 
lantly to Churchill that he gathered from Churchill's note of 30 
September that Churchill was terminating his appointment as DCO. Keyes 
then proceeded on for three more pages to vent his frustrations, He 
acRnowledged the responsibilities of the COS and the appointed 
34. Note the use of the word 'we'. Ag gain this is something not 
found 
in Ismay's notes. Hollis to Churchill 29 Sep 41, PRIII 3/330/2. 
3S. Churchill to Keyes 30 Sep 41, DEFE 2/698. 
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commanders, but complained that his exTerience was not being made 
use of. lie could not agree that there was a large and imnortant 
sphere of work for him under the new arrangements, though Pound had 
spent considerable time in trying to convince him of this. He was 
convinced that the COS and the joint commanders of PILGRIM did not 
understand the basis of amphibious operations, and because of this 
the effort and material being put into such operations was not pro- 
ducing a reasonable return. Under the new arrangements things would 
not be any better. He spoke of the hostility towards his organisa- 
tion, and outlined the persistent attempts to eliminate his Director- 
ate. Pound, the JPS., and the EPS were described as the 'rocks on 
which any bold plan might founder'. He told Churchill that he was 
not prepared to be associated with combined operations in any way if 
he was to be merely an adviser who could have his advice ignored when 
inconvenient, or be made a scanegoat when things went vrrong. If he 
were to remain, responsibility must be delegated to him by the COS 
'to prevent the recurrence of a long series of miscarriages', which 
he had been unable to avert even under his present directive, and 
which had 'impeded progress and efficiency and our ability to wage 
war overseas'. He ended by mentioning that he was preDaTing new pro- 
36 
posals. for a directive, wbich be hoped the COS would accept. 
As usual, Hollis received this letter, and in fon, 7arding it to 
Churchill he commented that it was clear that Keyes would not accept 
the COS proposals. 11 do not think that an), good can come of yet 
another paDer from him to the COS. DCO's letter is full of inaccura- 
cies and half truths'. This is without a doubt an unwarranted intru- 
sion into the affair by Hollis, and most certainly was a 'half-truth' 
36. Ke-ves to Churchill 2 Oct 41, IlIZENI 3/3.50/2. 
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in itself. When. all was said and done, Keyes had in reality commented 
once on each of the two COS -r)aT)ers sent him, and had met the COS only 
once on the subject. I%Iiether this could be considered excessive or 
not is a matter of judgement. But the COS on 29 September had agreed 
to wait for Keyes' proposals for a new directive, and this was the 
paper which Hollis disparagingly referred to. Hollis thus took on 
a nosition which even the COS had not maintained. Moreover, in 
none of the minutes to Churchill does he mention that the COS have 
agreed to consider this next paper. His actions in this matter 
certainly reflect no credit upon the secretariat, and could well be 
37 
described, in Keyes' terms, as an lintriguel. 
Keyes was at the same time writing a further, more conciliatory, 
letter to Churchill, though he still rounded on the mismanagement of 
the amphibious force 'owing to the pusillanimous folly of your 
38 
princinal naval adviser'. It was too late, however. Before Church- 
ill bad received this last letter he bad minuted to Hollis that, as 
Keyes did not wish to accept the new arrangements, be would like the 
Admiralty to arrange for Keyes' relief by Lord Louis Mountbatten. On 
the same day, 4 October 1941, he wrote 13rivately to Keyes, expressing 
his regret that Keyes would not accept the reorganisation. 11 have 
really done my best to accept your wishes. I have to consider first 
my duty to the state uhich ran], s above personal friendship. In all 
39 
circumstances I have no choice but to arrange for your relief'. 
37. Hollis to Churchill 4 Oct 41, PRf3-1 3/330/2 contains Hollis' 
comments. The events as remembered by Hollis in his book and 
the T)apers available do not tally. See Apnendix H. 
38. Keyes to Churchill 4 Oct 41, PP0.1 3/330/2. 
39. Churchill to Hollis 4 Oct 41, PROI 3/330/2 and Churchill to Keyes 
4 Oct 41, DEFE 2/698. 
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Keyes -received this letter on 6 October 1941. fie responded 
that the COS had on 29 September agreed to consider his proposals 
for a revised directive. lie bad since been worRing on these, and 
bad postponed a meeting with the COS until he bad finished them. 
He was therefore rather surprised that a decision bad been made 
solely on the basis of the 27 September memorandum of the COS., 
Aich, although fonjarded to Churchill, was in no sense a developed 
directive. Keyes therefore told Churchill that he hoped to -recon- 
cile the differences with the COS at their next meeting. If the 
question was not then resolved to their mutual satisfaction, he 
40 
would step aside. Keyes at the same time fonýarded his new pro- 
T)osals to Hollis, asking that he be able to exnlain them at a COS 
meeting. He was now told, however, that the COS would not see him, 
as the matter had been taken out of their hands by the Prime Minister. 
This was a somewhat disingeneous renly on their -Dart, but under- 
standable. Keyes was finally out, and it would be expecting too 
much of the COS to aid in his return. 
Keyes ao arently regarded the matter more as a misunderstand- 
ýp 
ing, and was not yet -ready to accept Churchill, s decision as final. 
Keyes wrote to Ismay on his return from Russia on 11 October 1941. 
He explained what hanDened and ex! )ressed a hope that Ismay could 
straighten things out, as he had often done in the nast. Keyes 
described his last proposals, which would 'have made him the 'Direc- 
tor of Combined Training I, presiding over the committee of the 
directors of training of the three service departments, and command- 
ing the CrCs, assault shipping, and landing craft. He would be 
40. Keyes to M-rchill 6 Oct 41, P10-13/330/2. 
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responsible for -all training until onerations uere detailed, and 
would then be able to turn over 'an efficient force to the apnointed 
commanders. Keyes noted that he did. not want the title of 'Adviser 
on Combined Operations', as he did not want to force his advice on 
anyone who did not want it, and it was clear that the COS did not 
want him to have anything to do witb the execution of combined 
41 
operations. 
Ismay, who had always resnected Keyes, was placed in a quandary, 
and decided to inform Churchill 'fully and frankly, of the contents 
42 
of Keyes' letter. Churchill then replied to Keyes, on 14 October 
1941. He exnlained that he had asked Keyes in all seriousness on 
30 September to accept the proposals of the COS, but that this bad 
been refused on 2 October. On 6 October Keyes had again, in Church- 
ill's oT)inion, indicated his unwillingrness to accept their proposals, 
and in the meanwhile things had proceeded in accordance with Church- 
ill's note of 4 October concerning Keyes' -relief. This would be 
effective on 19 October 1941, when Mountbatten would be promoted to 
Commodore and ap-pointed as Adviser on Combined Operations, termed 
'Commodore C1. Churchill concluded., 'there can be no question of 
43 
going back on any of these arrangements'. 
Keyes was certainly badly treated. His relief had occurred 
after only one meeting with the COS and none with Churchill, at a 
time when he had the agreement of the COS to his T)renaration of 
further pronosals. Initially lie tooh it very well, and on 14 Octo- 
ber 1941 he answered Churchill II only grieve to have let doi.. m my 
splendid commandos' , who were once again threatened with 
disnersal 
41. Keyes to Ismay 11 OEF-41, K 149/3/2. 
42. Ismay to Keyes 14 Oct 41, K 140/3/21. 
43. Churchill to Keyes 14 Oct 41, DEFE 2/698. 
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by the War Office. He was hurt that Churchill did not at least 
see him before. 'his relief, or 16t him discuss his last nronosals 
with the COS. He praised Tiountbatten as a 'a splendid fellow and 
a live wire with lots of drive' , and he closed by promising 'I 44 
will do all I can to give him a good start', Keyes and Ismay 
parted company as good friends. Further letters of thanks for his 
efforts were received form the coiTnandos, Haydon's in particular 
being very moving. Keyes was still hoping for further em-oloyment, 
and was indeed encouraged by Churchill in thinking so. The bitter- 
ness over his relief would grow as nothing hapPened, and he could 
45 
mal\, e no contribution to war effort. 
On 9 October 1941 the secretary of the COS was directed to 
draw up a new directive for Keyes' successor, based on the COS 
46 
memorandum of 27 Sentember. This was done and the directive, 
with minor modifications, was approved by the COS on 16 October 
47 
1941. Mountbatten was to be designated 'Adviser on Combined 
ODerations'.. which was reduced to 1ACO1, though his official short 
title, as noted above, was 'Commodore C1. He was to act as the 
technical adviser on all aspects of combined operations, in all 
planning stages, and in training. He was to coordinate the general Z> 
training policy for combined operations for all three services, and 
would command the C7Cs. In addition he was chaTged with the develop- 
ment of tactical doctrine for all sizes of combined onerations, as 
44. Keyes to Churchill 14 Oct 41, PRUI 3/330/2. 
45. Haydon to Keyes 19 Oct 41, K 13/21. Keyes returned to Parlia- 
meýt, but was never'again emnloved in an official calnacity. 
His minions about the conduct of combined onerations did not 
change. See his Amphibious 1'%'arfare and Combined Operations 
(Cambridge 1943), a print of the 1943 Lees Knowles Lectures. 
46. COS(41) 348 Mtg 9 Oct 41, C-kB 79/14. 
47. COS(41) 3S6 Mtg 16 Oct 41, CAB 79/15 and COS(41) 629 'Combined 
nnerations and Raids' 17 Oct 41, CAB-80/31. 
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well as the research and development of technical equinment peculiar 
to combined operations. For all operations other than very small 
raids, conducted by the Special Service troops tinder his command, he 
was quite firmly limited to this technical role. In regard to the 
small raids, be would be resnonsible for appointing the force comman- 
der and for the preparation of the detailed plan. The Special Service 
troops, regarded as specialists in combined operations, were to remain 
tinder his command, although they might be detailed to other commanders 
for major operations. He would serve in an advisory capacity in re- 
gard to training of the forces detailed for operations. 
With the change to Mountbatten, a much more junior officer than 
Keyes, there was aT)T)arently a feeling in the War Office that it 
might be the time to regain control of the commandos, particularly 
as the C-in-C Home Forces was to take on a raiding resT)onsibility. 
This view was even shared to some extent by personnel within the 
COHQ, including 11ajor General T. S. Drew, the DDIC0. The CIGS apT)roved 
of this in principle and spoke to the C-in-C Home Forces about it, 
but -preferred to wait until Mountbatten became established before 
48 
making a decision. With this in mind, Mountbatten's directive had 
the note inserted that the Drovisions regarding the commandos were 
subject to an early review. The entire text of the directive is 
reproduced in AppeDdix D. 
The raiding directive for the C-in-C Home Forces had been i 
anDroved at the same time as Mountbatten's. This authorised hipi to 
carry out raids on the French, Dutch, and Belgian coasts. In doing I 
so he could deal directly with the approi)riate air and naval connan- 
48. MZ-0, to VCIGS 18 Oct 41 and Note by CIGS 19 Oct 41, ýO 193/40S; 
Keyes to Churcbill 21 Oct 41, DEFE 2/698. 
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ders, and he was 
I 
instructed to consult the ACO in the preparation 
of the plans. 'The COS were to be kept informed of any raids that 
49 
were to be carried out. In practice the C-in-C Home Forces dele- 
gated his authority to the GOCs of Eastern, Southeastern and Southern 
Commands, giving each of them the responsibility for raiding the 
sector of the enemy coast opposite them. 
Churchill announced the replacenent of Keyes to the Defence 
Committee (Operations) on 17 October 1941, indicating that Mount- 
batten 'would have rather different functions to those exercised 
50 
by Sir Roger Keyes'. Mountbatten's takeover was slightly delayed, 
and be first met the COS on 28 October 1941. He had., 'at first 
sight', no comments to make on the directive. The CIGS then asked 
him if he would object to the Inspector of Infantry visiting the 
commandos, and indicated that the War Office was working on pro- 
posals for their future administration. Mountbatten had no ob- 
51 
jections to this. There was now a distinct change in the tone of 
the COHQ's dealings with the COS. Mountbatten, who bad the ability 
to 'charm a vulture off-a corpse', studiously avoided any clashes 
with the COS. Recognising the limitations of his position, which 
at the time did not entitle him to put forward napers unbidden, he 
refrained from intervening in COS discussions unless there was a C, 
clear consensus that it was a matter for which he bore responsi- 
bility. Although this often meant that he had to 'bite his tongue', 
his presence gradually became an established fact. To quote Lord 
52 
Ballantrae, he was eventually 'like a piece of the furniture'. 
49. COS(41) 630 'Raids' 16 Oct 41, C-kB 80/31. 
SO. DOM) 6S Mtg 17 Oct 41, CIAB 69/2. 
S1. COS(41) 370 Mtg 28 Oct 41, CAB 79/15. 
S2. Quotes on Mountbatten are from inteniew of author with Lord 
Ballantrae 12 Jan 78. 
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This was a far cry from the days of confrontation under Keyes, and 
the net result'was that Mountbatten attended the COS meetings fre- 
quently, as had been the original intention. In the end he D05sessed 
a far greater influence, so much so that Keyes was later to complain 
that the COS had accorded all to Mountbatten that they had denied to 
him. Certainly, Mountbatten's Proposals for offensive operations re- 
ceived sympathetic hearings, and he was invited to virtually all the 
meetings on the changes in the raiding T)olicy and the subse(iuent op- 
erations. Hollis, so critical of Keyes, was quick to apologise to 
Mountbatten on the occasions i%fien he was not asRed to meetinp-s in 
which tonics pertinent to the COHQ had been discussed. Circumstances 
soon ý)resented real opDortunities in combined operations work, and 




COM31NED OPERMONS ORGANISATION (7) 
THE FOURTH DIRECTIVE 
Mountbatten had hardly taken over as ACO before he began making 
suggestions to improve the combined operations organisation. The 
meetings of the Inter-Services Committee on Training and Polic, N, 
he noted, i)roduced results 'whicb demonstrate the value of a senior 
committee in dealing with questions of major policy'. As this 
committee consisted of members of the service training directorates, 
however, it was not quite suitable for the consideration of some of 
the urgent questions that were arising in regard to the air require- 
ments for combined operations. On 22 November 1941 Mountbatten 
recommended that a new inter-service committee be formed to coordin- 
ate such matters, comprising himself as the chairman, the Air Commo- 
dore CFC, the Fifth Sea Lord, the VCIGS, and. the VC. AS, or their 
representatives. The terms of reference for the committee would be 
'to place before the COS agreed and coordinated -proposals setting 
out air requirements for combined oi)e-rations '. This comm, ittee was 
approved by the COS on 9 December 1941, with the composition and 
1 
terms of -reference set out by Mountbatten. It was evident that 
Mountbatten was adept at using the service machinei-y to achieve 
his objectives, rather than attemming to ciYcunvent it, as Keyes 
had often done. 
The shortage of infantry assault shir)s had created a situation 
in which it was clear that there would be no nossibility of the 
COS(41) 686 (REVISE) 'Combined Onerations - Air Coamittee' 22 NON, 
41, CAB 80/32 and COS(41) 414 Mtg 9 Dec 41., CAB 79/16. 
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C-in-C Home Forces using these shir)s in his raiding programme 'for 
a long time to come'. About 5 to 6 weeks training with such ships 
was necessary to reach the standard considered essential for success- 
ful raiding. As the only five ships available were fully progrý-Unmed, 
it was therefore not possible to train the C-in-C's troops to the 
standard already reached by the commandos. Mountbatten took this up 
with the C-in-C Home Forces and the GOC Southern Command, and on 2 
December 1941 lie told the COS that it had been generally agreed that 
it would be better for raids involving infantry assault ships to 
be left in his hands, as had been the case during Keyes' tenure. This 
was considered by the COS on 9 December. 1941 and, after consultation 
with the C-in-C Home Forces, a new raiding directive was issued, 
Itemporarily' limiting him to -raids that could be conducted by 
assault landing craft only. Both the ACO and the C-in-C Home Forces 
2 
were instructed to work in the closest harmony. Another difference 
in style was evident here, for 14ountbatten's arguments i-., ere based 
primarily on practicability, rather than principle. This had always 
been the Admiralty apPyoac'ý, and the result was a lessening of the 
confrontations of the T)revious period. 
Mountbatten had quicl-, ly begun worl, on the revision of the combined 
oT)erations organisation, coordinating the naDers, initially, on 
the lower levels. A memorandum was then submitted to the COS on 3 
December 1941 concerning this. The COS agreed that, to save a great 
deal of time, each of the COS would study the T)roT)osals indeT)endenyy 
and send comments to the secretary. The only T)oint initially agreed 
upon was Pound's insistence that it was 'most undesirable' that there 
2. C05-(-4--IT 718 'Raids by C-in-C ome Forces' 2 Dec 41 and COS(41) 
733 'Raids by C-in-C Home Forces' 10 Dec 41, CAB 80/32; COS(41) 
414 Mtg 9 Dec 41, CM 79/16. 
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3 
be any change in the ACO's title, as Mountbatten suggested. 
'Mere was to bp no repetition of the Keyes' affair. 
Mountbatten met the COS the following day, 4 December 1941. 
lie as], ed that he might receive copies of 'most secret' service tele- 
grams that dealt witb combined onerations, and this was agreed to 
4 
by the COS. That such an obvious requirement had never been ful- 
filled in Keyes' tenure would be surprising, unless one was familiar 
with the personality clashes and the reluctance of the service de- 
partment to give Keyes any information which might lead to criti- 
cisms o-r disputes. 
On the same day J1.1ountbatten submitted a revised memo on the com- 
bined operations organisation. Perhans the major problem that Mount- 
batten had to grapple with was the scheduled increase in the landing 
craft and bases. These elements bad originally been tinder the naval 
wing of the CTC, being administered through normal Admiralty channels 
and -olaced for onerations under the SNIO Landings. This ad hoc 
arrangement had work-ed adequately with the small numbers previously 
involved, but the projected increase in the next 16 months, totalling 
2,700 craft and 22,000 nersonnel, required a centralised administra- 
tion. The Admiralty was pronosing that this be a function of the 
ACO. Mountbatten was willing to acce-ot this, as long as T)Yovision 
was made for a small administrative staff. This staff would be 
under a retired rear admiral at the COHQ, to be known as the Rear 
Admiral Landing Craft and Bases (RUB). The assault sbi-Dping and 
their landing craft would come under a commodore Imoun as the Senior 
Officer Assault Ships and Craft (SOASQ. Mountbatten was also inter- 
ested in establishing a much closer liaison with the Royal Mayines, 
3. COS(41) 406 Mtg 3 Dec 41, CIAB 79/16. 
4. COS(41) 408 I-Itg 4 Dec 41, CAB 79/16. 
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'the traditional combined onerations force' and consequently re- 
quested that his Royal Marine advisor's billet be regraded from 
that of a major to a colonel. lie also wanted to set un two teams 
of staff officers ufiom he could lend to force commanders, when 
appointed. Mountbatten also noted that Keyes had left a very small 
headquarters, and after the reorganisation outlined he would require 
5 
a net increase of 11 officers and a number of IMIS clerical staff. 
The COS considered these proposals on 9 December 1941. Mount- 
batten's request for additional personnel was pared down by two or 
three officers, but the remainder of his Teorganisation was approved. 
In order that his title might more cleariy reflect his increased 
executive authority, the COS bent their previous resolution to the 
extent of allowing him two titles. 'Adviser on Combined Onerations', 
ACO, would be used whenever acting in his advisory capacity to the 
COS, service department, or force commanders. When he was trans- 
mitting orders to the elements under his command he could use the 
title 'Commodore Combined Ooerations', CCO. A new directive, sub- 
6 
mitted by Mountbatten, was approved by the COS at the same time. 
This is reproduced in AT3pendix E. 
In most respects this directive was similar to 'Mountbatten's 
previous one, apart from the fact that it codified the committees 
that had been, or were about to be, established. These were the 
Combined Operations Sub-Committee, the Combined Operations Air 
Committee, and the Combined Operations Signal Committee. The 
Combined Operations Sub-Committee was meant to deal in all matters 
S. C05(-41) 711 (MIISE) 'Combined Operations Organisation, 4 Dec 41, 
CAB 80/32. 
6. COS(41) 414 Mtg 9 Dec 41, CAB 79/16 and COS(41) 732 'Directive 
to ACOI 9 Dec 41, CAB 80/32. 
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of detail in respect to training, and was similar to that proposed 
by Keyes. Its. superior, the Combined Operations Committee, esta- 
blisbed by the earlier October directive, would deal witb matters 
of policy. The Air Connittee had been established at 11ountbatten's 
request, while the Communications CoiTunittee stemmed from the sugges- 
7 
tion of the VCNS of 13 November 1941. As Mountbatten's background 
had been in corTminications, this idea received his firm support. 
The major change was the inclusion of the responsibility for all 
ships - other than Merchant Navy- and craft in the United Kingdom 
that were allocated for combined werations. Keyes had direct 
command of shipping for raiding purposes. only, with further craft 
coming tinder the CFCs, while Mountbatten's first directive had 
only given him command of the CTCs- The COHQ was now well on the 
way to -running its oin navy, and would do so until August 1943, when 
the Admiralty reassumed control. Policy for the allocation of the 
craft was to remain in the hands of the COS, though Mountbatten was 
to maRe recommendations. 
Keyes had already comDlained on 30 October 1941 that Churchill 
had 'given to Mountbatten all that be bad agreed to allow the COS 
8 
to taRe away from me'. 11,1ountbatten's new authority was in many 
respects far more comprehensive than that claimed by Keyes. Mount- 
batten's personality had a great deal to do with this, but an even 
greater factor was the changed relationshiD of combined operations 
to the higher direction of the way. Major combined operations, due 
to American manpower and production canacity, were for the first 
time a feasible oneration of way. Re return to the Continent, 
7. C05-(4--IT 6-78 Tomunications in Future Combined 0I)erations' 
13 Nov 41.9 CAB 80/31. 
8. Keyes to Ismay 30 Oct 71, DEFE 2/698. 
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possible only through a major combined operation, would take its 
place as a cenýral pillar of grand strategy. Major strategic de- 
cisions from now on would be an Allied concern, rather than a 
purely British one. For all these reasons the COHQ would change 
markedly in nature and function, and would assume a greatly in- 
creased importance up to the Normandy landings. British combined 
operations, as encountered in the period from Dunkirk to Pearl 
Harbour, were at an end. Despite all the acrimonious disputes and 
the succession of aborted operations, despite the exclusion from 
strategic policy and the doubtfulness of much of its doctrine, 
the combined operations organisation had laid the foundation for 
that unique day in military history, the 6th of June 1944. 
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QLAPFER XI 
CONTINGENCY OPERMONS IN 'ME ATLANrrIC (1) 
HIRE 
The first contingency operation to be mounted after IXink-irl-, was 
directed at Eire. On 13 June 1940 Churchill sent a note to the COS 
on the Possibility of a German invasion there, xOiich resulted in 
the ISPS being directed to study the occupation of the Shannon River 
1 
estuary, Queenstown Harbour, and Berehaven. The Royal Marine 
Brigade bad earlier been ordered to concentrate in the area of 
Milford Haven to continue its training, where it would be available 
for such operations. It was to be assembled and fully equinDed by 
21 June 1940, for employment in any of the areas mentioned. In 
order to be able to mount the operation in the shortest possible 
time, the COS decided on 20 June 1940 that the required shinDing 
should be assembled in Ntilford Haven, and the loading, of heavy stores 
3 
should start. -Churchill remained concerned about Eire, and reviewed 
the situation at a Defence Committee (Onerations) meeting on 21 June 
1940. The Royal Marine Brigade was intended to seize a bridgehead 
in Eire for the landing of a further division from the United Kingdom, 
although no division had as yet been earmarked for this role. Church- 
ill apparently approved of the plans, and directed that a division 
be earmarked and concentrated in an area from which it could sail for 
4 
Eire with as little delay as possible. 
On 24 June 1940 the COS agreed that the 3rd Division, at the 
1. COS(40) 179 lltg 13 Jun 40,09-79/ý and jP(40) S- (I-S-PS) I Irish 
Ports' 18 Jun 40, CIALB 84/93. 
2. COS(40) 187 Mtg 20 Jun 40, CAB 79/5 
3. COS(40) lS8 Mtg 20 Jun 40, CAB 79/5 
4. DO(40) 18 Mtg 21 Jtu-i 40, CAB 69/1. 
176 
time the only fully equipped -regular division in the United Kingdom, 
should be t he one earmarled for Fire. The COS met with Morford later 
that day to discuss the readiness of the Royal Marine Brigade. Under 
the arrangements in force'Morford estimated that it would tAe 24 to 
36 hours for the brigade to sail. This was unacceptable to the COS, 
and tbey*consequently directed that the whole brigade should be em- 
barked immediately, so that the force had but to raise steam to be 
ready to leave. Phillips, now termed Vice Chief of the Naval Staff 
(VCNS) , winted out that the Royal Marine Brigade was unsuited for 
extended land operations unless it was strongly reinforced by artillery 
and anti-aircraft weapons. Haining, noij termed Vice Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (VCIGS), agreed in nrinciple to this reinforce- 
ment, but deferred a decision pending an examination of the role of 
the brigade. 
The 3-rd Division had by then been prei-)aring two of its brigades 
for operations against the Portuguese Atlantic islands, and it thus 
momentarily found itself earmarled for two operations simultaneously. 
This was resolved at the COS meeting the following day, 25 June 1940. 
It was agreed that it would be faster and more efficient to moile the 
3rd Division to Northern Ireland at once, using that province as a 
'bridgehead' rather than having the Royal 11.1ari-ne Brilgade seize one. 
The Royal Marine Brigade was still to remain at Milford Haven, at 
6 hours' notice to sail for the Shannon. As it probably would not 
be required for an assault landing, however, it might then be used, 
in place of the 3rd Division, for the onerations against the Azores 
6 
and Cape Verdes. Churchill, when approached, would not consent to 
S. COS(40) 191 and 192 Mtgs 24 Jun 40, CkB 79/5. 
6. COS(40) 194 Mtg Z> 2S Jun 40, C-AB 79/5. 
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the planned mov6 of the 3rd Division to Northern Ireland, as it was 
still the Home-F6rces' main reserve. After further discussion with 
the COS, another division was sent in its place and the COS on I 
July 1 940 agreed that the Royal Marine Brigade should be relieved of 
its responsibility for operations in Eire. It could then be rein- 
forced with an army battalion, the 8th Battalion Argyll and Suther- 
7 
land Highlanders, and be used for the Atlantic Islands oT)erations. 
8 
This change of role was formally confirmed on 4 July 1940. 
7. COS(40) 203 Mtg 1 Jul 40, CAB 79/S. 
S. COS(40) 208 Mtg 4 Jul 40, CAB 79/5. 
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OlkT'FF: R XII 
ORERATJON' MNACE - THE ATFACK ON DAKAR 
The months imnediately after Dunkirk, when C. 1urchill. was still 
settling in and the planning and combined operations organisations 
were in a state of flux, saw, rather ironically, the only execution 
of a combined operation from the United Kingdom during the whole 
period under consideration. This operation, termed MINACE, was the 
assault on Dakar. It has been well researched, and A. J. Marder, in 
his ivork Qperation I-Tenace, published in 1976, has given almost the 
definitive account of this operation. Action against Dakar had been 
considered early in July 1940, and the operation actually started 
with a submission to Churchill of a plan by General Charles de 
Gaulle. On 4 August 1940 Churchill decided to undertake the operation. 
This was in the early i-)eriod of Churchill's tenure, when he was un- 
convinced of the ability of the service departments to produce quick 
and decisive offensive action. -just as in some of his early pro- 
posals to Keyes, lie now disregarded the normal service planning pro- 
cess and simply directed the COS to prepare an operational plan. He 
considered this decision to be entirely T)olitical, and made it knoi%m 
that he did not want to see a lot of military objections being T)ut up 
by the COS. 
The COS reluctantly anproved the ý)roject, iýhich was to go through 
a number of permutations. Churchill sent the COS a written directive 
on 8 August 1940 telling them, among other things, to use the Royal 
MI arines then being held for onerations against the Azores and Cane 
2 
Verdes. On 12 August 1940 Vice Admiral J. H. D. Cunningham and Major 
I%T(40) 301 'Operation SCIPIO' 4 Aug 40, CAB 66/1 
2. COS(40) 2S4 Mtg 8 Aug 40, CAB 79/6 
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General N. M. S. Imin were appointed as the naval and jnjlitai-ý, 
conunanders. a. mningham brought at least half his staff with him, 
but Indn was not so fortunate. His GSO I was detached from the 
Royal Marine Brigade, but his six other staff officers were an 
ad boc group assembled by the War Office. The new commanders first 
met the COS on 13 August 1941, and were instructed to approach the 
DCO for technical advice. The ISPS was to be resmnsible for the 
3 
embarkation of the force. The concem of the operation soon 
changed again, and the final directives for the comanders were not 
4 
approved until 17 August 1940. 
The situation was reviewed by Churchill, the VCOS, and the 
S 
comnanders on 20 August 1940. The operation would now entail the I 
U-se of the 101st Roval Marine Brigade and the four Royal Marine 
battalions, one independent company, and ancillary troops, embarked 
in the transports Sobieski, Ettrick, Kenya, and Karania. On 21 Auglust 
1940, as the commanders' detailed Plans were being prepared for sub- 
6 
mission to the WS, Keyes met with Churchill, Eden, and the VCNS. 
Keyes' frustration with the lack of offensive onerations, and his 
exclusion from the Dlanning system, had spurred him to seek a part 
of the responsibility for IENACE itself. The openiDg had been given 
to Keyes by a memorandum written by Haining, the VCIGS, on 17 August 
1940, in which a -Dostponement of MENACE had been suggested. This 
was written at the same time that Cunningham had presented some 
naval arguments for a delay until October 1940. 
3. COS(40) 262 Mtg 13 Aug 40, CAB 7-9 6 Z" 
4. COS(40) 267 Mtg 16 Aug 40, C-, kB 79/6 and COS(40) 639 'Operation 
ýEýIACEI 17 Aug 40, CAB 80/16. 
S. COS(40) 274 Mtg 20 Aug 40, CU 79/6. 
6. Churchill to Ismay 22 Aug 49, PRhM 3/276. 
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Haining had explained that the Royal Marines had been dis- 
covered to be 'completely untrained' in their sDecial role, and 
so were being sent to Scapa Flow on 22 -August 
1940 For a crash course 
in boat work. More training for thi's complicated oneration was 
plainly desirable, and the commanders considered a postronement of 
two weeks for this would be acceptable, if the month that Cunningham 
had asIed for was not granted. Even then conditions would not be 
7 
ideal. After some discussion on this request Giurchill 'came to 
the conclusion that the oT)eration P. EýIACE had best be entrusted to 
a smaller number of more highly trained mobile troops than is now 
proposed'. fie was now convinced that the Royal Marine battalions 
could not be considered as trained troops for the nurposes of MENACE, 
consisting as they did 'almost entirely of new recruits brought in 
since the beginning of the war, and whose training could T)-robably 
not compete with many battalions of the regular army'. Keyes had 
offered to furnish, in 3 days, I, SOO men from the commandos and in- 
dependent companies to conduct the assault phase of MEMIALCE, with one 
regular army and one Royal Marine battalion in reserve. Churchill 
at once sent off a message to the COS explaining this change and 
asl,, ing for the new schedule of dates for the operation that would 
result. 
This thunderbolt was ta'k-en uD the following morning by the 
VCOS and the joint commanders. The situation was viewed by them as 
far different than the optimistic one espoused by Keyes. No. 10 
Independent Company, already being employed for MENACE, was the 
only one fully mobilised and equipped. Of the other companies, 
one would be -ready by 28 August 1940, two were probably fit for 
7. C05(40) 641 10-Deration MFNIACE' 17 Aug 40, CAB 80/16. 
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operations but not mobilised, three were partly trained but not 
mobilised, and. tbree were defin. itely not ready for operations. 
None of these companies had bad any training with landing craft. 
The VCNIS considered it 'unlikely that their training compared 
favourably with the Royal Marines who had the advantage of a very 
high proportion of regular officers and NICOs_'-.. None of the com- 
mandos had been mobilised. This estimate of the relative readiness 
of the differing units was fairly accurate from the War Office 
point of view, but the case for the Royal Marines had probably been 
stretched a bit. In an) 7 event the transports were by then all 
loaded, and if the composition of the force were altered the restow- 
ing of the ships would delay the meration a further four or five 
8 
days. 
The VCOS explained this to Churchill, who then turned to Keyes 
for an opinion. Keyes now increased his estimate to 12,3SO first- 
class men led by excellent officers spoiling to fight', including 
600 Royal Marines. He admitted that only 850 men had so far been 
properly equipped, but thought that, if the V-ar Office would 'n1ay 
up', this could be corrected in 48 hours, as opposed to the War 
Office estimate of a fortnight. 'If the enterprise is confided to 
us we will get on with it full blast - if I have the responsibility 
- you may be certain that it will be nlanned to the last detail - 
and you will not hear anything about difficulties, hazards, and 
9 
potential dangers'. Churchill then held another conference with 
the VCOS, but faced with their arguments he relented and agreed to 
8. COS(40) 277 lMtg 22 Aug 40, C-AB 79/6. 
9. Keyes to Churchill 22 Aug 40, K 140/3/1. 
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10 
adhere to the original arrangements. 
Angered at this, Keyes wroie to Churchill on 24 August 1940, 
asRing him if he was going to IrisR failure at DaRarl and comaring 
the havering over MACE in some respects to the hesitancy of the 
oi)eration at oran. The opportunity for further protest bad Passed, 
however, as the -oreparations for MENACE were by then in an advanced 
stage. Their participation in MNACE being over, Keyes and his 
staff were now free to move from their Admiralty offices to the 
new accommodation at Richmond Terrace. 
Some of the deficiencies in the planning for M\IACE came to 
light before the expedition sailed. Considerable confusion had 
arisen in the loading of the shipping. The movements control at 
Liverpool had been under the impression that the ships were being 
loaded for a simple troop and stores. moxrment.. No preparations had 
been made for the large amount of mobilisation stores the troops 
brought with them, and I-n%rin himself admitted that no one had the 
least idea of what was actually stowed on each shin. On 24 August 
1940 one of the DCO's staff reported on an inspection trip to the 
port of embarkation, during which he had helped to straighten out 
the confusion as much as he could. The Ettrick was cited as an 
example. She was reported as being loaded to capacity although MT, 
stores, and four tons of ammunition allocated to her had been left 
over. The loading had been in any order, with no loading T)Ian being 
kept, and the ship was unlikely, as loaded, to prove seaworthy in 
heavy weather. Keyes forwarded this report the same day as evidence 
10. Ismay to Seal 22 Aug 40, PMI 3/276. 
11. Keyes to Churchill 24 Aug 40, K 140/3/1. 
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'that the present organisation is not satisfactory', in support of 
a proposal to pstablish, either in the COHQ or ISPS, a sub-section 
responsible for planning and sunervising the loading of ships for 
combined operations. lie asked, if he were to be responsiblel for 
the addition of one military and one naval officer to his staff for 
12 
this duty. The COS saw Bourne about this on 26 August 1940. 
Ready agreement was reached on the need for such a sub-section, and 
as Keyes already had a qualified officer the responsibility was 
assigned to him. No augmentation to his staff was granted, however, 
and so the personnel would have to be Drovided from his existing 
13 
resources. This irked Keyes, and he ? rgued that, as the responsi- 
bility was his, the decision on what staff was necessary v., as surely his 
concern. The COS decided on 6 September 1940 to uphold their previous 
14 
decision. When it was later decided, after ýEýACE, to restow the 
shi-ns at Freetown, the COHQ had to fly out an officer, who remained 
absent for a considerable -period. Keyes was not at all hapT)y with 
the situation, particularly in the light of the readily-accorded 
JPS expansion. He 'returned to the charge', and eventually the War 
is 
Office did appoint an additional officer for this duty. it is 
seemingly a minor affair, but these minor affairs, when added to- 
gether, did nothing to ease his relations with the service departments. 
MLNACE proved a failure, the force returning to its staging area 
16 
at Freetoum, Sierra Leone, on 27 September 1940. Churchill and the 
12. COS(40) 662 'Operation ýUýACH' 24 Aug 40, CAB 80/17; 'Marder, p. 
S2; Imin's Report 7 Oct 40, DEFE 2/174. 
13. COS(40 280 "IkItg 26 Aug 40, CAB 79/6. 
14. COS(40) 297 Mtg 6 Sep 40, C-kB 79/6. 
1S. Notes on DCO Paper 26 Aug 40, K 13/1. 
16. For details of the operation, see A. J. Marder, Neration Menace 
(London 1976) 
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COS decided on 28 September 1940 that the British component should 
be landed in West Africa and temnorarily placed under the cow)and of 
i7 
the CDC there. Plans were afoot for the reconstitution of the 
operations against the Azores and CApe Verdes, and the forces in- 
volved bad t: o be kept together as much as possible. 
In, jin submitted an after-action report on 7 October 1940, cover- 
ing at length the initiation, organisation, sailing, and assault 
phases of the operation and adding his own comments and conclusions. 
The report pointed out some of the fundamental problems. 'Fhe command 
and control arrangements had not been adequate. Irwin recoiinended 
that a special headquarters ship be used for combined operations, 
an idea later developed. This would also iil. iprove the communications 
arrangements, which for MENACE had been ad hoc and totally unsatis- 
factory. The commanders had also been hindered b-Y the fact that 
no staff existed for planning, and one had to be assembled indis- 
cTiminately even as the preparations for mounting the oneration. were 
in progress. The plans, in the main, had thus to be taken over from 
people who had no responsibility for carrying them out, a process 
'always unsatisfactory'. 
There were other deficiencies in the planning process. There 
was a lack of a clear directive early in the process, and the con- 
tinuous changes in concept had seriously delayed the Dreparation of 
detailed plans. The security had been weak. Perhaps the most tell- 
ing factor, Irwin thought, was the insufficient, and inaccurate, 
intelligence upon which the planning was based. There were unveri- 
fied political assumptions, and, from the purely military point of 
17. COS(40) 9 Mtg (0) and annexed telegrams 25 Ser) 40, G%B 7975S. 
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view, Irwin thou ht 'the absence of -, ood information about a place 
in which we had service officers for eight or nine months requires 
little but adverse comment'. This was an intelligence system which 
the COS. in reply to Keyes' criticism in August, thought soimd and 
efficient. Inyin closed his report witb the recoiwendation, in the 
light of his experience with the current planning system, in strong 
terms 'that the office of the Director of Combined ()DCTations should 
be itself or sbould contain the permanent nucleus of a combined op- 
erations headquarters'. This was almost exactly what Keyes had 
ProPosed earlier, and must have certainly raised a few eyebrows in 
the service departments, but the reDort-as a whole was soon shelved. 
18 
A few follow-up operations to IWACE had been considered. nough 
none of them came to pass there were a few important points about 
how they were handled. On 31 August 1940 Churchill bad told Keyes, 
directly, to prepare a coup de main to land French trooT)s in Casa- 
blanca. It is difficult to say whether this -request was in compensa- 
tion for the denial of Keyes' request to conduct MSNIACE, but in both 
of these cases the manner of initiating the operation, the geographic 
area, and the scope envisaged, clearly were outside the bounds of 
the directive he had inherited from Bourne. This must have given 
added support to Keyes' contentions about the status of his apDoint- 
ment. The JPS was at the same time working on an operation in 
French Morocco, termed THREAT. Keyes was prepared to await the JPS 
report on THREAT before he went into the Casablanca operation in i 
detail, but he did tell Churchill on 6 September 1940 that the opera- 
tion was feasible 'under a resolute commander', and there can be 
18. lný n's report on INEý. ACE 7 Oct 40, DEFE 2/174. A good account 
of the \EKIKE operation can be found in HIST. (A)I. (Revise) 
'The Dakar Operation' 5 Feb 41, PREM 3/276. 
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19 
little doubt about who he thought this comander should be, 
Nothing was to come of UREAT, for on 21 September 1940 the COS 
agreed that priority should be given to the Portuguese Atlantic 
islands. 
19. Keyes to Churchill 6 Sep 40ý 140/3/1. 
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CHM'FER XIII 
COYFINGENCY OPERATION'S IN 'ME ATIANTIC (2) 
AZORES AND CAPE VERDES 
Contingency operations in the Atlantic were to tie up virtually 
the entire amphibious capability of the United Kingdom throughout 
the period studied. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, at a War 
Cabinet meeting on 1S May 1940, had expressed some concern that if 
Italy came into the war and Spain, assisted by the Germans, became 
hostile, Portugal might also be forced to turn against the British. 
He therefore thought that some consideration should be given to 
holding a striking force ready to secure, in the latter event, 
strategic points in the Azores and Cape Verdes Islands, and Dossi- 
bly on the Portuguese mainland as well. The Cabinet thereupon re- 
quested the COS to determine what action could usefully be taken to 
1 
accomplish this. On 31 IMay 1940 the subject was brought up once 
again. Halifax 'hoped that a situation requiring action was 'remote', 0 
but thought that plans should be prepared. Further action was sus- 0- 
2 
pended until the COS conducted a detailed operational examination. 
The steadily worsening situation in FTance resulted in the 
Directors of Plans of the three services widening the scope of this 
examination. On 9 June 1940 the), instructed the Tnter-Service 
Planning Staff (ISPS), a committee of junior officers responsible 
for the executive arrangements of operations, to investigate, in 
order of -oriority, cooperation with the French to assist the 
Spanish in defending the Balearic Islands from Italian attack, the 
1.1%'M(40) 123 Htg 15 May 40, CAB 6S/7. 
2. ! %ý-1(40) 149 Mtg 31 May 40, C-AJ3 65/7. 
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denial of the use of the Canaries Islands. to the enemy if Spain 
were hostile, ýnd the seizure of the Azores and Cape Verdes if 
3 
Portugal were hostile. The ISPS report on these oDerations was 
approved by the JPSC on 14 June 1940. The Balearics were written 
off. If Italy entered the war they would be a French responsibility; 
if Spain turned hostile there was nothing that could be done about 
them by either the French or British. Attention was thus concen- 
trated on the Atlantic islands. With Spain and Portugal 'genuinely' 
neutral, and idth effective British control of the Straits of C-ibral- 
tar., the JPSC thought it unlikely that the enemy would attempt to 
establish air and naval bases on the islands. I'hey therefore recom- 
mended that no action be taken against the islands lunless our 
enemies attemi)t to occupy them or are evidently about to make the 
attempt'. 
The islands were then considered individually. The Canaries 
had a harbour at La Luz and an airfield at Gando on the Gran 
Canary, a harbour at Santa Cruz, and a landing ground on Teneriffe. 
Denial of these facilities to the enemy was not 'of outstanding im- 
poytancel in view of the existence of further air and naval facili- 
ties on the Spanish territory on the adjacent mainland, and because 
trade could be routed westward far enough to avoid the danger. The 
British would need the facilities only if they could not use (':, ibral- 
tar. At that time they still hoped that in this event the), could 
use Casablanca instead. The Canaries were therefore not critical, i 
though if Casablanca was not available, they would assume a greater 
importance as the nearest alternative to Gibraltar. In any case, 
the minimum forces considered necessary to capture and hold the 
islands were 2 infanti-y brigades -reinforced with 2 anti-aircraft 
3. JP(40) S4 Mtg 8 Jun 40, CO 84/2 and JP(40) 2 (ISPS) 'Western 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Projects' 8 Jun 40, CIAB 84/93. 
189 
regiments and a fighter squadron. Both fighters and anti-aircraft 
guns were in cTitically short supply, and it was questionable 
whether even those listed were enoug Ilh 
to defend the islands against 
large scale air attacks from the mainland. As the islands were 
'not vital' and the forces reouired. for an operation were not 
commensurate with the advantages to be gained, the JPSC recommended 
no action against the Canaries. 
The Azores and Cape Verdes were a different case. The Azores 
had a harbour at Horta on Fayal, a harbour at Ponta Delgada on San 
Miguel, and possible landing grounds on Terceira. Madeira with a 
cable station at Funchal was also listed. The CaT)e Verdes had an 
airfield on Sal, a harbour at St. Vincent, and landing grounds on 
some of the other islands. If the enemy occupied all these islands 
the British would be forced into the intolerable situation of 
routing the Cape of Good Hope trade almost to the West Indies. 
The use of all these islands would thus have to be denied to the 
enemy. In addition, tbe Azores would provide a valuable fuel]Ling 
base if Gibraltar were unusable. The JPSC estimated that an infan- 
try brigade would be required for each Of two groups Of islands. Air 
reconnaissance units would also be needed in each of the groups 
after capture. Action against Madeira was twmecessarv. If Portugal II 
were hostile it was clear that the islands would have to be occupied. 
If Spain only were hostile the situation would be delicate. If 
the British tried to forestall the enemy by seizing the Azores and 
Cape Verdes while Portugal was still neutral, it might lead to Spain 
tal, ing action against the Portuguese mainland. Nevertheless, the 
JPSC felt that the time is past when we can afford to allow our 
policy to be dictated by these considerations'. They therefore 
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recommended that, if there was 'clear evidence, that Spain would 
enter the war,. or that the Azores and Cape Verdes might be seized 
by the enemy, the islands should be occuT)ied. In order to be in a 
position to undertake this operation they further recommended that 
the troops required be earmarked and withdrai%rn from any other role, 
that the shipping necessary be earmarked, and that the naval and 
military commanders be appointed immediately to work out the de- 
4 
tailed plans. 
The COS considered this report on IS and 17 June 1940. The 
COS agreed with the policies and measures contained in the JPSC 
report with one exception. The use of ýYench ports in Africa was 
now improbable, and if Gibraltar were to become unusable other 
alternatives would be necessary. The harbours in the Azores and 
Madeira were not satisfactory substitutes for Gibraltar, and the COS 
looked at the Canaries. They were not full), convinced of the JPSC 
estimate of the forces required to seize and hold the Canaries, and 
directed the JPSC to re-examine the matter. As the forces likely 
to be available for any oDerations against the Atlantic islands 
would be limited, they also directed the JPSC to produce a recommen- 
dation as to the nriority to be accorded to the various island groups. 
The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JISC), the intelligence equiva- 
lent of the JPSC, was in the meanwhile to look into 'fifth column' 
S 
activities to assist in the occupation of the islands. 
As a result of the 17 June 1940 meeting the 3rd Division, under 
Major General B. L. iMontgomery, was task-ed to prepare for operations 
4. COS(40) 46S (JP) 'Western Mediteyranean and Atlantic Islands 
P. rojects' 14 Jun 40, C-kB 80/13. 
S. COS(40) 184 Mtg 17 Jun 40, C-AB 79/ý. 
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against the Azores and Cape Verdes. The division was then assisting 
in the defence qf the south coast. As Montgomery stated in his 
memoirs: 
The planners were now getting busy in Whitehall and 
various schemes were being considered. I%Ien it came 
to deciding which troops would carry out these wild- 
cat schemes, the answer was always the same; it must 
be the 3rd Division since tberetwassng other forma- 
tion yet ready for active opera ion . 
Whatever Montgomery thought of the Atlantic islands operations, 
he nevertheless produced outline plans for their capture by 23 
June 1940. The assault of the Azores, Operation Number 1, would 
require one infantry brigade with-sup-Dort, including one Commando. 
The assault of the Cape Verdes, Operation Number 2, would need an 
7 
infantry brigade with one Independent Company attached. 
heir The ISPS had been re-examining the Canaries project and tj 
report was amended and submitted by the JPSC on 20 June 1940. 
Rather than following the COS' line that the Spanish defence might 
not be very stubborn, the T)Ianners had in fact increased their esti- 
mate of the amount of opposition anticipated. They now declared 
that a complete infantry division would be necessary to seize the 
Canaries. After capture they felt that the garrison needed to hold 
the islands could be reduced to an infantry brigade group, but it 
would now include a bomber as well as a fighter squadron. The ISPS 
and JPSC, contrary to the COS and the Defence Committee of the War 
Cabinet, were at this time consistently doiýngrading the importance 
of the Canaries 2 which should be remembered when operational nlanning 
in 1941 is considered. The JPSC did not consider the Canaries an 
alternative to Gibraltar. The exit from the 14editerranean could 
not be adequately controlled from the Canaries, which were 640 miles 
6. Viscount Montgomery, The Memoir-s-o-f Field Marshal the Viscount 
Montgomery of Alamein KG (fondon 1958), np. 67-70. 
7. For copies of the operations order see WO 106/2933_. 
_____, _, 
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from the Straits, and 'under these conditions, the possession of a 
base in the CaDaYies is not a requirement of the highest importance'. 
'Me defences required to secure the Canaries would be 'an expensive 
and increasing commitment' of the resources that could be better 
used elsewhere. The JPSC therefore reaffirmed their recommendation 
of 14 June 1940 that no action be taRen against the Canaries, and 
8 
that Driority should be given to the Azores and Cape ITerdes. 
The COS considered this on 20 June 1940. Admiral Sir A. Dudley 
Pound, the CNS, told the comittee that the Naval Staff were at work 
on plans for routing trade, and suggested that the question be taRen 
9 
up when these plans had been completed. On 21 June 1940 the general 
question of bases in the North Atlantic was brought up in a Defence 
Committee (Operations) meeting. The Azores and Cape Verdes were 
covered, but attention was again centered upon the Canaries as an 
alternative to Gibraltar. Use of Casablanca and Oran was still 
suggested, 'whether or not the French co-operated'. Casablanca's 
harbour was declared unsuitable, but Oran was a -possibility. Cliurch- 
ill empbasised that detailed Plans must be worRed out immediately by 
commanders appointed for all the operations. 'SurDrise and boldness 
of action were essential. ' No delay should be incurred in getting 
the troons trained and prepared for embarkation at short notice, 
irrespective of whichever oPeration was ultimately undertaken. The 
COS were tasked to examine for the third time the seizure of the 
10 
Canaries, as well as looking into operations against Oran. 
The COS and VCOS met to consider these instructions on 22 June 
1940, and expressed their views to Churchill on 24 June 1940. Casa- 
8. COS(40) 474 (JP) 'Atlantic Islands Projects' ZO Jun 40, CAB 80/13. 
COS(40) 188 Mtg 20 Jun 40, CAB 79/5. 
10. DO(40) 18 Mt. g 21 JLm 40, CkB 69/1. 
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blanca and Oran were now both discarded as alternatives to Gibraltar 
because of their' indifferent harbour facilities, their vulnerability 
to air attack, and the diSPrODortionate forces necessary for their 
defence. The past studies on the Canaries bad indicated that at 
least a division would be required, and with this in mind it was 
Iclear that there can be no question of undertaking the operation 
in the immediate Riturel. The JSPC were in the meanwhile working on 
a detailed awreciation of the Canaries operation, so that a 'final 
decision' could be made as to its feasibility when troops, equipment, 
and air forces could be made available. 
The JPSC completed their appreciation on 28 Ame 1940. It 
was more or less a repetition of their earlier studies, with the 
added argument that successful control of trade at the source in 
the Americas would further reduce the need to. secure the Canaries. 
In this case, in view of the heavy commitment which the operation 
would involve, the JPSC did not 'consider that the capture and re- 
tention of these islands would be justified'. Even if the control at 
source proved ineffective, the existing threat to the United Kingdom 
and the shortage of trained troops and en. uiT)ment of all Rinds would 
preclude the seizure of the Canaries in the immediate future. The 
JPSC thought, however, that the oT)erations against the Azores and 
CaDe Verdes were essential, and they recommended that forces be made 
available for these operations to replace the 3rd Division, which was 
12 
being withdraim for other duties. On I July 1940 the COS endorsed 
the JPSC report, and confirmed a tentative decision that the Royal 
WS(40) 190 Mt-g 22 Jun 40 and CoS(4U-y 192 Mtg 24 Jun 40-, 013 19/5; 
COS(40) 486 'Atlantic Islands' 24 Jun 40, C-U 80/13. 
12. COS(40) SOI (JP) 'Atlantic Islands Projects' 28 Jun 40, CAB 80/14. 
'Control of Trade at Source' referred to the indirect system of 
blocRade used to influence exnorting countries. 
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Marine Brigade could be used for operations apinst the Azores and 
13 
Cape Verdes. This was not a 'final decision' on the feasibility 
of the Canaries merations, as intended earlier, but it did result 
in the question being shelved for some time. 
We-CO11%recently, established, was to assume a Tole in the opera- 
tions against the Azores and Cape Verdes. The Royal Marine Brigade 
was ready for these operations on 16 July 1940, when the directives 
prepared by the JPSC were issued to the military commanders. The 
chief naval staff officers received their directiveson 18 July 1940, 
as the naval commanders themselves would not be a-DT)ointed until the 
14 
operation was initiated. The Admiralfy issued detailed instruc- 
tions to all concerned on 20 July 1940. The basic assumption in 
these instructions was that the operations would probably be ordered 
without the British being at war with Portugal. It was honed that, 
unless the enemy had succeeded in establishing himself in the islands 
first, the local authorities would submit to occupation by British 
forces upon a demandbacked by force-majeure. The Royal Marine Brigade 
had been split into two for the operations. The Ist Royal Marine 
Brigade, under Brigadier A. C. St. Clair-Morford and consisting of the 
lst and Sth Battalions, Royal Marines, and the 8th Battalion: Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders, would occupy the Azores in Oneration 
ACCORDIAN. Naval support for this force would consist of 2 battle- 
ships or cruisers and 4 to 6 destroyers. The force would seize 
simultaneously the islands of Fayal, with its harbour at Ponta DeI--. 
gada-, -. 'and San Miguel, with its harbour at. liorta.. . 
3he. island- of 
13. COS(40) 203 Mtg I Jul 40, CAB 79/S. 
14. COS(40)227 Mtg 18 Jul 40, CAB 79/S. Final Directives are 
annexed to COS(40) 551 (MTISE) 'Atlantic Islands Projects' 
24 Jul 40, CAB 30/1S. 
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Terceira, where potential aircraft landing groimds existed was 
to be subsequept'ly occupied. Although it was hoped that there would 
be no resistance, the commanders were instructed to plan for an 
opposed landing over the beaches. The force would be transported 
in the merchant liners Sobies], J and Karanja and, considering the 
number of ALC available, would be landed mainly in ships' boats. 
A storeship and an oiler would also accompany the force. The 2nd 
Royal Marine Brigade, tinder Brigadier R. H. CwTi-nbell and consisting 
of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, Royal Marines, would occupy the Cam 
Verdes in Operation SACKBUTT. The naval forces would consist of 
I cruiser and 4 to 6 destroyers. The initial objectives were the 
islands of St. Vincent, with its harbour at Porto Grande, and Sal, 
where an Italian-operated airfield existed. The islands of St. Jago 
and Mayo, where there were i)otential aircraft landing grotmds, could 
be subsequently occupied. The force would be transported in the 
merchant liners Kenya and either Strathmore or Athlone Castle, 
with the landing arrangements being similar to those in ACCORDIAN'. 
A store ship and an oiler would also be i)resent with this force. 
The command arrangements for both ACCORDIM and SACKBUTT were sneci- 
fied as those of joint command by the military and naval commanders. 
It was intended that botb operations would tale place simul- 
taneously in order to achieve maximum surprise. Because of the 
greater distance to the Cape Verdes this resulted in a complex 
movement schedule suscentible to delay. If such a delay occurred 
in any of the component convoys, as a result of either mechanical 
difficulties, weather, or enemy action, the Admiralty x.. -ould give 
further instructions. The forces would be at 48 hours' notice to 
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sail from the time the War Cabinet decided to laimch the operations, 
15 
and the landings'would commence 10 days after sailing. As sur- 
prise was essential, the paramount need for secrecy was stressed, a 
requirement the COHQ found somewhat incongruous given the very lengthy 
distribution list of the Admiralty instructions. Keyes thought that 
the instructions themselves, mentioning as they did both the code 
names and the actual place names, constituted a security violation. 
The Admiralty did not agree, and Keyes tool. the matter to the ISSB. 
The Admiralty was overruled, and so on 27-July 1940 the code names 
ACCORDIANI and SACKBUTT were changed to ALLOY and SHRUNIEL respectively. 
Throughout July 1940 some of the more obscure points of the plans 
were clarified. The contradiction of the concept of Portuguese 
acQuiescence to a demand backed by force majeure with the require- 
ment for surprise in the assault was pointed out to the JPSC by the 
commanders. The decision was therefore made to concentrate on the 
initial attempt to secure key points against possible opposition 
by using surprise, after which action could be taken in conjunction 
with the Portuguese authorities to limit further resistance. The 
rewording of the directives to incorporate this concept was approved 
17 
by the COS on 22 July 1940. A renort on the operations, along 
with the directives, was then submitted to the War Cabinet for cover- 
ing anDroval of the T)reparations that had been made and for the accep- 
tance in Drinci-ple of the COS recommendations as to the conditions 
under which the operations should be launched. The fact was stressed 
IS. 'Instructions for Operations ACCORDIM and SACKBUTT' 20 Jul 40, 
DEFE 2/64. 
16. Notes on 21 and 27 Jul 40, DEFE 2/116. 
16 
17. JP(40) 74 Mtg 21 Jul 40, CAB 84/2; COS(40) 229 Mtg 22 Jul 40, 
CAB 79/5; and COS(40) 563 (JP) 'Atlantic Islands Projects' 
21 Jul 40, CAB 80/15. 
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that nothing would be done to initiate the onerations without an 
18 
express decision by the War Cabinet. 
This was the first that the War Cabinet had seen of the T)ro- 
jects since 31 May 1940, when it had been considering the seemingly 
remote possibility of Portuguese hostility. The COS now recommended 
that the Portuguese Atlantic islands be seized in the event of either 
Spanisb or Portuguese hostility, if it became clear 'beyond a reason- 
able doubt' that either country intended to intervene in the war, or 
if the exercise of economic pressure upon Germany and the occupied 
countries by the control of material at source or by the control 
of sbipning failed to acbieve adequate results, and reliance had 
to be placed upon more direct naval action. Halifax poi nted out 
that the British might soon be faced with hostilities with Vichy, in 
which case the third condition listed would not result in advantages 
sufficient to incur the risk of hostilities with either Soain or 
Portugal as well. Churchill was not personally convinced that the 
seizure of the islands would necessarily mean war with Portugal, 
as the government might conceivably accept the fait accompli under 
T)rotest. ýIich of Churchill's rather confident attitude could be 
traced to his grave concern that Gibraltar might be rendered unusable. 
His views were supported by the COS, who felt that although the Portu- 
guese could not be expected to bear an attack on the islands without 
resentment, particularly in view of the British inability to assist 
in the protection of Portugal against a resultant attack by Gel-many, 
the operations would be condoned by the Dominions and by the rest of 
the world, and might even be understood by Sala7ar, the Portuguese 
18. IVP(40) 265/COS(40) 551 (REVISE)'Atlantic Islands Projects' 
24 Jul 40, CAB 80/15. 
198 
President. In the end all the preparations were approved, as well 
I 
as the first two conditions under which the operation would be 
19 
launched. 
The COHQ was at the time T)laying a substantial role in the 
preparations for these operations, both in regard to direct planning 
and as a liaison between the force commanders and the JPSC. On 
24.3uly 1940 Keyes and some of his staff attended a Defence Committee 
(N, erations) meeting during which Churchill questioned the object 
of the operations. The readiness of the forces was discussed, al- 
though it was pointed out that so long Is it was possible to use 
Gibr6ltar, and until the flying boats intended to be based in the 
Azores were ready, it would be unwise to I)reciT)itate a crisis by 
action against the islands. Churchill was still mainly concerned 
with the threat to Gibraltar itself, and the possible effect of a 
20 
'treacherous attack' upon fleet units in the harbour there. 
This concern over the possibility of a suyprise attack- on Gibraltar, 
and the countermeasures that could be employed, became one of 
Churchill's preoccupations. Mulling over the ideas nresented at 
the meeting, he wrote to the Foreign Secretary later that day. 
All my reflections about the danger of our shins lying 
under Snanish howitzers in Gibraltar leads me continually 
to the Azores. Mist we always wait until a disaster has 
occurred? I do not think it follows that our occupation 
19.51(40) 249 Mtg, Confidential Annex 22 Jul 40, CAB -6S/14. For 
the diplomatic back-ground in the Iberian Peninsula, see Sir 
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World 
War, Vol. I (London 1970), pT) * 433-4S2, and Sii 
qiFual Hoare, 
ýýbassador on Special 114ission (London 1956) 
20. DD(40) 22 Mtg 24 Jul 40, CAB 69/1. 
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temporarily, and to forestall the enemy, of the Azores 
would nccessarily nrecinitate German iýteiwention ... Moreover, 'once we have an 'alternative base to Gibraltar, 
how much do we care whether the Peninsula is overrun or 
not?... I am increasingly attracted by the idea of simply 
taRing the Azores one fine morning out of the blue, and 
explaining everything to Portugal afte ýy ards. She would 
certainly have ever), right to protest. 
Halifax replied on 31 July 1940 that, while he was 'impressed' 
by the force of Churchill's argments, he nevertheless Tecomended 
caution. The situation in Spain had seemed to ease somewhat in the 
past fci%T days, and he thouPht the British could afford to wait before 
22 
action was -required. By this time Churchill's attention had turned 
to the attack on Dakar, and the pressure for ALLOY and SHRAPNEL was 
temorarily reduced. 
The Directors of Plans and the force comanders saw the COS 
on 26 July 1940 to discuss the operation. There was no represen- 
tative of the COHQ present, and from this time on the decline in its 
importance in the planning of ALLOY and SHRAPNEL became more and 
more noticable. A number of points vere brought ui) at this meeting, 
among which was the problem of a simultaneous assault. As the force 
for the Cane Verdes sailed 6 days before that for the Azores, and 
there was a possibility of a delay to either, the question was 
asRed whether in this event the original timetable should be adhered 
to as closely as possible, or the assault should be i)ostnoned to 
allow for coordinated action. The desirability of a simultaneous 
assault was affirmed, and in the event of major delays the commanders 
21. CFu__rchiM_fo Ml_fý 24 Jul 40-, PRDI 3/361/1. This general desire 
for offensive o-Derations somewhere was also reflected in his re- 
quest to Keyes the following day for proposals for a number of 
medium sizeý raids. 
22. Halifax to Churchill 31 Jul 40, PRIN 3/361/1. 
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were authorised to break radio silence to a. -, ),, for instructions. 
It was next suo 1>, gested that 
if the consuls in the islands, who were 
retired naval officers, were found to be trustworthy they might 
be able to render some assistance to the landing forces, even if 
given only 48 hours notice, as in the case of the occupation of 
Iceland. A number of items of equipment for the ancillary units 
had not been received, and the training of some of these units 
was still not complete. Parts of their mobilisation equipment 
were being sent to the units in their nresent locations, and part 
should have already been loaded into the ships at the port of 
embarkation. The force coiwanders declared that they could not 
be responsible for ensuring that the stores in the shipping were 
complete, but they had notified the War Office of the order in 
which the stores should have been loaded and were 'content' to 
leave the matter in War Office hands. The question of Portuguese 
-resistance was again raised, this time in the form of a request for 
instruction about the return of fire from Portuguese ships and shore 
batteries. The conditions were seen by the COS to be analagous to 
those that might have been encountered during the earlier projected 
operations in Scandinavian waters, and the instructions given then 
would be of equal value in this case. The fire would be returned 
only 'if it was endan w gering the safety of the transports before the 
troops disembarked, or is causing a number of casualties in a trans- 
23 
port'. 
Planning was now influenced by the increasing probability of 
MENACE. Churcbill bad told the COS on 8 August 1940 to consider 
23. COS(40) 234 ',, Itg 26 Jul 40,0ý-B 79/S. 
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the Royal Marines available for operations against DaRar. In the 
I 
plan for MENIXýE approved by the COS on 9 August 1940, the need for 
highly trained and specially equipped troons was accepted, and the 
obvious conclusion was that, of all the troops considered, the Royal 
Marines, who were in the process of acquiring all the available 
landing craft, i-muld bave to be those used. Altbougb planning for 
MENACE continued, it was not until 13 August 1940 that some doubts 
were raised in regard to the temporary abandonment of ALLOY and 
24 
SHRA-PNEL. The ISPS were accordingly instructed to renort, 'as a 
matter of urgency', on the possibility of reconstituting a force for 
ALLOY and SHRAPNEL, and the delay that mi. p ght 
be encountered in doing 
25 
SO. The ISPS considered that it might be nossible to reconstitute 
a force for the operations, but that this would entail the withdrawal 
of two scarce fully trained and eapipDed brigades from home defence 
duties. Counting time for training, the expedition could be ready to 
sail in about three weeks, i. e., by mid-September. The liners that 
would be needed for the expedition were in short supply. As it i", ould 
be undesirable. to withhold them from trooping, with a consequent loss 
of 7,000 to 12,000 troops from the approved reinforcement programme 
for the Middle East, the time required to taRe t1hem*from trade after 
the decision was made to launch the exT)edition might be as much as a 
fortnight. The only ALC available, necessary if beach landings were 
to be made, had already been committed to MNACE, and replacements 
would not be available until mid-October. By this time weather condi- i 
tions in the North Atlantic might well male it impossible to carrv out 
24. COS(40) 268 (JP) 'Operations in West Africa' 13 Aug 40,0\B 80/16. 
25. COS(40) 26S Mtg IS Aug 40, CAB 79/6. 
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beach landings no matter what equipment was u-sed. It was noted 
that the original ALLOY and SHRAPNIEL -plans had been based only on 
summer conditions. This rather rcmarRable statement well indicates 
the initial exnectations that the operations would be conducted 
shortly after they were mounted. Nevertheless, it serves as a 
reasonably valid indictment of faulty planning, as no alternative 
schemes 'had been considered. Although this problem was recognised in 
August, it was not until late SeT)tember that'any alternative nlan was 
developed, and credit for this must rest with the COHQ rather than 
the planning staffs. 
The ISPS concluded their renort with the statement that ALOY 
and SHRAP, ', TEL could not be conducted until October 1040. Regular trooT)s 
could be withdraun from other tasks if necessary, but this was not 
an immediate requirement. The shipping shortage would keep the 
expedition at 14 days notice, resulting in a total time of at least 
24 days from the decision to launch the exnedition until the assault 
26 
took -nlace. While this admittedly answered the COS, immediate 
question on the reconstitution of the force, the number of problems 
left unresolved is striking. There vas no consideration of an alterna- 
tive plan for the winter weather, nor indeed any evaluation of the 
underlying concept of the o-oerations, i. e., the -orobability of only 
light resistance. In the circumstances in which the operations would 
be necessary, when the 24 day Deriod to the assault was considered, 
this basic assummion was hardly lilely to be vali d. Neither was any 
mention made of the possibility of reconstituting the force from the 
MENACE expedition, a quicRer method than the T)Ian given, and the one 
HRAPNEL' 17 Aug 4, CAIFOOTI-6. 
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which was eventually adopted. The COS saw the inter-relationship 
of the operations more clearly, and when considering the report, on 
20 August 1940, noted that any werations against the Portuguese 
Atlantic islands could not tal,,. e place imtil I-MNIACE had been resolved. 
With a temporary cancellation of ?, ENIACE on IS September 1940, 
the JPS produced a report on the remounting of ALLOY and SHRAPINEL 
using the forces diverted for MENACE. it seemed best to leave the 
forces, initially, at Freetoi%n, though force ALLOY would eventually 
have to be brought back to the United Kingdom owing to the lack of 
accomodati-on on sbore there. Until de Gaulle's situation had been 
clarified Injin's staff and the indeT)endent company would also 
remain there. In the meanwhile the ancillary units of the forces 
should be reconstituted in the United Kingdom, and the 2nd Royal 
Marine Brigade headquarters and the Sth Argyll and Sutherland High- 
28 
landers should be sent out to Freetoun. 
On the reinstatement of H3\1-ACE, on 17 September 1940, the COS 
27 
directed that the preparations in the United Kingdom should be 
continued, though they intended to await developments at DaRar before 
letting the Argylls sail in the Pulaski. This would also give some 
time to find a replacement storeshiT) for ALLOY, as the original one 
29 
had been sunk- on 16 August 1940. After the outcome of ýENIACE was 
known steps were taken to reconstitute the forces for these o-oerations. 
Brigadier Campbell and his brigade major, along with the designated 
27.. W-S74q 27 Mtg 20 Aug 40, CAB -79-T6-. 
28. COS(40) 753 (JP) 'Reconstitution of Or)erations ALLOY and SHRAPINELI 
16 Sep 40, CAB 80/19. 
29. COS(40) 314 ', Itg 17 Sep 40, CAB 79/6. 
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naval comander for SHRAPINEL, Captain Wa)ler, with a renresentative 
of the DCO, were flmm out to Frectoi-m as quickly as possible. 'Me 
remainder of the staff and signals section of 102nd Royal Marine 
Brigade, as 2nd Royal Abrine Brigade was now designated, were sent to 
Freetoi%m by armed merchant cruiser. The Argylls would remain in the 
United Kingdom at 48 hours notice, ready to link up with the 101st 
Royal Marine Brigade, as Ist Royal Marine Brigade was now designated, 
30 
at sea if the decision were made to launch ALLOY. No mention had 
as yet been made of the changes in the basic assumptions of the 
plans, particularly regarding the weather. The new conditions were 
first brought up at a meeting of the JPS on 26 September 1940, and 
the EPS was accordingly instnicted to initiate exploratory studies 
31 
of the new tactical problem for referral to the commanders. 
The COHQ, involved in the earlier planning for ALLOY and SHRAPNEL, 
had independently put some thought into the problem of winter condi- 
tions. Keyes produced a plan that would enable ALLOY to be conducted 
by the Commandos, ubich would give these units a boost in morale and 
would, in his view, involve the COHQ in its execution. On 28 SeT)tember 
1940 the COS discussed ALLOY with the Directors of Plans md flornby. Gen. G. J. 
Giffard., GOC West Africa, had been instructed to temporarily concen- 
trate the ALLOY forces at Freetown and the SHRAPNEL forces at Taloradi. 
The shipping for these merations was to be restowed at Freetol%n. 
Although not the best course of action as far as security was concerned, 
this had the advantage of sDeed. The COS then examined the modification 
to ALLOY developed by Keyes, and it was agreed that the JPS should go 
30. COS(40) 10 1-ftg T 26 Sep 40, CAB 79/5S and COS(40) 8 (0 (JP) 
'Operations ALLOY and SHRUNIEL' 2S Sep 40, CAB 80/106. 
31. JP(40) 100 114tg 26 Sep 40, QkB 84/2. 
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into it in further detail. 
I 
32 
During this latter investigation the apparent reluctance to 
accept the new proposal was overcome by the long and detailed explana- 
tion of why the original plan for ALLOY could not be considered valid. 
'Me recent action at Dakar had made it imperative that any future 
oi)erations were assured of success. This requirement was affected by 
the dangers in the ALLOY plan that the enemy might get there first, 
by the degree Of Opposition that might be encountered from the Portu- 
guese, and by the risks attendant in attem-Dting to land the troops Zý 
in uncertain weather conditions. A naval patrol had been instituted 
earlier to prevent enemy landings in the islands, but had since been 
cancelled due to many other commitments. As the Germans were likely 
to include the occupation of the Azores coincidentally with, or even 
prior to, hostilities in Spain or Portugal, temporary naval patrols 
sent to intercept any'invading forces would be heavily denendent upon 
prior information, which was not likely to be available. Reliance 
could not thus be placed on forestalling the enemy. This in turn 
would affect the opposition likely to be encountered by the British 
upon landing. The original plan had envisaged the lowering of landing 
craft outside the area of the coast defences and an assault on the 
beaches in the barbours of Fayal and Horta. No other beaches were 
considered practicable. As a result of the prevailing swell from 
October through December the beach landings also could no longer be 
i 
relied upon. If conditions x,., ere unfavourable the ships could stand 
off the islands until they improved, but this would incur refuelling 
problems and would jeopardise sumrise. ne number of AC available 
32. COS(40) 328 Mtg 28 Sep 40, CAB 
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was limited, with no reserves in case of damage, and the use of the 
ships' life boats and motor boats for*the main body would also pose 
difficulties. Most of these problems did not affect SHRAPNEL, which 
could be mounted from Africa with the existing forces so long as the 
naval forces wcre available. If there were not sufficient naval 
forces to execute both operations then ALLOY should have oriority, 
as the forces for SHRAPNEL ivere believed sufficient even if all 
33 
surprise was lost. 
The COS met with Maund, the Directors of Plans, and the EPS 
on I October 1940 to consider this. A signal had been received from 
Freetown stating that the restowing for ALLOY and SHRAPNIEL would be 
complete by 4 October 1940, which was much earlier than had been 
expected. Maund then gave a verbal explanation of Keyes' plan, which 
basically called for the harbours in the Azores to be entered by 
four Commandos using shi-. r)s as Itroian horses'. The harbours would 
be taken by a coup de main, with the original ALLOY force as a backup. 
This T)roposal was accepted, and the DCO and JPS were authorised to 
34 
initiate preliminary preparations for the execution of the new T)lan. 
As part of these, the JPS examined the desirability of bringing ALLOY 
force back to the United Kingdom. This would relieve the congestion 
in Freetown harbour and ease the accommodation Droblem, as well as 
avoiding a deterioration in the health and morale of the troo-os being 
detained there under adverse conditions. It would be easier to 
assemble the required naval escorts if the convoy sailed from the 
United Kingdom, and this would also eliminate the problem or arranging 
a rendezvous for the components of the convoy in mid-ocean. The only 
33. COS(40) 10 (0)(JP) 'Operations to Capture the Azores' 30 Sep 40, 
CAB 80/106. 
34. COS(40) 331 Mtg I Oct 40, CAB 79/7. For short explanation see COS 
(40) 10 (0) 'Operation ALLOY' 4 Oct 40, CAB SO/S6. 
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disadvantage was that, if ALLOY were to be ordered as the force was 
approaching the United Kingdom; it would have to refuel before turn- 
35 
ing around. This was seen to be a minor difficulty, and the COS 
decided on 4 October 1940 to order the ALLOY force back to the United 
36 
Ki ngdom. The COHQ had four Commandos released to it from home 
defence duties on 6 October 1940 to carry out BRISK, as the new plan 
was called. These Commandos were to be embarked at Tnverary not 
37 
later than IS October 1940. In order that forces would always 
be in a position to carry out ALLOY/BRISK, the 101st Royal Marine 
Brigade, now termed P. AdRADOX force, was to proceed to Gibraltar and 
wait there until the Comandos were ready for BRISK before continuing on 
to the United Kingdom. The risks of the Portuguese becoming suspic- 
38 
ious of this deployment were considered acceptable. 
Resources had also been found to reconstitute a close naval 
patrol of the Azores, though it was decided not to inform the Portu- 
guese of this beforehand. If they asl,, ed they were to be informed 
3b 
that it was -part of. the blocRade programme. Even if the enemy 
managed to evade this patrol the forces for ALLOY/BRISK and SHRAPNEL 
were considered sufficient to dislodge them, provided that they did 
not have time to establish a formal defence. A new plan, termed 
FANMISE, was in the course of preparation for this latter contingency. 
40 
3S. COS(40) 12 (0)(JP) 'Location of Forces ALLOY and SHRkPNIELI 3 Oct 
40, CAB 80/106. 
36. COS(40) 11 Mtg (0) 4 Oct 40, (I-kB 79/SS. 
37. WO to Eastern and Southern Commands telegram 839SS 8 Oct 40 and 
telegram 84677 9 Oct 40, DEFE 2/116. 
38. COS(40) 12 Mtg (0) 4 Oct 40, CAB 79/SS. 
39. COS(40) 798 'Naval Operations in the Atlantic' 4 Oct 40, CAB 80/19 
and COS(40) 11 Mtg (0) 4 Oct 40, Q%B 79/SS. 
40. COS(40) 10 (0) 'Operation AJ. LOYI 4 Oct 40, CIAB 80/56. 
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'Me key personnel from the headquarters of the 102nd Royal 
Marine Brigade had been flown to Freetoivn on I October 1940. 'Mey 
had brought with them sRetchy details of the new plans for the Azores 
operations, but nothing further had arrived by the time that PARADOX 
41 
force sailed for Gibraltar on 6 October 1940. The complete plan 
was flown out from the United Kingdom to Gibraltar on 10 October 1940 
to await the arrival of the PARZADOX force. As a temporary expedient, 
until PARADOX force returned to the United Kingdom, Admiral Somerville 
of Force 'H' was appointed the naval coiwander. 
Keyes' expectations for action once. bis plan was apnroved are 
apparent in a minute he sent to Churchill on 9-October 1940, in 
which he noted that the plans were being sent out to Gibraltar on 
the following day. 'My directive gives me conEnand of the operations 
conducted by the irregular forces. I hope this will not be over- 
looked'. This minute was received by Ismay, who, seeing a storm brew- 
ing, quickly marshalled the arguments against Keyes' command of the 
operation. He pointed out to Churchill, should Keyes speak to him, 
that the appointment of the naval cormnander would depend on the naval 
forces employed in the operation, and that, if the operation were 
launched in the near future, these forces would have to come from 
Force 'HI under Somerville. The COS were in the process Of Drer)aring 
directives for the commanders of BRISK, and this was on their agenda 
for the following day. Ismay therefore asked Chuychill to take no 
decision on Keyes' minute until lie had discussed the matter with Pound, 
42 
even if not with the other COS. Pound was adamant on this point 
41. War Diary 101st Royal Marine Brigade I and 6 Oct 40, , .1 
M-2734. 
42. Ismay to nurchill 9 Oct 40 with Keyes to Churchill 9 Oct 40 
annexed, PREM 3/361/6. 
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x%fien it was -raised in the COS meeting. lie maintained that BRISK 
and SHRAXNEL were combined operaitions, not raids, and this was the 
governing factor as far as the responsibility for the operations was 
concerned, rather than the composition of the troops. It was clearly 
stated in Keyes' Directive that combined operations would be worRed 
out by the service departments through the planning staffs and the 
commanders designated, with the technical advice only of the DCO. 
The COS were therefore responsible for the arrangments and outline 
planning and the force commanders for the detailed iplanning, pre- 
paration, and execution of the operations. As BRISK was to be merged 
with PAPADOX, rather than being a pure commando operation, this was 
a valid point, and the argument did not proceed further. Keyes' T)oint, 
however, did have some logic, and was in line with the earlier ten- 
tative arrangements for the Commandos' execution of ýENACE. The 
denial to him of responsibility for BRISK certainly added to Keyes, 
frustration with combined operations in general, and was a further 
blow to his relationshii) with the CNS and EPS. 
Members of the EPS weye Dresent at this meeting to exDlain the 
intricacies of the changes in the operational plans. 101st Royal 
14 October 1940, and, if the Marine Brigade would reach Gibraltar by 
operation were necessary before 15 nctober 1940, the original ALLOY 
would take place. BRISK would be ready by 1S October 1940, and PAR'%- 
DOX force would return to the United Kingdom as soon as escorts 
could be found. Upon his -return to the United Kingdom Brigadier 
Morford would tale command of both BRISK and PARADOX forces, but, 
in the interim there was, unfortunately, an awlward gaT) when, al- 
though Morford had no resnonsibility for the BRISK plan and assault 
210 
orders, be would be expected to taRe conunand of BRISK force if the 
Soqp de main failed. A represchtative of the EPS was flown out to 
43 
Gibraltar to explain this to him. 
The 101st Royal Marine Brigade reached Gibraltar on 1S October 
1940, to find the new instructions waiting. The date for its return 
to the United Kingdom had not been set, although every attempt was 
being made to find an escort. Morford was, not unexpectedly, rather 
unhappy with the interim command arrangements. They would leave him, 
as he comDlained in a letter to the CIGS on 16 October 1940, in com- 
mand of a force spread out over a distapce of 150 miles, the greater 
part of whom he had never seen before, whose commanders and organisa- 
tion were wilnown to him, and who would already be engaged with the 
enemy. During this he would be without adequate signals or staff. 
Moreover he was upset by the general intent of the new plan. He 
reminded the CIGS that he had raised, equipped, and trained the Royal 
Marine Brigade for opposed landings, and its organisation had been 
designed to fit in landing craft for use as either a raiding force 
or the assaulting force of a larger landing operation. fie had been 
given to understand in his directive for ALLOY on 25 July 1940 
that the Royal ýIarines were to be used as the assaulting force, to 
be relieved as soon as possible by garrison troops. These new in- 
structions for BRISK seemingly relegated the Royal 114arines to the 
status of garrison troops, as the assault force was comnosed of 
other units 'which cannot have had the same amount of specialised 
training in this type of operation'. This would ceytainly lower the 
morale of the officers and men of his force., and mahe them feel that 
43. COS(40) 13-Mtg (0) 10 Oct 40, CAB 79/55. 
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they had been deceived. It would be the 
I 
greatest blow to the prid6 and traditions of the Royal 
Marine Cory)s since its foundation over 250 years ago. 
It is the equivalent of ordering the Brigade of Guards 
to consolidate a position which is to be captured by 
the Royal Engineers -a complete misuse of the cbarac- 
teristics of different arms. 
Morford asked that if BRISK plan was to be retained the Royal Marines 
should be ivitbdraxqn from the force and employed on other duties more 
44 
suited to their cbaracteristics and training. 
The COS on IS October 1940 agreed that PARADONX force should 
45 
leave Gibralter immediately. It sailed that same day, arriving 
in the Clyde on 27 October 1940. Keyes in the meanwhile visited 
the Commandos in training for BRISK at Inverary, and inspected the 
assault shipping. There was some problem in the ships selected by 
the EPS and Keyes lodged a comnlaint on this on his return to London 
on 22 October 1940. He reminded the COS that he had drafted the 
original BRISK plan and had considered himself responsible for the 
operation, but then 'officers of other departments were brought into 
the proceedings', and they assumed the responsibility for drafting 
the orders and generally organising the exT)edition. They bad chosen 
two ships, the Glengyle and the Ulster 'Monarch, each of v., hich was to 
carry two Commandos. There was no problem with the Glengyle, but the 
Ulster Monarch had been inspected by both Keyes and Brigadier J. C. 
Haydon, the commander of the Special Sen, ice (SS) Brigade into which 
the Commandos had been grouped, and they had agreed that she was i 
totally unfit to carry 900 men for a voyage in the Atlantic in the 
44. Morford to CIGS 16 Oct 40, PREM 3/330/7 and COS(40) 22 (0)(JP) 
'Operation BRISK' 31 Oct 40, CAB 80/106. 
45. COS(40) IS Mtg (0) 18 Oct 40, CAB 79/SS. 
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winter months, especially if the troops were expected to fight after 
disembarking. Garnons-Williams'had originally suggested that this 
would be the case and had made arrangements to take up a second vessel 
of the Ulster Monarch type, but be had been overruled by the EPS. The 
EPS had favoured one vessel 'for tactical reasons', and considered the 
Ulster Monarch sufficient. Keyes considered the EPS argument to be 
rather unsound as far as the tactics were concerned, and, in respect 
to the accommodatioji needed for the two Commandos, the one ship was 
'absolutely out of the question'. He had inspected the Royal Scots- 
man, a sister ship, and now requested that she should also be taken 
up. The special brows ordered for the Ulster Monarch had also been 
found to be far too heavy and unwieldy for ra-Did disembarkation, and 
Keyes had ordered the VACTC to order 24 of a lighter design. Keyes 
renorted that although some valuable training had been done and the 
two Commandos in the Glengyle were ready, the remainder had suffered 
some delay in the embarkation and then disembarkation of the Ulster 
Monarch, which had developed engine trouble during his visit. Though 
Keyes regretted the delay in the readiness of the Commandos for BRISK 
he felt that 'under the existing s) 7 stem such delays and miscarriages 
46 
are likely to recur'. 
On 24 October 1940 the COS called in Haund and the EPS for a 
discussion on the shinning problem and on the imnending arrival of 
PAPMOX force. To start with the term BRISK would, from 26 October 
1940, now cover the activities of both forces. The problem with the 
shipT)ing was resolved by directing that the Royal Scotsman be taken 
up immediately. Although the complete BRISK force could not sail 
until this was accomplished, and the Ulster 
_)Monarch 
Is engines re- 
paired, a composite force sufficient to undertake the whole operation 
46. Keyes to COS 22 Oct 40, PRIN 3/330/7. 
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in good weather, or nart of it in bad weather, could still be made 
available at 48 hours notice. As soon as Morford arrived in the 
United Kingdom he would assume command, under the general d! rection 
of the COS, of BRISK, and should meet in London with the commanders 
of the Commandos, the naval commander - if available, and represen- 
tatives of the DCO and EPS. They were to discuss detailed plans for 
the occupation of the Azores, on the differing assumptions that the 
enemy had forestalled the oDerations and that lie had not. Both BRISK 
and SHRAPNEL were, if nossible, to take T)Iace simultaneously, but the 
question of the timing of the operations could be considered when the 
occasion arose. Meanwhile, the EPS were to report on the length of 
time SHRAPNEL force could be left at Freetown, given the conditions 
there. Finally although BRISK was to be left at 48 hours notice from 
26 October 1940, it was agreed to give the personnel of 101st Royal 
Marine Brigade 7 days leave upon their arrival in the United Kingdom. 
47 
Morford's conversations with the commando leaders and the JPS, 
after his arrival, had removed any misapprehensions he had of the 
BRISK plan. After having the reasons for adopting it and the true 
nature of the relationship between the commandos and Royal Marines 
explained to him, he changed his views considerably, and was in fact 
to oppose later attempts to withdraw the coiTnandos from the oneration. 
Details of the T)Ian were then refined, and on 1 November 1940 Morford 
saw the COS at their morning meeting. The EPS also attended the meet- 
ing, but there was no renresentative of the DCO, and from this time 
on the DCO was to be excluded from virtually all BRISK planning. This 
was partly the result of the expansion of the authority of the EPS and 
partly because of the diversion of Keyes, attention to WORKSHOP. 'Mor- 
47. COS-1(4_03ý 1-6 Mtg (0) 24 Oct 40, VA 79/SS. 
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ford had, tinder the brief given by the COS on 24 October 1940, 
examined the feasibility of the" oneration on the separate 
tions that the Germans had not forestalled him., and that they had. 
Tn the former case he considered the forces at his dis. posal suffic- 
lent for the task, though be did require certain modifications to 
the plan as conceived in London. He was even willing to carry out 
the operation with three Coiinandos instead of four. lie had not been 
able to ascertain the state of training of the Argylls, but they 
would only be necessary if Terceira was to be occupied. Somerville 
in his capacity as naval commander had thought that to ensure success 
Madeira should also be seized, to enable the destroyers to refuel in 
its lee without interference. This question was referred to the EPS 
for study. 
An operation based on the other assumption, that the enemy had 
established himself in the islands first, was an entirely different 
matter. Morford had prepared an aDpreciation on this, in which he 
expected that the enemy would land on each island with anproximately 
1,000 men, some artillery, and a few light tanks. After two days 
the beaches and landing places in at least the main -norts might well 
be wired. Any form Of COUD de main would then be out of the question. 
Even if the BRISK force, as then constituted, succeeded in getting 
ashore, it could not deal with artillery and tanks. The original 
plan, a deliberate assault on the wrts, would be insufficient, and 
a landing on a far wider front would be necessary. In winter condi- 
tions this could result in a long wait, and at least three ships, 
caT pable of carrying a sufficient number of landing craft and disembarl, - 
ing them rapidly, would be needed. Only the one Clen ship allocated 
215 
to BRISK met those requirements. To take up the other two Glen 
ships would, however, delay the despatch of landing craft to the 
Middle Fast. A decision would thus have to be made as to which 
had priority. These conditional restrictions on the ability to 
acbiev6 success were wholly unsatisfactory to the COS. The War 
Cabinet was under the impression that the BRISK force was complete 
and able to handle any contingency, and now the military connander 
was taking the position that, with the shipT)ing at his dis-Dosal, 
BRISK was not feasible if the enemy occupied the islands first. 
The COS thought that the planning must be adequate to cover the 
worst case., and that there must be no possibility of failure. 
Morford and the JPS were therefore instructed to go back and re- 
examine the problem and to produce a statement on the decisions 
48 
required to place BRISK on a satisfactory footing. 
The JPS review of the situation, conducted with Morford and a 
representative of the DCO, was completed on S November 1940. It 
was far from encouraging. If the Germans established themselves in 
sufficient strength and with a sufficient margin of time the result 
would be a 'fundamental alteration of the whole character of the 
operations' that were envisaged. The assumption had always been that 
there would only be Portuguese resistance, or German resistance on 
a minor scale and without sufficient time being given them to organ- 
ise the defences. If the worst case was now considered, i. e. if 
the Germans established themselves in force 48 hours or more before 
the landings, it was 'extremely unlikely that an), force, however 
organised, would be able to attempt the capture of either island 0 
48. WMCOT 19 Mtg (OY71 -Nov40,09 79/SS and Note on 2 Nov 40, 
DEFE 2/116. The actual T)Ian i)rovided for only Nos. 4,7, and 
8 Commandos. 
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before the fine weather period between May and September 19411. 
By then the Germans would obviously have had time to thoroughly 
prepare the defences, and the problem would then be 'an entirely 
new one' which should be examined on a separate basis. As all 
the Men ships would then be -required, operations in the Middle 
East would be drastically affected. 
If BRISK was based on the original assumption of Portuguese 
resistance onlý, the current preparations were adequate. Morford 
had still to inspect the Commandos, and thought that further train- 
ing in boat work might be necessary. If this were so it would, 
because of the limited means available, probably interfere with the 
combined operations training programme of lst Corps at the CFC. 
However, as the operations against the Azores 'appeared to be more 
positive' than any operations that might be given to the Ist Corps, 
priority should be given to the BRISK forces. One Men ship was 
still necessary for BRISK., and the decision would soon have to be 
made whether BRISK or the Middle East had priority. As far as the 
capture of Madeira was concerned, there were a number of alterna- 
tives. The destroyers, which would only have two and a half days 
fuel left when they reached the Azores, could, in order of pref- 
erence, fuel at the Azores after capture; under the lee of the 
Azores, weather permitting; under the lee of Madeira, where condi- 
tions were liRely to be better; in Funchal harbour in Madeira, with 
the concurrence of the Portuguese or by forcing Portuguese acquie- 
scence by threat of bombardment; or in M adeira after cai)ture. If 
the capture of 14adeira were to be decided upon it was estinated 
that one battalion of troons landed from destroyers would be suffi- 
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cient. 'Fhis force would best come from Gibraltar, as the delay in- 
volved in sending it fr om the United Kingdom would increase the chance 
of the enemy establishing himself in I-Tadeira as well as in the Azores. 
'Fhere was an accommodation problem at ribraltar and the force might 
have to remain on board ship, but this could be accepted. 'fhe Dre- 
paration of a force for this T)urT)ose had been proposed by Admiral 
Somerville, who had pressed for the immediate occupation of Madeira 
49 
if Gibraltar became untenable. 
Keyes was astonished by this report, and it was later to be the 
cause of many caustic comments on the planning ability of the EPS. 
At the time, however, he was deeply involved -in WORKSHOP. He did 
seize upon the opportunity, now that he considered BRISK unlikely to 
take place, of requesting the return of the Commandos allocated for 
so 
the past month to the oneration. Whether Keyes' disenchantment 
with BRISK was link-ed with the fact that he no longer exercised any 
control over it is debatable, but, if the BRISK requirement held, the 
planned departure of two Special Service battalions, i. e. four Com- 
mandos, to the Middle East in December would leave the COHQ with only 
one Special Service battalion for operations from the United Kingdom. 
This battalion was already earmarked for some raiding operations. 
The COS reacted unfavourably to the JPS report. Confronted with 
the possibility of not being able to seize the Azores if they were 
occupied by the Germans, the CIGS thought that, in view of their imT)or- 
tance, it might be better to seize them immediately. Pound could not 
49. COS(40) 29 (0)(JP) 'Operations against the Azores' S Nov 40, CAB 
80/106. 
50. Notes on 5 and 18 Noir 40, DEFE 2/116. 
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accept this view, believing that their capture could not compensate 
for the loss of Gibraltar. The'current naval commitments, partic- 
ularly when considering impending operations in the Mediterranean, 
would in any case maRe it unlilely that the planned naval forces 
would be available. Further discussion on the to-pic was postponed 
51 
until Morford could be present. Morford met the COS on 8 Novem- 
ber 1940. His assessment being accepted, he was instructed, at the 
urging of Pound, to formulate a plan for the capture of the Azores 
in the winter weather, even if the Glens were not available, using 
as a basis the forces allocated for BRISK. Morford, faced with 
Keyes' request for the return of the Commandos, had by now become 
convinced of their worth and insisted that they must remain part of 
the force, even if the operation were only to face Portuguese 're- 
sistance, if success were to be assured. The COS accepted this 
point, though Keyes thought MoTford over-cautious. The inclusion in 
the planning of a battalion held at Gibraltar to seize Madeira was 
discussed, but it was seen to be an unnecessan, comT)lication. Pound I- 
was confident that the Royal Navy could prevent the Germans from 
occupying Madeira, and the idea was dropped. The decision on the 
Glen ships was deferred, most probably until the new plan could be 
52 
examined. 
Dill and Portal were not as certain as Pound of Gibraltar's 
worth relative to the Azores. This issue was brought up again on 
9 November 1940, this time by Dortal, vfio, in view of the seemingly 
grave danger of the Germans establishing themselves in the Azores 
first, thought that military considerations made it desirable that 
51. COS(40) 23 Mtg (0)- 7 Nov 40, CAB 79/S5. 
52. COS(40) 24 Mtg (0) 8 Nov 40, CAB 79/SS. 
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BRISK and SHRAPNEL be carried out immediately. The COS finally 
agreed that the secretary should draft a note to Churchill along 
S3 
these lines. This note was -ready for the next morning's moeting, 
but Pound still had doubts as to the advisability of immediate 
action. He suggested that before the immediate execution of the 
operations was recommended to Churchill, all -oossible German reac- 
tions should be investigated. Dill, who had originally raised the 
matter., responded that the JPS already had a great deal of work in 
hand. Pound's proposal was nevertheless accepted, and the JPS were 
instructed to iýrepare yet another report. After this tonic the COS 
had to face Keyes himself. After his request for the release of the 
BRISK Commandos had been denied he had, characteristically, gone to 
Churchill for support. Keyes' argwnents were based on the fact that 
in late October and early November, when there had been mechanical 
problems with both the Ulster Monarch and Roval Scotsman, Morford 
had prepared to conduct BRISK without the Commandos if necessary. 
Keyes thought Morford could still do so, but after some discussion 
be agreed that there had been some misunderstanding as to the in- 
tended use of the Commandos, and that they must now be considered 
54 
an integral part of the BRISK plan. 
The JPS evaluation was that the most likely German response to 
a British occupation of the Azores and Cape Verdes, other than an 
advance through Snain, might be to demand the use of naval and air 
bases in Portugal, which would extend the attacks on the British lines 
of communication to the south and west, and further complicate the 
British blockade problem. Such actions might also tilt Spanish policy 
53. COS(40) 384 ý, -Itg 9 Nox, 40, CIAB 79/7. 
54. COS(40) 385 ', Nltg 11 Nov 40, CAB 79/7. 
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in favour of the Mis. Madeira might be seized by the Germans, 
and they might acquire air and-haval bases in the Canaries. The 
JPS suggested that an alternative to the execution of BRISK and 
SHRAPNEL might be to approach the United States and induce it to 
lease certain facilities, such as a flying-boat base, in the 
Portuguese islands. This idea had the tentative support of the 
Foreign Office. It would give the United States a staRe in the 
islands, would not necessaril-Y compromise Portuguese neutrality, 
and might deter a Clerman seizure of the islands. The JPS cautioned, 
however, that it would still have to be made clear to the Americans 
that, in the event of Gibraltar becoming untenable, the British must 
have the use of the facilities in the Azores themselves. This would 
be a delicate act of diplomacy, and if success was doubtful it 
might be better to ask the United States to station permanently a 
warship in the islands. In the end none of these alternatives 
SS 
-proved feasible. 
The COS carefully studied these recommendations on 16 November 
1940, and then drafted a report to the War Cabinet giving the mili- 
S6 
tary view that it was desirable to seize the islands imediately. 
When theJPS 'heard of this decision they proposed, again unsuccess- 
S7 
fully, that Madeira be included. The COS examined and amended 
their draft on 19 November 1940, but before it could be submitted 
the question of BRISK bad come u-o in a meeting of the Defence Com- 
mittee (Operations) called at Keves' instigation to review the inter- 
5S. COS(40) 33 (0) (JP) 'German Reactions to Onerations SHRAPNEL and 
BRISK' 13 Nov 40 and COS(40) 34 (0)(JP) 'Operations Against the 
Azores' 13 Nov 40, C-kB 80/106. 
S6. COS(40) 391 Mtg 16 Nov 40, CIAB 79/7 and COS(40) 22 (0) 21 Nov 40, 
CAB SO/S6 (this is closed until 1991). 
S7. JP(40) 133 Mtg 18 Nov 40, CAB 84/2. 
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related WORKSHOP. Keyes infonlied the connittee that two Glens 
and one of the'"Dutch LSI(' ýO were required to transport the WORKSHOP 
assault force, and these were scheduled to leave the United Kingdom 
in a convoy on 15 December 1940. The conversion of the third Glen 
was due to be completed in the latter part of December. There was 
some doubt as to the exact date, but Keyes said he had been assured 
that it would be ready by 15 December 1940, in wbich case there would 
be little or no disruption in the arrangements for BRISK. This opti- 
mism was not shared by Pound, who more realistically held that the 
ship would not be ready for service until early in Janua-r-y-1941. Most 
of the discussion was concerned with the feasibility and desirability 
of WORKSHOP, and the committee finally agreed to approve in princiT)Ie 
58 
the sailing of the WORKSHOP force on IS December 1940. To effect 
this Keyes was authorised to withdraw the Glen ship and Commandos 
from BRISK force. The Commandos would be replaced by a regular 
battalion, or by other CoiTnandos, as required. The Defence Committee 
(Operations) wanted to ensure, however, that there would be no time 
59 
during AAch it would be imnossible to carry out BRISK. 
The decision on WORKSHOP temnorarily damnened the desire of the 
COS for the immediate execution of BRISK and SHRAPNEL, as all the 
operations could certainly not be carried out concurrently. ne 
plan for the assault of the Azores against German opposition, FANWISE, 
on which work had started at the beginning of October 1940, was com- 
pleted about this time. The plan was submitted to the COS on 19 
November 1940. The most productive action was seen as the capture of 
Horta, which would require two battleships, an aircraft carrier, and 
S8.03S 4 394 Mtg 19 Nov 40, CAB 79/7. 
S9. DO(40) 45 Mtg 19 Nov 40, C-A. B 69/1. 
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approximately seventeen destroyers, with the BRISK force reinforced 
with artillery'aDd engineer units and carried in two Glen ships and 
two transports. The capture of Ponta Delgade would require one 
battleship or cruiser, one aircraft carrier, a-pnroximatoly seventeen 
destroyers, and two submarines, with a force consisting of a four- 
battalion brigade with artillery and engineers, carried in two Glen 
ships and two transports. Even wi-th these forces it was stressed 
that the plan was heavily deT)endent upon reasonable weather and upon 
the effectiveness of the ships' gunfire against coast and beach de- 
fences. It was noted that the latter had proved none too effective 
in MENIACE. if the COS decided to proceed with these plans, which 
even then required more detailed stud), before they could be pro- 
nounced feasible, it was apparent that both islands could not be 
assaulted simultaneously, and a choice would have to be made. With 
WORKSHOP in the process of being m, ounted, however, FANIVISE was en- 
60 
tirely out of the question, and was not develo-ned further. 
With the inevitable delay in the conversion of the third Glen 
ship the contradictions inherent in the Defence Committee (()perations) 
instructions became clear. Morford was invited to discuss his require- 
ments with the COS on 20 November 1940, and he stated flatly that 
BRISK could not be considered a -practicable military Dronosition with- 
out the use of one Glen shin or its equivalent. If the Glengyle were 
withdrawn for WORKSHOP as directed, it would have to be done about 
a week before the sailing of the convoy, i. e. about 8 December 1940, 
and it was doubtful whether the fitting out of the Glenearn could be 
accelerated so as to be ready by then. 
lIt 
thus aT)T)ea-red to be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to carry out the Defence Committee 
60. (40) 37 (0) (JP) loperations Against the Azores' 19 Nov 40, C-4, B 




The COS then agreed to have the DCO, in 
consultation with Morford and the EPS, consider and report that sxne 
day as to whether the instructions could be fully implemented, or 
if they could not, to what extent BRISK would be affected by the 
61 
witbdrawal. of forces for WORKSHOP. 
Keyes chaired this meeting that same morning. It was confirmed 
that the two Glen ships were needed for WORKSHOP, resulting in the 
withdrawal of the Glengyle no later than 13 December 1940. The 
Glenearn, if worked on night and day, could be com? Ieted by 15 Decem- 
ber 1940, but, provided that the training of all the landing craft 
crews was previously completed and that the landing craft themselves 
were available, five more days would still be needed to commission 
her, store her, and work her up. Morford did not consider even this 
time adequate, and maintained that at least fifteen days would be 
required to bring the crew to the necessary standard of efficiency. 
The net result was that BRISK could not be conducted during the period 
13 to 30 December 1940 if WORKSHOP was undertaken. Keyes, who had 
just been given personal command of WORKSHOP, stressed that if Mor- 
ford's demands were met, regardless of the possibility or probability 
of BRISK being executed, the result would be the cancellation, or at 
least the postponement, of an offensive operation which was expected 
to have a major effect upon the conduct of the war in the Mediterran- 
ean. If enemy action nosed a real threat to Gibraltar before 13 
December 1940, WORKSHOP could always be abandoned and all efforts de- 
62 
voted to ensuring the success of BRISK. 
61. COS(40) 39S Mtg 20 Nov 40, CAB_ 79T7 and COS(40) 27 Mtg (0) 20 
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The COS considered this report the following morning, 21 November 
1940. A Dossible solution to the dileiina was suggested by Pound, who 
saw that the use of the barbour at Horta was not essential to the 
British., so long as it was denied to the Germans. If BRISK were 
initially confined to the capture of Ponta Delgada, which fortunately 
did not require the use of a Glen ship, the condition might be met. 
Naval forces should then be able to deny the use of Horta to the enemy 
until the necessary forces for its occupation could be assembled. 
T'he GlengyIe could thus be released on 13 December 1940. Morford 
agreed to this, and was willing to release the Commandos on that date 
if they'could be replaced by other Speclial Service troops. The COS 
consequently decided that BRISK would be modified during the period 
that a Glen ship was not available, to involve only the capture of 
63 
the island of San Miguel. This i3lan, termed TRUCK, was approved 
64 
by Churchill on 22 November 1940. 
The JPS had earlier examined the accommodation -Droblem for 
SHRAMIEL force at Freetoum. Their opinion, which subsequently proved 
false, was that as long as the force was accommodated in barracks it 
could remain there indefinitely. Further problems were caused by 
a plan to send two battalions from the United Kingdom to provide a 
permanent garrison to defend Freetoi%n against an overland attack by 
the French from Dakar. There was not sufficient accommodation for 
both forces, and none of the proposed solutions was fully satisf actory. 
The JPS recommended as the best the movement of the garrison batta- 
lions to Achimoto on the Cold Coast, from whence they could sail to 
Freetoun if SHRVINEL was ordered by diverting liners returning from 
63. COS(40) 397 Mtg 21 Nov 40, CAB 79/7; COS(40) 27 Mtg (0) 21 Nov 
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the Middle East to the United Kingdom, or by using the SHRAMEI 
shipping after the operation ended. The COS accepted this on 4 
65 
November 1940. 
All these relevant factors were considered at the Defence 
Committee (operations) meeting on 2S November 1940, at which the 
COS recommendation for the immediate execution of BRISK and SHRAPNEL 
was submitted. Pound ex-olained that the arguments for and against 
sbizing the islands were very evenly balanced. It was true that carry- 
ing out the operations immediately might precipitate a Cerman advance 
into S-nain and Portuo gal, and thus bring about the loss of (libraltar 
earlier than might have othenjise haPnened. - The governing factor 
seemed to be the effect British action would have on the Spanish and 
Portuguese. Halifax thought that an invasion of the Azores would 
cause. a. very unfavourable reaction in Portug -old bring into gal, and wo 
effect the mutual defence treaty between Spain and Portugal. This 
would bring about the very crisis the Cabinet was trying to avoid. 
Considerable discussion ensued on these and other possible effects. 
'fliere was much to be gained if the Spanish and Portugueuse put up 
even a slight resistance to a rerman advance, but it would nrobably 
be necessary to send considerable forces to the Peninsula to stimu- 
late this. If Lisbon or Cueta could then be held by British forces 
it would be better than merely controlling the Azores. From this 
point of vieu, it would be unwise to seize the islands, thereby elim- 
inating an), chance for Spanish or Portuguese cooperation with the 
British. Dill, who had supported the ipnediate occunation of the 
islands from the start, did not have much faith in the amount of 
6S. COS(40) 24 (0ý_(_JP) 'Opera: P: Loii--S-I-FaV. '\'-E-Ll-1 N6ý000__, Ckg__UOT1_0_6_ 
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opposition the Spanish Or Portuguese were likely to give the Gennans. 
The Cermans would naturally chose a favourable opportunity to them- 
selves if they in fact intended to enter the Peninsula. Under these 
circumstances, Dill would probably not be in a i)osition to find 
forces strong enough to hold Lisbon or Cueta, and if the Azores were 
not seized in time everything might be lost. Churchill seized upon 
the capture of Cueta, which he did not think beyond the means avail- 
able. fie therefore told the COS to investigate the possibilities 
forthwith. This was termed COUNTERPOISE, but nothing was to come of 
66 
it. The discussion on the Azores continued, with Dill gaining some 
support form Beaverbrook, Minister of AircraftProduction, who favour- 
ed the immediate seizure of the islands to strengthen the naval posi- 
tion, on which in the long run everything would depend. He did not 
think that this would cause a German invasion of Spain, though it 
would be wise to secure the aT)r)roval of Roosevelt beforehand. 
This gave Pound an opening for the deciding argument. He attacRed 
this idea of a strengthened naval position with the comment that if 
the Germans occupied the mainland of Spain and Portugal, and the 
Canaries, the British convoys would have to be routed via Trinidad and 
Halifax, and the holding of the Azores would not materially affect the 
situation. On its face value this was a remarkable assertion, effect- 
ively invalidating most of the assumptions on which operations against 
the Portuguese Atlantic islands had been based from the start. Con- 
siderable discussion in June 1949 had produced a somewhat different 
conclusion.. Pound continued that, if the Spanish did resist the Ger- 
mans and gave the British the use of the Canaries, the British would 
be much better -nlaced for controlling trade. It was therefore gener- 
66. COS(40) 43 (0) (JP) 'Capture of Cuetal 4 Dec 40, CAB 80/106. 
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ally agreed that if Franco could be offered any inducement to resist 
a German attack on the Peninsula, and to give the British, in such 
an event, the use of facilities on the mainland and in the Canaries, 
this would be much Preferable to an assault on the Azores. On the 
whole the members of the committee did not consider the arguments 
for carrying out BRISK and SHRAPNEL to be ove-n.. helming, and they 
consequently thought it would be better to wait and see whether a 
more suitable moment would arise. McanOhile, everything was to be 
kept in readiness so that the maximum advantage could be taRen of 
any opportunity. The forces for BRISK and SHMPNEL were therefore 
to be retained at 48 hours notice, and the situation reviewed in 
67 
ten days 'or a fortnight. 
On 26 November 1940 Keyes sent a note to the COS informing them 
that he intended to withdraw Nos. 3 and 4 Special Senrice Battalions 
from their commitment to BRISK on I December rather than 13 December. 
The original allotment of two Special Senrice battalions, i. e. four 
Commandos, had been reduced to three Commandos because of the short- 
age of accommodation on board the ships, and the loss of the Glen 
ship would further reduce the requirement to one Snecial Senrice 
battalion, which would be embarked in the two 'Monarch class ships. 
68 
The early release would enable Nos. 3 and 4 Special Service Battalions 
to taRe some leave before their deDarture for WORKSHOP. The JPS was 
advised of Keyes' intentions, and recomiended apnroval, which was 
69 
granted by the COS on 27 November 1940. On 4 December 1940 Pound 
67. W(40) 46 Mtg 25 Nov 40, W 69 1. 
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reported to the Defence Committee (Operations) that, owing to the naval 
disposition for EXCESS and WOU. ' SHOP., BRISK must be ordered by 6 
December 1940 or else it could not take place. The inability to carry 
out BRISK for the period 13 to 30 December 1940, with reliance on 
TRUCK, had already been accepted, and the committee 'took note' that 
70 
the period was now extended from 6 to 30 December 1940. 
At this point the liaison between the agencies involved in BRISK 
seems to have been somewhat disjointed. The EPS informed the COS on 
5 December 1940 that Morford had not been advised that the Special 
71 
Service troops for BRISK had been changed five days earlier. In 
addition to this unexplained lapse, there seemed to be some doubt as 
to whether TRUCK would be mounted for the period 7 to 13 December or 
the simultaneous seizure of both islands would still be attempted. 
The plan for the force for BRISK had finally been issued on 29 Novem- 
ber 1940, and, despite Morford's earlier statements, it now seemed 
that the plan could be adjusted to capture both islands simultaneous- 
72 
ly without using a Glen ship. The JPS were instructed to resolve 
these matters immediately, and to submit a statement showing the 
-Dreparedness of the force. 
The JPS replied on the following day. No. 5 Special Service 
Battalion had not yet completed mobilisation. ', Morford had not yet 
briefed the commander, and the battalion had had less time for pre- 
paration than had been originally nrogrammed. Under these circtun- 
stances, although everything possible was being done to hasten the I 
70. fjTU40-)--T-7- Mtg 4 Dec 40, CkB 69/1. 
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state of readiness, it was not possible to stipulate whether the 
operation coulý be launcbed at 48 hours notice until the report of 
an officer visiting Morford had been received. In addition it bad 
since been learned that the Glenearn would not be -ready until 7 
January 1941. The JPS considered that the Glen ship was in fact 
essential for BRISK, and thus for the period from 6 December to 
7 January only TRUCK could be mounted. This would involve the 
Ettrick, carrying the Headquarters 101st Royal Marine Brigade and 
the Ist Battalion, Royal Marines; the Pulaski, carrying the Argylls; 
and the Ulster Monarch, with half of No. S Special Service Battalion. 
A store shii), an oiler, and an armed yacht we re also to be used. 
The remaining ships then being held for BRISK, including the Karania 
with the Sth Battalion, Royal Marines and the Royal Scotsman with the 
other half of No. S Special Service Battalion, would be kept in readi- 
ness, as they might be required any time after the capture of Ponta 
73 
Delgada. Intelligence for the operation i.., as seemingly very good, 
as GS(P) at the War Office published a translation of the current 
74 
Portuguese defence orders for the Azores on 4 December 1940. 
Tbe cbangeover of operations from BRISK to TRUCK was effected on 
6 December 1940. The COS were informed the following day that No. 5 
Special Sen, ice Battalion had been sufficiently mobilised to send the 
necessary trooDs, and that this relief had been comT)leted satisfac- 
torily, although Morford bad not yet had an opportunity to vouch for 
7S 
the state of training of the unit. The priority accorded to oDera- 
73. COS(40) 44 (0)(JP) 'Operations BRISK and TRUCK' 6 Dec 40, CAB 
80/106. 
74. Note on 4 Dec 40, DEFE 2/116 and copY with 101 Force Outline Plan 
29 Nov 40, DEFE 2/117. 
7S. COS(40) 419 Mtg 7 Dec 40, C14B 79/8 and CS(P)/907 4 Dec 40, DEFE 
2/117. 
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tions against the Atlantic Islands would continue to result in some 
friction with the DCO. The traiisport EttrjcR, carmarRed for TRUCK, 
was damaged by a heavy gale early in December 1940. The COS, in 
order to Reep TRUCK at 48 hours notice, decided to allot the Glenale, I- 
part of Keyes' Force 10Z for WORKSHOP, to TRUCK for about a fort- 
night, until the Ettrick was repaired. Although the COS agreed that, 
once the stores for TRUCK had been loaded on the Glengy1e, and reason- 
able -precautions taken to secure them she could be returned to Keyes 
for training, the time required for stowing and removing the stores 
would result in a -loss of six days of much needed training for Keyes' 
force. This decision was taken at the befence Committee (Operations) 
level, an indication of the limited resources available and the care- 
76 
ful consideration given to their allocation. 
liornby protested against this decision, suggesting that, as the 
stores were nearly duplicated on board the two ships, it would be 
nossible to stow the items peculiar to TRUCK within the 48 hour time 
77 
limit allowed for sailing. Keyes, when appraised of the decision, 
also strongly objected for a number of reasons, ainong which was that 
the EPS estimate of the transfer time was 'quite inaccurate in light 
of practical experience'. He then submitted the characteristic sug- 
gestion that, as No. 3 Special Service Battalion, then embarRed in the 
Glengyle, had been one of the original components of BRISK, he should 
use the Glengyle, stowed as it was, to execute BRISK if the oneration 
were ordered before the Ettrick was renaired. Haydon also supported 
this proposal, i%Mch would allow the maximum amount of training to be 
76. COS(40) 431 Mtg 17 Dec 40, CAB 79/8. 
77. Hornby to COS 17 Dec 40, DEFE 2/613. 
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accomplished. I%Iiat Morford may have thought of it, if he was 
informed, is not known, but lie equally orotested, for his own 
reasons, at the transfer of stores to the rlengyle. lie felt that 
if the ship were handed back to Keyes after restowing, he could not 
guarantee the safety of the stores nor the 48 hours readiness to sail. 
The COS considered both of these protests on 19 December 1940, but 
79 
held to their original decision. This incident well. illustrates 
Keyes' views on the conduct of operations, including his dislike 
of the interference of the relatively junior and inexoerienced 
officers of the JPS, and of the EPS in Darticular. 
On 21 December Churcbill v., rote that, 'as we have a little time 
on fiand', it-would be a good thing for Keyes and Haydon to confer 
with Morford and the JPS to see if the plans could be simplified or 
80 
modified. The dispute over the restowing of the Glengyle had just 
ended, and Churchill was concerned about 'undue heavy weather being 
made' about BRISK and SHRAPNEL. Hornby and the EPS met on 22 D(fcem- 
ber 1940 to discuss the situation. The), were convinced that there 
would be no further troubles in regard to BRISK and SHRMNIEL except 
for the allocation of shin ing. 'So long as a Glen ship was ear- lp 
marked for BRISK there would be trouble between the DCO and the 
commander of BRISK whose requirements must sometimes clash'. The 
only solution appeared to be the cancellation of BRISK in favour of 
TRUCK. In this regard a report was being, prepared on the future of 
the Glen ships, once a decision was made on their allocation the 
81 
whole situation would be clarified. 
78. DCO to Adm 1346/19 Dec 40, PREI 3/351/6. 
79. COS(40) 433 Mtg 19 Dec 40, C-AB 79/8. 
80. Churchill to Isma,,, r 21 Dec 40, PROI 3/361/6. 
81. Notes 22 Dec 40, DEFE 2/116. 
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The report was ready on 23 December 1940. It reconmiended that 
one Glen ship be retained in the United Kingdom for BRISK, for any 
other unforeseen combined operations, -ind for combined operations 
training, at least until the conversion of the Dutch LSI(M) and 
Belgian LSI(S) was completed in January 1941. As the Ettrick would 
not be ready until 11 January, no immediate decision was required. 
By 6 January, however, optimism over the maintenance of Spanish 
neutrality was such that TRUCK was considered adequate for the pres- 
ent, and it was agreed that BRISK need not be remounted as planned. 
This conformed with Churchill's views, and TRUCK was not only re- 
82 
tained, but place on 96, rather than 48, hours notice to sail. 
On 9 January 1941 Dill brought up for a second time the ques- 
tion of the location of the SHRAPNEL force. This force had been at 
Freetown since September 1940, and although its sick rate had re- 
cently been lowered from 23% to 16%, there was no doubt that if it 
were left at Freetown much longer its o-nerational valud would be Irl 
'seriously reduced'. Dill posed three possible o-ptions: return the 
force to the United Kingdom and conduct SHRAPNEL from there; replace 
the force at Freetovn with a fresh force; or, as had been suggested 
by the commander of 102nd Royal Marine Brigade, introduce ai-vied men 
in plain clothes into the Cape Verdes to carry out a 'fifth column' 
operation. Of the three options, he nreferred the return of the 
force to the United Kingdom, and this was apreed to by the COS on 
83 
11 January 1941. SHPATNEL, however, would take 14 days to execute 
from the United Kingdom, as opposed to 7 days for BRISK, and this 
82. S-(-w S-Z (0)-(J P) - IMI I oEa_Ft_i oný76T __G_17e_n Sh i ns 123 De c40, CIAB 
80/106 and COS(41) 9 Nitg 6 Jan 41, CAB 79/8. 
83. COS (41) Sý (0) 'Operation SHRAPNEL' 9 Jan 46, CAB 80/S6 and COS 
(41) 15 Mtg 11 Jan 41, CAB 79/8. 
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meant that either BRISK must be delayed in order to carry out the 
operations simultaneously, or S1 . iRAPN`EL would have to be carried out 
without surprise. As the British were to occupy the Cape Verdes to 
prevent their being used by the German_, loss of surprise for SHRAPNEL 
seemed to be a justifiable risk. Churchill gave his assent to the 
return of SHRAPNEL force on 18 January 1941, although lie was also in- 
clined to introduce the plain clothes agents. 'Even a cduple of hun- 
84 
dred would keep the nlace sweet'. The COS asked the JISC to con- 
sider this, as well as the infiltration of agents into the Azores. 
The records of the next meeting of the COS on this subject are closed 
until 1991, but it may be assumed that some such measures were in fact 
85 
taken. 
The COS had decided to give SHRAPINIEL force 14 days leave on its 
return to the United Kingdom, and thereafter to bold it at the same 
96 hours notice as the TRUCK force. With the advent of staff conver- 
sations with the Portuguese, however, there was some question of 
the necessity of reconstituting the force. A delay in starting these 
conversations, combined with the imminence of the SHRAPNIFL force's 
arrival in the United Kingdom, resulted in other arrangements being 
made. The COS discussed the situation on 21 February 1941 with the 
Deputy AGRM, the commander of the Roval Marine Division, and the JPS. 
Political developments and the latest reports on the strength 
of the garrison in the Cape Verdes - SO native troops and 30 police- 
men, indicated that a strong striRing force might not be necessary. 
All that was apparently reouired was the preparation for a peaceful 
84. 1 smay to Churchi II -Y 2 - jýE 4-1 -, - PFNI 3/361/1. 
8s. COS(41) 217 Mtg 23 Jan 41, CIALB 79/8. 
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occupation of the islands by a force of about one infantry battalion. 
'Mere were in fact some extra British infantry battalions then in 
West Africa, in 161st Brigade, which had been sent out for security 
Purposes after MENACE, and which was scheduled to remain there until 
April or May 1941. It seemed nossible to give the GOC West Africa 
the task of providing a force using whatever shinping or warships 
were available at the time. This would have the advantage of enabling 
BRISK and SHRAPNEL to be executed simultaneously. It would free the 
Royal Marine battalions for the formation of the Royal Marine Division, 
and would result in a force being available in the United Kingdom for 
any other operations that might be required. 
- 
It would also release 
the transports held for SHRAPNEL to trade. The reconstitution of a 
snecial force for the Cane Verdes could be reconsidered when the 
return of 161st Brigade to the United Kingdom was imminent. The COS 
agreed to this course of action, subject to the concurrence of the GOC 
West Africa. Pending this SHRAPNEL would remain at 96 hours notice 
86 
in the United Kingdom. 
The GOC West Africa re-olied to the COS on 8 March 1941, indicat- 
ing that arrangements were in -progress for an operation to seize the 
Cane Verdes. He wanted to retain the transports that had been loaded I- 
for SHRAPNEL, but was told that this was not possible. He was also 
informed that he could expect 96 hours notice in which to launch the 
87 
operation. When asked what was the earliest date by which the 
operation, termed B. kSEBALL, would be ready, be replied 1 April 1941. 
This prompted the JPS to recommend that SHRAPNEL be dismounted from 
86. COS(41) 62 Mtg 20 Feb 41 and COS(41) 64 Mtg 21 Feb 41, CAB 79/9. 
87. JP(41) 196 'Operation SHRAPNIELI 11 Mar 41, CM 84/28. 
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2S March 1941. At the same time the JPS noted that BRISK had been 
held in abeyance since 13 December 1940, although the troops were 
still earmarked for it. They therefore also recommended that TRUCK 
be retained and BRISK formally dismounted. Additional troops would 
thus be freed for other merations, and the Karanja, from TRUCK, and 
Kenya, from SHRAPNEL, could be tahen up for conversion to LS1. 
F. ttric'k- from TRUCK and Sobiesl,, i from SHRONTEL could be released for 
88 
trooping. 
The COS approved these reconunendations on 22 March 1941, but 
their implementation was stopped by Churchill. He had just -received 
renorts of Cerman submarines refuelling under the lee of the Azores, 
and was once again thinking of launching BRISK. As before, he 
thought that such action by the British would not greatly affect 
German plans, or cause the Spanish or Portuguese to invite the Clermans 
89 
in. He would, however, consult Roosevelt beforehand. Sir Alexander 
Cadogan from the Foreign Office and Rear Admiral J. H. CodfTey, the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, (I)NI), met the COS on this subject 
later in the afternoon. Godfrey býýIieved that the Tenorts of subma'r- 
ine refuelling were unfounded, though an observer was sent out to the 
Azores to investigate them. Cadogan had received other reports of 
German action in the Iberian Peninsula, however, and the committee 
agreed that it was -Dossible that the Germans might be preparing the 
occupation of Portugal on the 'Non%! egian style'. 'Ihey considered 
that such an operation would almost certainly include an expedition 
to the Azores, and possibly the CaDe Verdes, so the question of the 
88. JP(41) 219 'Operations SHP--WNEL, BRISK, and TRUCK' 21 Nar 41, 
CIALB 84/28. 
89. COS(41) 1.0S Mtg 22 Mar 41, CAB 79/10. 
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inEnediate execution of TRUCK and BASEMIL was -resurrected% After 
consultations with the Director*s of Plans, who now tied the question 
of the Portuguese Atlantic islands to that of the Canaries, it 
appeared to the COS that there were disadvantages to inuncdiate action. 
With the seemingly deteriorating situation, the original considera- 
tions against action, i.. e., an occupation of the Portuguese islands, 
which would weaken Portuguese and Spanish determination to resist, 
no longer aDDeared to hold much weight. The danger of subsequent 
Spanish acquiescence in the German use of the Canaries, however, 
was now a serious, if not the governing, factor. Another hindrance 
would be the moral obligation imposed u Don the British b-v their own 
precipitate action, especially since the recent staff conversations, 
to send some forces to assist Portugal. The COS therefore decided 
to confirm the cancellation of BRISK and SHRkPNEL on 23 March 1941. 
TRUCK and BASEBALL would be sufficient for the time being. 
91 
90. COS(41) 6 Mtg (0) 22 Mar 41, Cle ý7 
91. COS(41) 7.. ýitg (0) 23 Mar 41, GAB 79/55. 
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GIATIFER Xllf 
OPERNNON WORKSHOP - ME PLANNED ATFACK ON 
PA\rl'FI. T. FR TA 
An increased attention to the actual employment of an unphibious 
force in the Middle-East was engendered by the Italian attack on 
Greece on 28 October 1940. Keyes immediately i%Tote to the COS stat- 
ing that the entry of Greece into the war provided a great onnortunity 
for raiding the Dodecanese, using Crete as a base. lie -Proposed that 
one or two Commandos be sent out at once for this nurnose. Although 
their transport for raiding might Prove'a difficult nroblem, the), 
1 
could use local vessels. 
As Keyes was working on this idea, Churchill decided at a JPS 
meeting on 30 October 1940 that the capture of Rhodes was necessary. 
Keyes was accordingly instructed to prenare a Wan. It was thought 
possible that Dlans for such an operation might already exist in the 
Middle East Command, and should be requested, but in the meanwhile 
Perhans a better plan could be developed in London. The FOPS, who 
had been working on nlans for thp elimination of Italy from the war, 
2 
were to consult the DCO on the matter. 
As early as September aurchill had also spoRen to Keyes about 
the canture of Pantelleria, a small island, with an airfield heivn out 
of its rocky surface, lying 140 miles to the southwest of Malta. 
Keyes had at that time considered that the island could be cantured, 
f 
and had gone as far as requesting that an aerial reconnaissance be 
conducted. This had been denied on the grounds that no operation 
1. Keyes to COS 29 Oct 40, K 140/3/1. 
2. JP(40) 119"jkltg 30 Oct 40, CAB 84/2 and JP(40) 598 (0) 'Operations 
in the Eastern Mediterranean' 30 Oct 40, CIALB 84/21. 
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against it had been approved. On 30 October Keyes again suggested 
to the COS the capture of the island. lie saw it as a small or)era- 
tion, within the canabilitv of his commandos, and thus within the 
scope of his directive. lie thought that possession of the island 
would confer advantages in staging aircraft in the Middle East, in 
controlling the Tunis - Sicily channel, and in attacRing Sardinia 
and the mainland of Italy. Although intelligence about the island 
was scanty, he nevertheless considered that its capture would not 
entail a major oneration, as the forces involved would be limited 
3 
in number, and the duration of the action extremely brief. 
As the mounting of BRISK had diverted some of the assault ship- 
ping intended for the 'Middle East, it was decided on 1 November 1940 
to ask Wavell for the general outline and i)ossible date of any com- 
bined oneration he contemplated for the next six months. It was 
clearly undesirable to withhold shii)s from trade or to send the 
assault shinging to the Nfiddle Fast unless there was a reasonable 
4 
i)rosnect of their being required for definite operations. 
On 2 November 1940 Keyes discussed the prosT)ects of offensive 
action with the COS. He had, with the FOPS, looRed at the capture 
of Rhodes, and had decided that it could not be accomplished by a 
raiding party. It would renuire a major operation, for v., hich the 
forces and landing craft necessary would not be ready until early 
1941. He did think, however, that a Special Service battalion on 
Crete would be useful in raiding Stampalia, Castel Rosso, Scarpanto, 
3. Keyes to COS 30 Oct 40, K 140/ 3/1. 
4. COS(40) 369 ', Itg I Noir 40, C-A. B 79/7. 
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and Kaso, and proposals for this had already been sent to Wavell. 
Although the COS thought these operations were desirable, they 
concentrated on the operation against Pantelleria, termed WOU. SHOPp 
which 'had great attraction'. The VCNS, standing in for Pound, 
gave the Naval Staff view that the canture of the island would 'be 
most valuable for controllng the Central Mediterranean'. Dill 
approached the idea more cautiously, as he-was concerned about the 
size of the garrison necessary to hold the island after its capture. 
The COS eventually decided that 11, 'ORKSHOP was to have priority over 
the raids in the Dodecanese., and Keyes was instructed to Drepare, in 
conjunction with the JPS, an outline i)lan for the ol)eration, 
5 
with special reference to the later garrison requirement. This 
coincided with the dispute over Keyes' responsibilities as DCO. 
Pound's absence from this meeting was to be of consequence, as it 
is doubtful whether he would have agreed to the planning for WORKSHOP, 
which was not really a raid, being assigned to Keyes. The fact that 
the other services consented to Keyes' planning 1,1. 'OPJ\'SHOP supports 
Keyes' claims that the main onnosition to 'him came from Pound. 
Keyes oras-Ded at what finally seemed a reasonable chance at action, 
6 
and x%Tote to Churchill about WORKSHOP on the same day. The discussion 
with the JPS, however, lasted over ten days, with Keyes noting that the 
planning staffs 
raised every possible objection, and -Dersistently derided 
the operation to my stafý declaring that strategically it 
would have no effect upon the conduct of the war, and did 
not fit in with the war plan; operationallv, it i.., as hazar- 
dous; it would be quite impossible to land a second flight 
S. C S(41) 20 'Mtg (0) 2 Nov 40, CAT 79/SS and -jP(-40-1 61S-(O-)--iýeraF- 
tions in the Eastern Mediterranean' 2 Nov 40, CAB 84/22. 
6. Keyes to Churchill 2 Nov 40, K 140/3/1. 
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Keyes' impatience with the progress of these talks led him to revert 
to his other proposal, and on 7 November 1940 he asked Churchill for 
T)ermission to take two or three thousand of his 'braves' to Crete, 
for raiding in the Aegean. He was even willing to accept a -reduc- 
tion in rank to go with the force. lie wanted to stay in the Medi- 
terranean until the raiding operations there were well organised, 
8 
after which be could fly home and resume his appointment. 
Keyes had increased the number of Commandos involved because he 
was becoming more and more convinced that BRISK would not take place. 
fie had asked, unsuccessfully, for the return of the Commandos as- 
signed to this operation on 14 November 1940. He then annealed di- 
rectly to Churchill to release his troops from the 'side track' to 
which they had been diverted, suggesting that all three Glen ships 
and six Commandos be sent to the 11[iddle East as soon as possible, as 
'immediate offensive action against the Italians is of paramount im- 
i)ortance as an effective way of aiding Greece'. He again offered to 
take command himself, though by now he was becoming intent on using 
the force if(possible for WOUSHOP first, and then for -raiding from 
9 
Crete or perhaps Malta. 
Keyes determination contrasted with the C-in-Cls vague renlies 
concerning future combined ODerations in the Mediterranean. On 8 
November 1940 Wavell answered the COS inquiries by saying that he I 
7. Keyes, 'History of Workshop' 2- Nov 40, DEFE 2/698. 
8. Note by Keyes 7 Nov 40, K 140/3/1. There was a consistency in 
Keyes' character. During the Boxer Rebellion he had turned over 
command of his destro-, er so he could find action vith the Army 
moving against Pel\ing. 
9. Keyes to Churchill 14 Nov 40, PREM 3/507. 
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considered it 'most desirable' to hold the machinery for combined 
operations in the Middle East, in order to take advantage of any 
fleeting opportunities, but that he could only give a general indi- 
cation of operations -possible in the next six months. These included 
landings as part of major merations in the Western Desert; raids 
on the Libyan, Red Sea, and Italian Somaliland coasts, and the re- 
duction of the Dodecanese. aving to the IraT)idly changing situation', 
10 
the approximate dates of these were impossible to estimate. The 
JPS were also of little help to the COS in providing alternatives to 
Keyes' suggestions for offensive operations. On 14 November 1940 
they produced an outline nlan for operations against the Italian 
lines of communication in Libya, including raids on Tobruk and Ben- 
ghazi, but the forces and assault shinping, necessary were not likely 
to be available in the near future. The -p1an was nevertheless sent 
11 
out to the Middle East for information. 
The JPS -report on WORKSHOP, based on Keyes' outline plan and on 
the EPS estimate of the garrison needed to hold the island, x.; as also 
ready on 14 November 1940. Keyes envisaged the use of the three ý, Ien 
LSI(L), or of two of the Glens and a Dutch LSI(M). He was counting 
on surprise and speed of execution for success. As the air and shore 
defences posed a serious threat to the force, the approach, landing 
of troops, and withdrawal of shipping would all be accomplished in 
one night. The troons landed would be self-contained, and were ex- 
pected to capture the island in the eight hours of darlness remain- 
ing after their landing. The anticipated nature of the fighting 
would maximise the Special Service troons' short-range firenower and 
10. C-in-C ME to WO 0315/8 Nov 40, WO 193/378. 
11. JP(40) 653 'Future Plan 'Number I- Elimination of Italy' 14 Nov 
40, CIAJ3 84/22. 
242 
Tninimise their lack of sugnort wcanons. 
The EPS estimate, on the other band, was rather discouraging. 
'Mey considered that the size of garrison required to bold the island 
12 
as a working airbase would be a7oproximately 5, SOO. The port 
facilities were extremely noor, the island's water suT)T)ly limited, 
and the civilian PODUlation that would have to be supported numbered 
about 9, SOO. The maintenance of the island would thus require con- 
siderable shipping movements, including a substantial escort, all of 
which would be subiect to numerous air and submarine attacks. The 
EPS accordingly considered that, unless-. the strategic importance of 
the island outweighed all other considerations, 'the magnitude of 
the expedition and the maintenance of the garrison form a commitment 
which would neither justify the risks involved nor the effort nec- 
essary'. Keyes had seen this report before its submission, and had 
Drenared a covering letter to it emphasising that, while the commit- 
ment was admittedly 'somewhat large', and the difficulties of install- 
ing and maintaining the garrison 'considerable', he nevertheless felt 
that at least a raid should be undertaRen. Even a -raid would serve 
as a great blow to Italian prestive and morale. I. C> 
The JPS considered both alternatives in their re-oort. Although 
they had 'every confidence' that WORKSHOP had a reasonable chance of 
success, they felt, 'in the broad strategic concept', that there were 
other operations iýhich should be given nriority. High on their list 
was the one against the Dodecanese, which was marRedly different 
from the COS oDinion of 2 November. The JPS held that the i)rosT)ects 
12. Keyes acidly noted that the Italians held it with half that 
number, without control of the sea. 
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of a raid on Pantelleria were not very good, as the underground 
works on the airfield would require a disproportionate amount of 
13 
time and effort to destroy. 
The COS considered this report on IS November 10-40. They 
agreed with the JPS that the effort required to bold Pantelleria 
seemed 'all out of proportion' to the results to be gained. Rather 
than kill off the entire project, however, they did think that a 
raid might be worthwhile. This was to be conducted in the context 
of a larger role for the Special Service troops in the Ilediterranean. 
'T'he priority was now to go to the captuTe of key islands in the 
Dodecanese, with additional raiding operations being conducted 
against the Italian mainland, throughout the Dodecanese, and against Z> 1> 
14 
Pantelleria. 
Keyes managed to obtain a copy of the JPS Tenort, and com-nlained 
to Churchi-11 that 'it blows hot and cold and like the recommendations 
of most councils of war - if acted u-Don, would result in nothing being 
done'. He agreed that it was important to attack the Dodecanese, 
and felt that Special Service troops should have been sent out for 
this long befoýe. 'I urged this on 29 October but nothing has been 
done exceDt to sidetrack the raiding troops and all the vessels ready 
to carry them for the i)roblematic operations against the Portuguese 
islands', Worse still, he noted, i,., as 'that the JPS have not made 
any suggestions for the immediate des. patch of troops and vessels to 
Crete to carry out offensive operations', and had merely referred a 
number of suggestions he had made to Cunningham and Wavell for their 
--- TP-- T3. (40) 666 or COS(40) -35(O)(JP) 'Cý-p-ture of a Certain Island' 
14 Nov 40, CAB 84/23. 
14. COS(40) 390 Mtg 15 Nov 40, CALB 79/7. 
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consideration. Keyes noted that lie was meeting the COS the following 
day, and would then urge the sa'iling of the three Glens and six Com- 
mandos out to the Middle East. 
is 
. 
The focus on the use of the assault shinping for comman0o raid- 
ing operations bad brought about, at least in Keyes' mind, a change 
in concept in the use of the assault shipping. The decision in 
Sentember 1940 had been to send out the assault shipping and craft 
in order to provide the lift for an assault division for large scale 
operations. Keyes was now thinking in terms of an amphibious strik- 
ing force, comprising the commandos and. assault shiming, which would 
come under the COHQ in general and himself in particular, rather than 
general purpose resources under the C-in-Cs Mediterranean and Middle 
East. He thus told the COS on 18 November 1940 that he was certain 
that the C-in-Cs would 'welcome the cooneration (author's italics) 
16 
and heIT)l which the force could give to their amphibious plans. 
Keyes thought the meeting with the COS on 16 November 1940 was 
'very amicable', but lated noted that this was 'before I had seen 
the report of the COS Committee! Keyes had given his views on the 
'immense' strategic value of Pantelleria, and had suggested that the 
EPS figures for the garrison be reconsidered. The Italians held the 
island with a smaller garrison, and without control of the sea. 
Keyes also went over the other possibilities for raiding, and again 
17 
requested the despatch of the Glens and the Con-fl-iandos. The official 
minutes were far more cautious in tone, indicating a consensus that 
the resources necessary to maintain Pantelleria as an active base, 
IS. eyes to Churchill IS Nov 40, PFE%l 3/SO7. 
16. Keyes to COS 18 Nov 40, DEPE 2/116. 
17. Keyes to Churchill 16 Nov 40, K 140/3/1. 
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particularly as, regards anti-aircraft defences, constituted an un- 
sound commitment. A raid on the island, considering that little 
damage could be inflicted, and that the Italians would then nrobably 
reinforce the island, did not an ear fruitful. Raids in the Dode- 
.P 
canese and against the Italian mainland, in view of their probable 
effect upon Turkey and Greece, were seen to be more valuable. The 
necessity for retaining one Glen and the Connandos for BRISK was 
upheld, and so the force available for the Middle East was consider- 
ably reduced. Keyes was therefore asked to provide a schedule of the 
exnected availability of the assault shipping, along with proposals 
, )s. 
He was also to nre- for their complement of ST)ecial Service trooT 
pare an outline of possible raiding operations against the Italian 
18 
mainland. 
The JPS were immersed in the plan for the capture of the Dode- 
canese, termed WNIDIBLES. They saw, as the first stený the seizure 
of the outlying, less heavily defended islands, after which the maJor 
assaults would take place against Rhodes and the key base of Leros. 
The attack on Rhodes would be launched from Crete and would require 
up to two infantry brigades and 2,000 S-necial Service troops, along 
with the majority of the available assault shipping. The assault 
on Leros would be staged from Rhodes, and would require a slightly 
19 
smaller force including, for the first time, airborne troms. 
Keyes continued to advise Churchill that WORKSHOP v., as 'hanging, I 
fire'. Churchill had been attracted to this operation as worthwhile 
18. COS(40) 26 Mtg (0) 16 Nov 49, CAB 79/SS. The JPS renort on the 
operation was JP(49) 667 (S) 'Onerations Against Pantellerial 
14 Nov 40, CIAB 84/23. 
19. JP(40) 699 'The Capture of the Dodecanese' 24 Nov 40, CAB 84/23. 
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in its own right, and not merely as an outlet for Keyes' energies. 
The Dodecanese-were proving less of a threat to British coTimiunica- 
tions than had been forecast. MAJNDIBLES would -require a larger 
force than WORKSHOP, and so would take longer to mount. The StCT)- 
by-step method of attack envisaged in MANDIBLES would also take 
time. The possibility also existed that, by the time ktANDIBLES was 
launched, the garrisons in the Dodecanese, reportedly low in morale 
and with failing su. n. plies, might have been starved out, or, at least, 
would not be able toofferthe degree of resistance predicted by the 
JPS. 11NIAle the capture of the Dodecanese would undoubtedly have im- 
portant effects, there would also be political difficulties concern- 
ing their future as they were claimed by both Greece and Turkey. 
Churchill therefore thought that it would be best to begin with WORK- 
SHOP, which aopeared to be the easier Meration - he noted 'it is 
as well to begin with a success'. Pantelleria was also much nearer 
Italy, and might be a good prelude to operations against the mainland, 
which he considered 'of the very highest interest'. The commandos, 
less one Commando for the garrison of Pantelleria, might well remain 
in Malta after WORKSHOP in order to raid Italy. One of Churchill's 
other ideas on the subject, soon to become an integral part of the 
T)lan, was that WORKSHOP force might be Dassed through the Mediterranean 
under cover of a convoy to Malta or Egypt. This would divide the 
20 
enemy's forces, with advantage to either WORKSHOP or the convoy. 
On 19 November 1940 Churchill therefore held a meeting of the 
Defence Committee (Operations), with Keyes nresent, to consider 
WORKSHOP. The COS now reversed their nosition and conceded that IVORK- 
20. Churchill to Ismay 17 Nov 40, Pie--1-3TS07. 
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SHOP was both feasible and worthwhile, as long as further intelli- 
gence did not reveal a larger Italian garrison than assumed. Once 
the island was talen it was deemed inadvisable, on the grounds of 
morale, to let the Italians recaDtUre it, so the idea of a raid 
was dropped entirely. Anproval in principle was then given for 
WORKSHOP to be attemnted in conjunction with the passage of a con- 
voy through the Mediterranean, termed ]EXCESS, which was due to 
leave the United Kingdom on 1S December 1940. Keyes was authorised 
to start Drenarations for WORKSHOP, to include the withdrawal of the 
Glen ship and the Commandos earmarled for BRISK, provided they could 
be replaced by similar forces. The COS indicated that they still 
considered BRISK to be 'strategically of much greater iMDOrtance 
than WORKSHOP, and the Defence Committee (Onerations) accordingly 
added the stipulation that WORKSHOP could only be carried out if 
21 
it did not interfere with BRISK. 
As with most official records, the minutes of this iieeting are 
dry and 'reveal little dissention. Tn fact, the COS still opnosed 
WOPYSHOP. Churchill was firmly in favour of it, however, and the 
ensuing debate was rather acrimonious. The COS suggested that the 
C-in-C Mediterranean and the Governor of ýIalta should be consulted 
before a decision was made, to which Oiurchill retorted that the 
end result of such action would only be 'to put on two more committees 
to find two more reasons why it should not be done'. At one point 
he angrily turned to Ismay and commented 'Ceneral, pray make a note-, 
the Council is resolved to do nothing! ' Churchill was inclined to 
inform the C-in-Cs of the decision and then ask them for their 
comments. Given the C-in-Cs'latitude in the conduct of the war in 
21. DO(40) 4S 'Itg 19 Nox, 40, CIALB 69T 
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their respective. theatr9s, such a course of action would invariably 
mcet considerable resistance. Nevertheless, with Churchill's im- 
patience for some form of offensive operation, there was no dissuad- 
ing him. 
After the meeting adjourned, Churchill saw Keyes alone. To 
add further to the difficulties of the operation, and to set the 
stage for a strictly partisan battle, Churchill now, without con- 
sulting the COS, offered Keyes connand of the expedition. 'I 
v., on't have anything to do with it', he told Keyes, 'unless you are 
22 
prepared to lead it'. This was the goal Keyes had constantly 
sought. He would not even be required to take a reduction in rank, 
although, in order to avoid confusion, it was to be specified that 
his command would be definitely limited to those ships taking part 
in WORKSHOP. The'reaction of the C-in-C Mediterranean to these 
arrangements needs little imagination. Zý 
Keyes that same day confronted the VCNS, alleQing that the naval 
officers on the inter-service committees 'had done nothing to imnle- 
ment the decisions of the Defence Minister and the COS', and in 
fact had done much to limDedel progress, maRing'ceaseless' efforts 
to discredit the operation. The VCNS apparently agreed that this was 
? most improper' and promised to put a stop to it. Keyes later 
23 
commented that 'nevertheless, the opposition persisted'. 
Keyes set off for Scotland as soon as possible to supenrise 
the training of the WORKSHOP force, termed Force 103, leaving the 
22. C. Aspinal-Oglander, RogerYeýyýs -(L6-n--d-6-n- 19-51), p-p. 3917--3-93. 
23. Keyes, 'History of IVork-shoT)"19 Nov, 40, DEFE 2/698. 
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DDCO to run the COHQ in London. n, ere was still much work to be 
done in tying *up the planning, and Hornby met the JPS on 25 November 
to iron out some of the details. Cunningham bad still not been 
informed of WORKSHOP, and the EPS was instructed to T)repare a message 
asking for his comments. Consideration was also given to what should 
be said to the C-in-Cs- Middle East, Gibraltar, and Malta, and the 
24 
SO Force IlP. It was eventually decided that they should be inform- 
ed of WORKSHOP only after Cunningham's comments bad been received. 
In order to give as much time as possible to WORKSHOP force, and yet 
still allow for the necessary moonless period for the oneration, 
EXCESS bad its sailing date postDoned to 18 December 1940. 
A telegram was sent to Cunningham on 28 November 1940 inform. ing I 
him that the use of E(CESS to attack Pantelleria was 'tinder considera- 
tion'. An outline plan was sent with the detailed plans to follow 
at a later date. Cunningham was also told that the Special Service 
troops., once in the Mediterranean, would come under his onerational 
control. The garrison of Pantelleria would have to be provided from 
25 
Malta. 
Cunningham replied that, besides his fears of the inadequacy of 
the military plan, be was opposed to WOUSHOP on broad strategic 
grounds. He did not think that the nossession of the island would 
materially contribute to the prosecution of the war in the Mediter- 
ranean, as the Italians could continue to onerate from bases in Sicily. 
Pantelleria had not posed a very serious threat to the Allies, whereas 
Allied possession of it would not be a 'great gain', since operations 
24. 
25. COS to C-in-C Mediterranean 0332/28 Nov 40, PRDI 3/507. 
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could be better conducted from 1-falta. Holding the island would 
create yet another sunoly problem, particularly as the small, 
fast shins needed to use its harbour x.., ere simply not available. 
Moreover, the naval resources were already overstrained in trying 
to cover trans-Mediterranean, Greek, and local convoys, and there 
was a real danger that the ability to conduct offensive naval actions 
would be rapidly diminished. Pantelleria would also require strong 
air defences at a time when there was a chronic shortage of air 
defence equipment throughout both the Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern theatres. It was conse(iuently extremely difficult to justify 
diverting any equipment for Pantelleria . Cunningham added that, 
while he fully appreciated the 'step forward' towards offensive 
action demonstrated by WORKSHOP, lbacl\ed by the necessary personnel 
and material for which we have all been waiting for so long', he would 
much prefer to employ the forces against the 'decisive nointl of the 
Dodecanese, starting with the smaller islands of Stampalia. and Scar- 
26 
nanto. 
The COS questioned Cunningham's description of the Dodecanese 
as the 'decisive point' in theMediterranean. In pre-war apprecia- 
tions, and in the Anglo-Turkish military convent)ions, it had been 
assumed that they would be a much greater thorn in the Allied side 
than they had in fact proved to be. The COS consequently told 
Cunningham that, 'in present c ircumstances and in view of the 
Italianýlfailure to make effective use of their -Dosition in the 
Dodecanese we do not fully appreciate strategical arguments for 
27 
capturing the islands by assault'. The COS also felt that Cunning- 
26. C-* ý! editerranean to Admiralty 1319/29 Nov 40, PREM 3/507. 
27. COS to C-in-Cs jl, ý--diterranean and Middle East 30 Nov 40, PPPI 3/124/2. 
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ham had not fully appreciated that he would obtain the Mens and 
commandos regardless of whether* or not WORKSHOP was actually carried 
28 
out. On 1 December 1940 Cunningham backed down slightly, admitting 
that the word 'decisive' might have been too strong. He nevertheless 
maintained that an oneration against the Dodecanese 'would contribute 
29 
a great deal more to winning the warl than one against Pantelleria. 
The success of the current British offensive in North Africa 
and the establishment of the fleet at Suda Bay in CTete were maRing 
Churchill much more optimistic about the general Mediterranean situa- 
tion. He thus sought bolder operations.. than MNDIBLES, and requested 
staff studies to find alternatives. The COS, -considering this demand, 
thought that it was not feasible, given the information available in 
London, to make useful suggestions for ampbibious onerations on 
the coast of North Africa. They therefore told Churchill that they 
30 
were unable to nrovide the requested studies. Churchill had just 
noted that he took it 'as settled' that hIORKSHOP would leave on 
31 
schedule. The COS hastened to explain to him that Cunningham's 
cbjecti-ons, which be had not yet seen, indicated. that even WORKSHOP 
was far from definite. They were to meet Keyes the following day 
to discuss the plan, after which they would be prepared to advise 
Churchill as to whether or not the oneration should be carried out. 
Churchill took the night to study Cunningham's messages himself, and 
indicated that he would personally review the situation with both 
them and Keyes. 
Z8. A-d-miralty AU U-in-C Alediferranean 184871 Dec 40, PREM 31507-. 
29. C-in-C Ilediterranean to Admiralty 003S/2 Dec 40, PPRI 3/S97. 
30. COS(40) 29 jNItg (0) 2 Dec 40, CIAB 79/SS. 
31. Churchill to Ismay I Dec 40, PROI 3/361/6. 
252 
The COS, with Keyes and Hornby, met Churchill on the morning of 
1 
3 December 1940. Keyes still had only the outline nlans for WORKSHOP 
and Pound, who had not attended the nrevious meetings on the operation, 
had some misgivings about the adequacy of the forces involved. A 
decision on the military feasibility of WORKSHOP was therefore post- 
poned until Keyes could present the detailed plans, but it was agreed 
that Force 103 should proceed to the Mediterranean irresnective of 
whether or not WORKSHOP was approved. The alternative of '111NNIDIBLES, 
desired by Cunningham, was then considered, but Churchill persisted 
in his opposition to it. It was a larger operation, requiring at 
least two brigades - eventually the use*of a division was T)lanned - 
and would take a longer time to mount and conduct. WORKSHOP and 
MWDIBLES were thus not, in Churchill's view, equatable, and be could 
still see no reason why they could not be executed Sequentially. 
Churchill's support was welcomed by Keyes, who saw an operation 
that had twice been agreed upon being left once more in limbo. It 
was finally accepted that priority should be given to WORKSHOP. Con- 
sensus was also reached that, in an), event, raids on the Italian 
coastline would prove useful, and plans and preparations for these 
32 
were also to be worked on. 
Churchill then wrote a personal telegram to Cunningham empha- 
sising his support for WORKSHOP and attempting to deal with some of 
Cunningham's anprehensions. The COS saw this before it was des- 
patched, and asked Ismay to hold it un until they could again dis- 
cuss WORKSHOP with Churchill. It was apnarent that there was still, 
in almost all respects, a wide divergence of oninion between Churchill 
32. COS(40) 30 Htg (0) 3 Dec 40, CAB 79/SS. 
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and his professi 
, 
onal advisers. In writing the telegram, Churchill 
had inferred that the COS has recommended that WORKSHOP be under- 
taken. This was not the i)osition as the COS saw it. They were 
still concerned about the adequacy of the forces employed and a T)ossi- 
ble shortage of naval escorts. They therefore requested that any 
messages sent to Cunningham should not give the imDression that they 
bad studied and endorsed the final plan. They also stated that both 
Pound and Dill wanted to see Churchill privately on the question of 
Keyes' commanding the oDeration. They had not lmoun of this when 
the operation was ap. nroved in principle on 19 November 1940, and were 
obviously unhapff about it. This feeling was shared by Cunningham 
when he heard of it. The COS also questioned Churchill's assertions 
that the 'joint staffs here consider very high value attaches to 
removal of this obstruction to East-West communications'. They 
declared that neither they nor the JPS had ever rated the value of 
Pantelleria quite so high. The Naval Staff in particular had never 
considered that the island had to be seriously taken into account 
33 
when passing shi-Ds through the Narrows. 
The difference of opinion was hammered out at a Defence Com- 
mittee (Operations) meeting during the night of 5 December 1940. 
The COS had spoken to Keyes earlier that day about the detailed 
plans, and remained concerned about the T)roblems of the landing 
and the adequacy of the force. Although they 'fully apl)reciated' 
the need to seize every chance of taking the offensive, they saw 
it as their duty to report 'frankly' their estimate of the situation. 
63. Churchill to Ismay 6 Dec 4U and Ismay to Churchill-4 Dec 40, 
PMI 3/507. 
254 
They did not think that surprise could be counted on. The number of 
destroyers neeýed for an adequate escort meant some would have to 
be withdraum from home waters, and this in itself would nose un- 
acceptable problems. Cliurchill was not at all pleased to hear these 
arguments. He considered them overcautious, and he reminded the COS 
that there was never 'an absolute guarantee of success in warl, nor 
could fully adequate forces ever be T)rovided. It was admittedly 
out of the question to denude home waters of destroyers to the extent 
demanded, but, he nointed out, this would equally apply to Cunning- 
ham's favoured alternative of MANDIBLES. There would thus be no 
prospect at all of an offensive operation in the Mediterranean for 
some time to come. As the need for some form of raiding operations 
to be carried out in the Mediterranean in the near future was gener- 
ally accepted by the COS, Churchill, reluctant to abandon what he 
had always considered a worthwhile oneration, requested the COS to 
determine if the WORKSHOP T)Ian could be improved to the extent needed 
to gain their apT)roval. Other Dlans for the employment of Force 103 
were simultaneously to be prepared, as the force in any event iý,, ould 
34 
sail with EXCESS. 
Keyes and Haydon spent the night of 7 December at Chequers, I 
urging their -olan on Churchill. I'he criticism of his -plan at the S 
December meeting as 'immature and sketchy' had irked Keyes. 
In 1918 1 was given an absolutely free hand to organise 
a much larger and fay more hazardous operation, and it 
never occurred to me that, once the command of the ex- 
T)edition was confided to me, I would be expected to T)ro- ýuce a detailed plan to be criticised by týe comparatively 
junior staff officers, who I knew were responsible for 
34. DO(40) 48 ', Itg 5 Dec 40, CIAB 6971. 
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3S 
making these suggestions to the COS. 
In respect to the controversy about planning, the service denart- 
ments were being overly critical. The Admiralty nlanning section 
had lent Captain C. S. Daniel to Keyes for WORKSHOP. Daniel later 
noted that 'Roger Keyes was in no sense a paner man, he disliked 
paper and administrative work of all sorts, but be usually took care 
to have a good staff on whom he placed implicit trust to do this 
workI. Although Daniel had some doubts himself about the strategic 
necessity for WORKSHOP, he defended the operation as a sound mili- 
36 
tary proposition. 
Cunningham was not to be moved. On 9 December 1940 he sent a 0 
message that the arrival of the commandos and the assault shiMing, 
whether WORKSHOP was executed or not, would be too late to exnloit 
any successes gained in the Western Desert. He could thus not fore- 
see any suitable targets on the North African coast for the force 
to attack. He therefore re-iterated his view that the most nrofit- 
able employment for the force would be an attack of Stamnalia, the 
headquarters of the Italians in the Dodecanese. Cunningham also 
added an additional argument. Ple had consulted Wavell, and presented 
their- . oint view that, as a general principle, it was highly undesir- 3 
able to conduct an operation directly from the United Kingdom with- 
out prior consultation and coordination with the theatre commanders 
concerned. He emphasised that combined operations needed more careful 
and detailed planning than any other ty-j)e, and that the details 
should be worked out together by those responsible for the execution It, 
3S. Keyes, 'History of 1VMKSHOP1 7 Dec 40, DEFE 2/698. 
36. Unnublished Ifemoirs of Admiral C. S. Daniel held in Churchill 
Cohege, Cambridge, 'n. 213. 
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and for the sumort and maintence of the project. 
37 
A further meeting of the Defence Committee (Operations), with 
Keyes, Hornby, Haydon, and Knox present, was held on the evening of 
9 December 1940. Keyes had met the COS earlier that day, and had 
been granted some additional forces for WORKSHOP. As the Dutch 
LSI(ýo could not be converted in time, the Royal Scotsman had been 
allocated from the BRISK force, along with some additional warships. 
The COS had then given the operation their qualified approval. 
Against this was the message just received from Cunningham. His 
case was weaRened, however, by his failure to produce a viable al- 
ternative to WORKSHOP. It thus appeared to be WORKSHOP or nothing 
at all. The COS continued to vacillate in regard to the value of 
WORKSHOP. Whereas 'up to quite recently' it had not seemed that 
there was sufficient strategical Justification for canturing and 
holding the island, it now appeared that, with the ascendancy gained 
over the Italian air force, Cunningham was inclined to take convoys, 
including merchant ships, through the Narrows by day and not by 
night. This would greatly ease the shipping problem, and a fighter C, 
airfield at Pantelleria would, in this event, provide some worth- 
while cover. Its usefulness as a base for naval forces, however, 
would still remain negligible. 
The COS invariably expressed doubts about the plan. It might C, 
not be possible to get more than the first flight of 1,600 lightly 
armed men ashore. The size of the Italian garrison, as well as the 
extent of the beach defences, was still not 'known. Surprise was 
37.. C-in-C Mediterranean to Admiraltv IS13/9 Dec 40, Annex. to 
DO(40) 49 Mtg 9 Dec 40, CAB 69/1. 
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considered unlik. ely. Overall, the COS judged the cliances against 
success to be three to one. Nevertheless, if the nolitical risk 
of failure could be accepted, and if Cunningham was satisfied that 
he could accept the subsequent maintenance commitment, they agreed 
that the operation should take place. As it was already clear that 
Cunningham was omosed to the maintenance commitment, this was not- 
a very great concession, and Churchill saw it as yet another example 
of overcautious procrastination. He remarked that the original 
objection to WORKSHOP, the shortage of destroyers, had now not even 
been mentioned, and he was presented instead with the argument that 
the chances of success were poor. He personally could not accept 
the odds quoted, and did not accept it as a valid argument. It 
was impossible, in his opinion, for anyone to assess the precise 
chances of success in any military enterDrise. The battle in Libya 
was then going well, and the capture of Pantelleria, besides pro- 
viding a valuable air base, would further shake Italian morale. 
Churchill therefore i)ressed for the execution of WORKSHOP, assuring 
the COS that he would be the first one to cancel it if, at the 
time of execution, it did not fit in 'harmoniously' with the stra- 
tegic plan. The committee thereupon agreed to the plan for WORKSHOP 
as outlined, aDT)roving the comDletion of the preDarations for it 
and the sailing of Force 103 with EXCESS. 11, 'ORKSHOP, subject to a 
Defence Committee (Operations) cancellation, would be carried out 
providing weather conditions were favourable and surorise could be 
38 
obtained. 
38. W(40) 49 Mg 9 Dec 4T, - CAB 69/1 and COS(40) 420 Mtg 9 Dec 
40, CAB 79/8. 
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The JPS were instructed to examine and reDort on the evacuation 
of the raiding force after tbe'capture of the island, on the size 
of the garrison required to fulfill the strategic aim, on the ad- 
ministrative arrangements required, and on the notification to be 
given to the other relevant commanders in the Mediterranean and 
39 
Middle East. British successes in these theatres had led the JPS, 
at the same time, to work, on the policy to be followed in the event 
of an Italian collanse. 
The final decision on IVOPKSHnP was sent to Cunningham on 9 
December 1940. He insisted, in a mess; kpe the next morning, that 
WORKSHOP should be called off, not so much because of the strategic 
arguments against it, but because of the logistics problems it 
would create. As he was'still aware of nothing 'more than the 
object of operation and forces to be employed', he would not argue 
against it on the grounds of feasibility, but he was still troubled 
by the subsequent maintenance commitment, particularly in. regard to 
sup lies for the civilian population, the T)rovision of suitable p 
supT)ly ships, and the provision of adeauate cover for the suT)T)ly 
onerations. He placed the onus for these squarely on the nlanners 
in London, with the comment 'I assume those resnonsible for this T)lan 
have considered question of supply and I request I may be informed of 
the results of their study'. He was 'reluctant to seem to be maRing 
difficulties', but he considered the resources of the T-lediterranean 
Fleet stretched to their utmost, and if the canture of Pantelleria 
was to be considered he would reouire reinforcements. As it was, 
during the execution of EXCESS and WORKSHOP all movement of supplies 
39. - WS-C40) 422 Mtg 10 Dec 40, CAB 79/8. 
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to Greece and Crete and into the Western Desert would have to cease. 
40 
The Admiralty replied that, if the passage of the 1,11arrows could 
be made by day by trade as well as by troop convoys, the shipping 
situation would be substantially easier, and Pantelleria would prove 
41 
valuable in this res-nect. Churchill, concerned about Cunningham's 
-reluctance, sent him a message stating that the whole matter of WORK- 
SHOP had been considered 'exhaustively', and that 'Zeebrugge would 
never have got past scrutiny bestowed on this I. - He went on to give 
all the reasons for his confidence in WORKSHOP, which would, after 
all, be conducted against 'Italian sedeiltary troons, not Germans'. 
The strategic advantages were recounted, but Churchill's main concern 0 
was revealed in his rem, ark that live need it to show ourselves caT. )able 
of vehement offensive amnhibious action'. Churchill then tackled 
MANDIBLES. He was onnosed to startin. - operations against the smaller 
islands until the time was ri-ne for the immediate follow-up by major 
onerations against the larger ones. Unless this were done the minor 
operations would only 'stir up' the area without any imT)ortant reward. 
This was the same reason for his objections to many of the small raids 
on the Continent. Churchill also explained that there were diplomatic 
problems with Greece and Turkey. Capture of the Dodecanese would 
42 
-raise awRvard problems as to their ultimate oi%nership. Cunningham, 
though privately unconvinced, f inally accented i%'oRKSjiC)P, and on 12 
December 1940 sent his assurance that the 'utmost endeavour would be 
43 
made by the IMediterranean Fleet to ensure success'. 
40. C-in-C Mediterranean to Admiralty 0053/10 Dec 40, PPRI 3/507 
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Arrangements for the garrisoning of Pantelleria were also being 
finalised. The JPS had reduced'their estimate to 2,000 men, including 
the personnel for the anti-aircraft defences, which w6Uld initially be 
provided from the garrison to Malta. These would be in*addition to 
one Special Service battalion now planned to remain on the island. 
The garrison would come under the command of the Governor and C-in-C 
of Malta, and the detailed planning of the installation and maintenance 
44 
of the oarrison would be his res-oonsibility. 
After a month and a half of haggling, WORKSHOP was now definite. 
This was to change almost immediately, lbowever. 
On 13 December 1940 
the Snanish assumed comnlete control of the International Zone at 
Tangier. Churchill feared that, as the British situation in the 
eastern IMediterranean imi)roved, the Germans might take some action 
in the western end, either in collusion with Spain or by an indepen- 
dent coup. The Snanish action at Tangier at first looked 'suspicious- 
ly' like the former. Discussions were held at Chequers on 14 Decem- 
ber 1940. Churchill's reaction was that the British were at the 
moment 'crouched', but that if EXCESS and WORKSHOP were undertaken 
they would become Isprawled'. The situation in the Western Desert 
was such that EXCESS was not essential. Attention turned to the con- 
tingency plans for the Atlantic islands; TRUCK was ready but if 
WORKSHOP were undertaken BRISK could not be remounted. It therefore 
seemed more desirable to retain the available troops, assault shipning, 
and naval escort for any counter-moves the British might care to taý-. e, 
rather than commit them to WORKSHOP. 
Halifax did not share this concern, as he had been advised 
44. COS(40) 47 (0)(JP) 'Operation WORKSHOP 13 Dec 40, C-ALB-80-7-106. 
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through diplomatic channels that the Spanish action was more likely 
the result of Spanish nationalism rather than an Axis --plot. lie 
believed that Franco and the Spanish army were not anxious to enter 
the war, but cautioned that any British move contrary to ST)anish 
interests would probably have the undesirable effect of nusbing 
Spain towards the Axis. Churchill therefore agreed that no move 
against Spanish or Portuguese territory should be made until the 
situation was clarified. Meanwhile, however, he agreed that the 
British should take stens to meet any contingency. All present, 
including Keyes, therefore concluded that EXCESS and WORKSHOP should 
be suspended, thus freeing the resources involved for nossible op- 
45 
erations in the Atlantic or western Mediterranean. 
The dearth of viable options for oDerations in the western 
Mediterranean, along with the importance of the stores in EXCESS 
for the continuance of operations in the eastern Mediterranean, 
soon raised the question as to whether it might in fact be possible 
to carry out EXCESS after all. There were both advantages and dis- 
advantages to this, and on 16 11ý--cember 1940 the Defence Committee 
(Operations) decided that EXCESS should sail in December. Churchill, 
however, still wanted a force to counter a German initiative in the 
western Mediterranean. No great disadvantage was seen in . ')ostponing 
IVOM(SHOP until the January 1941 moon period, and it was therefore 
considered best to keep Force 103 in the United Kingdom to continue 
46 
training, rather than letting it sail with EXCESS. 
4S. COS(40) 32 114tg (0) and CnS(40) 33 Mtg (0) 14 Dec 40, -OT 79/SS- 
46. DO(40) SO Mtg 16 Dec 40, C-kB 69/1. See also COS(40) 423 Mtg 
16 Dec 40, CIAB 79/8; COS(40) 49 (0) 'Operations CRl\., D 
, 
and 1U. MR' 
IS Dec 40, C-43 80/106; and COS(40) 32 'Operations in the Vt*estern 
I Mediterranean' 16 Dec 40, CU 80/56. 
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Keyes was, not surprisingly, unhappy with this postponement. 
Although he could see the necessity of delaying WORKSHOP until the 
situation -regarding Spain had been clarified, be thought it 'very 
unwise to leave such a splendid striking force and shining sword to 
rust and lost its temper in the Highlands when all the alternative 
objectives such as WORKSHOP, GRIND, BRISK, ALLOY, SHMPNEL lie east 
47 
and west of the Straits. ' It would take about 7 days for Force 
103 to reach Gibraltar, by which time the situation should have been 
sorted out. The British could then strike first rather than, as had 
happened so often before, leave the initiative to the Germans. Keyes 
re-emphasised the strategic value of Pantelleria, and asked for a 
48 
personal interview with Churchill. to discuss his ideas. 1ýhen he 
was turned down, lie tried a number of other people, including 
the Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty, all to 
no avail. Churchill finally saw Keyes, but refused to change his 
position. Keyes was concerned about the effect the delays were hav- 
ing on the morale of the Special Service troops. He began to think 
that the opposition to WORKSHOP was centered around him personally, 
and even offered to withdraw as DCO if it would help Churchill -Dursue 
a more aggressive policy. As Keyes could see that staying in London 
was a 'pure waste of time', he then returned to Scotland to oversee 
the training of Force 103. 
The postponement of WORKSHOP had in some ways been advantageous, 
i 
as the force's training had been seriously curtailed by bad weather 
and some equipment had been damaged. Keyes recognised this after a II 
47. GRIND was a Tiossible operation týý--s-eizeTanIT&-r. - 
48. -Keyes to Churchill 17 Dec 40, PREM 3/330/7. See Ismay to Keyes 
17 Dec 40, K 140/3/1. 
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short period in Scotland, and admitted that the delav was nossibly 
49 
for the best --if the Cermans did not act first. lie was extremely 
happy, almost invigorated, in worRing with the commandos, and be 
planned to stay in Scotland for three weel\s until WORKSHOP was again 
mounted. His letters mellowed as his confidence waxed, and he re- 
quested that the decision be taken to launcli WORKSHOP in time for 
so 
the force to reach Pantelleria by 22 January 1941. 
In London Hornby was running the COHQ. Throughout this period he 
attempted to have two of the Glens, with a S-oecial Service battalion 
each, and possibly a Royal Scotsman claýs ship for a force head- 
quarters, released for Merations in the Mediterranean. He argued 
that., with the one Glen ship allocated to BRISK, the British would 
still be 'crouched'. Hornbv informed Keyes on 22 December 1940 that 
if he asled for the release of any more, the normal 'argy-bargy' would 
commence, since the Admiralty onposition to WORKSHOP had not flagged. 
'flie Dutch LSI(ýq were at the time not included in the force because 
their conversion had been delayed, and when they were completed they 
would be required for training in the United Kingdom. It was expected 
that both they and the third Men shin would be able to join the force 
in the Mediterranean in February 1941, thus fulfilling the assault 
S1 
shipping portion of the COS -Drogramme of 23 Sentember 1940. 
On 16 December 1940, Wavell sent a joint telegram em-phasising, 
the urgency of canturing the Dodecanese. As it ameared that the war 
might break out in the Balkans in the spring of 1941, the imnortance 
49. The condition of the forces at this time are reflected in a note 
to Churchill 18 Dec 40., PREM 3/330/7 and DCO to Admiralty for COS 
0530/20 Dec 40, DEFE 2/613. 
SO. Keyes to Churchill 22 Dec 40, K 140/3/1. 
51. Hornby to Keyes 22 Dec 40,1,13/2S. 
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of these islands had increased. Air and naval units operating from 
there would constitute a seriouý threat to the lines of communication 
to Greece and Turkey, which were vital for any major onerations in 
the Balkans, including attacks on the Romanian oil fields. Even now 
these lines of communications were causing a 'serious waste of effort' 
by the demand for strong escort forces. Wavell ascribed the failure 
of the Italians to use the islands more effectively to this strong 
British escort, provided at the expense of other operations. With 
German forces in the Dodecanese the situation would become much worse. 
He therefore intended to adopt the 'nibbling' policy of taking the 
smaller islands first, in conjunction with commando raids. The 
grip on the main islands would thus be tightened, and they might 
eventually fall without. a major oT)eration.. As far as the political 
objections were concerned, hethoughtthat the British should seize 
the islands before Turkish intervention could further complicate 
52 
matters. 
The situation in the Dodecanese was reviewed by the COS on 20 
December 1940. They admitted that they were impressed by the force 
of Wavell's arguments, and agreed that plans for the capture of the 
Dodecanese should be -prepared 'forthivith', on the assumptions that 
the operations v., ere to be carried out only with the forces and land- 
ing craft already in the Middle East, or else with the addition of 
the commandos and assault shiDT)iDg earmarked for WORKSHOP. The 
Foreign Office was asked to consider the effect of the operations on 
S3 
Greek and Turkish relations, Churchill noted these stens on 27 
S2. COS(40) 10 ecanesel 16 Dec 40, C-U 80/24. 




Opposition to WORKSHOP continued in the COS. On 23 December 
1940 it was agreed that WORKSHOP depended on the cover of a convoy 
for a surnrise, and without this cover the operation would be pre- 
judiced. The proposition was then nut fonýard that the C-in-Cs 
Middle East and Mediterranean would undoubtedly find a force of 
Special Service trooi)s together with two or three LSI, most useful 
early in 1941. The JPS were therefore instructed to report on the 
next T)ossible opportunity for WORKSHOP, together with a studv of the 
5S 
assault shipping available, 
The JPS bad already been worRing on 2 -report of their own, in 
which they accepted Hornby's proposal of sending two Glen ships to 
the Middle East. They stressed, however, the need to get the ships 
out to the Mediterranean,, and were less interested in the execution 
of WORKSHOP. They suggested that the force could go through the 
Mediterranean with the -nroiected Januarv convoy, LAINDFALL, or that 
it could sail around the Cape at the earliest opportunity. The 
latter was considered a more certain nethod of ensuring their arri- 
S6 
val. The COS deferred a decision on this on 24 December 1940, 
however, until the CNS could Dresent an Admiralty paper being pre- 
57 
pared on the subject. 
Keyes continued to send Churchill ontimistic forecasts on IVOIRK- 
i SHOP. Although the force was restricted to the Isle of Arran, Keyes 
S4. Ismay to Churchill 27 Dec 40, PRE4 3/124/2. 
SS. COS(40) 436 Mtg 23 Dec 40, CAB 79/8. 
56. COS(40) S2 (0)(JP) 'Allocation of the Men Ships' 23 Dec 40, 
CIAB 80/106. 
57. COS(40) 437 I-Itg 24 Dec 40, CIAB 79/8. 
266 
sent Churchill's son Randolph, then serving with the commandos in 
the force, home for Christmas on the nretext of carrying an official 
desnatch. Randolph was exT)ected to heli) the cause. 'Mese efforts 
began to have an effect on Churchill, and on 26 December 1940 he 
told Ismay that be was 'becoming increasingly convinced of the need 
and urgency of WORKSHOP'. He therewon demanded nroposals for carry- 
ing it out before mid-February. His continued personal interest in 
the operation is evident in a note to Ismay in which lie stated that, 
as there was now time, to nrepare fully the operation, the commandos 
58 
might therefore be issued with four 3" mortars for sur)Dort. 
Pound presented the COS with the Admiralty view on Mediterranean 
onerations on 28 December 1940, according to Keyes, 'in order to pro- 
59 
vide fresh arguments to sabotage WORKSHOP'. The number of destroyers 
required for either WORKSHOP or L*MFALL, or both, was such that, 
if the operations were carried out in January, the North West Approach- 
es to the United Kingdom would be left dangerously weak. Additional 
destroyers would not be in service with the Home Fleet until February 
1941. It therefore appearea best to cancel Lk\TDFALL. The ships which 
comprised this convoy could join the convoy leaving the United King- 
dom about 27 January 1941, sailing via the Cane. Pound further -pro- 
posed that Force 103 should sail independently about 7 January 1941, 
via the Cape, and then conduct 1,. *O1Z1'SH0P from the eastern end of the 
'4editerranean. This could be done by IA February 1941, thus fulfill- 
ing Churchill's conditions. This option of conducting the o-peration 
from the other end of the Mediterranean had not been considered before, 
58. Churchill to Ismay 26 Dec 410, PPD! 3/SO7. For follow-on see 
Hollis to Churchill 30 T-)ec 40 and Churchill to Hollis 3 Jan 41, 
PPENI 3/507. 
59. COS(40) 34 Mtg (0) 28 Dec 40, CA. B 79/SS. 
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but it would have some advantages. The naval arrangements would be 
easier, and the operation could afford to wait for favourable weather. 
Surprise could just as easily be achieved. Faced with this situation, 
the COS agreed to recommend Pound's proposals to Churchill. 
Churchill thought that while either course of action would get 
the IANIDFALL troops to the Middle East at approximately the same time, 
he Preferred to pass them through the Mediterranean in March 1941. 
This would keep the troops available in the United Kingdom for a 
longer peri od of time, and -reduce the Iwaste neriod ' of the voyage. 
He also favoured it because 'the passing of troops through the Medi- 
terranean must be held steadily in view as an'object of importance, 
which the Admiralty should seek persistently to achieve'. lie would 
not countenance the WORRSHOP force sailing around the Cape, 'as once 
the force arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean it would be Practically 
certain to be used for MANDIBLES instead of WORKSHO1.11; whereas I am 
hoping it can be used for both'. He therefore preferred that the 
force should go through the 'Mediterranean with the re-scheduled 
LANDFALL in ýIarch. Unlike the COS, he could see no reason why WORK- 
SHOP could not be sent earlier, on its own. He reiterated the im- 
portance of the oneration, as 'constant reflection has made me feel 
the very high value of WORKSHOP'. The effect of the operation would 
be 'electrifying', and would 'greatly increase our strategic hold unon 
60 
the Central Mediterranean'. 
Pound accepted the points raised by Churchill, but insisted 
that the governing factor was nevertheless the destroyer shortage. 
60. Giurchill to Ismay 28 Dec 40, P! Uh\--137-S0-7. 
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lie therefore secured Cliurchill's assent to the des-patch of the fonner 
I 
LANDFALL troonS around the Cane with the convoy leaving on 27 January 
1941. WORKSHOP would sail for the Mediterranean about 14 February 
1941, enabling the oneration to be carried out in the early March moon 
61 
period. 
Keyes, upon learning of this decision on 30 December 1940, thought 
it 'imperative that the SS troons not be Rept waiting until the middle 
62 
of February'. In this case he would even -prefer PouiAls earlier 
suggestion of sailing the force around the Cape immediately, and con- 
ducting WORKSHOP from the eastern end of. the Mediterranean. Haydon 
protested, that, if WORKSHOP was T)ostT)oned until February, 'an entire- 
ly new situation' would arise. The frustration of the commandos was 
becoming intense. The first postDonement, together with the news of 
the successes in Libya, had already led to a number of requests for 
transfer from men who, feeling that they had as good, if not better, 
a chance of action with their original units than with the Snecial 
Service Brigade, now wanted to take advantage of the commando Joining 
condition which allowed them to return to their original units at 
their own discretion. Further delay would only result in a greater 
deterioration of morale. Haydon was 'of the opinion that the whole 
question of the continued existence of Special Service units will 
63 
require reviewl if WORKSHOP was T)ostiloned again. The situation 
was exacerbated by shipning Droblems. The Royal Scotsman had by 
now been added to the force from BRISK, and Keyes was asking for the 
Karania. The constant changing of the shiT)ping allocated to the force 
61. COS(40) 37 (0) 'Operations IANDFALL and WORKSHOP 29 Dec 40, 
CAB 80/S6. 
62. 'History of Events of the Last Few Days' 30 Dec 40, K 13/S. 
63. Haydon to Keyes 30 Dec 40, K 13/S. 
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and the lack of a definite sailing date caused many difficulties. 
Haydon had complained that it was 'impossible to load ships correctly; 
to allot definite tasks; to issue complete and final operation orders; 
or to lay doi%n a proper training programme based on the time factor', 
adding that 'it seems a sad commentary that we have never had here 
at one and the same time all the ships each with its oiNn stores on 
64 
board'. 
Keyes returned immediately from Scotland to place his case for 
sailing the force on 7 January 1941 around the Cape before the COS. 
The COS agreed to SUDport this proposal. at their first meeting on 
31 December 1940. The sailing of the EXCESS convoy had by this time 
been delayed three weeRs owing to the need to give priority to opera- 
tions in support of the camnaign in the 11. estern Desert. The COS also 
considered sailing WORKSHOP with the delayed EXCESS, which had simul- 
taneously occurred to Churchill, but the Admiralty again declared this 
6S 
unacceptable owing to the destyoyer shortage. Churchill sat in 
on the second meeting of the COS on 31 December 1940 to consider the 
recommendation to send Force 103 around the Cape, one of the only 
recommendations on which both Keyes and the COS were agreed. Churchill 
was adamant, however, that Force 103 should be held in the United King- 
dom for contingency nurposes, and the earlier decision to sail 11. "ORKSHOP 
66 
through the Mediterranean in mid-February 1941 was unheld. 
During his meeting with the COS, Keyes was not aware of the actual 
sailing date of the delayed EXCFSS. He had not -pressed for the sail- 
ing of WORKSHOP with EXCESS, because he was under the imDression that 
64. Hay-don to Keyes 28 Dec 40, K 13/S. 
6S. COS(40) 3S Mtg (0) 31 Dec 40, CAB 79/SS. 
66. COS(40) 441 Mtg 31 Dec 40, CIALB 79/8. 
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the convoy would sail at the end of January, and be wanted action 
taken sooner than that. hhen he learned on 3 January 1941 that 
EXCESS was leaving at the beginning of the month, he drafted a 
memorandum for the COS T U' pressing for the inclusion of h'0. SHOP in 
the EXCESS convoy, an alternative ; %ýhich, unknown to him, the COS 
had already -rejected. In the memorandum he expressed his fears that 
a long delay in mounting the oneration might give the Germans time 
to make a move which could render WORKSHOP impracticable - '11ý'e must 
not be forestalled! ' He had investigated the maintenance problem with 
Haydon, and he concluded that Immecessarily heavy weather' A., as being 
made of the difficulties. He evidently'did not expect to secure much 
supPort, for he concluded by asking that, if the COS accepted 
the risk of German forestallment, and would not let WORKSHOP sail in 
January, Force 103 sbould be granted 7 daý 7s leave. 
Keyes enclosed this menorandum with a letter to ChQchill, 
written in far stronger language. He exDlained that he thought 
the Naval Staff's contentions on the destroyer issue were labsurd', 
and 'would not stand uT. ) to investigation'. 'The folly of the Naval 
Staff's procrastination is tormenting', lie added. lie admitted that 
he was being a 'damned nuisance' , but he had always been im-pelled 
'to fight the King's enemies and among those - incidentally also your 67 
enemies -I regard those who are wilfullv obstructing WORKSHOP. 
Ismay replied on Churchill's behalf. As aCESS was leaving almost 
immediately, there was no time to incornorate WORKSHOP within it, 
and thus no -purpose would be sen, ed by forwarding the memorandum to 
67. Keyes to COS 3 Jan 41 and Keyes to Churchill 3 Jan 41, PREI 
3/507. 
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the COS, Ismay noted tbat, in any event, Churcbill, 'quite apart, 
f rom any reasons put fomard by'the Naval Staff was not -orey)ared 
to let Force 103 leave the country. Its usefulness in the event of 
a crisis with ST)ain still appeared to be the deciding factor. In 
an effort to bolster the i,. iorale of the comandos, Ismay added that 
68 
Churchill would like to visit them towards the end of January. . 
On 6 January 1941 the COS decided not to remount BRISK. Al- 
though the disposition of the third (Ilen ship was not laid doum, 
Keyes thereafter assumed that it was nart of his force, as had been 
intended in September 1940. The force now comprised the three Glens, 
the Royal Scotsman, and the Karanja. This would enable three Special 
Service battalions to be embarked for WORKSHOP, plus elements of 
tv, To further Comandos for other raiding operations. The Special 
Service tyooT)s were given leave from 13 to 28 January 1941, after 
which they would haNre two weeRs to train before the new sailing date. 
69 
While these decisions were being made in London, Wavell, on being 
given authority on 20 December 1940 for nlanning operations against 
the Dodecanese, aDpayently took it as the anroval of his nlan for P 
first attacking the smaller islands. In a telegram to the 'Nar Office 
on 26 December 1940 he indicated that raids on some of the smaller 
islands by locally raised commandos should commence as soon as arrange- 
ments could be made. While the plans for the capture of the larger 
islands would be drawn up, their implementation would probably await 
the arrival of the assault shipping. On, 30 December 1940 he T)resumed 
that it was advisable to inform the Greek and Turkish govenunents of 
68. Ismay to Keyes S Jan 41-, -PPDi 3/S07 and Keyes to Ismay 7 Jan 41, 
K 140/3/1. 
69. War Dairy of SS Brigade Jan 41, DEFE 2/54 and COS(41) 11 (0) 
(Revise) 'Operation WORKSHOP 16 Jan 41, CAB 80/56. 
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the proposed British action against the smaller HMO. On 5 
Ja. nuary 1941 the War Office replied that it was inadvisable to tell 
the Turks, though the Greeks could be informed through military 
70 
channels. 
Churchill saw these telegrams and questioned them, as lie had 
not approved any operations in the Dodecanese, and was still opposed 
to the -policy of striking the smaller islands before the major 
assaults i-: ere ready. Ismay advised Churchill that the word linten- 
71 
tions' used by Wavell was inappropriate. Churchill, on 13 January 
1941, nevertheless wrote to the COS reiýerating his oPposition to 
attacks on the smaller islands. They were neither necessary for the 
assault on the larger islands, nor were they necessary to defend 
Crete. 'Stirring up' this quarter would only nut the enemy on -his 
guard, and lead to disagreement between Greece and Turkey. He -Doint- 
edly remarked that the Defence Committee (Operations) had not author- 
72 
ised any such action. 
Cunningham had his sights set on the Dodecanese, which, with the 
increasing probability of a German attack unon rreece, he now con- 
sidered of very great importance. On 14 January 1941 he requested 
the immediate despatch of at least two (Ilens and their complements 
vi a the Cape, to -rose a threat to the enemy in the Dodecanese, and 
enable the British to take advantage of any other fleeting opi)ortuni- 
ties. He also mentioned that the first sea-borne raid in the Dode- 
canese would take place in the next few days. Such raids would 
70. Cl-)S(41) 9 (0) 'Attack on the Dodecanese' 13 Jan 41, QkB 80/S6. 
71. Ismay to Churchill 8 Jan 41., PREM 3/124/2. 
72. Churcbill to Ismay 13 Jan 41, PRFN 3/124/2. 
273 
continue but, f9r lack of the necessary mordern landing material, 
73 
they could only be 'pin-pricks'. 
The COS did not receive Churchill's minute, which had been held 
up pending a JPS report on future Mediterranean strategy, and Cunning- 
ham's telegram until 16 January 1941. They telegraphed Cunningham 
concerning the undesirability of stirring up the Dodecanese before 
a policy and a programme for the capture of the islands had been 
74 
settled. By the time Cunningham received this, a small expedition 
had already left on a raid. The question of whether to continue the 
raid or to cancel it was referred back to London, and the COS raised 
the matter with Churchill. After consultation with the Foreign Secre- 
7S 
tary, Churchill ordered the recall of the raiding force. 
The situation in the Mediterranean changed dramatically in the 
early part of January 1941, when German air force units arrived in 
Sicily. This increased Churchill's fear of the Germans establishing 
themselves on Pantelleria, as Keyes had warned from the outset, which 
would mean a complete closure of the Narrows. Churchill therefore 
called for WORKSHOP to be reviewed, as it had become 'more urgent and 
at the same time more difficult'. If the Germans increased their 
activity, he foresaw that the operation might become imnossible. He 
remained 'completely of the opinion that WORKSHOP is cardinal', and 
76 
pressed for it to be launched at the earliest moment. The operation 
was accordingly reviewed at a Defence Committee (Operations) meeting 
73. C-in-C Mediterranean to Admiralty 2009/14 Jan 41, PRENI 3/309/1. 
74. COS(41) 20 Mtg 16 Jan 41, CAB 79/8. 
7S. COS(41) 23 Mtg 18 Jan 41, CAB 79/8 
76. COS(41) 8 (0) '?. L-diterranean Situation' 13 Jan 41, CAB 8 0/56. 
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on 13 January 1941. The feasibility of the plan was considered in the 
light of the new circumstances, ' and Keyes was invited to sneak to the 
77 
COS about it the followin day. 91 
During the meeting with the COS on 14 January 1941, Keyes was 
asked to prenare a report in answer to the Defence Committee's 
question as to whether the plan should be modified and, if so, how. 
The Acbni-ralty was simultaneously asked to determine, in consultation 
with Cunningham, what the timing of the operation should be, given the 
likely weather conditions and other naval T)Ians. After Keyes' renort 
had been received the JPS would then recommend whether, in view of the 
changing situation in the Ilediterranean, WORKSHOP sliould be undertaken 
78 
at all. 
Keyes submitted his report on 16 January 1941. In his opinion 
WORKSHOP was still practicable, although the forces would have to be I C! 
slightly augmented. Keyes was worling on the assu-intion that three C. 
Special Service battalions could be used, carried in the three Glens, 
along with the other Connandos in the Royal Scotsman and Karanja. His 
estimate of the earliest possible date for the operation was now some 
79 
time between 20 and 28 February 1941. The EPS issued concurrently 
a report on the garrison and maintenance requirements. 'flie general I 
thrust of their arguments mirrored that of Cunningham's The worst 
Dossible case was ap gain assumed. 
The estimate of size of the garrison 
required had more than doubled, to S, 000. 'Maintenance difficulties 
were forecast because of the Twoblems of unloading i6thout a 1)roner 
77. DD(41) 4 Mtg 13 Jan 41, C-AJ3 69/2. 
78. COS(41) 17 ',, %Itg 14 Jan 41, CAB 79/8. 
79. COS(41) 11 (0) (Revise) 'Operation WORKSHOP' 16 Jan 41, CAB 
80/S6. 
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escort, and denendence on calm weather to do so; the danger of air 
attacR throughout the oneration and the impracticability of pro- 
viding adequate fighter protection; the danger from mines and sub- 
marines, and the necessity for strong surface shin cover. The 
authors of the paper also questioned the strategic necessity for 
capturing the island, and concluded that it would impose so heavy 
a burden on the Mediterranean Flect that it would curtail its 
80 
offensive capabilities. 
A copy of this report fell into Keyes' hands, and, not un- 
expectedly, he was enraged by its contents. He teymed it a IsnoRe 
screen of potential difficulties. The shining goal is lost sight 
of by its dismal authors'. The i)rincii)al obstructionist, in his 
opinion, was the naval member of the EPS, Cantain G. French, MN. 
Keyes pointed out to Churchill that he had suggested WORKSHOP on 
29 October 1940, that on 2 November 1940 the COS had considered it 
a most important objective and directed that Drenarations be made 
to caDture the island, and that on 19 November 1940 Churchill, 
81 
three ministers, and the COS had unanimously anT)Yoved it. 
Churchill agreed, and Ismay was forced to explain that the EPS 
report was merely the advice tendered to the JPS by the section of 
the planning organisation that was responsible for studying the 
problems of escorts, transportation, and maintenance. Ismay de- 
clared that they had no business to digress into problems of high 
strategy, or into the question of the practicability or otberwise 
of WORKSHOP, nor should their -report have been circulated to anybody 
except their imedi ate chiefs, i. e. the JPS' . 
'Fhe latter part of 
80. EPS(41) 147 'Oneration 1, VORKS-H--OPI16 Jan-41, PRNI-3507. 
81. Keyes to Churchill 17 Jan 41, PRDI 3/SO7. 
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this statement is a revealing one, for it serves to indicate u,, hY 
Keyes was so upset over the opposition to his projects by lower- 
r, "king officers, given a system which, did not allow him full 
access to their criticisms. Churchill asked for the names of the 
officers of the EPS concerned, but by the time he was given them 
WORKSHOP had been cancelled, and Tsmay tried to assuage him, ad- 
mitting that be had been somewhat unfair to the EPS in his earlier 
note to Churchill. It was, be said, 'difficult to -prescribe any 
82 
exact frontier to their resDonsibilities'. 
The COS report on ll. 'ORKSHOP, based on Keyes' renort, the Admiral- 
ty reDort, and the EPS report, was completed on 18 January 1941. 
Keyes' memorandum was dismissed as being phrased only in 'very gen- 
eral terms' and thus not a detailed plan. In the COS view, the in- 
clusion of the third Glen ship and the Karanja_would commit all the 
assault shipping then available'- 'at a time when they are urgently 
required elsewhere'. This requirement was not further explained, 
and it is difficult to ascertain what possible operation the COS 
had in mind. The Admiralty report pointed out that WORKSHOP would 
require forces from home waters in such numbers as to cause a serious 
reduction in the ability of the fleet to -provide trade protection in 
the North West Approaches, as well as to defeat an invasion of the 
United Kingdom.. The escort problems involved in the maintenance of 
Pantelleria, following the argument of the EPS, were such that the 0 
additional defensive burden could only be detrimental to the British 
offensive capability. The introduction of German dive bombers into 
Sicily had also greatly increased the risRs. This EPS renort was 
82. Ismay to Churchill 21 Jan 41, PREM 3/507. 
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accented at face value. Mven these difficulties, the COS then 
looked at the strategic implications. 'Me deciding factor here was 
the arrival of the German air force. The nrovision of fighter cover 
for convoys and the disruption of Italian communications - the ob- 
jects of a British attack, on Pantelleria - required the free use of 
its airfield. The COS doubted, with the Germans in Sicily, that this 
was nossible. Even if it were, the British could not adenuately 
cover the whole nassage of the Narrows. Pantelleria was considered 
to be of little use to the Cermans, as adequate coverage was afforded 
them by bases in Sicily. The COS were therefore of the oi: )inion that 
the strategic value of Pantelleria, either to ourselves or to the 
r1ermans, is, in reality, only slight'. They accordingly recommended 
that, as the risks and maintenance commitments 'could only be justi- 
fied in achieving a strategic object of far greater value than the 
83 
capture of Pantellerial, VJORKSHOP be abanddned. While their 
judgement must be accented as valid, considering their central role 
in the formulation of strategy, this annears to be a curious reversal 
of many of the opinions they expressed during the nlanning of IIJORK - 
SHOP. In fact., the COS, pushed in one direction by Churchill and 
Keyes, and in the other by the JPS and Cunningham, never really took 
a firm position on IVORKSHOP. It was nlain, however, that the hesi- 
tancy, nrocrastination, and in some nlaces outright obstructionism, 
of the nlanning'and decision-taRing system had resulted in the very 
outcome that Keyes had predicted -a seizure of the initiative by 
the Germans. 
The COS recommendations on WORKSHOP v., ere ecboed in their review 
83. C6-S-(41) 13 (0) 'Oneration WORKSMP, 18 Jan 41, C-AB 80 S6. 
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of the whole policy in the Mediterranean on 18 January 1941. This 
-repeated Cunningham's appreciation that TMIDIBLES should be 'given 
high priority'. Other possible operations a ainst Libya and Sicily 
were mentioned, and it was considered essential that the snecial 
shipping and assault craft which Cunningham had consistently de- 
manded should be sent to the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as possi- 
84 
ble. 
These two reports were taken up at a Defence Committee (OQera- 
tions) meeting on 20 January 1941. Churchill was unhappy about the 
COS recommendation on WORKSHOP, but he accepted the fact that the 
British had 'lost the chance' of capturing Pantelleria, and that 
with the changes that had taken place in the central Mediterranean 
it might never occur again. Keyes was to be informed by the COS 
of the decision to abandon WORKSHOP. He was also told by Ismay 
snecifically that Churchill did not want to discuss the matter fur- 
8S 
ther. The committee's attention then focused on the other pro- 
jects in the Mediterranean (ýRNIDIBLES being the major one) , which 
required the despatch of assault shi-n-ning around the Cane. Chur- 
chill was not receDtive to these Dro, )osals, and was 'firmly onposed 
to sending snecial troons to the Middle East, where they would nass 
out of our control'. The crux was that Churchill was determined to 
find an offensive operation, and the COS were not presenting him with 
any viable options. He finally consented to MkNDIBLES, although 
he was not convinced that it i.., as a satisfying object for the forces 
gathering in the Middle East. He nreferred an attack on Sicily or 
84. COS(41) 14 (0) 'Review of Our Policy in the Mediterranean' 18 
Jan 41, CIAB 80/S6. 
8S. Keyes to Churchill 21 Jan 41, PRDI 3/507. 
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Sardinia, and thought the main difficulty was in the two C-in-Cs' 
limited conceDt of small raids. ' As far as he i-: as concerned, tile 
forces currently in the I'liddle East should be sufficient for MM- 
DIBLES. The growing threat to the Balkans might involve TurRey, and 
if she was attacked the Dodecanese would have to be caT)tured quickly, 
86 
with whatever forces were available. 
Churchill took some time to consider the recommendations made 
at this meeting, as he was still reluctant to release the Commandos 
and the Glen ships. 'Die claim had been made that MNDIBLES could 
be conducted sooner if the assault shipping were used, and it was 
Churchill's imnatience for some offensive strole which -! ý, roimnted his 
release of some of the elements of the striking force. Aii associated 
question was how the force would get to the Middle Fast. It could 
either go around the CaPe, or t1hrough the Mediterranean when naval 
cover was available. In both cases, it would arrive about the same 
time, the end of February. Churchill's reservations about having the 
force out of action for*an extended -period on the safer route, via 
the Cai)e, veTe allayed by the JPS assurance that there would still 
be sufficient landing craft available for operations from the United 
Kingdom. Ke) Y es was later to discount this, noting that the JPS 
had overloo'jled the fact that there would be no assault shiPT)ing to 
carry them. 
Churchill gave his decision on 21 January 1941. He v., ould auth- i 
orise the sailing of the three Glen shins, with their full com-plements 
of landing craft and Commandos (less one Commando which would be 
renlaced by local ones formed in the Middle East) around the Ca-oe at 
86. DO(41f)--6Mtg 20 Jan 41, CIAB 69/2. 
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87 
the earliest mportiuiity. This decision was not taken lightly, 
since it was made, as the Vilar Office later stated, 'at the cost of 
paralysing for some months onerations in the Western Mediterranean, 
88 
Tbe Royal Scotsman and the Karanja, with a sufficient mober of comman- 
dos for small operations, were to remain in the United Kingdom. Cliur- 
chill directed that the commando force in the United Kingdom was to 
be immediately reconstituted to the full strength of 5,000 fully 
eouinped oersonnel, and would continue its training. 'If this is not 
done we shall have lost an essential weapon of offence needed to man 
and use the new landing craft which are coming out steadily now from 
the builders. It will be necessary for'the DCO to remain at home to 
reorganise and rebuild this force'. 
Keyes did not passively accept the decision to abandon WORKSHOP. 
He iffote to Churchill on 22 January 1941 urging its execution, and 
it was not until Churchill finally consented to see him, on 27 January 
1941, that Keyes gave up his last hone of salvaging IMRKSHOP. The 
debate was conducted with considerable bitterness, and would contri- 
bute to the second attempt at reorganising the combined onerations 
89 
system. 
Another argument broke out over the breaking up of Force 103, an 
action which Keyes strongly opposed. As has been noted, he had come 
to -regard it as -an integral whole, an indeT)endent striking force useful 
for any combined operation. When he learned of the decision to send 
the three Glens around the CaT)e he immediately asked for an inteniew 
with Churchill, as his instructions opened up 'a question of policy on 
87. COS(41) 1S (0) 'Note by Secretary' 2-1 Jan 41, CAB 80/56. 
88. IVO to C-in-C Middle East I Feb 41, PRDI 3/124/2. 
89. Keyes to Churchill 28 Jan 41. DEFE 2/698. 
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which I am better qualified to advise you than anyone else'. This 
90 
intervi ew was r. efused. Keyes then approached the COS, requesting 
that a larger number of Special Service troops be sent. fie argued 
that the plan to send half of Nos. 2,3, and 4 Special Service 
Battalions, 'i. e. three Commandos, would result in the morale of those 
left behind becoming even worse, and there would probably be a 
large number of requests for transfers back to parent units. The re- 
forming of the battalions from the infantry training centres would 
mean that it would be about four months before the Special Service 
units would become fully operational again. There was also the 
problem of finding sufficient officers of the right type. Haydon 
had felt that 'the Mediterranean should be our hapPy hunting ground', 
and urged the desI)atch of at least the three Special Service battalions 
91 
in the Glens as integral units. The COS, however, rejected Keyes' 
proposals, on the grounds that Churchill's instructions were 'per- 
92 
fectly imDlicit on this point'. 
Keyes then tried Churchill again, writing to him on 22 January 
1941 that, 'without realising it', Churchill was breaking up 'the 
splendid little amT)hibious force which I have organised, trained, 
and inspired'. He remonstrated that the first flight lift capability 
of the vessels remaining in the United Kingdom would be less than 
1,000 men. Contrary to the Admiralty view, he thought the assault 
shiT)ping remaining in the United Kingdom was the goierning factor, 
rather than the number of landing craft. He again stressed the 
effect the action would have on the remaining commandos, and pressed 
90. Keyes to Chu-rch-ill 2-1 Jan -41, PPM VS-017 
91. Ilaydon to Keyes 22 Jan 41, K 13/S. 
92. Ismay to Churchill 21 Jan 41,4inex to COS(41) 17 (0) IMediter- 
ranean Policy' 22 Jan 41, C-kB 80/56. 
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93 
for the passage of the entire force through the Mediterranean. 
Churchill replied that the deci,; *ion had been made, and Keyes and 
his comilandos would 'have to obey orders like other People and that 
-94 
is all there is to be said about it'. Churchill finally saw Keyes 
on 27 January 1941. Keyes accepted the decision, although lie hoped 
that a proposed plan for the capture of Sardinia, termed YORKER, 
might result in the cancellation of the Glens' sailing on their 
Iwild goose chase'. Keyes tried once more, writing to Churchill on 
28 January 1941. He explained that the decision to split uT) the 
striking force had been based on the 'false premise' that the United 
Kingdom would retain a sufficient amnbib ious capability. He made 
the valid point that the sailing of the Mens would only result in 
tiqo forces 'each too weak to take a decisive part in any operation 
east or west of Maltal. He felt that the Naval Staff recognised 
this but, having frustrated I'MRKSHOP, they Iwere delighted to send 
the Glens abroad so that the execution of any action for which they 
95 
might be held responsible would be impossible'. 
There was nothing Keyes could do to change the course of events, 
and the Glens sailed on 31 January 1941. Even the manner of their 
sailing, however, added to Keyes' frustration. On 17 January 1941 
the Admiralty had signalled the Glen ships that all communications 
in connection with personnel, material, and movements should be 
routed directly to the authorities concerned, and not through the 
96 i 
DCO. Keyes was outraged that he was to receive no further infor- 
93. Keyes to Churchill 22 Jan 41, PREM 3/507. 
94. Churchill to Keyes 24 Jan 41, K 140/3/1. 
9S. Keyes to Churchill 28 Jan 41, DEFE 2/69S. ' 
96. Admiralty to Glengyle, Glenroy, and Glenearn 17 Jan 41, DEFE 
2/698. 
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mation on their activities, particularly when be learned of the 
I 
embarkation arrangements. 'The*essence of successful amphibious 
warfare lies in training the soldiers and sailors of each unit to 
Work together I, he once noted. He had assumed that the only logi - 
cal arrangement was to embark a Commando on each of the shi-Os with 
which they had been working, so that in the course of the voyage 
they could become true amnbibious units and would be ready for 
service immediately unon their arrival in the Mediterranean. '*It 
did not occur to me for one moment that any other course could have 
been contemplated'. Keyes now learned, too late, that No. 11 
Commando bad been split in half and loaded on both the Glengyle 
and Glenroy, separated from the crew of the Glenearn with whom they 
were to work. To make matters worse, because of the overcrowding 
on the Glengyle and Glenro-. vt 18 commando officers were separated 
from their units and embarked in the Glenearn, which was carrying 
miscellaneous replacements. Keyes therefore suggested that the 
Glens should put in at Capetown to have the accomodation altered. 
Churchill, who hoped that MMIDIBLES could be executed immediately 
upon the arrival of the ships in the Middle East, agreed and asked 
97 
the COS for a report on it. 
The COS replied that the DCO's staff had been consulted at 
every stage of the embaykation, and had been in agreement with all 
the arrangements. They maintained that 'it is not practicable to 
stow ships tactically for a combined operation unless the detailed 
98 
T)lan is Imown'. As the ýMTDIBLES T)Iari Ivas still in nreparation 
97. Churchill to Ismay 12 Feb 41, HEM 3/124/2. 
98. Ismay to Churchill 14 Feb 41, PPEA 3/124/2. 
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it had not been possible to load the ships tactically, and the DCO's 
staff bad not s'u'ggested that this be done. The haste to dCS. Datch 
the ships had also caused loading problems, and unless the ýWMJBLES 
plan could be flown to Canetoim in time to meet the convoy, nothing 
useful could be achieved there. The COS maintained that MANDIBLES 
could be carried out'more satisfactorily and at an earlier date' if 
all the final preparations were made at Alexandria. Churchill agreed 
99 
to this on 15 February 1941. This dispute is a rather strange 
one, and the details of the arrangements for embarkation are ob- 
scure. It is rather unlikely that Keyes would have com-Plained if 
all the assertions of the COS were correct; if they were, it would 
indicate a serious breakdown of communications in Keyes' small head- 
quarters. It is therefore Drobable that the truth lies somewhere 
in between the two positions. The movement of the ships prior to 
sailing was not controlled by the COHQ, and, as only two Glens 
were sent to Lamlash for the embarkation of the commandos, it apDears 
that the Special Service Brigade made the best of what it was given. 
Certainly the COS' contention that the ships could only be tactically 
loaded if the detailed i)lans were known would have been onPosed by 
Keyes, who on at least one prior occasion had been T)Yepared to carry 
out an operation on a 'standard' loading. 
The three Glens and Nos. 7,8, and 11 Commandos, termed 'Lay- 
force' after their commander, Brigadier R. Laycock, passed from the 
operational control of the DCO on their departure. Their employment 
in the Mediterranean demonstrated the accuracy of Keyes' predictions 
about mismanagement and imT)roner tasking. Under the -pressure of 
99. Churchill's notation on Ismay to Churchill 14 Feb 41, PRE-1 
3/124/2. 
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events this was perhaps inevitable, but Keves' claim that a major 
Dart of his bighiv trained force was being throim away for no worth- 
while purpose was well founded. The outcome of the actions of 'Lay- 
force' in the Mediteryanean was to be a source of recrimination 
later, and would further add to the feud between the DCO and the 
100 
Cos. 
On 27 January 1941 Wavell in-formed London that, while both 
C-in-Cs considered IýLNNDIBLES of the 'utmost and urgent importance' , 
the operation, which would involve the whole of the newly-forming 
101 
6th Division, would not be possible until the beginning of AT)ril. 
Cunningham at the time also lacled a flag officer to act as SNO 
Landings, and on 31 January 1941 requested that one be sent out from 
the United Kingdom, adding, in reference to Keyes, that he hoped 
'there will be no suggestion of any very senior admiral being 
102 
sent'. Pound showed this to Churchill, so that he would be aware 
of Cunningham's feelings, whereupon Churchill drafted a critical reply 
to Cunningham. Pound interceT)ted this, and managed to dissuade 
Churchill from sending a message on the condition that Pound would 
103 
convey the substance of Churchill's rebuRe. 
Pound sided uith Cunningham, informing him on 8 February 1941 
that it had been 'a hard fight to get rid of' WORKSHOP. 'As you can 
imagine R. K. is a perfect nuisance and is at daggers drawn with every- 
one', in particular with Pound himself. Noting that he had shoi.., n 
100. For details of Layforce's actions see St. George Saunders, PD. 
58-76; Buckley, pp. 176-181; and Fergusson, pD. 94-105. 
101. C-in-C INtiddle East to War Office 27 Jan 41, PRF-1-1 3/309/1. 
102. C-in-C '-Iediterranean to CNS 1301/31 Jan 41, PREM 3/124/2. 
103. Pound to Churchill 3 Feb 41 and Churchill to 'Pound 4 Feb 41, 
PR-DI 3/124/2. 
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Churchill Cunningham's message in order to support his oi%m onnosition. 
to Keyes' going to the '114editerranean, Pound described how Churchill. 
had 'gone off the deep end over it', 11 cannot understand why he 
allows himself to be burdened with R, K, as he must realise how ab- 
solutely futile the latter is except as regards creating trouble' 
104 ? 
he concluded. This minor sRirmish well reflects the antipathy 
between the CNS and the DCO, which to one degree or mother affected 
every decision regarding combined operations during Keyes' tenure. 
NMIDIBLES then became intertwined with LUSTRE, the shipping of 
British troops to Creece. By the beginping of April 1941, when the 
British were capable of mounting MNDIBLES, the situation in the 
Western Desert was such that the forces ea-rmarked for it were used 
105 
in the desert war. ýMIIDIBLES, another operation on which much 
time and effort 'had been sT)ent, and for which a large T)art of the 
amphibious resources available had been diverted., had, through delay, 
been overtaken by German initiatives. 
104. Pound to C 
105. COS(41) 122 ', Itg 4 Apr 41, C-AB 79/10. 
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I GIAFTER XV. 
COWINGENCY OPERATIONS IN 'M ATLANTIC (3) 
THE CANARIES 
Nerations in the Atlantic remained a low priority during the 
early nart of 1941. The JISC,, at the beginning of ýIarch, thought 
that the next Cerman move would taRe -place in the eastern, rather 
than the western, jMediterranean. Even as forces for BRISK and 
SHRUINEL were being dismounted, however, the EPS were reconsidering 
the situation if the Germans did in fact enter Sý)ain. The only 
effective riposte still would be the seizure of the Atlantic islands. 
In looR-ing for alternative merations, the EPS had, on 8 11-larch 1941, 
reviewed the possibility of seizing the Canaries. They considered 
that, since this nroject had been last examined, in mid-1940, there 
had been a 'complete change' in the governing factors that had then 
rendered it inpracticable. This was a rather sweeT)ing statement. 
Although the nro. ject must have seemed attractive iýhen the forces re- 
quired for it were compared to those needed for the other alterna- 
tives - expeditions on the Spanish mainland or in North Africa, the 
forces then available to the British do not seem markedly greater 
than in 1940. Nevertheless, the FPS and the DCO's staff now decided 
that the capture of the Canaries was a feasible operation. Accord- 
ing to the EPS it had a good chance of success I, and was 'in accord - 
ance with our fundamental strategy of defending our sea co-im. unications 
2 
-rather than in starting land warfare on the Continent'. At this 
time the nroject was viewed as an isolated action, no effort being 
I. COS(41) 90 1-ftg 8 Mar 41, C-AB 79/9. 
2. JP(41) 212(E) 'Canture of the Canary Tslands' 12 ýIar 41, WO 
106/2953. 
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made to evaluate, it in relation to the operations against the Azores 
or Cape Verdes. Lov., key studies on the Canaries continued tbrougb- 
out IMarch 1941. 
The scare of 22 March 1941 about Ge-rman U-boats -refuelling in the 
Azores caused the COS to check the status of the contingency plans 
for this area. Assuming that a British occupation of the Portuguese 
Atlantic islands would lead both to a German occupation of Portugal 
and to an ultimatum to Spain to use the bases in the Canaries, the 
JPS were instructed to review the strategic value of the Canaries 
3 
to the enemy. It was at this time that: the JPS -reversed -practically 
all of the assummions unon ubich the operations against the Portu- 
guese Atlantic islands had been founded. 
The JPS declared on 23 March 1941 that the Canaries would offer 
the Germans excellent facilities as a base for surface raiders, 
submarines, and long range aircraft. The scale of attack on the 
Sierra Leone convoys would then be similar to that encountered in 
the North 11, est Approaches, and this could be countered only by weah- 
ening the escort forces nearer home to a dangerous degree. In this 
respect, the JPS thoug t 'the nossession by us of the Azores and the gh 
Cape Verdes would do little to mitigate this danger, and we should 
probably have to abandon these convoys and route all traffic via the 
western Atlantic'. They therefore recommended against the premature 
seizure of the Azores and Cane Verdes, if this would result in the 
Germans gaining use of the Canaries. If it were clear that the Gemans 
were about to occuDy the Azores and Cape Verdes themselves, however, 
3. COS (41) 6 3M 
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then the British should act, lest they should lose all t1iree groups 
I 
of islands. These views were accepted by the COS and embodied in a 
4 
minute to Churchill. 
The change in position is rather startling. While the appre- 
ciation of the -possible German threat in the area vas relativelv 
constant since the summer of 1940, the Canaries had earlier been 
discarded as an impracticable operation and ALLOY and SHRAPNEL seen 
as an accentable substitute. Now that the JPS considered the re- 
sources available sufficient for an attack upon the Canaries, in- 
creasin weight was nlaced upon their imi. )ortance. This may indeed 9 
have been correct, but the positions were contradictory. If the 
Portuguese islands iý. lere suitable enough to Reel) oDerations against 
them mounted for almost eight months, they should still have sufficed. 
If they did not suffice now, it is difficult to see why they were 
considered suitable before. During this neriod, the main considera- 
tions were the British need of an alternative to Gibraltar, and the 
threat nosed by German use of the Atlantic islands. It was not 
until later that the Portuguese islands became im. nortant for the 
Allies as anti-submarine bases. 
Churchill was not content with the COS recommendations. TRUCK 
and BASEBALL, then in readiness, had been designed to seize the Azores 
and Cape Verdes against Portuguese -resistance. 'Surely if the GenTians 
take over any one of these islands', Churchill noted on 24 '11arch 1941, 
'we shall have to try and beat them out. It is curious that no attempt 
should be made to deal with this pronosition'. He was also extremely 
concerned about the suggestion of re-youting the Sierra Leone convoys 
4. COS(41) 7 Mtg (0) 23 Mar 41, CAB 79/55. 
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to the west. 'This would be a supreme admission of failure and 
defeat at sea. ' The Admiralty must not suppose that stich a policy 
i.., ould be accepted by Cabinet or Parliament'. This prompted another 
review of the plans, to see what could be done if the Germans occu- 
nied the Portuguese Atlantic islands first -a very lilely proposi- 
tion if they contemplated a move into the Iberian Peninsula. 
On 2S March 1941 the COS consequently invited the DCO, in con- 
sultation with the JPS, to T)reDare a -., )Ian for the capture of the 
Azores and Cane Verdes in the face of German ol)T)osition. At the 
same time the JPS, in consultation with . 
the DCO, was to prepare a 
plan for the caT)ture of the Canaries, on the assLunntion that the 
6 
Spanish, assisted by a few Germans, resisted. These arrangements 
were almost immediately superseded by the directions for the organi- 
sation of the striking force, and the arrangements for ý)Ianning its 
operations. Priority was still given, however, to the Portuguese 
Atlantic islands. 
The JPS report on a number of plans for the capture of the 
Azores against German opposition was -ready by 9 April 1941. Provid- 
ing that the landings were undertaken shortly after the German occu- 
-oation, they were feasible urith only a small addition to the forces 
previously earmarked for TRUCK and SHRAPNEL. The governing factor 
determining the choice of plan would be the amount of naval supnort 
7 
available. By this time, however, the situation seemed less threat- 
ening. The JISC reDorted that no German move into Spain was likely 
S. COS(41) 67 (0) 'Operations TRUCK and BASEBALL' 24 Mar 41, CAB 
80/56. 
6. COS(41) 108 'Mtg 225 Mar 41, CAB 79/10. 
7. JP(41) 281 (E) 'CaT)ture of Azores against German Onposition' 
9 A-or 41, DEFE 2/613. 
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until after the situation in southeast Furope was clarified, and 
the COS therefore made no explicit decisions on the mounting of 
8 
operations in the Atlantic.. Work on the plans continued con- 
currently with the assembly of the striRing force. 
Towards the end of April 1941 the see-saw tipped again. The 
JISC reported on 22 Anril 1941 that German T)ressure on Snain was 
increasing, and it thought a German move to the south-west almost a 
certainty. Although there were no concrete indications of troop 
movements toward the Spanish frontier, and no indications at all of 
any German moves against the Atlantic islands, the JISC nevertheless 
felt that a Cerman move towards Gibraltar migbt well take nlace 
within a month or so. Unlike the Foreign Office, the JISC thought 
that there was no immediate danger of a German attack on the Soviet 
9 
Union after the camnaign in Greece.. TRUCK was therefore again 
placed on 48 hours notice, and the COS questioned the readiness of 
the striking force. As has been noted, although the T)Ians for an 
assault against German o-p-oosition were ready, little bad actually 
been done to assemble the force.. 
Whe-reas the JPS had advised caution a month earlier, recommend- 
ing that no action be taken until it anpeared certain that Spain 
would enter the way on the Axis side, they declared on 23 April 1941 
that, with the strengthening of the German nosition in the Balkans 
and in Cyrenaica, and the increasing T)ressure upon SDain, diplomacV 
alone was insufficient to keep the Germans out of Spain. -Fhey there- 
8. ARM 144 "German StrateU in 19411 10 A. -)r 41, CU 79PO. 
9. COS(41) 143 Mg 22 Or 41, W 79/11. For the intelligence back- 
ground to these ouerations, see F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence 
in the Second 1'ý'orld War, Vol I (London 1970) Y)p. 249-259. Even 
iFi-th this, the intelligence situation in the su=er of 1941 re- 
mains unclear. 
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fore thought 'the time to act has now come'. As soon as the posi- 
tion in the BalRans was cleared'uT), Germany would turn to Spain, 
so that within a short time Gibraltar would cease to be of use to 
the British and the Germans would be in the Canaries. To offset 
this disadvantageous strategic -nosition, the JPS thought that action 
must be taken to secure bases in the Atlantic islands. The courses 
open seemed to be either to seize the Azores or Cam Verdes immediate- 
ly, or to seize the Canaries as soon as forces could be orepared. 
The former seemed to seriously i)rejudice the chances of the latter, 
and the JPS declared that 'it was ah.., ays recognised that the 
Canaries offered the only substitute for Gibraltar as a base for 
big ships'. They explained that the former nlans had not included 
the Canaries, because, ostensibly, the British had lacked the nec- 
essary fighter defences and assault shi-oping. The JPS considered 
that these constraints no longer applied, and they therefore re- 
commended that the Canaries should have first priority. An outline 
plan, termed CHUTNEY, had already been prepared, which called for 
all the forces earmarRed for the striking force -olus an infantry 
brigade group and other supporting arms. The provision of these 
forces, and the shipping required, did not seem an 'insurmountable' 
problem, and the JPS recommended that the expedition be mounted. 
Although the TRUCK force would graduall'y be absorbed into the CHUT- 
NEY force, BASEBALL would be 'kept mounted, and would take T)Iace 
simultaneously with CHUTNEY. It was considered nossible that the 
Azores and Madeira could then be T)eacefully occunied by small forces 
carried in warshiT)s. All of these oDerations could be mounted in as 
10 
short a time as three weeks if the go ahead was given. 
10. JP(41) 313 'The Atlantic Islands, 23 Apr 41, CAB 79/11. 
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This recommendation was in line with the earlier JPS report of 
March 1941 on the strategic advantage of the Canaries to the Germans, 
but it still does not adequately explain their -reversal on the issue 
of the Canaries. The glib phrase that it was always assumed that 
the Canaries were more imT)ortant than the Azores and CaT)e Verdes as 
a naval base does not stand uD under examination. The recommendation 
to take action as soon as possible, which would almost certainly 
have brought Spain into the war and caused the loss of Gibraltar, 
the very things that the oT)eration was designed to counter, is 0 
astonishing, given the actual German intentions, and YeDresents 
an intelligence misaDpreciation of the f irst order. 
The JPS recommendation was considered by the COS on 24 April 
1941 in two meetings, the second with Churchill in the chair. The 
COS considering the recent developments in Spain, supDorted CHUTNEY, 
and Churchill was 'wholeheartedly' in fail-our of all the necessary 
preParations being made Iforthwith'. The final decision to launch 
the expedition would be taRen nearer the time when it was ready. It 
was at this time that Churchill changed the name to PU11-14, as one 
Iwanted the biggest possible cat to catch a canary'. 
It was immediately apparent that, in addition to the shinping of 
the striking force, another four or five ships canable of carrying 
about 8,000 men would be required for the PLJ), tk force. The only waN 
of obtaining the extra shipping quickly was by reducing the capacity 
of the 'next convoy to the 'Middle East-, all the other onerations 
would delay PU. \Lk until the end of May or June. It is a measure of 
the urgency of PUMA that planning proceeded on the assum-Dtion this C, 
would be done, even before Churchill anproved it on 26 Anril 1941, 
'14 -AT)r 41, 
Uý9779-- 11. COS(41)146 and 147 Mtg . TI-f and Fergusson, pn. 78-79. 
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and that, in doing so, he agreed, without further comment, to delay 
12 
the movement of part of SOth DiVision to the Middle East. 
The outline plans prepared by the JPS and the directives for 
the military and naval commanders were approved at the COS meeting 
of 26 April 1941, with Keyes and the commanders -present. Pound 
did not think that the commanders should be bound by the JPS plan, 
and they were consequently instructed to rer)ort in a few days as 
to whether they were satisfied vith the forces allocated to them. 
Sturges had had a short period to study the plans, and was generally 
satisfied that they gave a 'reasonable prospect of success', although 
he thought another wo Belgian LSI(S) and a Commando might be added 
for a diversion. Hamilton had not yet seen the plans and so had no 
comments. It was agreed that the expedition should be -ready to sail 
13 
by 17 May 1941. 
Keyes queried Ismay about the command of the expedition, but this 
was not passed on to Churchill. Ismay told Keyes on 27 April 1941 
that Churchill had been too busy to consider it, and suggested that, 
as the meeting with the COS on 26 Anril had been 'most satisfactory', 
and that., as everything was apparently proceeding on the lines Keyes 
wished, 'it would be better to leave well alone, and -not bring the 
Prime Minister into the matter at this stage'. He noted that every- 
14 
thing seemed to be going fonqard 'serenely'. Keyes thanked Ismay 
is 
for his efforts, and appeared to be satisfied. By 30 AT)ril 1941, 
however, he was writing to Churchill directly, intimating that the 
12. Ismay to Churchill 25 Apr 41, PRDI 3/361/1. 
13. COS(41) 12 Mtg (0) 26 Apr 41, CAB 79/5S. 
14. Ismay to Keyes 27 ADY 41, K 140/3/2. 
1 
15. Keyes to Ismay 28 Apr 41, K 140/3/2. 
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joint commanders could not acquire the experience needed for such a 
complex operation in the time available. 'Surely the time has come 
to make full use of such qualities as I possess and my experience. 
I urill not fail you. ' lie enclosed the papers he had previously sent 
I smay, with a new covering note, quoting Ismay's assurance that every- 
thing was going fonýard 'serenely'. "'Serenely" aptly describes the 
temno of the war as conducted by inter-service committees, with the 
result that we have been forestalled by the Germans time after time. 
But the time has now arrived for dynamic action. ' Although he thought 
that the two commanders were competent officers, he felt that the 
complexity and importance of PUMA requir'ed not the joint command nro- 
posed, but the system, -orovided for in the Manual of Combined Oncra- 
tions, for 'unified command', both in the preparation and in the exec- 
ution. 'This last month's delay and the speed with which the enemy 
have delivered their successive strokes have left us no time to si-)are, 
and a supreme commander with experience of combined operations should 
be aDpointed without delay and given full responsibility and a free 
hand', lie told Churchill, with little doubt as to who this commander 
16 
should be. He eý, idently received no reply to this. 
Keyes and the commanders met the COS again on 3 May 1941, at 
which time the commanders presented their apgreciation of PINN. 
Additional naval forces, including a battleship, were -requested, as 
well as additional air cover. The VCNS promised that the Navy would 
try to find the ships, but noted that, as all the available aircraft 
carriers were involved in oneration JAGUAR, the air reinforcement of 
Malta, PUýtA might have to be nostponed. Vie commanders expressed 
16. Keyes to Churchill 30 Apr 41, PPEI 3/36171. 
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their concern that this could result in TUMA being carried out in 
an unfavourable moon neriod. They pointed out that this might require 
a change in the plan; at best the chances of success would be reduced. 
The committee accepted this drawback, however, if the air support 
question could not be resolved. The assembly and training of the 
force was now progressing satisfactorily, and one fairly comm-ehen- 
sive rehearsal was scheduled. TRJCK would have to be dismounted from 
17 
6 May 1941 to integrate the forces, and this too was accepted. 
Keyes was still involved in the nianning T)rocess, and he met the 
commanders and the JPS on 8 May 1941 for a review. The joint coiTuTian- 
ders again stressed that a moonless night was essential. The force 
would now be ready to sail by 22 May 1941, for an operation about 1 
18 
or 2 June. Keyes and the commanders presented the T)Ian to the De- 
fence Committee (Operations) the next day. There was no problem with 
the military T)renarations, but as the situation in S-pain had anparent- 
ly eased, Churchill reminded the committee that it would be necessan" 
to consider the political aspects of launching PLP-1k. There had been 
no adverse developments in S-oain, and he thought that launchinp the 
expedition in advance of such incidents would be undesirable, and 
would have an unfortunate -political effect. He therefore asRed the 
commanders if PLMA, could be Rept in -readiness for an indefinite 
-period, - and what the effects of this would be. Sturges and Hamilton 
exDlained that in this case the force would continue training for 
PMA,, but would have to be at 7 days notice. The coilunittee event- 
ually authorised the commanders to proceed with the preparations for 
PU', Ibt, with the -proviso that the final decision to launch the oneration 
17. COS(41) 13 Mtg_(_OT_S_May 41, CU 79/55. - 
18. COS(41) 169 Mtg, Secretary's Standard File 8 May 41, CIALB 79/86. 
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would have to be made by the goverment in the light of the circum- 
19 
stances at the time. In the meanwhile small forces were also being 
20 
prepared to occupy the Azores and Madeira by 'fair dealing'. 
Keves was not T)leased with the possibility of postponement, and 
iýTote personally to Churchill urging action. Since be thought that 
the matter of the assault lay within his directo-rate, be ventured to 
make some suggestions on the general implications of a delay. If 
PUM was postnoned, he thought that sui-irise would be lost, and the 
hazards of the assault greatly increased. He also pointed out that 
if the expedition was held indefinitely. the assault could not be 
delivered in less than 17 days from the time of the decision. If 
the initiative were left in German hands the British miglit be fore- 
stalled again; and if the Cermans had the time to organise the de- 
fences PLT! I, Lk would be a very formidable operation requiring far 
larger forces than at nresent allocated. As it was, all the assault 
shipT)ing available was insufficient to carry the present force. He 
also wrote to Eden asking him to use his influence on Churchill to 
have PUIAk executed. Keyes told Eden that lie had nlaced all his re- 
sources at the disT)osal of the commanders and, except in an advisory 
capacity, was no longer in the picture, but that the short time to 
prepare the force had already revealed the inexperience of the com- 
manders in combined operations. He pressed again the constant 
themes of action - 'procrastination is the thief of time - time is 
half a victor), which, being lost, is irrevocable' - and of his desire 
21 
for command. Eden assured Keyes on IS May 1941 that the Defence 
19. DOffl) 27 Mtg (-0-)-9 NFaý-, 41, CAB 69/2. 
20. COS(41) 173 MtF, 12 May 41, CIAB 79/11. 
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21. Keyes to Eden 12 ý-Iay 41, K 13/1S. 
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22 
Cojiunittee would vive his views the most careful consideration. g 
Annotating som6 of his earlier Papers at this time, Keyes noted 
that 12 days had passed si-nce his letter to Churchill urging the 
appointment of a supreme commander, and lie considered it lunques- 
tionable that the lack of such a commander has resulted in consid- 
23 
erable delay'. 
The Defence Committee (Ooerations) met on 14 May 1941 to decide 
whether PLPA should in fact sail on 23 May 1941. Eden believed that 
the situation in Spain was 'a little easier', and Churchill decided 
that in view of the situation he could j)ot launch the oDeration. 
The possibility of German forestallment would-have to be accepted. 
24 
PLYIR force was consequently ordered to be kept at 7 days notice. 
Keyes at this time was in Scotland, watching the training of the 
force. He was quite satisfied with the progress being made, and 
thought that the force could be maintained at neak efficiency for 
a fortnight. Mien informed of the postponement he i%Tote to Churchill 
telling him that he fully realised that no other course of action 
had been possible. Keyes was thinking in terms of only a short delay, 
and -Dromised to make further -Dronosals for the force before the fort- 
25 
night was up. 
The Majority of PU'tk force conducted a rehearsal the night of 
15 May 1941. The results were considered satisfactory, although the 
Royal Wrines needed further training with the supnorting arms, and 
the temno of the exercise was rather slow. This rehearsal was con- 
22. Eden to Keyes 15 Play 41, K 13/1S. 
23. Keyes to Churchill 30 Apr 41, DR-IN 3/361/1. 
24. DO(41) 29 k! tg 14 May 41, C-6LB 69/2. 
25. Keyes to Churchill 16 May 41, PRFý' 3/330/7. 
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ducted by moonlight, and after seeing it both coiwanders decided 
that the landing plan for TUR i*ýas definitely not feasible unless 
26 
carried out either in darkess or with the moon in the first quarter. 
hbile this was taking place the directives were Drepared for the 
cor=anders of the small expeditions to the Azores and Madeira. As 
there had lately been some renorts on the strengthening of the defences 
in the Canaries, these onerations began to take on a greater impor- 
tance. If PWR failed the British should at least be certain of 
the Azores and the Cape Verdes. As the contemplated operation 
against the Azores had really been in the nature of a Ibluff', it 
was now not considered adequate. The JPS were-thus instructed to 
come u-n with proposals for capturing the Azores against opposition, 
without interfering with the PLPIA force. The T)ossibility of inducing 
the United States to take action in the Azores., leaving the British 
to cover only the Canaries, was even considered, and the Foreign 
Office was asked to study an anproach to the United States on these 
27 
lines. 
Keyes met the COS on 21 ',, Ia-,, 1941 to discuss the imnlications of 
holding PLMAL force on 7 days notice. The force was to be disem- 
bar'k, ed so as to continue its training, and the possibility of leave 
was raised. Keyes favoured this, Dointing out that under the -wesent 
plan there were 12 days each month favourable to the operation, and 
6 days on which it would be iT. -inracticable. As the latter moon nhase 
had just started the exnedition would be unlikely to sail before 13 
June 1941. Although it meant that the whole force could not be keDt 
26. GS(P) to IY-IOFIP 18 May 41, WO 106/29S3. 
27. COS(41) 182 Pitg 20 May 41, CAB 79/11. 
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28 
at 7 days notice, the COS consequently approved the leave, A 
Following this, Keyes explained to the COS that, owing to the 
urgency of PUMA, the shipPing 'had been loaded primarily for that 
oi)cration. As there was now some time, he would nrefer to reload 
them so that as far as DOSSible each sbin would have a standard 
load, thus enabling the force to be ready at the shortest possible 
notice for other operations, Keyes had plainly decided that PUMA, 
as all the Atlantic operations before, might be held over indefin- 
itely, and he therefore sought to regain full control of the strik- 
ing force. 
It is considered desirable that the trooT)s and vessels 
should now be placed under the DCO operationally as far 
as their movements are concerned - consulting EPS as 
necessary - for training. Generally, the Directorate 
of Combined Ooerations and the CTC are better eqUipr)ed 
to carry out training than newly selected coim. anders 
and their staffs, who cannot have had the benefit of 
the same recent and intensive study of combined opera- 
tions. 
On a decision being reached to carry out an opera- 
tion the a2yointment of comnanders would again be 
considered. 
This question of control is finely balanced, and well illustrates 
the organisational iý. eakness in the system for combined operations. 
On the one hand it would be unrealistic to seT)arate the commanders 
and their staffs from the formations they would lead during the 
oneration, giving the formations to an outside apency for training 
and then reuniting them just prior to the operation. On the other 
hand the indefinite retention of all the ami)hibious troons for the 
operation, in an organisation separate from the Directorate of Com- 
bined On 
jerations, which after all, was resnonsible 
for training, 
28. COS(41) 183 Mtg 21 ýIay 41, GAB 79/11. 
29. Ke-% 7 
, es to 
COS . 11 May 41, K 13/8. 
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doctrine, and rpsearch and development, was wasteful of resources, 
and bound to lead to endless biclering. Perhaps the only way to 
resolve the problem would have been to place the commanders staffs, 
and trooT -nurpose striRing force. This ps under the DCO, as a general 
was in effect the nosition which Keyes bad demanded for so long, and 
which, for both good and bad reasons, had been so strenuously re- 
sisted by the service departments. This was indeed the crux of the 
problem, but it was again byp ., assed, and 
things were left to drift 
with the customary vague assurapces. 
Sturges and Hamilton bad meanwhile* been worl%iiig on aii altci-Date 
Plan to enable PUMA to be carried out in moonlight. On their return 
from the rehearsals in Scotland they -presented this to the COS, with 
Keyes once again nresent. This alternative T)lan entailed changing 
some of the objectives, and involved the use of far larger forces, 
narticularly naval, and more shipping. The COS did not think that 
these could be made available, and the alternative -Dlan was dis- 
carded. Pound felt that, as PUIM was a difficult weration, it 
should take place under the best circumstances. Keyes agreed in 
principle, but thought that RJINIA could be carried out in less favour- 
able moon conditions. The COS agreed with Pound, and accemed the 
fact that PUNIA should only be launched during the 10 days of the Z> 
dark moon neriod each month. This was recommended to Churchill, 
who agreed, and this neant that for the next few months the sailing 
dates would be 12-21 June, 12-21 July, and 10-19 August, for an 
assault on 21-30 June, 21-30 July, and 19-23 August respectivel-\ 
30 
6 
30. COS(41) 186 Mtg 23 May 41 and COS(41)- 190 Mtg 26 I'lay 41, C-AB 
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On 10 June. 1941 Keyes met the COS to consider wbetber JIUM sbould 
be mounted in the June moon T)eriod. While the COS, on purely military 
grounds, thought that it was desirable to carry out the operation, the 
political objections seemed to be still as strong as they had been 
a nonth prior. Pound finally agreed that if the Defence Committee 
(Onerations) stood PMA doi%m again, it would -remain at 7 days notice 
and would, as Keyes had suggested come tinder the DCO for training. 
Keyes stated that he thought this would be a more satisfactory ar- 
gement than before, since, although he had been able to assist in ran 
the training of PUMA force, lie had found it necessary to refer a 
number of minor matters of detail to the COS for decision. Given 
the necessary authority, be could easily settle such things himself. 
The question of launching PTIA was brought un in the Defence 
Committee (ODerations) meeting later that day, and the decision to 
stand MAN down until July, along with Keyes I responsibilitY for 
3ý 
training, was confirmed. A message was then sent to the joint 
commanders and the ITACM, which directed that all matters of nolicy 
in training, any operational or administrative natters in regard to 
the force's operational role, and any proposed movement of ships, 
should be referred to the DCO. Detailed matters of training would 
33 
be handled by the local authorities. Keyes now seemed to have 
all the authority he had renuested, but it remained to see how the 
arrangements would work in Dractice. 
31 
On 23 June 1941 the CIGS sugpested that, owing to the im-nortance 
31. COS(41) 207 Mtg 10 Jun 41, CIAB 79/12. 
32. DO(41) 40 TI! tg 10 Jun 41, C-6LB 69/2. 
i 
33. Keyes to Joint Co-mmanders, VACTC, and FOIC Greenock 12 Jun 41, 
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attached to MR, Keyes should review the plan and the forces alloca- 
ted for it in the light of the continued strengthening of the de- l 
fences by the Spanish, and of the need to do everything possible to 
34 
ensure a success. Keyes saw the COS on this on 24 June 1941. He 
doubted whether, tinder the new circumstances, the force was sufficient 
for the task, particularly as the plan was to a great extent dependent 
upon surprise. A far stronger naval force would be necessary if 
success was to be assured. The COS then asked Keyes, on the assump- 
tion that whatever forces i%, ere necessary would be made available, to 
discuss with the joint commanders the requirement for additional 
35 
forces. 
The coim. anders consulted with the EPS, and on 30 June 1941 sub- 
mitted their appreciation. They pointed out a number of weaknesses 
in the existing plan, including the shortage of air suDDort and the 
lack of numbers in the landing force. They therefore recommended 
the addition of a four-battalion infantry brigade, with supPorting 
arms, totalling 5,500 all ranks, with 370 tanks, guns, and vehicles. 
In order to carry these, another 4 transports and 2 Mr shi-os would be 
needed, and a further 2'Maracaibos'and 2 111LC carriers would be nec- 
essary to expedite. the landing. The naval forces would have to be 
increased by an 8" cruiser, an aircraft carrier, and several smaller 
shins, and ani)roximately 3 more fiphter and bomber srjuadrons would 
be needed. Even with these reinforcements, the joint commanders 
thought that they could only guarantee the seizure of the naval base 
at La Luz and the airfield at Cando, both on the Gran Canary and 
that it might not be Dossible to seize the remaining islands in 
R-. ----COSj-41ý 221 %Itg 7-5Tu-n-4-f-, -C7ff 19/12. 




Keyes and the joint commanders met the COS to examine this nroblem 
on 1 July 1941. After a lengthy discussion the COS agreed to T)rovide 
the additional military forces. The extra assault shipT)in. g was 
just coming into service, and could be allocated to PIJ\ik. They took 
note of the other forces required. In some respects this was not a 
major diversion of military forces, for the great majority of the 
reinforcements uould in any case have been included in a follow-up 
convoy scheduled to sail as soon as PU\iAL had taken place. 36th 
Infantry Brigade was therefore added to the original TUMA force of 
101st and 102nd -Royal Marine Brigades, the Special Service Brigade, 
and 29th Infantry Brigade. As far as the ship i oncerned, the . ping was c 
Ministry of War Transport was struggling to find shiT)s for all the 
demands that were being placed upon it, and was not at all inclined 
to lock uD valuable shi-pi)ing indefinitely. It therefore argued that 
the majority of the additional transnort could be taken uT) when the 
oneration was nearer execution. In the interim the Karanja and Hydra 
could be recommissioned as Royal Navy infantry assault ships. As 
soon as this was done an exercise combining all the forces involved 
37 
could be held at ScaDa Flow. 
The increase in the size of PLMA, force was to lead to other pro- 
blems. On 5 July the CIGS raised the issue of the military Command. 
As the forces involved had been considerably increased since the in- 
ception of the operation, the present headquarters was now inadequate. 
It would be necessary to either add a new headquarters or to increase 
36. COS(41) 121 (0) 'Operation 
-PUltA' 30 jun 41, CAB 80/S8. 
i 
37. COS(41) 18 Mtg (0) 1 Jul 41, CAB 79/55. 
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Sturges' staff,. in narticular his signals organisation. Keyes, 
Bourne (back as AGRM), and Sturges discussed this with the COS the 
following day. Two courses of action seemed feasible: to appoint a 
corps commander and nucleus staff to command the exnedition, with 
Sturges commanding the assault force; or to appoint a senior and 
experienced army officer as Sturges' deputy. Keyes strongly favoured 
the latter. He thought that the addition of a corps staff was un- 
necessary, and the COS agreed that the addition of the staff might 
well result in a temporary upset of the teamwork of the force and 
the detailed planning of the oDeration,. as well as producing an 
unfortunate DSYChOlogical effect. Dill maintained that the right 
solution, in principle, was to appoint a cor-os commander, but he 
recognised the problems it might cause. The COS therefore agreed 
to have the War Office appoint an army officer as second in command to 
Sturges and to make arrangements, in consultation with the DCO, 
39 
to augment the staff and signals. Dill was not satisfied, however, 
and raised the subject again on 9 July 1941. After the assault land- 
ing, PU. I. tk entailed a considerable land operation, and Dill considered 
that the commander of the force sliould have experience in this type of 
warfare. He suggested, as this was a nolitical ammintment, that the 
matter should he placed before Churchill. Pound and Portal deferred 
to the military view, but felt that Churchill should also be advised 
40 
of the disadvantages of such an appointment. A memorandum outlining ZI 
both points of view was accordingly sent to Churchill, recommending 
that Lieutenant Geneyal H. B. D.. Willcox be aT)T)ointed the military com- 
mander. Churchill accepted the new arrangement on 11 July 1941, 
38. COS (-4-lFT-Y233-4- ý It _c15 
,, 
5 ul 41, CIAB 79/12. 
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although by 18 July 1941 he had decided to appoint Lieutenant General 
41 
H. R. G. Alexander as the military coiinander. This was certainly not 
the only occasion where Keyes had reached an agreement with the COS 
at a meeting, only to have it reversed later when he was not present. 
Keyes and Sturges had worked well together; Keyes would not have the 
conflicts witb Alexander that he was to have with Hamilton, but Alex- 
ander firmly supported the War Office Dosition, and Keyes' influence 
was considerably diminished. A small example is seen by the fact 
that, whereas Sturges made use of the DCO's offices for planning, 
Alexander and Hamilton would work from the Admiralty. 
The IMinistry of War Transport was becoming increasingly con- 
cerned by the number of shiDs it was being asked to T3rovide for 
indefinite periods for operations, which represented a substantial 
loss to the reinforcement and import programmes. Some of the ships 
42 
bad already been lying idle for a year. A representative of the 
Ministry saw the COS on this on 16 July 1941, at the same time as 
the JPS were studying the additional shipping requirements for TIROL. 
At least three more MF ships were required for the full dress re- 
hearsal. The next favourable period for sailing, due to the dates 
of the rehearsal, was 14-19 August, and in the course of the dis- 
cussion it was pointed out that if PLNA i.. -as postDoned again the whole 
operation might have to be reviewed in the light of the deteriorating 
weather conditions, the continual increasing of the strength of the 
, garrison, the availability of naval 
forces, and even the T)ossibility 
of a German invasion of the United Kingdom. Taking these factors, 
and the political situation, into account, it was apreed that the 
41. Hollis to Churchill 10 Jul 41, PREM 3/361/1. 
42. COS(41) 432 'Merchant Shipping Held for ST)ecial Operations' 
IS Jul 41 CAB 80/29. 
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whole question of retaining valuable shipping should be reexamined 
43 
if PUMA was postponed after its* next reiriew on 6 August 1941. The 
COS had considered bringing the Glens back from the Pliddle East, and 
bad inquired as to their availability. The C-in-C Middle Fast told 
them that only one was readily available, and on 17 July the COS 
decided to order the ship back- to the United Kingdom. The move was 
halted by Churchill, however, who wanted the Glens used for combined 
44 
operations in the Middle East. 
During July 1941 the situation in Spain seepled to worsen when 
Franco made a major speech which appeared to place him firmly in the 
Axis camiD. The War Cabinet now thought that there was no question of 
his defending Spain against German subversion or attacR. The deci- 
sion would thus have to be made as to whether the British were ready 
to let matters develop until it suited Cermany to bring Spain into 
the war, or whether they should themselves take the initiative. The 
economic and militarv i)olicies in regard to Snain were therefore 
4S 
reviewed on 21 July 1941. The Defence Committee (Operations) con- 
sequently took up the question of PU\IA that same day. The opinion 
of the committee was that the Germans i.., ould enter S73ain 'either when 
th ey had successfully dealt with Pussia or if matters reached a dead- 
lock on the Russian front', a view which certainly covered most of the 
wssibilities. Echos of the earlier ALLOY and SHRAPNEL were heard 
when it was eXDlained that if PUNLA. was not executed before October, 
the bad weather in the Atlantic might make it impracticable. The 
arguments for and against carrying out PUM early on, at a time of 
British choosing, seemed to be fairly balanced. The majority, includ- 
43. COS(41) 247 Mtg 16 Jul 41, QkB 79/12. 
44. Telegram WO to C-in-C ME 17 Jul 41, PP04 3/330/9. C, 
45. WM(41) 72 MtgI 21 Jul 41, CAB 6S/19. 
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ing Pound, favoured the execution of PUIA4, and the committee therefore 
agreed in principle that the operation should be carried out 'at our 
oim chosen time,, and that preparations for sailing the expedition in 
August should proceed, despite all the disadvantages of alienating 
46 
Spain and Portugal. 
Alexander, recently appointed, had been studying the PUMA plans, 
and met the COS on *22 July 1941. This was his first meeting iqitb the 
COS, and it is interesting to note that Keyes was not present. In 
Alexander's opinion the plan still depended upon surprise for its 
success, and he was doubtful whether it could actually be achieved. 
He therefore considered that the size of his force should be in- 
creased sufficiently to ensure that it could force its waY ashore 
if suiwise failed. To do this he would need a third infantry bri- 
gade and the necessary landing craft, some more tanks, and an addi- 
tional bomber squadron. The COS granted these increases on 22 July 
1941 without any great discussion. The recommendation and decision 
has been made vJthout -reference to Keyes, and this marks the end of 
his influence on the plans and preparations for TUNAN. After the 
decision, however, Keyes was called in for consultation, as the 
increase in the military forces was to come nrimarily from the units 
allocated to the operations against the Portuguese islands, now 
47 
termed THRUSTER and SPRINWARD. The COS also suggested that, 
as the Defence Committee (Operations) had a-pnroved PUMA in princi0e, 
further questions of detail could be decided with Churchill alone, 
48 
unless political considerations were paramount. 
46. DO(441) S2 Mtg, __Uo_nfidential Annex 21 Jul 41, C. A. B 69/8. 
47. COS(41) 220 Mtg (0) 22 Jul 41, CIAB 79/SS. 
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Cliurchill. saw the COS about PMA the evening of 23 . 1uly 1941. 
The joint coiiun . anders were pres6nt; Keyes was not. Churchill thoiight 
that the political situation in Spain had worsened, and he was there- 
fore in favour of carrying out PLJ, \tk at the earliest opportunity. If 
the situation altered 'radically' before the operation, the govern- 
ment would of course have to cancel it. 
It was essential that PUMA be successful, since, if it was con- 
ducted, Gibraltar would be lost. Churchill therefore apDroved the 
recent additions to the PUN1A force, and cancelled THRUSTER and SPRING- 
BOARD. He was also -orepared to withhold any shipping necessary from 
trade. The rehearsal, termed LEAPFROG, was to start on 4 August 1941, 
after which the force would be ready to sail. The joint commanders 
then explained the details of their plan, and their belief that it 
held 'every reasonable chance of success'. The question of whether 
the operation should be conducted in August or Sentember was then 
raised, by whom is not clear. This seems somewhat surr)rising, since 
the generally accepted view was that the operation should be conducted 
as early as possible. In an), event, the commanders thought that 
August was preferable and Churchill agreed. The political situation 
was deemed to favour this month, and the chance of a r1erman invasion 
of the United Kingdom then was small. If PUItA, was successful, oT)eTa- I 
tions against the Portuguese islands could be carried out by elements 
of the RM4 force, and the T)Ians were to be n-repared with this in 
49 
mind. 
All these decisions were explained to the War Cabinet by Chur: 
chill the following day, 24 Jul), 190.1. Mt4 force would leave the 
49. COS(41) 249 Mtg, Secretary's Standard File 23 Jul -4-If-, -GSY--779786. 
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country about 10 August, and would be 9 or 10 days en route, so the 
operation could-be called off at any time up to 10 August. This 
emphasis on the possibility of cancellation would seem to indicate 
something less than full bacRing for PUNIA, even by Churchill, but 
the War Cabinet nevertheless took note of the decisions without 
50 
dissention. 
On 28 July 1941, with the amalgamation of the PUMA, THRUSTER, I 
and SPRINGBOARD forces, the code name was changed from 'PUMA to 
PILGRIM. Pound then brought up the results of a study of the i)ye- 
vailing weather conditions, which showed that the northeast trade 
winds made surf conditions in August particularly difficult. Sep- 
tember would be a better month in this respect. Pound also felt 
that it would prove easier to find the necessary naval escorts in 
September, as well as nroviding time to study the results of LEAP- 
FROG. A more detailed study of the weather conditions was being 
S1 
carried out in consultation with Hamilton. Considering the fact 
that operations against the Atlantic islands had, in one form or 
another, been mounted for a year, it is an indictment of slipshod 
staff work if the surf conditions had not been lmoi%n beforehand. 
It is nossible, of course, that Pound was lool\ing for a convenient 
excuse to delay an operation with which he was not wholly in favour. 
On 29 July 1941 the COS met with the joint commanders and the 
Directors of Intelligence. Ace again it was clear that Pound was 
applying the braRes. Three main points were touched on in this 
SO. W14(41) 74 Mt, 9 24 Jul 41, CAB 65/19. For detail of Francos's 
s. Deech see Hoare, pp. 112-114. 
S1. COS(41) 264 ', Itg 23 Jul 41, C-AB 79/13. 
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meeting, The first was Pound's statement that the need for destroyers 
for PILGRIM would deplete the British resources e1scwhcre to a great 
extent, and that the situation would be very mucli easier in September. 
The Directors of Intelligence then covered reT)orts on the strengthen- 
ing of the defences in the Canaries. Details were still lacking, and 
the British consuls there were to be instructed to re. Dort on the 
defences 'as a matter of urgency'. Alexander stated that the ilost- 
i)onement of PILGRIM, from a military T)oint of view, would not make 
much difference, as the overall defences could not be considerably 
strengthened in one month. Pound then brotiolit uo the noint about the 
weather. Hamilton was not impressed by the arg gument on the surf 
conditions, and countered it i%Tith the assertion that the weather on 
the Tiassage in September would i)robably be worse, with attendant 
fuelling problems. On balance, he did not see much difference be- 
tween the two months from the point of view of the weather. Pound 
then Produced other arguments favouring the postponement of PILGRIM. 
The British would retain the use of Gibraltar, with the ability to 
pass ships and aircraft into the P-Tediterranean, for a further month. 
Trade with the Iberian Peninsula could continue for another i'.. 1onth. 
Finally the longer September nights would be an advantage to the 
assaulting force. The COS succumbed toDound'sarguments, and a 
memorandum was sent to Churchill recommending that PILGRIM be post- 
T)oned until Sentember. All the advantages listed above were enLmier- 
ated, and a few more added. It was noted that if the decision to 
launch PILGMM were taR-en in Au(ýust, the oneration would occur during 
the RIVIERA conference with Roosevelt. Alexander was said to T)refer 
a further ronth to train his troons and to mould his staff into a 
team. The invasion situation would then be clearer. The Foreign 
Secretary had also been a! ). proached, and iJiile lie was nrenared to 
4 
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'jump the fence' in August if military reasons made it necessary, be 
S2 
also would Prefer a -nostponement. 
Churchill did not accept the delay, and sent the memorandum 
back to the COS asking what would happen if the Germans acted in the 
53 
interim and, as a result, the British lost the use of Gibraltar. 
The COS reassured him that, with the strength of the forces now 
committed to PILGRIM, the islands could be taken regardless of German 
54 
activities. Churchill was still not completely convinced, and 
the postponement was discussed at a Defence Committee (Operations) 
meeting on 1 August 1941. Pound recounted the arguments for post- 
ponement, dwelling on the destroyer shortage. The question of 
carrying out PILGRIM, if necessary, during a Period of moonlight was 
raised, but the COS, considering the o. neration a hazardous one, were 
not willing to do this. aurchill in the end agreed to the 'Postnone- 
ment, and noted that even if the Germans (Irove the British out of 
Gibraltar during the intervening period, PILGRIM would have to wait 
SS 
until the Se-Dtember dark neriod. 
On the following day the commanders informed the COS that they 
had decided that it would be practicable to carrv out the oneration, 
if necessary, in conditions of -Dartial moonlight. The number of 
days each month on vJAch PILGRIM could not be carried out due to 
moon conditions would be limited to S. The commanders therefore 
thought it essential thatnoneof the shipping taking part in LEAP- 
FROG should be released at the end of the exercise. The COS so 
52. COS(41) 23 NItg (0) 29 Jul 41, CIAB 79/S5. 
I 
53. ;% Note on Ismay to Churchill 29 Jul 41, PRDI 3/361/1. 
54. Ismay to Churchill 30 Jul 41, PFLNI 3/361/1. 
S5. DO(41) S3 Mtg, Confidential Annex I Aug 41, C-AB 69/8. 
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informed Churchill at their next meeting, and the change was 
1 56 'cordially approved'. Meanwhile, the Governor of Gibraltar was 
worRing on the defences there, including the evacuation of some of 
57 
the support organisation. 
As has been noted, the Portuguese Atlantic islands had not been 
forgotten during the buildup of UM and PILGRIM. At the first signs 
of a deterioration of the situation in Spain, TRUCK and B-ASEBALL bad 
been put on 48 hours notice, and the JPS report on 23 April 1941, 
which recommended PUMA, also envisaged the simultaneous execution of 
BASEBALL. As the forces for TRUCK were. to be absorbed into DUýtk, it 
was accepted that the Azores could not longer -be taken against opPo- 
sition. The JPS thought, however, that it would still be desirable 
to occupy the Azores and Madeira simultaneously with PUMA and BASE- 
BALL. It was considered that a small force, carried in ivarshiDs, 
might successfully land in the islands. The JPS felt that the arri- 
val of such a force, backed by the -oresence of warshiT)s in the har- 
SS 
bour, might be accented by the Portuguese garrisons. The JPS 
started working on plans for these operations, the urgency being C, -- 
increased when Sturges announced that, after 6 May 1941, TRUCK force 
would no longer be at 48 hours notice. During the period when the Z' - 
TRUCK force was being integrated into PU11-1, %, an improvised operation 
for the canture of the Azores could be mounted at 96 hours notice, 
S9 
but this would then interfere with the mounting of PLJ. 'tA, On S May 
6 1941 the JPS nresented the COS with some suggestions for sendincy 
56. COS(41) 272 and 274 Mtgs 2 Aug 41, CAB 79/13. 
57. See discussion in COS(41) 276 Mtg S Aug 41, C-AB 79/13. 
S8. JP(41) 313 'The Atlantic Islands' 23 Apr 41, CAB 79/11. 
59. COS(41) 13 Mtg (0) 3 May 41, CAB 79/5S. 
) 
small forces to the Azores and Madeira, and were instnicted to 
pmoare the plans. As in Cane Verdes, these operations were to be 
60 
conducted with the intention of a peaceful landing. The outline 
plans were ready by 12 May 1941. The COS accepted them, ordering 
that the appropriate directives be prepared for the respective 
corrunanders and the nrenarations be T)ut in band for the despatch of 
61 
the forces. 
During the beginning of May reports were received of the in- 
creased defences in the Canaries and thus, when the JPS on 20 May 
1941 presented the draft directives to týe commanders of the opera- 
tions against the Azores and Madeira, there was now some doubt as 
to the basic premise behind the occunation of the Portuguese islands. 
The COS felt that if PLJIXIA failed they must at least be certain of the 
other operations. Although it did not seem possible to attack 
both the Canaries and the Azores in force simultaneously, the COS 
thought that it might be T)ossible to improvise an operation at 
short notice, so that if owosition was encountered in the Azores 
the British would not have to 1withdraw tamely'. The JPS were there- 
fore instructed to put fomard proposals for capturing the Azores 
62 
against opposition, without interfering with PUM. 
On the following day General Giffard, GOC West Africa, saw the 
COS while on a visit to London. He was satisfied with the m-epara- 
tions for B. k9EB-UL, but wanted to lmow that woLild happen when 161st 
Brigade, earmarked for the operation, was despatched to the Middle 
East. He did not consider that it would be wise to use the replace- 
60. COS(41) 161 Mtg S May 41, CAB 79 11. 
61. COS(41) 173 Mtg 12 'May 41, 
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ment African troops for the Operation, as their participation might 
be bitterly resented by the Portuguese. Also, if BASEBALL met with 
opposition, he did not think- they were of a sufficiently high stand- 
ard of training to succeed. The JPS were consequently instructed 
63 
to see if other forces could be provided for BASEBALL. 
The JPS presented their new plans for the Azores and Madeira 
on 28 May 1941. The COS agreed that the military forces required, 
a brigade of two battalions for the Azores and a battalion for 
Madeira, should be assembled, ýIong with the stores and equipMent, 
and prepared for the operations. Ist Guards Brigade was earmarRed 
for this. The forces would be Rei)t at 7 days notice. Although an 
W/store ship would be tak-en up at the first available onportunity, 
no transnorts were to be held. Royal Navy shins could be used if 
necessary. As far as BASEBALL was concerned, the JPS recommended 
that no special force should be provided after the departure of 
161st Brigade. Due to the location of the Cape Verdes, and the minor 
German threat, it was felt that part of the PU. AA, forces could be 
64 
used to occupy the islands after the Canaries were secured. The 
COS agreed to this, and the GOC West Africa was asked how long he 
could kee-P BASEBALL mounted. The GOC informed the War Office that 
BASEBALL could not be mounted after 9 June 1941, and his formal 
responsibility for BASEBALL ceased on 10 June 1941. On 9 June 1941 
the COS also approved the general plans for the seizure of the Azores 
against opposition, termed THRUSTER, and instructed the JPS to -ore- 
pare the directives for the commanders. The COS also considered 
63. COS(41) 183 Mtg !l May 
1 
41, CAB 79/11. 
64. COS(41) 192 Mtg 28 ýMay 41, C-kB 79/11. 
plans for the occupation of Madeira, now by invitation, termed 
6S 
SPRINGBOARD. 
These merations were revicived in a COS meeting with Keyes on 
10 June 1941. Keyes thought URUSTER would have more of a chance 
if two Belgian LSI(S) previously earmarked for the Mediterranean 
were made available, and said he would take this up with the joint 
66 
commanders. SPRINGBOARD seemed to nose little -oroblem. The I 
operations were discussed again at a Defence CoiTnittee (nperations) 
meeting later than night, the one at which PUNR was postponed until 
July 1941. It was then agreed that the 
. 
1st Guards Brigade, ear- 
marked for THRUSTER, should be at 7 days notice from 11 June 1941. 
A Royal Marine battalion earmarked for SPRINGBOARD was -ready then, 
67 
and could be launched simultaneously with PUý-tk. 
There were some delays with the THRUSTER force, and on 14 June 
1941 Rear Admiral AN. Willis, the naval commander designate, in- 
formed the COS that the force could- not be considered at less than 
68 
14 days notice. On 17 June 1941 the final directives for the 
commanders of THRUSTER and SPRINGBOARD were ready, and were anproý, ed 
by the COS. The joint commanders of THRUSTER were instructed to con- 
sult the DCO and his staff when making their plans. This coordina- 
tion apparently worked well, as bad the PLJMý nlanning tinder Sturges. 
SPRINGBOARD was to be tinder the command of the naval officer detailed, 
and its commanders were not similiarly enjoined to consult with the 
6S. Notes to DP, Adm 29 May 41 and to DMOýP 3 Jun 41, WO 106/2948, 
Telegram WO to GOC West Africa 4 Jun 41 and Commander Sierra 
Leone Area to IVO 5 Jun 41, WO 106/2948; COS(41) 205 Mtg 9 Jim 
41, C-kB 79/12. 
66. COS(41) 207 Mtg 10 Jun 41, C-, %B 79/12. 
67. DO(41) 40 Mtg 10 Jun 41, CAB 69/2. 




DCO. As SPRINGBOARD was to be a peaceful landing, this was tinder- 
69 
standable. 
On 30 June 1941 Willis and the military commander of THRUSTER, 
Brigadier V. Copeland-Griffiths, submitted an appreciation in which 
they maintained that the continued Portuguese strengthening of the 
defences, in part due to British pressure, and the general tighten- 
ing up of security, would in time invalidate the basic premise of 
the THRUSTER plan. They did not think they would be able to esta- 
blish the trooDs ashore without a resource to force. They -pointed 
out, however, that the forces involved ivere hardly strong enough 
for an opposed landing against 'serious' resistance, and unless the 
operation took place soon they felt it would be necessary to review 
the comnosition of the force. They also considered the naval forces 
inadequate, and requested the addition of an aircraft carrier - this 
at the same time the PUMA commanders were requesting a third air- 
79 
craft carrier. Keyes saw the COS on 3 July 1941 and su-nported the 
commanders' opinions on the weakness of the THRUSTER force. He 
thought that the best possible -plan had been made tinder the circum- 
stances. The COS, however, could not find additional reinforcements 
71 
for the operation. 
Towards the end of July 1941 the anparent worsening -nosition in W 
Spain caused the COS to concentrate on PUMA. This was after Alexander 
had assumed command and requested the addition of another brigade to 
his force. Keyes and the joint com. anders of THRUSTER met the COS on 
22 July 1941 to consider the position. The COS felt that with the 
69. COS(41) 214 Mtg 17 Jun 41, CAB 79/12 and COS(41) 108 (0) 'Atlantic 
Islands' 18 Jun 41, CAB 80/S8. 
70. COS(41) 122 (0) 'Operation THRUSTER' 30 Jun 41, CAB 80/58. 
71. COS(41) 223 Mtg 3 Jul 41, C-AB 79/12. 
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increase in the Portuguese defences and the tightening of security 
it seemed unlikely that the Germans could effect a landing in the 
Azores. For the same reasons it was agreed that the THRUSTER force 
was insufficient for the task, and it was argued that the forces 
allocated for the operation could be used with better effect in RDIA. 
In any event, if PU11A were to be reinforced to the extent considered 
necessary, the landing craft and naval escorts were unlikely to be 
found for a simultaneous landing in the Portuguese Atlantic islands. 
If THRUSTER was put off until after PLJ. 14A, SPRINC-30ARD would also be 
unnecessarv. The COS therefore decided that THRUSTER and SPRINGBnAPD 
forces would be used to Teinforce PLJIM, and that these operations 
72 
would, if necessary, be carried out after PLJj\tk. Operations against 
the Portuguese Atlantic islands, which had been mounted in one form 
or another since the summer of 1940, were thus at an end. It would 
not be until early 1942 that they would re-emerge. 
One of the alternatives to British operations against the Atlantic 
islands occasionally suggested was the involvement of the United States. 
First direct mention of this occurred on 24 Anril 1941, when Rear Ad- 
miral Robert Ghormley of the 11nited States Navy, serving as an observer 
in London, asked the COS what-T)Ians the British had for the occunation 
of the Azores and Cape Verdes if the Germans invaded Spain or Portugal. 
On S May 1941 the COS agreed to inform him of the British intention to 
73 
seize the islands. The British had earlier told the United States 
that there were no -nlans for the occiwation of the Canaries, and when 
72. COS(41) 20 Mtg (0) 22 Jul 41, -CALB -79/SS. 
73. COS(41) 7ý (0) 'Spain: Plan if Axis Invades' 4 ýIay 41 and COS(41) 
7S (0) IST)ain: Plan if Axis Invades' S 'May 41, CAB 80/S7. Chorm- 
ley had come in August 1940. See R. E. Lee, The London Observer 
(London 1972), edited by j. Leutze, for details. 
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on 7 Ilay 1941 the JPS suggested that Mormley be informed that the 
British were reconsideri ng their interests in this area, the COS 
replied that they did not think it necessary unless PLIAAL were 
74 
definitely decided upon. 
The United States was worRing on its own T)Ians at this time. 
The Ist Marine Division, on the east coast, had been earmarRed for 
landing onerations, and on 27 May 1941 the 2nd Marine Division in 
California was also instructed to provide a reinforced regiment for 
expeditionary duty in the Atlantic. The most probable missions 
appeared to be either the occupation of. Martinique or of the Azores. 
As the American intelligence indicated that Germans would soon invade 
Russia, however, the American feeling was that this would cancel any 
immediate threat to Gibraltar and render the Azores venture pointless. 
Roosevelt therefore ordered a suspension of the Azores planning on 
7 June 1941, and the reinforced regiment earmarked for it was shortly 
7S 
thereafter ordered to move to Iceland. No mention of the American 
project aDpears in the British military records. 
By 23 June 1941 the COS decided that the Joint Staff Mission in 
Washington should inform the Americans of the planned operations 
76 
against the Canaries. The subject of the Atlantic islands was one 
of those covered in the talks between Churchill and Roosevelt at the 
74. COS(41) 165 Mtg 7 May 41, CAB 79TI-1. 
7S. LTC K. J. Clifford, The U. S. Marine Corns in Tceland 1941-1942 (HQ 
USMC 1970), pp. 3-4. For ýAmerican planning in general see S. Conn 
and B. Fairchild, The Framework of Hemis-ohere Defense (Washington 
1960). British-. American Planning is covered in M. Matloff and E. 
Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (Wash- 
ington 1953). 
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RIVIERA Conference. Salazar had contacted Roosevelt regarding the 
Portuguese goveimment's plans to move to the Azores in the event of 
a German invasion. While he was relying on British assistance he 
would, if they were occupied elsewhere, willingly accept American 
beli). Roosevelt was agreeable to this. Churchill explained PILGRIM, 
which might precipitate a crisis, but Roosevelt said that, even if the 
British acted first, it would not affect his responsibility to Portu- 
gal. Roosevelt discussed the earlier American plans for occupying 
the Azores, and agreed to have a force in readiness for this oneration 
by mid-September. The COS welcomed any relief from their commitments, 
and it was decided that the British should change their -Dolicy in 
regard to Portugal, and encourage Salazar to seek American assistance. 
77 
The Portuguese problem was thus laid to rest. 
Keyes had been cut off from the T)Ianning and preparations for 
PILGRIM since the arrival of Alexander. With the successive nost- 
ponements of PUMA and then PILGRIM, he was becoming convinced that 
this operation would never tak-e nlace, and he feared that his original 
concept for a striling force nrepared for any operation that might 
be opnortune had been lost. The indefinite 'holding of the I)ILGRIM 
force would prevent any useful offensive operations being undertaRen I 
Z. ý 
against the Germans. lie wrote to Ismay about this on 6 August 1941. 
Now that the Cermans were deenly involved in the Soviet Union, he 
thought the time rine for offensive action by Britain. He sug , gested 
a raid on the French coast, but admitted that it was a limited opera- 
tion. I%Iiile this was all the British could do on the Continent it- 
self, he thought that the British had the power to deliver a 'con- 
siderable stroke overseas' if the whole of the amnhibious striking 
77. C- (41) 25 Mtg (0) 12 Aug 41, CAB-79TS5 and 1\', NI(41) 84 Mtg 19 Aug 
41, C-AB 6S/20. 
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force was used. The previous plan for the capture of Sardinia might 
prove an attractive proposition. ' PILGRIM force, with a few extra 
units that were available, was canable of seizing and holding the 
island, and he thought it doubtful that the Germans would be able 
to offer substantial resistance. Considerable -pressure could thus 
be exerted upon the enemy in the western Mediterranean without the 
involvement of the British forces already there. 'Events may move 
very rapidly now, and I suggest that PILGRIM force should not be held 
inactive for any one object, since it is the only amphibious force we 
78 
possess, or can possess for a long time to come'. This was a valid 
point, and was to lead to another confrontation. 
There were others who doubted that PILGRIM would ever take nlace. 
MO 1 cast covetous eyes at the shipping being tied up, thinking of its 
usefulness in the Middle East reinforcement i)rogramme. Various sec- 
tions of the War Office had been asked to examine what effect an in- 
crease in the programme would have on the strategic situation in the 
14iddle East, and whether it would justify nressing for the release of 
the shipping instead of holding it for the various Attractive - if 
79 
not altogether sound - projects which may also be competitors'. 
Keyes met the COS to discuss his views later on 6 August 1941. 
It was agreed that the JPS should consider what oDerations might use- 
fully be undertalKen by the force during the following six months, 
assuming that the situation in Snain improved and that Axis morale 
showed definite signs of deterioration. No detailed T31ans were to be 
prepared. Keyes was also authorised to discuss his i)YoT)osals for a 
80 
raid on the French coast with the PILGRIM commanders. On 19 August 
4 
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Keyes therefore explained to Alexander his concept of a. striling 
I 
force., and inciuded the proposal for Sardinia as well as the raid in 
81 
France. Alexander did not prove forthcoming, however, Although 
he read Keyes' papers 1xvith interest', he did not feel he could give 
a useful opinion of either project without more detailed intelligence 
on the latest enemy situation, including aerial photographs. lie was 
also very wary about committing himself on the question of the stra- 
tegic advantages of such an operation - 'this again can only be 
82 
assessed by those who have full access to all information'. Alex- 
ander, on the joint commanders' last visit to London, had failed to 
call on Keyes, and Keyes was 'very disappointed that Alexander won't 
play'. Keyes still considered Alexander the right man for the job, 
but was upset at being cut off from the amphibious force. 11 have 
not been invited to have anything to do with PILGRIM force since 
the COS gave their instructions to the joint commanders about a 
month ago', he noted on 22 August 1941. Once again, Keyes felt that 
the opportunity to striRe an offensive blow was being lost through 
83 
failure to T)roperly prepare the means. 
The joint commanders themselves were beginning to have doubts 
about PILGRIM, albeit for other reasons. On 14 August 1941 they sub- 
mitted a paper to the COS showing the deterioration of the weather 
conditions on passage as the months went by. The disparate size, 
seaworthiness, pronulsion, and endurance of the shiT)s now allocated 
to the operation v., ould cause great difficulties if an), substantial 
bad weather was encountered. The increasing -Drobability of this, if 
81. Keyes to A 
82. Alexander to Keyes 21 Aug 41, DEFF 2/698. 
83. Keyes to Ismay 22 Aug 41 and Keyes to Alexander 22 Aug 41, DEFE 
2/698. 
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the operation was delayed until October, would thus pose an additional 
hazard 'of very grave concern'. * The comanders noted, in closing, 
'that PILGRIM has been compared with the Spanish Annada, of which it 
84 
has been written "Me winds blew and they were scattered"', 11ey 
were also very concerned about the changes in the com-position of the 
force, most of which in isolation appeared minor, but whose cumulative 
85 
effect was important. Both of these complaints received sympathy at 
least in the War Office, and it was clear that a decision would soon 
have to be made whether PILGRIM would be launched in 1941, as well 
86 
as what priority the PILGRIM force should have. 
The COS met the Joint commanders on 20 August 1941 to resolve 
these questions. Earlier in the meeting the COS had spoRen to the 
military attache to Madrid, Brigadier Torr, who vas home on a visit. 
This was apparently the first time that they had had an opPortunity 
to hear his views., which were more ontimistic than most of those r)re- 
vailing in London. Torr thought that Franco would not let the Cermans 
enter Spain as long as the British held on to Egypt, and that the 
Germans were not prepared to force their way in. A premature attack 
on the Atlantic islands, however, would change all this, He felt 
that the disadvantages of such a course of action far outweighed the 
advantages. hben the COS saw the joint commanders Pound was therefore 
able to stress the undesirability of a premature decision to launch 
PILGRIM, which would -result in the loss of Gibraltar and severelv 
damage both trade and the Middle East -position. The British could not 
84. COS(41) 171 (0) 'Weather Conditions on Passage' 14 Aug 41, CM 
80/59. 
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afford to be forced into the oT)eration solely because the wcather 
conditions precluded them from carrying it out later in the year. 
He went on to suggest some alternatives, such as mounting the opera- 
tion from the West Indies. The COS did grant some naval reinforce- 
ments, and the Admiralty was asRed to examine some of the other 
organisational difficulties facing the commanders. They in turn were 
to investigate further alternatives along the lines suggested by 
87 
Pound. 
Hamilton produced a new proposal on 22 August 1941. He was 
convinced that it was imT)racticable to Eiail the whole convoy from 
the United Kingdom during the winter months. Alternatives that had 
been looked at were the sailing of the expedition from Bermuda or 
Trinidad and the use of either Gibraltar or Freetoi%m as a base. 
The first two options were ruled out because there were not enough 
facilities for the forces involved, and the refuelling problem would 
remain. The third was ruled out because Gibraltar might not be 
available when it was needed. The fourth, which involved sailing the 
'Maracaibos', smaller transports, and ships of the slow convoy, 
with the full complement of landing craft but minus the troops, to 
Freetoim, to be joined by the main convoy when the operation was ordered, 
looked more promising. Some minor adjustments would have to be made 
in the shipping and escort arrangements, but it would allow PILGRIM 
to remain at four to five weeRs notice throughout the winter. The 
concentration at Freetown might be taken as a prelude to another 
assault on Dakar, which would provide good cover for the oneration. 
Alexander agreed with this recommendation, and it was presented as a 




The COS examined this proposal on 27 August 1941, The War Office 
had opposed the idea, as with the long notice required it was quite 
T)sosible that the Germans could occupy the Canaries first. Naval 
considerationst howevert were to remain the governing factor. After 
some discussion the COS agreed that Hamilton's proposal was the only 
way of keeping PILGRIM mounted during the winter months. Hamilton 
pressed for an immediate decision, but he was asked to provide, in 
consultation with the Naval Staff, further details on the implications 
of the proposal, in regard both to the size of the force which would 
be sent to Preetoi%m, and to the effect on the-availability of equin- 
ment for combined operations training in the United Kingdom. The 
COS were also concerned about the effect on the availability of forces 
for other raiding operations, and the JPS were tasked to cover this 
in the course of the prenaration of a reDort on assistance to the 
39 
Soviet Union. 
Hamilton quickly provided the COS with details of the force to 
be sent to Freetown. The possibility of mounting a major operation 
on the Continent to relieve the Soviet Union was -regarded as un- 
realistic, and so on that same day the COS agreed that PILGRIM 
should remain mounted during the winter. They aT)proved, in principle, 
the sending of the shipping Hamilton bad listed to Froe-toim. The 
decision would be confirmed by the Defence Committee (OrDerations), 
and in the meanwhile the DCO was to be informed. Considering that 
the shipping to be sent to Freetoi%m included both Dutch LSI(M), the 
88. COS(41) 177 (0) 'Operation PILGRIM' 22 Aug 41, CAB 80/59. 
89. WO Brief on COS(41) 177 (0) 25 Aug 41, WO 193/794 and COSOI) 
298 Mtg 27 Aug 41, CAB 79/13. 
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counissioned. transports Royal Scotsman, Royal Ulstennan, and Ulster 
Monarch, the 'Maracaibos' Misoa' and Bachequero, and the LSG Dewdale 
90 
and Ennerdale., this certainly was a matter of interest to Keyes. 
Keyes had not been consulted before the COS made this decision, 
nor did they wait to receive his comments before they discussed it 
with Churchill and Eden. Churcbill, on 28 August 1941, livelcomed' the 
idea, for if it had been found impracticable to carry out PILGRIM 
during the winter, he would have been forced to make a very difficult 
decision, and 'might have made a false move'. Eden sui)ported the 
proposal, as he felt that the situation.. in Spain could readily de- 
teriorate in the autumn, and it would be 'an-enormous advantage' if 
the British could avoid making the first moire. Agreement was there- 
fore reached that the smaller ships should be sent to Freetoun as 
soon as escort could be found, with the proviso that the oneration 
91 
should be Rept at short notice during the changeover. C> 
Hollis informed Keyes of this decision the same day, noting that 
'the consequences of this decision will need a little thinking out, 




Keyes replied imediately that a good part of the assault 
shiming available for operations in home waters or the Mediterranean 
would thus 'be i.,, ithdraim to lie idle'. The sending of both available 
tank assault ships would seriously reduce the impact of any landing 
F 
contemplated in the future. The shipping of the 44 landing craft 
involved would not only seriously curtail an), of fensive onerations in 
home waters, but would also greatly interfere with the combined oDera- 
tions training programe the War Office had requested. The gradual 
90. COS(ýl) 28 Mtg (0) 27 Aug 41, CAB 79/SS. 
91. COS(41) 29 Mtg (0) 28 Aug 41, C-e 79/SS. 
i 
92. Hollis to Keyes 28 Aug 41, K 13/9. 
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deterioration of the condition of the force while at FrectoiNn had also 
93 
to be considered. For a second time, Keyes felt that the only 
available striking force was being uselessly broken up. 
Nevertheless, the COS T)roceeded with the implementation of the 
decision, seeing the PILGRIM commanders and the EPS the morning of 
29 August 1941 to work out further details. Most of these were minor, 
although the COS accepted the new estimate that, under this plan, the 
assault could not take place until 32 days after the decision was 
made. The PILGRIM commanders were asked also to frame recowenda- 
tions for the administration and training of the PILGRIM force in 
the United Kingdom during the winter months. It was in this connec- 
tion, and only in this connection, that Keyes was invited to meet the 
94 
COS and the commanders the next day. 
Keyes was meanwhile thinking along broader lines, and he returned 
to his earlier ideas on alternative einployments for the PILGRIM force. 
He i., Yas critical of the offensive plans then being considered by the 
JPS, all of which went into 1942, and which required larger forces than 
were likely to be available. He therefore stressed that 'practically 
the whole of our means of prosecuting amnhibious warfare has been ab- 
sorbed into the PILGRIM expedition, which may never be necessary'. 
By this time Keyes no longer believed in the Dracticability of PILGRIM, 
given the conditions likely to be encountered, and he again Dressed for 
the use of the force for operations such as an assault on Cherbourg, 
or against Sardinia. lie was convinced that the Ge-nTians were being 
over-stretched in the Soviet Union, anO that the time was opportune 
93. Keyes to COS 2, Q) Alig 41, K 13/q. 
I C, 
94. COS(41) 30 Mtg (0) 29 Aug 41, CAB 79/SS. 
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9s 
for offensive action. Hollis' note on the COS decision to disperse 
the force., sent after the 29 August COS meeting, therefore uDset Keyes 
a great deal. Characteristically, he was at first inclined to go 
directly to Churchill, but he told Hollis that 'before appealing to 
the Prime ýIinister and placing the facts - as I see them - before him, 
I am of course ready to give my views to the COS and let them know 
96 
what I propose to say to him - if I consider it necessary'. 
Keyes and the PILGRIM commanders met the COS on the morning of 
30 August 1Q41. Pound explained the background behind the decision, 
including the fact that the JPS had looýed, without results, for al- 
ternative operations. There was no operation-on the Continent that 
would materially assist the Soviet Union, and 'there was no question 
of launching an expedition merely for the sake of finding emnloyiTient 
for these well-trained and well-equipped amphibian forces'. Pound 
considered that, if the PILGRIM force was eventually to be used for 
operations in the Mediterranean or North Africa, it would be just as 
well to get the slow and less seaworthy ships south of the Bay of 
Biscay before the bad weather set in. Keyes replied that he 'quite 
understood' the reason for the decision, although he had not been 
consulted. He 'strongly disagreed', however, witb locking up valuable 
shipping at Freetoi%n, possibly for the whole winter. He thought that 
the opportunity to capture the Canaries had passed, but that the ranid- 
ly changing situation on the Continent might nrovide new opportunities 
which must be grasped. The COS 'took- note' of Keyes' objections and 
97 
alternative proposals, but the decision stood. 
95. COS(41) 184 (0) 'Alternative EmT)lo), ment 6f PI-f-GRIM force' 29 Aug 
41, CAB 79/5S. 
96. Keyes to Hollis 29 Aug 41, K 13/9. 
97. COS(41) 31 Mtg (0) 30 Aug 41, CIAB 79/55. 
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Keyes reminded the COS later that day that he still disagreed 
with the breaking up of the force, and on 2 September 1941 he sent a 
letter to Churchill, with a copy to the COS, registering his protest. 
lie pointed out that the decision had been arrived at on the advice of 
Hamilton, without reference to himself, and was based on two assump- 
tions - that PILGRIM as constituted could capture Gran Canary by 
assault during the winter months, and that no effective use could be 
made of the amphibious striking force at home or in the Mediterranean 
during the winter months - with which he could not agree. Further- 
more, he complained that Churchill had made the final decision before the 
DCO had even heard of the plan. Keyes went on to say that he was 
98 
'impelled, as DCOI to put these views before Churchill. Churchill 
did see Keyes briefly on 4 September 1941, but remained firm. Chur- 
chill was concerned, however, about Keyes' assertions that a beach 
assault on the Canaries, without any -prospect of surprise, Iwould be 
bloodily repulsed'. 
A meeting was therefore held at No. 10 Downing Street on 9 Sep- 
tember 1941, with Churchill, the COS, Keyes and the commanders present. 
The first matter taRen up was the feasibility of PILGRIM. This hinged 
on the interpretation of recent information received on the defences 
in the Canaries. It was apT)arent that Keyes gave more credence to 
unconfirmed reports than the COS or the commanders did, and it was also 
disclosed that Keyes had not been made aware of the latest increase in 
the naval forces allocated to the operation. Churchill supported the 
commanders. There was little further argument on the point, as indeed 
the resi)onsibility of the commanders had always been one of Keyes' 
principles. The next question was the decision to split Up the assault 
98. Keyes to CFuirchill 2 Sep 41, PRDI 3/361/1. 
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shipping. Keyes maintained that the five fast transports were capable 
of maling the passage to the Ca'narles in bad weather, wheyeas some of 
the shipping which was being left in the United Kingdom was not. The 
joint commanders replied that the decision had been taken on the re- 
commendation of the Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty. 
Keyes had in mind an alternative T)Ian of taking the Canaries by force 
maieure, which would avoid having to send the tank assault sbips to 
Freetown, but this idea was lost as a result of interruntions during 
his explanation. Keyes then conTlained once more about not having 
been consulted beforehand. When Churchill asl., ed Pound why this bad 
not been done, Pound replied that it was a matter 'of strategy and 
seamanship, as o, -)posed to the technical details of the landing', and 
pointed out that Keyes had been present on all the occasions when the 
latter had been discussed. Here was the nub of the argument. Chur- 
chill backed Keyes on the principle, stating that 'it was quite right 
for the DCO to give his opinion on the chances of success of a combined 
operation and having done so he was relieved from all responsibility 
should the operation be launched'. On the matter in hand, however, 
Churchill saw it as essential that the government be in a position 
to launch PILGRIM during the winter, and so, unless the COS unon 
reflection considered the course unnecessary, the arrangements for 
sending part of the PILGRIM force to Freetoi%n would remain. This was 
a very unusual meeting, in that Keyes attached such importance to it 
that he requested to see the draft minutes, and then insisted on 
submitting long and detailed corrections to them. The minutes were 
99 
finally issued five davs after the meeting took place. 
99. COS(41) 201 (0) 'Operation PILCRIýl, 14 SeD 41, Ce 80/59. 
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During the course of another meeting with the COS on the following 
morning, 10 Sentember 1941, Keyes again requested that the five assault 
transports remain in the United Kingdom. Showing great persistence, 
be insisted that this would not jeopardise PILGRIM, and indeed said that 
it appeared improbable to him that such an exceedingly difficult and 
complicated operation could succeed under the new arrangements. Keyes 
had uTitten another note to Churchill telling him th is. It was too 
100 
late for such arguments, however, and the decision was upheld. 
Keyes refused to give uD, and on 12 September 1941 lie told Hollis be 
was still working on his alternative plan, and hoping that the -Admir7 lbi , 
alty would retain at least the two DutA LSI(M). 
The process of minor alterations to the PILGRIM shipping con- 
tinued unabated, as the Ministry of War Transport continued to demand 
the release of shipping that was lying idle. On I September 1941 
it was agreed that four of the hired transports would be replaced by 
slower ships. Two of the seven W ships could also be released, pro- 
viding that others could be taken uD at short notice, even though 
three replacements for an earlier trade had not yet been given. By 
this time the other sbipPing had sailed to FreetoiNm, except for the 
Misoa. and Bachequero, delayed by mechanical defects, and the Royal 
Ulsterman, which needed repairs. The shipDing situation was definitely 
102 
getting a bit untidy. 
With the sailing of the assault shipping, Keyes had to admit 
defeat. He was now more than ever convinced that PILGRIM, sn-read as 
100. COS(41) 319 Mtg 10 Sep 41, CAB 79/14. Zý 
101. Keyes to Hollis 12 Sep 41, K 140/3/3. 
102. COS(41) 323 ', Itg 15 Sep 41, C-U 79/14. 
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it was over 3,000 miles, was I slicer folly'. Ile therefore ,; uýjgested 
that the remainder of the shipping held for PILGRIM, except for the 
assault shipping, be released for service of national importance. 
The assault shipping, with a few Mr vessels, could assemble in Loch 
103 
Fyne for training by the VACTC. Ismay stopped this note before 
it reached the Prime Minister, telling Keyes that he was sure Chur- 
cbillwould not forego the possibility of PILGRIM, despite all the 
104 
attendant difficulties. 
Keyes was detennined - on 17 SeDtember he wrote to Eden, press- 
ing his alternative. Although he had, ? ccording to the 9 September 
meeting, been relieved of all resnonsibility, -he told Eden 11 cannot I-I 
divest myself of the responsibility of trying to prevent what I con- 
10S 
sider may well result in another misadventure. Eden sent a diplo- 
matic reply, saying that he would study Keyes' proposals, though 
106 
1hap ily the Spanish position seems to be improving'. p0 
PILGRIM thus remained mounted through the autumn, though minor 
changes in the shiT)Ding were to occur. The Ministry of War Trans'nort 
on 29 September 1941 obtained the release of certain of the shi7pning 
107 
for local use, with the proviso that they remain at 21 days notice. 
The Karanja and Kenya were nut into dock for repairs during October, 
108 
which placed them on 31 days notice. By this time, however, it was 
becoming apparent that PILGRI", as Keyes had thought, would not take 
103. COS(41) 202 (0) 'PILGRIM - Shipping' 16 Sep 41, C-AB SOTS-9. 
104. Ismay to Keyes 16 Sep 41, K 13/9. 
10S. Keyes to Eden 17 Sep 41, K 13/1S. 
106. Eden to Keyes 18 Sep 41, K 13/15. 
107. COS(41) 336 litg 29 SeT) 41, CAB 79/14. 
108. WS(41) 341 Mtg 3 Oct 40, W 79/14. 
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place, and the troops and ship * Ied for it were allocated . 
ping earmar 
to a nunber of otber concurrentoperations. 
The COS, on 30 October 1941, considered whether it was advisable 
to reconstitute the PILGRIM force or to use the troops and sbipping 
109 
for an active raiding programme. The decision was made on 5 Nov- 
ember 1941 that the raiding programme was to have priority, and the 
PILGRIM forces were thus no longer to he held at short notice. That 
the decision was made at the COS level, rather than that of the De- 
fence Committee (Operations), is a good indication of the lower 
110 
ps and priority now accorded PILGRIM. The infantry assault shii 
transports at Freetoi%n were then allotted to TRUNGEON -a raiding 
operation against Italy, and only the difficulty in providing trans- 
norts prevented then from sailing to Gibraltar before TRUNICHEON was 
ill 
cancelled. 'Fhe JPS considered the general distribution of assault 
shipping and landing craft in a paper on 30 November. They recommend- 
ed that the shipping for PILGRIM be kept in home waters, though the 
'Maracaibos' should be sent to the Middle East. This would result in 
the British being unable to fully remount PILGRIM until January 1942, 
Mhen the third 'Maracaibol was commissioned. The JPS, owing to a 
shortage of MLC at home, also wanted the two MLC carriers at Freetoiým 
returned to the United Kingdom. The COS realised that this would in 
effect mean totally dismounting PILGRRI until the snring, and they 
thought that the British could not afford to take such a risk. On 3 
December 1941 the COS therefore decided that though the4\11aracaibos' g 
could go to the Middle East, the two MLC carriers must remain at 
109. COS(41) 372 %ltg 30 Oct 41, (! AB 79/1S. 
110. COS(41) 277 ', \ltg S Nov 41, C-4B 79/1S. 
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Freetown. PILGRIM, though technically mounted, had by this time 
assumed a very-low priority. 
The cancellation of TRUNCHEON on 3 December 1941 released the 
assault shipping for return to PILGRIM, but on 8 December 1941 the 
COS told the JPS to consider the forces previously designated for 
TRUNIMEON to be available for BONIUS, an operation against Madagas- 
113 
car. PILGRIM and BONIUS would tbus be competing operations. This 
-problem of trýying to conduct offensive operations while at the same 
time having contingency forces available to counter a German threat 
to Gibraltar was never to be satisfactoýily resolved, and was to 
continue, through a whole series of new plans, until the invasion of 
North Africa in November 1942. 
112. JP(41) 1017 'Future Distribution of Landing Craft and Assault 
Ships' 30 Nov 41, CAB 84/37 and COS(41) 406 Mtg 3 Dec 41, CAB 
79/16. 
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QIAJYFER XXTI 
CONCLUS i ON'S 
During the neriod from Dunkirk to Pearl Harbor, British grand 
strategy for the defeat of Germany, as evidenced in the War Cabinet 
paper of May 1940, the JPS -r)aT)er of September lQ40, and the COS 
RIVIERA paper of July 1941, rested firmly on the triad of blockade, 
bombing, and subversion. Although, from the end of 1940, a return 
to the Continent in the final phase was forecast, and initial esti- 
mates of requirements made, the combined operations T)olicy in force, 
from the detailing of troops for contingency operations against the 
Azores and Cape Verdes in June 1940 to the breakup of the force ear- 
marked for the seizure of the Canaries in the fall of 1941, so that 
the elements involved could be used for an active raiding nrogram. e, 
envisaged a long-range amphibious assault of up to a corps size 
against outlying enemy )ossessions. A substantial amount of effort, 
both in terms of time and resources, was nut into this form of onera- 
tion, with extremely meagre results. The only true combined oneration, 
as o-. r),, )osed to a raid, during this neriod was the abortive assault on 
Dakar, and this was an ad hoc affair mounted even before the ý)olicy 
was formalised in September 1940. 
The combined operations organisation, developed durin-0 this 
period, provided the basis for the invasion of Normandy in 1944, and 
there is no disT)ute that victon, would not have been T)ossible without 
it. These latter events, however were in the context of the Anglo- Zý 
Merican prosecution of the war. Th. e results of the earlier combined 
o-ocrations policy of the 'British warl, the object of this study, 
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would certainly seem to be a disappointment. As noted in the intro- 
duction, littld would be served'by an espousal of alternative policies. 
Indeed, it would be -rather arrogant of the historian to do so. The 
concern here is whether the policy actually adopted was developed and 
prosecuted in the most effective manner, in a sense, wbether the 
rational influence was the predominant. The contention here is that 
it was not, and that the decision-taking process was markedly hindered 
by organisational and T)ersonal influences, rendering the efficient 
use of the resources available an unattainable goal. 
The justification of this contentim can be seem by the examina- 
tion of the policy and material development, organisation, and opera- 
tions undertaken. The policy would seem to be the fundamental com- 
ponent, from which all the other asT. )ects would develop, but there 
was a surprising lack of a well-staffed and coherent policy. The 
preparations prior to Dunkirk had envisaged a raiding capability of 
a four-battalion Royal Marine Brigade, or of a divisional assault by 
two army brigades. There is no evidence of any plans being developed 
which might require this capability, and the material procurement was 
on a rather low priority. The months after Dunkirk were a time of 
flux, and the assault on Dakar was mounted without any regard to a 
combined operations policy or organisation, and indeed with little 
regard for the service planning system then in effect. The first 
outline of a -nolicy was produced by the JPS on 4 September 1940, but 
this was only in the briefest detail and without any s! )ecific aim in 
mind. This paper, the only one taRen un at the Defence Committee 
j 
(Oerations) level, had been overtaken by events even as it was con- 
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sidered, and was never given full endorsenent as a Y)olicy. 
The newly-fonned FOPS was given a speculative list of merations 
in September 1940, from which the material requirements for an assault 
by a corps of two divisions, supported by armour, in either the Middle 
East or staged from home waters, were developed. Though this was 
first outlined in October of 1940, the priority was such that it was 
not issued as a COS document until January 1941. Even then, the army 
and air elements called for were never established, and the only con- 
crete result was the production of the assault shipping and craft 
required. By the time the RIVIER4 papeT was produced, in July of 
1941, this scant reference to combined operations had been reduced 
to a mention of the need to secure the Canaries. Prior to the devel- 
opment of this capability for a corps assault, the general Dolicy, 
developed in the series of meetings in September of 1940, had been 
to give T)riority to a division assault in the Middle East, with a 
possible division assault being mounted from home waters. There was 
never a formal document on this, nor were any detailed proposals for 
the use of such a capability ever sent to London by the Middle East. 
The above is the sum total of study and documentation for a policy 
which provided the only true offensive use of British land forces 
other than in the 11estern Desert. There was scant investigation of 
the final aim, little examination and develogment in detail, no formal 
approval at all levels, virtually no coordination with the Adviser to 
the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations, and no follow-up. The 
Middle East Command, one of the principal beneficiaries, had little 
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interest or involvement, the Admiralty had other priorities, and 
the Air Ministry was clearly antipathetic. The overall combined 
operations T)olicy was, on balance, a shak-y foundation on which to 
build an organisation and from which to mount operations, a condition 
which must be ascribed to organisational deficiencies. 
The absence of a clear combined operations policy affected the 
development of a combined operations organisation. The Directorate 
of Combined Operations was founded at a time when Churchill had just 
taRen over the reins of government, a period in which he was rather 
distrustful of the abilitý of the serviqe machinery to produce bold 
offensive action. 
_q)urchill' 
s co-opting of the Joint Planners in 
August and September of 1940, and the development of the -Dlanning 
organisation, gave him, as Minister of Defence, a direct link into 
the planning system. While this was not fully agreeable to the ser- 
vice machinery, it gave Churchill an outlet for his designs, and to 
a great extent stopped his habit of disregarding the established 
channels. 
'Me initial concepts of the Directorate of Combined Operations 
and the scaling doim of its responsibilities in drawing uT) the dirst 
directive, owing to the ooPosition of service organisations, have 
been detailed. The replacement of Bourne by Keyes was justified b) 
the declaration of a greatly increased responsibility to be given 
to the position. One of the major organisational faults of that time 4 
was the failure to revise the limited directive irdierited from Bourne, 
which gave a very restrictive raiding role and an ill-defined advisory 
role on combined operations. Cliurchill's opnosition to small raids, 
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the only tyT)e the British were capable of at the time, virtually 
prevented an operational role for the Directorate. The failure 
to study the advisory role, and to answer a number of key questions 
in its implementation, prevented this from becoming a focus of effort. 
One of the fundamental problems in the advisory role was the 
failure to tie the Directorate in to the service planning system. 
Planning papers were not circulated to the Directorate as a matter 
of course, with the result being that Directorate disagreement with 
plans was often first apT)arent at the'COS level. The desire of the 
planners to keep an outside agency, uritb whom they were often in con- 
flict, out of their deliberations can be understood, but the sub- 
sequent confrontations at the COS caused great difficulty, and did 
much to damage the credibility of both sides in respect to the other. 
The directives, admittedly, did state that the Directorate should be 
consulted when an opposed landing was under consideration, by both 
the planners and the appointed commanders, but it was left up to the 
consideration of the individuals involved, again often in conflict 
with the Directorate, when this should be done. There was no 
arbiter, other than the COS, and the Directorate was certainly of 
the opinion, justified in many cases,, _that 
it was being disregarded 
by the T)Ianners. Keyes' attemi)ts--to have a rehearsal of the planning 
system are a good example of this. Personalities often T)Iayed a maJor 
role here, as can be seen by the change in climate after Alexander had 
replaced Sturges as the military commander for PILCZRIM. Even in cases 
where there was consultation, no attention had been given to the situa- 
tion in which there was a disagreement between the Directorate and the 
i 
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planners. This was brought up in the discussion of the fourth direc- 
tive, when the service machinery maintained that the Directorate, 
having offered its advice, had no further responsibility, even when 
the advice was disregarded. It will be remembered that Churchill 
sided with the Directorate. This still produced no resolution of the 
problem, however, and it would not be until some time after the neriod 
studied that a Combined Operations Planner became a regular part of 
the Joint Planning Staff. This logical solution was never considered 
during the period studied. The antagonism between the Directorate and 
the planning system, particularly when Keyes was the Director, would 
probably have T)revented such a steD in any case. 
The operational responsibilities of the Directorate were always 
rather uncertain. The directives should have made them clear enough, 
but the desire for offensive action of both Churchill and Keyes, 
action which was not possible under the terms of the directives, often 
caused responsibilities to be assigned in contravention of the restTic- 
tions. Churchill often went directly to Keyes, particularly in the 
period before be bad firmly established his oi%n nlanning, system. Keyes 
had just taken over in July 1940 when Churchill went to him for large 
raids of S, 000 to 10,000 men, Churclhill, who had initially gone out- 
side the planning system in initiating the Dakar operation, went out- 
side the system again when he considered letting Keyes carry out MENACE 
in August 1940. In September of 1940 Churchill went to Keyes for an 
Meration against Casablanca and for one against the Channel Islands. 
His giving the command of WORKSHOP to Keyes, with no reference to 
the COS, is perhaps. the most flagrant violation of the directive in 
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force, and set the stage for a dispute betwecn Pound and Keyes that 
was as much personal as principled. The initial arrangements for 
the buildup of a new striking force in the United Kingdom in February 
and March 1941 also implied a combined o-oerations responsibility that 
went beyond the directive. 
The circumstances of his original appointment, and all the in- 
cidents noted above, certainly went far to justify Keyes' opinion 
that the Director of Combined Operations bad rather extensive powers 
in respect to combined operations, no matter what the wording of the 
directives. This was, de facto, true dpring the summer and fall of 
1940, when Keyes bad rather easy direct access to Churchill. As 
time went on, and Churchill's planning system took- hold, this access 
was steadily reduced. Churchill still stood as the arbiter in most 
of the disputes, bowever, and it is notable that it was Churchill 
himself who drew up the second directive in February 1941. The root 
of the problem had been recognised as early as November 1940 by 
Ismay, who noted that the resnonsibilities of the Directorate and the 
service machinery were hard to define precisely, and that there would 
always be an overlap. Ismay's solution, requiring a Ispirit of give 
and take', was, considerino the split between Keyes and Pound in par- 
ticular, hardly feasible, and must have been recognised as such at 
the time. In any event, the problem having been identified, Chur- 
chill must bear a good deal of responsibility for allowing it to 
continue for a further twelve months. With the concept of his role 
as seen by Keyes, any attempts by the COS to limit his Yesý)onsiblity 
was revarded as an unwarranted ursui-oation of the authoritv vested 
in him by Churchill, whereas, in the concept as seen by the COS, 
Keyes' claims were beyond the scope of his directives and were dis- 
ruptive of the normal service planning nrocess. There could, con- 
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be no reconciliation of these sidering the personalities involved 
responsibilities. Churchill often used his drive and powers of 
persuasion to foist unwanted schemes on the COS, but he was not one 
to go against the determined opposition of his professional advisors. 
On the other hand, the period under consideration was marked by 
a singular attitude of caution, and a lack of offensive operations. 
This proved a great frustration to Churchill, making him susceptible 
to Keyes' similar opinions of the effectiveness of the service 
machinery. The result was that neither side could claim a decisive 
influence. WORKSHOP is an excellent example. It is clear that the 
services opposed the operation, particularly with Keyes in command, 
and used all the negative power of the machinery to obstruct it. 
As the COS had to maintain their position as the sole source of 
strategic advice to the Prime Minister, this was understandable. 
Although one can not argue with their evaluation of the strategic 
worth of the operation, the constant delay did result in the one 
thing feared and predicted by Keyes, forestallment by German action. 
It is hard not to sympathise with the resultant frustration of both 
Churchill and Keyes. 
Given a vague policy and a faulty organisation, problems would 
have arisen with any combined operations considered at this time. 
As has been noted, jNEMACE was an ad hoc operation mounted without 
regard to either overall policy or the Directorate of Combined Opera- 
tions, but it was, paradoxically, the only combined operation ever 
mounted during this period. The fact that, apart from IMENACE, the 
entire amphibious assault capability of the United Kingdom was locked 
up from -June of 1940 to October of 1941 for contingency operations 
f 
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in the Atlantic against neutral 
initiatives, poses questions as 
whole. This is a subiect to be 
and will not be addressed here. 
have a number of effects on the 
revealing other organisational 
resolved. 
powers, in anticipation of German 
to the viability of the strategy as a 
tal, en in the wider context of the war, 
'Mis situation, however, was to 
organisation for combined operations, 
lefects not properly anticipated or 
In respect to the material development aspect of the advisory 
role of the Directorate, little was done. Exnerimentation had a 
low priority, while overall requirements, except for the neriods 
mentioned, were firmly in the hands of the service planning system. 
The Directorate control of the combined onerations training establish- 
ments, however, was to be of much greater importance. Two contrasting 
concepts gradually evolved. The planning system had originally en- 
visaged that commanders and troops would be detailed for a specific 
operation, the forces would be trained in amphibious techniques by 
the establishments under the Directorate, and the operations would be 
undertaken. This rapid process, which occurred in the case of Dakar., 
would have papered over some of the organisational flaws. The holding 
of all the amphibious forces in readiness for long periods, however, 
enhanced the conflict between the Directorate, which wanted to keep 
the forces under its control while training, and the commanders, who 
were loath to give un control of the forces to an outside agency. 
hliile Keyes himself always upheld the primacy of the commander's 
control, the fact was that, as can be seen in PILGRIM, the assault 
shipping and landing craft, as they became available, were detailed 
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to the ever-growing force held in readiness. This severely reduced 
the forces available to Keyes for raiding and, in the innediate 
context, also caused problems in the material for training. Large- 
scale amphibious operations with the new equipment were something 
that was still in evolution. The training establishment and the 
forces held in readiness, over time, thus became competing agencies, 
both in regard to material and to the position of being the final 
arbiter on technique. This was the root cause of the confrontation 
over LEAPFROG. This duality was never satisfactorily solved in 
this period, and caused a considerable diversion from the overall 
effort. 
The operations which have been covered are all those for which 
troops were detailed, but there were plans considered for many more. 
This brought up another difference in concept between Keyes and the 
planning staffs. During this period the planning staffs 'held gener- 
ally to the principle that the forces were tailored for each par- 
ticular operation, and could not be used as a general-Durpose am- 
phibious force. Keyes, particularly after he obtained control of 
the Glens and the commandos for WORKSHOP, began to develop the idea 
that this was a general -purpose amphibious striking force, capable 
of being used for any of the operations then being considered. This 
concept extended to that of a standard load for the shipping, as 
can be seen in the dispute over the assignment of one of his Glens 
to BRISK in December of 1940. This concept was resisted by the 
planning system. No clear reasons are apparent, but, aside from 
a matter of principle in maximising the efficiency of any one plan, 
f 
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it is obvious that the acceptance of such a concept would result in 
Keyes' gaining command of a general nui-Dose force and his involve- 
ment in all the operations tinder consideration, without regard to 
area or type. This was amathema to the service machinery, and could 
be seen as a major factor in the decision on the manner of sending 
the Glens to the Middle East. 
With such a goal clearly in mind, Keyes then advocated the 
creation of a second striking force, again suited for any number of 
oDerations under consideration. Though this was tentatively agreed 
to by the COS, there was almost no efforý to bring it into being 
until the operation against the Canaries began-to take form. The 
development of this force again shows a definite turn away from a 
general-T)Mi)ose force under Keyes to a force designed for one T)ar- 
ticular operation under commanders wbo dealt only with their res- 
1)ective service ministries. The available records bear no indication 
of a serious investigation into the general-purpose force, perhaps 
because this would have raised further questions of control. In 
this respect, the material requirements outlined in January 1941, 
calling for a specialised 'invasion corps' come to mind. It is 
quite surprising that no further reference was made to this corps, 
although the PILGRIM force by the end had assumed its nature. In 
all this, in respect to the scale of combined operations called for 
by the limited policy, as opposed to major landings on the Continent, 
Keyes' views could be held valid, as the post-war Royal Marine organ- 
isation would seem to bear out. The point is not to debate here the 
merits of the opnosing conceDts of Keyes and the planning system, but 
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to indicate that such a debate was, by all the evidence available, 
never carried out, and the primary reason would appear to be per- 
sonal and organisational influences. 
The lack of coordination in the operations mounted is also in 
evidence. In the numerous incidents recounted, from the stowing of 
the ships in ME1\1ACE and the earmarking of shinning for WORKSHOP 
through the embarkation arrangements of the Glens for the Middle 
East, there was a constant dispute between the Directorate and the 
planning system. The seriousness of the situation was increased 
by the fact that such small matters came to light at the highest 
levels of the direction of the war, as seen in many of the minutes 
and letters quoted. This organisational fault has already been 
noted. It would also seem that, in these technical matters, the 
Directorate was often correct, as indeed one would except of an 
organisation primarily concerned with this one type of operation. 
'flie technical expertise of the Directorate was thus not used to the 
fullest extent. 
The artificial division of responsibilities for combined 
operations meant that the Royal Marines, the force best suited for 
such affairs, was kept virtually separate from the Directorate des- 
pite the attempts by both Bourne and Keyes to have them placed under 
directorate control. This separation, one extremely difficult to 
defend on a rational basis, had its oi%n effects on the development 
of both the Royal I'larines and the Special Service troops. . 41)art 
from 
the one JPS study of January 1941, rejected because it had not been 
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requested, the evolution of these forces was devoid of my correla- 
tion between operational requirements and structure. 
War is a dynamic process, never fully rational. Nevertheless, 
it is the responsibility of those charged with its higher direction 
to clearly define the aims, to impose as logical frameworl, as possi- 
ble on the allocation of the resources of time, manpower, and material, 
and to create an organisation suitable to carry out established poli- 
cies. The ideal, as in any field of human endeavor, will never be 
fully attained, but there will be measurable degrees of success. The 
military historian must attempt to ascqrtain this degree, and the 
reasons therefor,. so that the decision-tak-ers in the future may be 
aware of the often detracting influences of organisation. and per- 
sonality in this theoretically rational process. 
The higher direction of combined operations in the United King- 
dom from Dunkirk to Pearl Harbor, as examined in this work, must be 
deemed, in the context of the declared strategy of the time, to be 
a rather limited success. While a sound base was provided for later 
development, the operational results were not nroi)ortionate to the 
effort invested. Organisational deficiencies, exacerbated by ner- 
sonal differences that were virtually irreconcilable, proved time and 
time again to be a stumbling block to the rationally effective use 
of the resources available. Those who may be involved in similar 
decision-taking in the future, both in the United Kingdom and its 
allied countries, could usefully review this record, and reflect 
thereon, for, if brought to the test, the), can, and must, do better. 
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APPENDIX A- The First Directive 
SECREr 
C. O. S. (40) 468 
17th Jime, 1940 
WAR CABINE7 
CHIEFS OF STAFF CU-NITTEE 
RAIDING OPERATIONS: DFIRECTIVE TO GENERAL BO[JRNE 
We have approved the attached directive* for Lieut. -General 
A. G. B. Bourne, C. B., D. S. O., NIN. O., who has been appointed 
Commander Raiding Operations and Adviser to the Chiefs of Staff 
on Combined Onerations. 
(siogned) R. E. C. PEMSE, V. C. A. S. 
T. S. V. PHILLIPS, V. C. N. S. 
R. H. RAINING, V. C. I. G. S. 
*Annex 
DIRECTIVE 
To: Lieut. -General A. q. B. Bourne, C. B., D. S. O., MN. O., Royal 
Marines. 
1. You are ap ointed Commander of Raidina Goerations on coasts P Cý . in enemy occunation and Adviser to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined 
Operations. 
Raiding Onerations 
2. The object of raiding operations will be to harass the enerny 
and cause him to disperse his forces, and to create material damage, 
particularly on the coastline from Northern No-nvay to the western hmit of German-occupied France. 
3. We propose to give you, within the limits of the forces and equip- 
ment available and subject to directions which you receive from time 
to time from the Chiefs of Staff, complete discretion in the choice 
of objectives and the scale of oneration undertaken. The Joint 
Intelligence Sub-Committee have been instructed to helT) you in the Z: > 
choice of suitable objectives. You are to keep the Chieýs of Staff 
informed of the operations you proDose to carry out. 
4. Six Independent Comi)anies and a School of Training in Irregular 
Operations have already been raised by the War Office. These and 
the irregular Commandoý now being , raised will. come under your onera- tional command and any adninistrative suggestions you may wish to 
make., e. g. for the organisation of units, their location in the 
United Kingdom, etc. will be met as far as they can be. 
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In addition the War Office have taken preliminary steps to 
raise parachutist volunteers of whom a number will be placed under 
your command. *Mien raised, theý will be trained by the Air Ministry y 
and the War Office according to your requirements and advice. 
S. Should you want further independent units, over and above those 
already raised, you should discuss your requirements with Service 
Departments and advise us accordingly. 
6. Certain raids by the independent companies have already been 
planned by the General Staff in the War bffice. You shold'maRe 
yourself acquainted with such projects at once and take over control 
of any planned raids when you deem it advisable. 
7. Irregular actions of various types are undertaken from time to 
time by the Service Intelligence Denartments. There must therefore 
be close touch between your staff and these departments in order 
that your several activities shall not interfere with each other 
and that, on occasions, co-operation may be T)ossible. 
Combined Operations 
8. Your second role will be to take over coimýand of the Inter- 
Services Training and Development Centres and to act as our adviser 
on the organisation required for opposed landings. 
9. Three brigades groups are being detailed for special training in 
combined operations as soon as they can be equiT)-ped. Of these, one 
may be made available at your request for purely raiding operations, 
in which case it would., of course, be placed tinder Your command. 
You will, however, be resnonsible for supervising týe technical 
training of all troops earmarked for combined operations. 
In addition we wish you to press on the development and produc- 
tion of special landing craft aný equipment and to advise us, when 
the occasion arises, as to its allotment. 
10. If it is desired to undertake a combined operation, detailed 
plans will be worked out by the Service Denartments (through the 
medium of the Inter-Service Planning Staff) and the commander 
designate. Both urill require your technical advice and help. 
Relations with other Staffs 
11. We are directing the Inter-Service Planning Staff to consult 
you whenever they receive a combined operational -project for examina- 
tion which imnliýs a landing on a hostile shore. 
You should maintain close liaison with this staff and also with 
the onerational. and intelligence staffs of the Service Departments 
and with the Inter-Service Project Board. At the same time, you 
will have direct access to the Chiefs of Staff Committee who will 
also advise you of any combined onerations which are envisaged. 
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Ileadmiarters and Staff 
12. Your headquarters will be at the Admiralty. You should let us 
Imow as soon as possible wbat staff you need. 
13. An Officer of the Royal Air Force will be attached to your 
staff who will also be resnonsible, under the Air Ministry, for the 
development as far as the Air Force are concerned, of parachute 
troops and other air requirements for raiding and irregular opera- 
tions. 
Secrecy 
14. You will appreciate the paramount need for secrecy 
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APPH-NIDIX B- The Draft Directive of 12 October 1940, as Revised 
by Keyes on 21 October. 1940. 
Note: (Material added by Keyes) 
(Fla 7te-riiil-d-El-&t*ejd by Keyes) 
DRAFr DIRECHVE TO DIRECFOR OF CGIBINED OPERATION'S 
1. Your duties comprise those of Commander of Raiding Operations 
on Coasts in Enemy br-cupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff 
on Combined Operations. 
Raiding Operations 
2. The object of raiding operations will be to harass the enemy 
and cause him to disperse his forces, and to create material damage, 
particularly on the coast line from northern No-nqay to the western 
limit of German-occupied France. 
3. We propose to give you, within the limits of the forces and equip- 
ment available and subject to the directions you receive from time 
to time from the Chiefs of Staff, complete. discretion in the choice 
of objectives and the scale of operations undertalen. The Joint 
Intelligence Sub-Committee have been instructed to help you in the 
choice of suitable objectives. You are to Reep the Chiefs of Staff 
informed of operations You propose to carry out. 
4. Irregular operations of various types are undertaken from time 
to time by the service departments. There must therefore be close 
touch between your staff -and these departments, in order that your 
several activities should not interfere with each other and that, 
on occasions, co-operation may be possible. 
Irregular Forces 
S. A special brigade of irregular troops, com-orising five special 
battalions, is nowbeing organised in the United Kingdom by the 
War Office. This brigade will be at your disposal from 10th November 
1940. The half-size commando of 2SO 6n in Northern Ireland will 
also be available should you require it. 
6. Your responsibilities in repard to these units is defined as 
follows: 
(a) Operations 
The special brigade will be under your operational control. 
The commander will be entirely at your disi)osal (but opera- 
tion orders issued to him should be aD-Droved bv the War 
Office. ) 
(b) Training 
You will. be resi3onsible, through the brig , ade commander, 
for 
the training of the special briFade. You will communicate 
direct with the War Office (Director of ý-Iilitarv Training) 




The. War Office will be responsible for the general 
administration of the special brigade, including 
maintenance and movement of its units. You will 
however, be responsible for advising the War Office 
as to bow these units can best be organised, armed, 
equipped, and located to suit your particular needs. 
(d) You are authorised to communicate with approDriate 
directors of the service ministries on any matter 
requiring action or advice. 
7. Should you want additional forces for any particular oneration 
you should discuss your requirements with thý service departments 
and advise us accordingly. 
Combined Q)erations 
8. Your second role will be to take over command of the ISTDCs- 
and to act as our advisor on the organisation required for opposed 
landings. 
9. Certain troops will from time to time be placed under your command 
for s-Decial training in combined operations. You will be responsible 
for their technical training in am-phibious warfare, and for the 
development and production of special landing craft and eq ' uii)ment. You will also advise us as to the allotment of such craft and equipment. 
10. You have beenchargedby the Prime IMinister with the responsi- 
bility for the nlanning and execution of all raiding operations in- 
volving not morý than about S, 000 men, and in this you may call upon 
the ISPS for any assistance you may require. 
Mien it is decided to undertaRe a combined operation (whether 
by regular or irregular forces) beyond the limited scope of a raid, 
detailed plans will be worked out by the service departments (through 
the medium of the ISPS) and the commanders designate. Both will 
require your technical advice and help. 
Relation with Other Staffs 
11. We are directing the ISPS to consult you whenever the), receive 
a combined operation project for examination which implies a landing 
on hostile sbore. 
You should maintain close liaison with this staff and also with 
the operational and intelligence staffs of the service departments 
and with the Inter-Service Project Board. At the same time, \IOU 
will have direct access to the Chiefs of Staff Committee which will 
also advise you of any combined operations that are envisaged. 
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An officer of the Royal Air Force is attached to your staff, 
He will be responsible, under the Air ýIinistry, for all air require- 
ments for raiding and irregular onerations (and for advice on the 
air training of an airborne force and the dev-eYo-nmýnTt 6f-flTe-mean-s &Ct- -- &Cs- ro- -.. y --------------- 21allspolltation ucS a_ rce 
The War Office 
12th October 1940. 
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APPENDIX C- The Second Directive 
C. O. S. (41) 166 
14th March, 1941 
WAR CABINEF 
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMITTEE 
DIRECTIXT TO THE DIRECTOR OF COMBINED OPERATIONS 
Note by Major-General Ismay 
The Prime Mdnister has anproved the amendments to the directive 
to the Director of Combined Operations, which were nut fon-jard by 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, and agreed to by the Chiefs 
of Staff on Ilth March (see Annex to Minutes of C. O. S. (41) 93rd 
Meeting, ýIinute 1). The Prime Minister has also added a new para- 
graph at the end of the corrections to paragranh 2(3). 
A copy of the directive in its final form is attached. 
(Signed) H. L. ISWY. 
DIRECTIlT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CONMINED OPERATIONS 
The responsibilities of the Director of Combined Operations 
were laid doun in a directive issued to Lt. -General A. G. B. Bourne 
by the Chiefs of Staff in June 1940. In view of the changes which 
have taken place since that date, it is desirable that these responsi- 
bilities should be re-defined. 
At the same time, it is to be recognised that the division of 
responsibility between the Director of Combined Operations on the 
one hand and the Joint Planning Staff on the other is not capable 
of precise definition. There must always be border-line cases 
wbich will have to be settled as they arise by mutual consultations. 
General Scone of D. C. O. 's Responsibilities 
2. The Director of Combined Operations is responsible under the 
general direction of the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, 
for: - 
(a) The Command and training in irregular warfare generally, and 
in landing operations in particular, of the troops specially 
organised for this nurnose, i. e. the Snecial Service Troops. 
(b) The sunervision of the technical training in landing operations 
of such other trooi)s as may from time to time be eannafted for 
enterprises which call for this particular tyne of training. 
(c) The development, including exneriment, research and trial, of 
all forms of snecial equiT), ment and craft required for opposed 
landings. 
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(d) The initiation, uithin the general policy prescribed, and the 
planning and execution of operations by the Special Service 
Troops, reinforced if necessary by small forces - naval, mili- 
tary and air - which are not normally under his connand. 
For the purpose of making plans he may have any assistance he 
requires from the Joint Planning Staff. In this connection, the 
Prime Minister has laid it down as a guide that the Director of 
Combined Operations should be responsible for the planning and 
execution of raiding operations which involve not more than 
5,000 men. 
(e) The provision of advice to the Chiefs of Staff on the technical 
aspects of opposed landing operations. When the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee are considering an operation which involves an onnosed 
landing, the Director of Combined Operations should be present 
when that part of the -Dlan is under discussion. 
Similarly, when the Joint Planning Staff are directed to prepare or 
wish to suggest outline plans-for an operation which involves an 
opnosed. landing, they-should first consult the-Director of Cmbined Nerations.. 
Subject to: - 
(a) his concurrence that the opposed landing is T)racticable; 
(b) the general nature of the project being approved by the 
Chiefs of Staff and Defence Committee; 
D. C. O. 's staff and the Joint Planning Staff will work in conjunction; 
the Joint Planning Staff preDaring the General Plan and the Director 
of Combined Onerations' Staff T)reDaring that part relative to the 
o-o osed landing. Subsequently the Commanders designate will consult 
.p0 the Director of Combined Operations and his staff when working out 
their plans. 
The above does not apply to the worl< of the F. 0, P. section, 
wbo will receive their instructions both as to what they plan and 
who they consult, from the Minister of Defence office. 
(f) The provision of advice to the Chiefs of Staff on the tactical 
use and allocation of carriers and landing craft for combined 
operations. The Director of Combined Operations will be -res- 
ponsible for the training of naval personnel in so far as 
opposed landings are concerned, including officers and men 
oý'carriers, landing craft and beach narties. 
He will have under his co; m-and and operational control carriers 
and landing craft for raiding purposes, which will include such 




3. The routine administration of the Special Service Trooi)s in- 
cluding maintenance and movements, will be the responsibility of 
the War Office. The D. C. O. is, hoiý,, ever, responsible for advising 
the War Office as to hot.; these units can best be organised, armed, 
equipped and located, to meet his particular needs. 
Special Equipment and Landing Craft 
4. The Director of Combined N, erations will have tinder his command 
and direction the Inter-Services Training and Develonment Centres. 
Authority for Operations 
S. The general T)olicy for raiding oT)erations will be laid down from 
the time to time by the Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the 
direction of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. 
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APPENDIX D- The Illird Directive 
SECRET 
C. O. S. (41) 629 
16th October, 1941 
WAR CABINEF 
CHIEFs nF STAFF CWHITEE 
CO, MBINED OPERATION'S AND RAIDS 
Note by Secretary 
The attached directive*, as approved by the (hiefs of Staff, 
is circulated for record -Durnoses. 
Great George Street, (Signed) L. C. Hollis 
S. 'IV. 1. 
*Annex I. 
AN AITEX I 
DIRECTIVE TO THE ADVISER ON. COMBINTI) OPFRATINS 
I. You are appointed Adviser on Combined Onerations (short title 
Commodore C. ). 
Ceneral Responsibility 
2. Under the general direction of the Chiefs of Staff you will: - 
(a) Act as technical adviser on all aspects of, and at all stages in, 
the planning and training for combined operations. 
(b) Be resDonsible for co-oydinating the general training policy 
for combined operations for the three Services (see para. 5'(a) 
below). You I-All command the Combined Training Centres and 
Schools of Instruction. 
(c) Study tactical and technical developments in all forms of com- 
bined operations varying from small raids to a full scale in- 
vasion of the Continent. 
(d) Direct and T)Yess fonýard research and development in all forms 
of technical equipment and special craft peculiar to combined 
operations. 
Planning 
3. The procedure by iýhich -olanning for large scale operations 
will be carried out is shown in Annex II. You will note that it 
is incumbent upon you to give technical advice upon all plans 
for combined operations at all stages from their inception to the 
point when they are finally apT)roved. It is equally incumbent unon 
the Commanders and Staff to seek your technical advice at all stages 
of planning. 
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4. The procedure with regard to small raids will be similar to 
that of large -ýcale operations, with the exception of raids on a 
very small scale which are carried out by Special Service Troops 
only. For these onerations you will aT)point the Force Commander, 
subject to the anproval of the Chiefs of Staff; and you will be 
responsible for the detailed plan. 
Training 
5. You will: 
(a) Preside over an Inter-Service Committee consisting of the 
A. C. N. S. (Weapons), Admiralty, and the Directors of Training 
at the War Office and Air Ministry. This Committee will for- 
mulate the training and technical policy for combined operations 
and will maintain close liaison with the organisation for the 
development of airborne forces. 
(b) Be responsible for co-ordinating the teaching at such schools 
of instruction or training establishments as it may be found 
necessary to set up. 
(c) Command the Combined Training Centres* at which the training 
of formations and units in combined operations will be carried 
out under their Commanders and with the technical advice of 
the Staffs of the Centres. This advice xvill be your resnonsi- 
bility. 
These include Initial Training Centrcs such as H. M. S. Northney 
and H. M. S. Tormentor and Raiding Craft Bases such as Brightling- 
sea and H. M. S. St. Helier. 
(d) Advise, as required, Commanders, subsequent to their appointment 
for an oDeration, on the technical training of their forces. It 
is equally incumbent on them to seek your advice on this matter. 
Tactical and Technical Developments and S-necial Equipment 
6. You will set up under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Adviser 
on Combined Operations an Inter-Services Committee which, under the 
guidance of týe Policy Committee referred to in para. S(a), will 
deal with questions of detailed insnection, training, equipment 
and administration. 
S-necial Service Troons 
7. The Special Service Troo-Ds will be under your command. Their 
Administration will, however, remain the responsibility of the War 
Office. These troops are to be regarded, so far as combined opera- 
tions are concerned, as snecialists. Beyond such tasks as you ma-y 
allot to them, e. g., at the various centres of instruction, these 
troops will be available for snecific combined onerations when they 
will be placed under the Commander appointed foý that operation. 
Para. 7 is subject to early review. 
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ANNEX II 
C. O. S. consider Outline Plan 
with A. C. O. as adviser 
I 
1 
C. O. S. issue necessary 
instructions for project 
to be examined by Joint 
Planning Staff with advice of 
A. C. O. 






Force Commanders -oroduce Final 
Plan in conjunction with Joint 




Final -olan considered by C. O. S. 
with A. C. O. as adviser. 
Implementationlof anproved Plan 
by Force Commanders assisted by 
Joint Planning Staff and Service 
Ministries 
360 
APPENDIX E- The Fourtb Directive 
SECRh-r 
C. O. S. (41) 732 
9th December, 1941 
WAR CABINEr 
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE 
DIRECTIVE TO ADVISER OIN COMBINED OPERATION'S 
Note by Secretary 
The attached revised directive to the Adviser on Combined 
Operations has been approved* by the Chiefs of Staff and is cir- 
culated for information and record -purposes. 
Great George Street, S. W. 1. 
9th December., 1941. 
(Signed) L. C. Hollis 
*C. O. S. (41) 414th Meeting, Minute 7. 
DIRECTIVE TO THE ADVISER ON COMBINED OPERATIONS 
1. You are appointed Adviser on Combined Operations. This title is 
always to be used when you are acting in an advisory canacity. When 
exercising your executive functions, you will use the title "Commodore 
Combined Operations" (short Title - C. C. O. ). 
General Responsibility 
, ou will: - 
2. Under the general direction of the Chiefs of Staff N7 
(a) Act as technical adviser on aspects of, and at all stages in, 
the planning and training for combined onerations. 
(b) Be resDonsible for co-ordinating the general training policy 
for coAined operations for the: three Services (see para. 5(a) 
below). 
(c) Study in conjunction with the Chiefs of Staff Organisation 
tactical and technical developments in all forms of combined 
operations varying from small raids to a full scale invasion 
of the Continent. 
Direct and Dress fonýard research and development in all forms 
of technical equipment and special craft Deculiar to combined 
operations. 
Planning 
3. The procedure by which i)lanning for operations other than those 
referred to in para. 4 will be carried out is shown in Annex 11. 
You will note that it is incumbent uT)on the Commanders-in-Chief 
at Home, Force Commanders and Staff to seek your teclinical advice 
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at all stages of planning and to Reep you infomed of their in- 
tentions. I 
4. In the case of oT)erations which are carried out by Special Service 
Troops only, you will appoint the Commander of the Special Service 
Troops who will pre-oare the detailed plan in conjunction with you 
and under the Commander-in-Chief carrying out the raid. In such cases 
you will keep the Joint Planning Staff in touch at all stages. 
Training 
S. You will: - 
(a) Be responsible for co-ordinating the teaching at such schools 
of instruction or training establishments as it may be found 
necessary to set up. 
(b) Command the Combined Training Centres'- at which the training 
of formations and units in combined operations urill be carried 
out under their Commanders and with the technical advice of 
the Staffs of the Centres. This aavice will be your resDonsi- 
bility. 
(c) Advise, as required, Force Commanders, subsequent to their 
appointment for an operation, on the technical training of 
their forces. It is equally incumbent on them to seek your 
advice on this matter. 
These include Initial Training Centres such as H. M. S. Northney 
and H. M. S. Tormentor and Raiding Craft Bases such as Brightling- 
sea and H. M. S. St. Helier, and such other training centres or 
bases as it may be necessary to set un. 
Inter-Service Committees 
You I%Ti 11: - 
(a) Preside over the Combined Operations Committee which will have 
as members Assistant Chief of Naval Staft (Iýeapons), Admiralty; 
Director of Operational Training, Air Ministry; Director of 
Military Training, War Office. This Committee will formulate 
training and development nolicy for combined operations and 
will maintain close liaison with the organisation for the train- 
ing and develoT)ment of airborne forces. 
(b) Preside over the Combined Operations Air Committee which will 
have as members týe Sth Sea Lord, Admiralty, or his represen- 
t, atives; Vice-Chief Imnerial General Staff or his representa- 
tives, War Office; Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry 
or his representatives; Air CoFunodore C. T. C. This Committee 
will examine the air requirements for combined operations. 
The Committee will formulate co-ordinated T)rooosals on air 
requirements for submission to the Chiefs of Staff. 
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(c) Set up a Combined Nerations Sub-Committee, which under the 
guidance of the Committee referred to in para. 6(a), will 
dcal with: questions of training, equipment and administration 
and keep touch with progress. 
(d) Set up a Combined Operations Communications Copunittee with 
representatives of the Signal Branches of the three Services 
to deal with all communications questions affecting combined 
operations. 
ShiT)s and Craft 
7. The policy for the allocation of assault shins and landing 
craft throughout the world will be decided from time to time by 
the Chiefs of Staff. 
All shiDs (other than Merchant Navy ships) and craft in the 
British Isles allocated for combined operations will be under your 
command except during such time as they are specifically turned 
over to the Force Commanders for an oDeration. 
Mercbant Navy ships allocated by the Admiralty for combined 
operational purposes will. be attached to your command, or that of 
the Force Commanders, but will be administered by the Director of 
Sea Transnort. ' 
You will be-rea 
- 
uired to inform the Admiralty from time to time 
of the state of availability of all ships and craft held for com- 
bined operational purposes. 
Special Service TrooDs 
8. The SDecial Service Troops will be under your command. Their 
administration will, however', remain the resnonsibility of the War 
Office. Beyond such tasRs as you may allot to them, e. g. at the 
various centres of instruction, these troops idll be available for 
specific combined onerations when they will be T)laced under the 
Commander annointed for that oneration. I 
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ANNEX II 
C. O. S. consider Outline Plan 
with A. C. O. as adviser 
0, -ý kp (CO 
C. O. S. issue necessarv 
instructions for projýct 
to be examined by Joint 
Planning Staff with advice of 
A. c. o. 
Force Commanders 
I 
Force Commanders produce Final 
Plan in conjunction with Joint 
Planning Staff and with advice of 
A. C. O. 
Final plan considered by C. O. S. 
with A. C. O. as adviser. 
Implementationlof approved Plan 
by Force Commanders assisted by 
Joint Planning Staff and Service 
Ministries 
A requirement arises 
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APPENDIX F- Gencral Sir Leslie Hollis and the Relief of Keyes 
One of the few first-band accounts of a major decision con- 
cerning the Directorate of Combined Operations is to be 
found in James Leasor, War at the Top (London 1959), pp. 122- 
125. This is based on the exT)eriences of General Sir Leslie 
Hollis, and explains in detail the decision concerning Keyes' 
relief. In sum, it states that Churchill called Hollis in 
and asked him if Keyes and the COS were having difficulties. 
When Hollis explained the situation, Churchill asked for a 
recommendation, and Hollis suggested that Keyes be asked for 
his resignation. Churchill thereupon dictated a letter to this 
effect. Sensing Churchill's reluctance to sign it, Hollis 
pressed him to do so, and then had the letter despatched before ýhurchill could change his mind. Leasor writes t"hat Churchill 
did have second thoughts, but, as the letter had already been 
sent, he stood by the decision. 
The difficulty is that this account in no way corresnonds 
to the minutes in the Prime Minister's files, as nuoted in 
the text. If events hanDened as Leasor describes, there 
would have been no need of the minute Churchill sent to Hollis,, 
informing him of the decision and indicating that Churchill 
had written privately to Keyes. On the whole it would seem 
that Leasor's description, and perhaps Hollis' memory, are of 
doubtful accuracy. 
The one thing to be noted, however, is Hollis' clear 
opposition to Keyes. No matter which version is accurate, his lack 
of im 
, 
partiality la) 7s him oDen to criticism, for such impartiality 
was crucial for the effectiveness of the secretariat. 
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APPENDIX G- List of Abbreviations 
ACAS - Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
ACAS(T) - Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Onerational 
Requirements and Tactics) 
ACNS - Assistant Chief of Naval Staff 
ACNS 61) - Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Weapons) ACO - Adviser on Combined Operations 
ADCO(A) - Assistant Director of Combined Operations (Air) 
ADCOCý, q - Assistant Director of Combined Operations (Military) 
ADCO(N) - Assistant Director of Combined Operations (Naval) 
ADOD(CO) - Assistant Director of Operations Division (Combined 
Operations) (Admiralty) 
AG - Mjutant General (War Office Staff Section) 
ACIRM - Adjutant General Royal 14arines 
ALC - Assault Landing Craft 
C-in-C - Commander in Chief 
CAS - Chief of the Air Staff 
CIGS - Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
CLE - Central Landing Establishment 
CLS - Central Landing School 
CNS - Chief of Naval Staff 
COHQ - Combined Operations Headquarters 
coo - Commander, Offensive 0 perations 
Cos ' - Chiefs of Staff (Committee) 
CTC - Combined Training Centre 
DCAS - Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 
DCI('S - DeýUty Chief of the lmýnerial General Staff DCNS - Denuty Chief of Naval Staff 
DCO - Director of Combined Operations/ Directorate of 
Combined Operations 
DCOS - Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Committee) 
DCOS, (IT) - Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on Inter- 
Service Training 
DDCO - Deputy Director of Combined Operations 
DDCO(A) - Deputy Director of Combined Oýerations (Air) 
DDCO(M) - Deputy Director of Combined Onerations (Military) 
DDCO(N) - Deputy Director of Combined Operations (Naval) 
DD11K) - Deputy Director of Military Operations (War Office) 
DDTSD(CO) - DeDuty Director of Training and Staff Duties 
Division (Combined nnerations) (Admiralty) 
DDSD - Deputy Director of Staff Duties 
(1, 
%T ar Office) 
DMO&I - Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 
(War Office) 
EMO&P - Director of Military Operations and Plans (War 
Office) 
DNTr - Director ofMilitaTy Training (War Office) 
DNC - Director of Naval Construction (Admiralty) 
DNI - Director of Naval Intelligence (Admiralty) 
DSD - Director of Staff Duties (War Office) 
EPS - Executive Planning Staff 
FO - Flag Officer 
FOPS Future Operational Planning Staff 
GOC General Officer Commanding 
CISM General Staff (Plans) (War Office) 
CISO General Staff Officer 
ISPB Inter-Services Project Board 
ISPS Inter-Services Planning Staff 
ISSB Inter-Services Security Board 
ISTDC - Inter-Services Training and Development Centre 
JISC - Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee 
JPC - Joint Planning Committee 
JPS - Joint Planning Staff 
JPSC - Joint Planning Sub-Committee 
LSD - Landing Ship Dock 
LSG - Landing Ship Gantry 
LSI(L) - Landing Shin Infantry (Large) 
LS I (m) - Landing Shil) (Medium) 
LSI(S) - Landing Ship (Small) 
LST - Landing Shi-D Tank 
MCO - Manual on Combined Nerations 
MI(R) - Military Intelligence (Resear-ch)(Ivar nffice Staff 0 Section) 
MLC - Motor Landing Craft H\TBD0 
- Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (Royal 
Marines) 
MO - Military Operations (War Office Staff Section) 
Ur - Mechanical Transport 
RALB - Rear Admiral Landing Craft and Bases 
RNI - Royal I'larines SD - Staff Duties (War Office Staff Section) SIS - Special Intelligence Service 
SLC - Sýp ort Landing Craft 1P SNO - Senior Naval Officer SNO(L) - Senior Maval Officer (Landings) 
so - Senior Officer SO_ASC 
- Senior Officer Assault ShiT3s and Craft SOE - Special noerations Executive 
SPS - Strategic Planning Staff 
SS - Snecial Service 
TLC - Tank Landing Craft VACTC - Vice Admiral Combined Training Centre 
VC-ALS - Vice Chief of the Air Staff 
Mcs - Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
ITCNS - Vice Chief of Naval Staff 1%7RN. S 





I. Primary Material - United Kingdom 
A. Unpublisbed 
(i) Material from Cabinet Files located at the Public Record 
Office under the following headings: 
CAB 2- Committee of Imperial Defence Meetings 
CAB S3 - Committee of ImT)erial Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee 
Meetings and Memoranda. . 
CAB S4 - Committee of ImT)erial Defence, Deputy Chiefs of Staff 
Committee 'Meetings and Memoranda and Deputy Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee on Inter-Service Training Meetings and Memoranda. 
CAB 65 - War Cabinet Meetings, incluoing Confidential Annexes 
C-AB 66 - War Cabinet Memoranda, (WIP) and (CP) Series 
CAB 69 - War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations) Meetings 
and Memoranda. 
CAB 79 - War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meetings, 
including Meetings (0) and Secretary's Standard File. 
C-AB 80 - War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, 
including (0)(JP) Series. 
CAB 82 - War Cabinet, DeDuty Chiefs of Staff Committee and 
Sub-Committee Meetings and ýIemoranda, including Deputy Chiefs 
of Staff Sub-Committee on Inter-Service Training. 
CAB 84 - War Cabinet, Joint Planning Committee Meetings and 
Memoranda and Joint Planning Sub-Committee (ISPS) Meetings 
171 and Memoranda. 
Material from Admiraltv Files located at the Public Records 
Office under the following headings: 
AD%I 1- Admiralty and Secretariat PaT)ers, including AMI 
1/8664/134, Functions and Training of the Royal Marines, 
ADM I Code 47, Combined Ooerations, and ADM I Code 60, Roval 
Marines General Matters. 
ADM 202 - Royal Marines War Diaries. 
Material from Air Ministry Files located at the Public Records 
Office under the followinig-hieadings: 
AIR 2- Air Ministn, Correspondence, including AIR 2 Code 74, 
Training, and AIR 2 Code 88, Army. 
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Material from War Office Files located at the Public Records 
Office under the following headings: 
WO 33 Reports and Miscellaneous Papers 
WO 106 DMO&I Peers, in particular the following: 
1782 - 1997- Norway 
1998 - 2013 Spitzbergen 
2933 - 2946 Azores 
2947 - 2948 Cane Verdes 
2949 - 29SS Canaries 
29S6 - 3017 Channel Islands 
4109 - 4473 North West Furope.. 
WO 163 - War Office Council and Army Council. 
WO 193 - Director of Military Operations Collation Files, 
in particular the folloving: 
378 - 410 Combined Operations 
780 - 82S Planning 
WO 216 - CIGS: 'Papers 
Material from the Prime Minister's Files located in the Public 
Records Office under the following headings: 
PR13,1 I- Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and PaT)ers 
Until 1945. 
PRhM 3- Operati., Dnal 'Papers, in particular the following: 
32/1-7 Airborne Troops 
103/1-6 Commandos and Special Companies 
124/1-4 Dodecanese 
234 INFLUX 
160/1-13 Landing Craft 
276 1\E\1ACE 
309/1-6 Principal Telegrams Relating to Operations 
328/1-11 Nonýjay 
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Material from the ýIinistry of Defence Files, located at the Public 
Records Office under the heading DEFE 2. These include 1427 files 
from the Combined Operations Headquarters up to 194S. The cnHQ 
, and commando war diaries are included. 
War Diary of No. 2 Comando/No. 11 SAS Battalion, located at the 
Airborne Forces 'ýIuseum, Broi%ning Barracks, Aldershot. 
I 
"Fhe History of No. 1 PTS' by Flt. Lt. P. W. Jevons and miscellaneous 
correspondence relating to the establishment of the CLE, located at 
No. I TyrS Museum, RAF Brize Norton. 
The napers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, located at the 
British Library, in particular KFYES 13/1-2S, -and Keyes Additional Paners 140/3/1-3. These T)aT)ers have come from Churchill College, 
CaAridge, and may in future be re-indexed by the British Library. 
At present the British Library still uses the Cliurchill College 
index, except for the Keyes Additional Paners, now found tinder the 
desi-nation'of 'Grey Folýer 3 1-31. These paT)ers are invaluable, 
and-Drovide the great bulk oCkeyes' correspondence. Gaps in these 
papers can be filled by using DEFE 2/698 and some of the PRDI files. 
Keyes was a prolific writer, and the main T)roblem for the researcher 
is that no similar collection exists giving the other side of the 
disputes. 
The papers of Admiral of the Fleet The Viscount Cunningham of H-,, ndhope, 
located at the British Library as Add. 52561. These naners contain 
a few letters from Pound exnressing his view of Keyes. 
The 'papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir -John Slessor, located 
at the RAF Museum Hendon. These , paners contain a few references to 
the development of overall strategY-in 1940 and to the development of 
airborne forces. 
The unpublished memoirs of Admiral Sir Charles Daniel, located at 
Churchill College, Cambridge. This contains an interesting section on 
Daniel's attachment to the COHQ for WORKSHOP. 
The diary of Major General R. H. Dewing, held by ]Mr. William Dewing, 
his son. This gives occasional insights into the early period of the 
COHQ, when Dewing was the MVIP. 
The papers of Captain S. W. Roskill, R\I, located at Churchill College, 
Cambridge. These include Roskill's correspondence with most of the 
key naval officers concerned, and occasionally have some interesting 
comments. 
The napers of Churchill and Eden are closed, thought Martin Gilbert 
states that all -the relevant Churchill paners are in the 1"ublic Records Office. Other papers consulted including those of Jsmay 
and Portal, were of very little use in regard to this subject. 
B. Published 
United Kingdom 
Admiralty, Navy List, 1940 Editions (London 1940) 
AI%TiQ, Combined Qierations Organisation 1940-194S (AMQ 1956) 
(Originally published as a 'Confidential' docu-nent, now 
declassified). 
Buckley, C. , Nonýay, the Commandos, DieDDe (London 1951) 
Butler, J. R. M. , Grand Strategy, Volume 11 (London 1971). 
Butler, J. R. H. , Grand Strategy, Volume 111, Part 11 (London 1964). 
Derry, T. K., The Campaign in Nonýay (London 19S2). 
Foot, M. R. D., SOE in France (London 1966). 
Gi %Tyer, J. M. A. , Grand Strategy, Volume 111, Part I (London 1964) 
Hinsley, F. H. , British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume I 
(London 1979) 
RNISO, Combined Onerations (London 1943). 
ITNISO, The Second World War: ý'-' A rluide to Documents in the Public 
Records Office (London 1972). 
Otway, T. B. H., Airborne Forces (War Office 1951) Originally 
Published as a 'Restricted' document, now declassified). 
Roskill, S. W. , The War at Sea, Voline I (London 1954). 
Woodward, Sir Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World 
War, Volume Il (London 1971). 
(i) United States 
Clifford, K. J., The United States Marines in Iceland 1941-1942 
(Washington 1970). 
Conn, S. and Fairchild, D., The Framework of Hemisphere Defense I-- 
4 
Washington 1960). 
Matloff, M. and Snell, E. M., Strategic Planning for Coalition 
Warfare 1941-42 (Washington 1953). 
(ii) 
Astley, J. B., The Inner Circle (London 1971) 
Bond, B. (Editor), Chief of Staff, The Diaries of Lieutenant 
General Sir Henry Poimall, Voý"ume II (London 1974). 
Churchill, Sir Winston, Their Finest Hour (New York 1962). 
Clarke, D., Seven Assignments (London 1948). 
Durnford-Slater, J., Commando (London 19S3). 
Hoare, Sir Smauel, knbassador on Special Mission (London 1946). 
Ismay, Lord, The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London 1960). 
Kom, P., No Colours or Crest (London 1958). 
Kennedy, J. N., The Business of Ilar (London 19S7). 
Keyes, Sir Roger, Amnhibious Warfare and Combined Operations 
(Cambridge 1943). 
Leasor, J., War at the Top - Based on the Experiences of General 
Sir Leslie Hollis (London 19S9). 
Leutze, J., (Editor), The London Obsenrer - The Journal of General 
Raymond E. Lee 1940-1941 (London 1972). 
Loewenheim, L., Langley, H. D., and Jenas, M. (Editors), Roosevelt 
and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence 
(London 1975). 
Lovat, Lord, March Past, (London 1978). 
Maund, L. E. M., Assault from the Sea (London 1949). 
Montgomery, Viscount, The Memoirs of Field Marshall the Viscount 
Montgomery of Alemein KG (London 1958). 
371 
i 
Slessor, Sir John, The Central Blue (London 1956). 
372 
Spears, Sir M-wa. rd, Two Men Who Saved France (London 1966). 
Vintras, R. E., The Portuguese Connection (London 1974). 
Young P., Commando (London 19S3). 
I II. Later Works 
Books 
Allison, G. T., Essence of Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Boston 1971). 
Asninall-Oglander, C., Roger Keyes (London 1951). 
Cruickshank, C. , The German Occupation of the Channel Islands 
(London 1975). 
Ferysson, B., ne Watery Maze (Now York 1961). 
Higgins, T., Winston Churchill and the Second Front 1940-1943 
(New York 1957). 
Hinsley, F. H., Hitler's Strategy (Cambridge 1951). 
Ladd, J. D., Assault from the Sea 1939-45 (London 1976). 
Ladd, J. D., The Roval Marines 1919-1980, (London 1980). 
Leivin, R., Churchill as Warlord (London 1973). 
Marder, A. J. , Oneration MENACE (London 1976). 
Millar., G. , The Bnineval Raid (London 1974). 
Moulton, J. L., The Non%Tegian Campaign of 1940 (London 1966). 
M1 oulton, J. L., The Royal Marines (London 1973). 
Roskill, S. W., Churchill and the Admirals (London 1977). 
Sainsbury, K., The North African Landings 19421, A Strategic 
Decision (London 1976). 
St. George Saunders, H., The Green Beret (London 1971). 
St. George Saunders, H., The Red Beret (London 1971). 
St. John Barclay, G., Their Finest Hour (London 1977). 
I 
373 
Taylor, A. J. P., Beaverbrook (London 1972). 
Terraine, J., Th e Life and Tirneý of Lord 
-Mountbatten 
(London 1980) 
Warner, G., Iraq and Syj: ia 1941 (London 1974). 
Wheeler-Bennet, Sir John, Action This Day - Working With Churchill 
(London 1968). 
Articles 
Hughes-Hallett, J. 'The Mounting of Raids', RUSI Journal, November 
1950. 
UnDublished Manuscrints 
Clifford, K. J., 'On Parallel Courses - _Aji 
Analysis of British and 
-American 
Amphibious (Combined)Operations 1920-194SI 
Theses 
Beaumont, J., 'Great Britain and the Soviet Union: The Supply 
of Munitions 1941-194S', PhD, King's College London, 197S. 
Steers, H. J. T., I Hiding the Continent: The Origins of British 
Special Service Forces', MMAS, U. S. Arm), Command & General 
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1980. 
Interviews 
EaTJ Mountbatten of Burma 
General The Lord Bourne 
Lieutenant General Sir E. Ian Jacob 
Major General J. L. Moulton 
Major General C. R. Price 
Brigadier The Lord Ballantrae 
Brigadier Peter Young 
Of the above, General Jacob and General Moulton proved to 
I 
have clear and detailed memories, and v., ere the most heInful. 
374 
Correspondence 
(ýiestions ivere asl\ed of ihe surviving members of the 
secretariat, JPS, and COHQ. Response varied greatly, the most 
helpful being the following: 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter Dawson 
General Sir Hugh Stocbvell 
Major General M. W. M. MacLeod 
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